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The main theme is the differences in response among the churches
to the Shinn' Shrine Issue in Korea under Japanese colonialism. The
central focus is an inquiry into the possible reasons why some
religious groups, including the Catholic and Methodist Churches,
should choose the way of compromise,
	 while others, such as the
Presbyterian Church, represented by individual missionaries and the
Non-Shrine Worship Movement and the Mount Zion Sect, chose the way of
radical challenge and withdrawal. It is proposed in this study to
concentrate on three major churches - the Roman Catholic, the
Methodist and the Presbyterian.
This study offers, firstly, a detailed analysis of the content of
the debate, the attitudes and actions of the three churches towards
the shrine problem in their historical evolution since 1931;
secondly, an attempt is made to explain the different positions of the
three churches in terms of the sociology of religion and the sociology
of missions.
	 The sociological consequences of religious experience
provide a general framework.	 The main assumption is that the
difference in ideological elements is more important in religious
institutions than has been usually thought.
	 In explaining the
differences of position in the three churches, the following eight
factors are proposed:	 (1)	 Theological emphasis;	 (2) Church
structure; (3) World view; (4) Mission policy; (5) Relationship to
nationalism; (6) Relationship to non-Christian religions; (7) Early
historical experience; and (8) Nationalities of missionaries.
The thesis is divided into two parts: (1) Part I (Chapters One
to Three) reviews the theoretical and methodological literature
relevant to the study of the Shinta Shrine Issue.	 It also surveys
the introduction of the two principal forms of Christianity (Roman
Catholicism and Protestantism) in Korea, and examines modern Japan,
State Shinta and Christianity.
(2) Part II (Chapters Four and Five) comprises a detailed
analysis of the positions of the three Christian churches towards the
shrine problem, and a systematic comparison of the different responses
of the three churches by employing the above-mentioned eightfactors.
Three key factors are proposed in respect of the denominational
division in the matter of the Shinta shrine question: 	 theological
emphasis, mission policy and church structure.	 Attention is also
drawn to the historical discontinuity in motivation between the Non-
Shrine Worship Movement by the fundamentalists and the recent
political struggle for justice by the liberals. The legacy of the
ordeal of the ShintU shrine controversy in the 1930s remains as an
obstacle to the reconciliation between ultra-conservative theology and
liberal 'minjung' theology.	 It is therefore demonstrated in this
thesis that the particular form of religious outlook is a relevant
factor in its own right, which is not to be reduced to other
variables.	 Thus for the purpose of this study, the tools of Weber
seem to prove more effective than do those of Marx.
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INTRODUCTION
The main theme of the present study is the differences in
response among the churches to the Shint5 Shrine Issue in Korea under
Japanese colonialism. This was an important and controversial issue:
as the editors of The International Review of Missions (IRM) recorded
in the special issues for April, 1940 and July, 1940, one of the
gravest questions confronting the Church during the war (1931-1945)
was that of observance at State Shint5 shrines in the Japanese Empire,
especially in Korea.
State Shint5 or nationalistic ShintlY ideology was a means
employed in the so-called peaceful offensive of Japanese military
expansion.	 Although Japan had guaranteed China's territorial
integrity by the Nine-Power Treaty (1922), Japanese troops suddenly
invaded Manchuria on 18 September 1931 (in what is known as the
'Manchurian Incident').	 In Manchuria the Japanese had invested huge
sums of money in industrial developments; the country had reserves of
oil, bauxite (for aluminium), coal, iron ore and foodstuffs, all of
which could provide jobs and living-space for an expanding Japanese
population already hard-hit by the 1929 world economic crisis.
Moreover, Manchuria was an ideal springboard for a future attack upon
China.	 Japanese expansion began with the Manchurian Incident;
subsequently Japan expanded into the Asiatic mainland, and the
chauvinistic authorities increasingly looked to State Shinn" as the
main force for intensifying patriotic loyalties.
The international and domestic situation of Japan after the
outbreak of the Manchurian Incident demanded an intensification of the
policy of 'Japanisation' in Korea.
	
The establishment of the puppet
state of Manchukuo in 1932 by Japan's expansionist authorities placed
Korea in a significantly new position in the areas of communication,
economy, and defence of the Japanese Empire. In more concrete terms,
Japan needed not only the material resources and the strategic
position of the Korean peninsula but also the 'native manpower' for
the
conscription.	 Thusv\need for the loyalty and devotion of the Korean
people to the empire became, from the Japanese viewpoint, more urgent
than ever before.
It was important that the Japanese should have authority and not
only power. As a means of making Koreans loyal subjects, the Japanese
administration attempted, at any cost, to bring about the cultural
assimilation of Korea by urging the population to revere the emperor
and to offer obeisance at ShintO shrines.
	 Since the annexation of
Korea in 1910 the expressed policy of the Japanese government had been
to make all members of the subjected people into standardised Japanese
subjects, both legally and psychologically.
	 But the policy of
cultural assimilation failed, mainly because of the widespread and
institutionalised practice of racial discrimination.
	 Forced worship
at the ShintO shrines or daily bows in an easterly direction - to
TOky5 - (Tongbang yobae) annoyed rather than converted Koreans.
Historically in Japan a very important measure for strengthening
the position of State Shint6 or Shinn' nationalism was the
promulgation of the Imperial Rescript on Education (KyrYiku Chokugo) on
30 October 1890 (See Appendix A).
	 The fundamental principle of
morality adopted in this reform was the Confucian-Shinta concept of
reverence towards the proper authorities.
	 But at the time of the
Imperial Rescript religious teaching in the schools was prohibited as
a result of the early Meiji government's granting freedom of religion
in the Constitution.	 Under such circumstances the 'non-religious'
status for the official cult of State ShintO was insisted upon.
-2
Particularly from 1900 onwards officials were emphatic in their
insistence that the state ceremonies were not religious in nature.
From 1932 onwards the Governor-General of Korea required that all
school personnel - principals, teachers, and students - should attend
ceremonies at Shint3 shrines. 	 The Japanese authorities maintained
that these ceremonies were in the nature of patriotic celebrations or
national rites:	 shrine worship was not a religious act, but a
political expression of patriotism. Some of the foreign missionaries
accepted this contentious explanation and met the Japanese
requirement;	 others looked upon the shrine ceremonies as religious
worship, and they saw it as a matter for their conscience. 	 In point
of fact, there was a division of opinion and action among the various
Christian churches on the matter of Shint3 shrine attendance, which
occurred to some extent along denominational lines.	 From the
beginning, the Presbyterians concluded that the issue was clearly
religious: between Christian monotheism and Shinn" polytheism.
	
The
Methodist and Catholic missions, unlike the Presbyterians, yielded to
Japanese pressure regarding observances at Shinn" shrines. This point
of division deserves more attention than has been given to it
elsewhere.
The central focus of this study is an inquiry into the possible
reasons why some religious groups, including the Catholic and the
Methodist Churches, should choose the way of compromise, 	 while
others, such as the Presbyterian Church, represented by individual
missionaries and Sinsa pulch'ambae undong (SPU), the Non-Shrine
Worship Movement and a sect called Sionsan cheguk (the Mount Zion
movement), chose the way of radical challenge and withdrawal. It is
proposed in the present study to concentrate on three major churches -
the Roman Catholic, the Methodist and the Presbyterian (see Table 1:
-
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Mission Statistics, 1939). 	 1984 saw the bicentennial of Catholicism
and the centennial of Protestantism in Korea. The two principal forms
of Christianity, Roman Catholicism and Protestantism, with over nine
million members, are a close second to Buddhism. As we can see in
Mission Statistics, 1939 (Table 1), in 1939 there were 141,243 Roman
Catholics and 246,779 Protestants (179,483 Presbyterians, 28,439
Methodists and 38,857 others).
The first Protestant missionary societies to begin evangelistic
efforts in Korea were the Board of Foreign Missions of the
Presbyterian Church in the United States (the American Northern
Presbyterian Mission) and the Foreign Missionary Society of the
Methodist Episcopal Church (the American Northern Methodist Mission).
These two agencies started their work simultaneously, carried it on
side by side, and have organised the majority of the churches existing
in Korea today: Presbyterians are the largest Christian denomination
with more than three million members; 	 Methodists are the second
largest Protestant denomination.	 Other Protestant denominations
include Holiness, Baptist, Pentecostal, Church of Christ, Seventh Day
Adventist, Salvation Army, Anglican and Lutheran. But these are not
so significant, since their memberships are not as large.
As C.Y. Glock and R. Stark (1965) rightly point out, many social
scientists in the USA take the essential unity of Protestantism for
granted, thereby typically referring only to Protestant-Catholic-
Jewish comparisons, not to variations in religious commitment within
any of these general categories. 1	For example, G.E. Lenski in The
Religious Factor: A Sociologist Looks at Religion (1961) found that
differences between the Protestant churches were small. But adopting
a more international, comparative perspective, Glock and Stark
conclude that "while Protestant-Catholic contrasts are often large
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enough to be notable, they seem inconsequential compared to
differences found among the Protestant groups". 2	With this in mind
this study focuses on the different positions of the Catholic church
and the two leading Protestant denominations - the Methodist and the
Presbyterian Churches - with regard to the ShintU Shrine Issue in
Korea during the so-called war period, 1931-1945.
It is to be noted that under Japanese rule (1910-1945) most
religions - Buddhism, Confucianism and Shamanism - in fact enjoyed the
protection of the colonial authorities. Thus the overall religious
response to the Japanese administration was not as antagonistic as
that of other elements in Korean society. However, like Christianity,
Ch'Ondogyo, a syncretic religious movement influenced by Catholic
teaching, suffered from Japanese oppression because of its strong
nationalist orientation and messianism;
	 but its strength in the
leadership of Korean society at the end of the Japanese rule was
minimal, as a consequence of the success of the authorities' severe
persecutions since the 1919 Independence Movement.
The shrine-worship order and many others like it precipitated a
crisis for Christianity in Korea, resulting in the closing of hundreds
of mission schools and the withdrawal from the country of many foreign
representatives of Christian organisations.
	 The stand of the
Presbyterian mission against this measure was particularly strong, and
this led to the closing of its mission schoolz. by 1938. In contrast,
the Methodist and Catholic missions accepted Japanese pressure
quietly, and so their schools were allowed to remain open. It is
generally accepted that the shrine issue has substantially influenced
both the character and direction of the Christian movement in post-
liberation times.	 In this context, D.N. Clark in Christianity in
Modern Korea (1986) notes the negative effect of the Shint -6 Shrine
6
Issue in the Korean Church:
During World War II, the resisters suffered severe
persecution and even martyrdom, while others who co-
operated suffered comparatively little. By 1945,
deep schisms had developed all across the Christian
community that reflected conflicting strains of
nationalism, religion and collaboration. In the
emotions of the period just following the War, even
questions of atonement and forgiveness became
controversial. Charges bred counter-charges,
further complicated in later years by new pressures
on the church imposed by Communist rule in North
Korea. The Shinto Shrine Issue can be taken as a
starting point for the study of the fract"ioupess
which is so evident in the Korean church today.
When the Pacific War ended, in churches all over Korea bitter
disputes erupted between those who had collaborated with the Japanese
and those who had resisted. Disputes over orthodox theology drawn
from the old struggle over Shint3 worship, along with missionary roots
(the comity system) and regional rivalries, have fragmented the
church, especially for the Presbyterians. 	 The shrine issue has
contributed to greater institutional cleavage within the Presbyterian
community than has been the case with other Christian groups, because
members of this denomination were generally more active than others in
resisting the Japanese on religious grounds.
Among four major Presbyterian denominations,	 the KoryiS
Presbyterian Church (Kory8-p i a, Kory8 Seminary Faction), organised in
1949, is a relatively small fundamentalist . group whose origins were
substantially influenced by the earlier Shinto:7 Shrine Issue. 	 On the
other hand, the Presbyterian Church in the Republic of Korea (Kijang-
p e a, Chos'On Seminary Faction) founded in 1954 is a more liberal group
in style and theology, which came from the northwestern provinces of
North Korea, the former Canadian mission territory (see Table 2: Map
of Korean Missions).	 From the 1920s the leadership of Kijang-p'a
was trained in Japanese schools with the support of the
theologically liberal Canadian mission.	 When the	 theologically
-7-
I I •
Manchuria
_South Province
P'y'Ongan
North Province_)	
If =mi.,
ginch'iin'' • ''''
0
• ..Ch'ungcliOng •	
-
South Province Ch'ungcli6ngi.V
: : : :North Province
Kyongsang
North Province
ChZingsong
"I( ' Taegu
ProvinceKyCingnang;South
•
1111L-
North Province
ChCilla \
South Province
•••••••••••••I
••1111•111MMIR
VEER-
,1.1/11
1111/
,Pusan
•Cheju
, Province
Canadian -Presbyterian
Northern Presbyterian
_
Southern Presbyterian
•111111 •111M•U......
••••• • '.Australian Presbyterian
; Methodist Episcopal Church, North
Methodist Episcopal Church, South
Pngan 'Wiinsan
*South Province
P'yZingyang
_
liwanghae
Province
c1
NOME HarngiOng/
:	 North Province
Hamgyiing
Table 2: Map of Korean Missions*
( Allocation of Territory among Major Denominations in Korea )
* L.G.Paik, The History of Protestant Missions in Korea.1832-1910, Seoul,
—
Yonsei University, 1987, 4th Edition, p.470.
—8-
conservative American missionaries, who had expanded their work since
1884, had to leave the country as a consequence of hostilities in
1940, leadership in theological education fell to the theologically
liberal Canadian territory people, who as a whole did not see great
harm in shrine worship and yielded to Japanese pressure. Hence the
'Liberated Saints' (the former-members of the SPU) specifically
(higher Biblical Criticism)
opposed the ChosOn Seminary in SCiul based on new theology by those
A
educated at liberal schools in Japan. 	 Eventually the 'Liberated
Saints' organised the Koryii Seminary 1m Pusan in 1946.
Unlike Presbyterians whose deep schisms resulted from disputes
over the shrine issue, Methodists and Roman Catholics did not suffer
similar fractious tendencies, since they, as a whole, had collaborated
with Japan.
In order to approach the Shinn' Shrine Issue appropriately, we
must consider two preliminary theoretical questions: (1) problems of
definition of religion; (2) the question of nationalism and religion.
These will be considered in turn.
The case of the controversy of State Shint75 observance in the
Japanese Empire reveals that some of the established sociological
definitions of religion are evidently drawn from Christian theological
considerations.	 There are, however, functionalist definitions of
religion in terms of its reference to things 'ultimate' (Parsons,
Bellah and Yinger), but these cannot provide the paradigm by which the
non-Western Shinta shrine case might be analysed, 4 although they
might seem to be an attempt to get away from western bias. In this
respect W. Cohn rightly maintains that European languages, and only
European languages, have ordinary words which clearly and
unambiguously mean religion. 5 There are indeed some limitations in
the sociology of religion developed as a discipline originally in the
-9-
context of Christian culture. 	 It is to be noted in the present
context that Japanese Christians knew that religious words and
expressions in the Japanese language did not always have the same
meaning that was given by theologically-trained Westerners to the
corresponding words in English. 6 So an American missionary in Japan,
looking at the Shine6 shrine question in Japan from a new angle,
wrote:
There is a question of nomenclature involved
Then, in Japan what is meant by 'worship'?
	 Not far
from where we live, daily worship is paid by dozens
of people to the spirit of a faithful dog, whose
statue stands at the railway station where he
awaited the return of his dead master. Buddhist
masses are regularly held for the spirits of needles
broken when sewing, and for the spirit of broken
dolls. Bowing the head is not reserved for what we
Westerners would term 'religious' occasions. The
sentiment of awe which is at the centre of the
Japanese idea of worship enters into many of their
social conventions and habits. It is possible for
Christians therefore to bow at shrines, even though
these same shrines may be used by others for
religious purposes. It means no more to them than
our taking off our hats at that tame shrine would
mean to us, and we always do that.
M.E. Spiro stresses that any comparative study of religion
requires, as an operation antecedent to inquiry, an ostensive or
substantive definition that stiPulates unambiguously those phenomenal
variables which are designated by the term. 8 Thus he remarks that by
'religion' he means 'an institutional aspect of society based on
beliefs in a superhuman or supernatural realm 1 . 9	This is a narrower
and more precise definition for religion than functional definitions
of religion.	 E. Krausz, following the work of Spiro, admits that
ideologies or value orientations such as Communism or Marxism might
undergo in some circumstances subtle changes which could bring them
within the ambit of religion as more narrowly defined. 10 Thus, for
example, the cult of personality subtly transformed itself into the
'deification' of Stalin, the Communist dictator, by large sections of
- 10 -
the population in the Soviet Union, particularly during and at the end
of the Second World War. 11
In this context we recall that the Japanese government,
determined to create 'State Shint-6 1 , a new religious superstructure,
from 1882 to 1945 advocated Shint5 as a 'nonreligious' emperor cult
and a patriotic national morality to which every Japanese, regardless
of his or her religious beliefs and affiliations, was expected to pay
homage. According to J.M. Kitagawa, 	 those who subscribe to the view
that Shint5 is nonreligious in character point out that, strictly
speaking, Shinto has no scripture comparable to the Bible or the
Qur'an and that between 1882 and 1945 State Shint5 prohibited
preaching.	 Moreover, lacking a sophisticated cosmological, ethical,
and metaphysical orientation, Shint5 freely appropriated insights from
the Yin-Yang and Taoist cosmological systems, from Confucian ethics,
and from Buddhist metaphysics. 	 Conversely, Kitagawa argues, those
who cite the prominence of the priesthood, liturgies, charms, amulets,
and parish organisations emphasise the religious character of Shint5.
In his view, the issue has in a sense been settled by the
disestablishment of State Shint5 (Jinja Shint5), which has been
legally recognised as a religion since the end of World War II.
However, Kitagawa suspects that the debate on the problem of Shint5's
own identity - is it a religion or is it something other than a
religion? - will not stop here. 13 For the historian of religions,
Shinn" presents some very difficult and disconcerting questions. But
given the fact that the emperor cult subtly transformed itself into
the deification of the emperor, particularly during the Pacific War,
we could emphasise the 'religious' character of State Shint5.
Secondly, the Shint5 Shrine Issue should be approached in the
light of nationalism and religion. By 'nationalism' I mean 'a sense
12
of identity held by any group that prides itself on being a
'nation , . 14 The similarities between nationalism and religion arise
from the fact that both give the individual a social framework and
then both elicit an emotional and enthusiastic devotion to that
framework. 15 Both can become totalitarian in their demands. Since
nationalism can serve as a surrogate for religion, the problem of
coexistence with other religions has always arisen when it has been
strong.	 Nationalistic thinkers must decide between these two
conflicting and all-embracing world-views. 	 Thus the conflict between
church and state has been the essence of western history. A.J. Hoover
in The Gospel of Nationalism (1986) maintains that nationalism and
religion can coexist in three ways: (1) they may exist in violent
opposition to each other;	 (2) a moderate form of nationalism may
exist alongside of and be condoned or even bolstered by the
traditional church; (3) nationalism may be inextricably combined and
coordinated with the traditional religion so that the two almost lose
' 1
their separate identiti6es. The third relationship is the most
desirable for the nationalist, and modern Japan provides an example of
this.
a
However, not all religions are amenable to amalgamation with
nationalism. 17 In fact nationalism often comes into conflict with the
so-called universal religions (e.g., Christianity) which are usually
concerned with denouncing parochialism. 	 Historically, in Japan the
introduction of Christianity (Protestantism) coincided with the rise
of aggressive nationalism.	 The charge that Christianity is
'unpatriotic' is met from the first to last in the history of the
mission in Japan. Christianity was considered as a foreign religion
which was a threat to the traditional Japanese faith. 	 Under the
pressure of this national sentiment there were a number of Christians
^
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who attempted to show that there was no basic conflict between
Christianity and Japanese patriotism. 	 Therefore, in the climate of
extreme nationalism during the War, for Japanese Christians it was
important to be no less patriotic than their non-Christian
compatriots. As a whole, Christian leaders in Japan saw quite clearly
the difficulties that would be involved in a refusal to observe ShintO
shrine practices, which were regarded as expressions of loyalty and
,
patriotism.	 Thus the Japanese Christians, like all religious groups,
compromised with Shinto nationalism without hesitation.
In the discussion of the Japanese Christian reaction to Shinn
nationalism we should also consider the fact that ShintO was a part of
Japanese culture. As Kitagawa rightly points out, relative to ShintO
we should regard the matsuri (usually translated as ceremonials or
rituals) as the 'inner' meaning; matsuri-goto (usually translated as
government) as the 'outer' meaning;
	 and saisei-itchi (unity of
religion and government, or of the ceremonial and the political
dimensions) as the principle relating the two. 18 Japan had always
operated on the principle of unity of government (matsuri-goto) and
religion (matsuri). 	 Thus a noted ShintO historian, Murakami
Shigeyoshi, emphasises that "ShintO equals politics (matsuri-goto)". 19
We could argue plausibly that for Japanese Christians attendance at
ShintO rites was nothing more than an act of patriotism.
As a whole, the Christians in Japan had a conformist attitude to
the ShintO Shrine question. Further, representatives of the Church
from Japan proper acted as advocates for the authorities, pressing the
government view upon Korean Christians.
	
This, to be sure,
precipitated a crisis for Christianity in Korea.
The Korean Shrine question and the Japanese Shrine question
differed first in the fact that Koreans were not Japanese. What a
•_
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Japanese might accept from a patriotic standpoint may be obnoxious to
a Korean.	 Again, the two questions differed in the fact that the
issue was militantly pressed by the colonial government in Korea. In
Korea, unlike Japan, Christianity became the vehicle for preservation
of national hopes in reaction against Japanese domination. Here was a
situation where the Christian missions were independent of the
colonising power. The church was associated with a new nationalism.
Hence, in Korea the fundamental conflict between the claims of
Japanese ShintO nationalism and Christianity were naturally more
serious tharnflJapan.	 Among all religions practised in Korea,
Christianity presented the greatest problem because of its
transcendental reference, its claim of universality for its doctrines,
and particularly its close ties with the churches in the West. Also,
because Korea was subjected to political methods of compulsion by
colonialism, it was more difficult for the Christian Church in Korea
than in Japan itself to solve the Shinto Shrine Issue.	 The
assimilation policy by the Japanese Empire raised critical tensions
among Koreans,	 especially Christian converts and individual
missionaries. Although the Church at large in Korea collapsed, and
the net result was eventually accommodation to the Shinta political
standards, as was the case with the Church in Japan, the forces of
resistance were much greater in Korea than in Japan.
Thus, a crucial caution arises in the sociological investigation
of the Shinn- Shrine Issue in Korea under the Japanese Empire: the
church-state problem in a colonial setting cannot be approached
without drawing a distinction. 	 In the case of colonial Africa or
India as a whole, two European agencies - the church and the state -
in their mutual relations appeared in the colonial setting. 20 On the
other hand, in China, Korea and Japan, where all missionaries alike
- 14 -
were not citizens of the nation in control but 'aliens', the
missionaries had to decide about their attitudes on international
political questions.
In this context, the missionaries in the most complex situations
were those in Korea under the Japanese Empire. Colonial Korea was in
a unique position in the sense that there existed three different
forces together: a Korean indigenous force, Japanese colonialism, and
Euro-American influence through missions.	 Christianity gathered
strength and support from Koreans who used church institutions as
havens from Japanese oppression. When Japan ruled Korea, conditions
combined to neutralise the contradictions between nationalism and
Christianity that existed at the same time in China.
21
	Whereas
Christian missions and churches in other colonies were seen as part of
the imperialist presence, in Korea, whose master was a non-Western
power, the (early) church was associated with a new nationalism. This
point must be taken into consideration in the • discussion of the
church-state problem in colonial Korea. 	 But in relation to Euro-
American influence through missions, it was mainly American influence
through Presbyterian and Methodist missions that moulded Korean
Protestant churches.	 Unlike the European tradition, the American
tradition, stressing the total segregation of church and state, made
religion a subject of no official concern, relegating it to the sphere
of private affairs. 	 In brief, therefore, in the case of colonial
Korea we cannot employ categories and generalisations which have been
developed in the other colonial contexts where two European agencies
existed.
Whilst there was a difference between the Japanese shrine'
question and the Korean shrine question, the few Christians who
resolutely resisted shrine worship in the two countries showed a
- 15 -
remarkable similarity in their theology, namely a 'religious
fundamentalism'.	 In Japan the MukyZikai (non-church) group of
Christians and the Holiness Church ministers formed a strong pocket of
Christian resistance to the militarist state. 	 They believed in a
literal coming of Christ as the King of kings. 	 The aisSUient
Christians in Korea, like their Japanese counterparts, were religious
fundamentalists.	 The Christians who struggled against the Shint3
shrine worship attacked modern theological liberals. In the orthodox
resistors
biblical fundamentalism 	 Christian;A
 were by and large
'Adventists', who believed that the second coming of Christ to the
world was near.
P.L. Berger in "Religious Liberalism and the Totalitarian
Situation" (1960) observes 22 that, although in general it is religious
conservatism and the church bureaucracies which finally come to terms
with the secular regime, it is correct to maintain that religious
liberalism is more vulnerable to ideological infiltration in a
totalitarian situation. In this context S. Bruce in "A Sociological
Account of Liberal Protestantism" (1984) emphasises the 'precarious'
feature of liberal Protestantism. 23	Whilst liberals tend to see
their aim in serving the secular world in a way that eventually erodes
what is distinctive about their faith, conservative Protestants can
avoid relativism by sticking firmly to certain historic statements of
faith. 24	In this respect the history of the so-called 'Japanese
Christianity' claimed by the Japanese Congregational Church under the
ultranationalistic fascist regime shows that religious liberalism,
unlike religious conservatism, easily falls prey to totalitarian
ideologies. The Korean Methodists' infamous movement of IJapanisation.
of Christianity' in 1938 on the plea of 'Orientalising of Western
orthodox Christian tradition' also exemplifies religious liberalism's
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vulnerability to ideological infiltration in totalitarian situations.
The document of reform - "Reform Plan for the Korean Methodist Church"
(Appendix F) - adopted by the Korean Methodist Church on October 2,
1940, was one of the extreme cases of its utter obeisance to the
reigning Japanese ideology.
The Shint3 Shrine Issue provides the opportunity to investigate
the sociological problems that relate to missions, e.g., missionary
response to local cultures and its attitudes to the political
authorities in the mission field.	 In general terms, missionary
response to local cultures varies throughout the history of missionary
effort;	 it varies according to the church in question, and also
according to the culture where the mission is found.	 Similarly,
missionary attitudes towards the political authorities can be
sympathetic to an indigenous force, or can be influenced by the
missionaries' own government at home, or by an alien colonial
government.
Although there are certain valuable documents, many histories of
missions, the reports of missionary societies, and monographs from the
mission fields, it is true that these documents have rarely been
utilised from the sociological point of view.	 In this respect,
T.O. Beidelman's Colonial Evangelism (1982) is the first pioneering
work which raises some general questions about the relationship
between missions and colonialism. In his view, anthropologists and
sociologists have been remiss in studying colonial institutions even
if they give lip service to considering the total social context of
the societies they investigate.	 'Colonial institutions', he argues,
should be studied because they provide insights into the development
of the Third World. 25	Given that the social universe of the Third
World today resembles the colonial world which preceded it, the study
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of institutions of colonialism would provide valuable insights into
social features still evident in contemporary situations.	 In this
sense,	 although all colonial	 organisations display similar
characteristics, 'missions' are the quintessential example; they aim
at the most far-reaching domination, attacking the most deeply held
traditional beliefs and values as well as economic and political
forms.
,
A rapprochement between sociological and historical studies has
been evident in recent years.	 Thus, C.W. Mills rightly says all
sociology worthy of the name is 'historical sociology
,
.
26
	The
contrasting-type approach of social scientists often requires the
examination of historical sources. 27 Also some knowledge of world
history is indispensable to the sociologist. The present work is a
sociological study based on historical materials. 	 The source
materials relied upon include mainly academic writings on the ShintB
Shrine Issue, missionary archives, missionary periodicals, the reports
of missionary societies, histories of missions in Korea and Japan,
contemporary Japanese periodicals, and other relevant publications
written in English, Japanese and Korean. The perspective adopted will
be sociological. That is to say, the present work proceeds on the
assumption that people in groups act in ways which are constrained by
the structures and processes of groups; and it is those constraining
structures and processes which are the object of study. But it is
hoped that this work will prove of interest not only to sociologists;
there should be material of interest to the student of religious
history, missiology, Korean church history, theology, international
politics and Japanese studies. 	 Following the principles of	 -
'intellectual craftsmanship' outlined by Mills, 28 I have tried to
search for comparable cases within the histories of the various
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Christian churches of Korea and Japan during the last war. In this
present study undisputed facts in other disciplines have been
incorporated where appropriate, yet any claims I might make to
originality remain within the confines of sociology.
The Shint5 Shrine question in Japan has attracted interest since
the 1930s. 29 There is no doubt that D.C. Holtom's Modern Japan and
Shinto Nationalism (1943) is the most important of recent scholarly
,
contributions to an interpretation of the political implications of
State Shint5.	 Historically, Holtom argues, the tensions between
nationalism and universalism in Japan in the war (1931-1945) were
concentrated in the area of the adjustment of Christianity to the
claims of the military state. 30 Holtom's thematic unity in his
scholarly works is the political significance of State ShintU, that
is, Japanese politico-religious policy in relation to world expansion.
Lee Kun Sam's The Christian Confrontation with Shinto Nationalism
(1966) examines the response of Japanese Christians to State Shint6.
He argues that in its confrontation with the shrine worship problem
the Japanese Church took a firm position at first, but later
compromised with the growing militarist nationalism.
31
	In addition,
he compares the Japanese and Korean Christian reactions to Shint5
nationalism. C.H. Powles's "Foreign Missionaries and Japanese Culture
in the Late Nineteenth Century: Four Patterns of Approach" (1969) has
stimulated my own sociological investigation of the Shint5 Shrine
Issue in many ways.	 In order to compare and contrast the main
differences in the approach of the various Christian traditions to
Japanese culture, he has chosen to set up certain patterns of approach
which approximate to the general characteristics of each type. These -
are as follows:	 (1) American Protestantism: a dialectic approach;
(2) Roman Catholicism: a dualistic approach; (3) Russian Orthodoxy:
- 19-
absorption into culture;	 and (4) Anglicanism: affirmation of
variety. 32	His typological approach provides a useful framework for
the discussion of Christianity and culture.
Regarding the theological implications of the so-called 'Japanese
Christianity' position, mention must be made of Takeda Kiyoko's
"Apostasy - A Japanese Pattern" (1978). 	 Takeda points out that
Christianity in modern Japan manifested some unique qualities. 33
First, Christian orthodoxy in Japan never became part of the
Establishment as it did in Europe; it never ascended to a position of
authority, either as a religion or as a political or social force.
Rather, in a nation whose orthodoxy was the ideology of emperor
worship, Christianity was regarded as a heretical opponent of the
system.	 Christian heterodoxy in modern Japan (e.g., the 'New
Theology' of the Meiji period as a form of rationalistic
Christianity), Takeda argues, in fact often joined hands with anti-
Christian 'orthodoxy' such as certain forms of the emperor system. 34
The Mikuni (Divine Land) Movement led by some Christians during World
War II is another vivid example of a Christian offshoot combining with
an ideology of social orthodoxy of that period, in this case ultra-
nationalism.	 Regarding Japan as a divine land, they equated
Christianity with ultranationalism. This led them actively to support
worship at ShintO shrines. In a similar vein, E.E. Best in Christian
Faith and Cultural Crisis: The Japanese Case (1966) argues that those
who were most radical theologically were also the most nationalistic
in Japan and thus suggests that there was a real connection in
motivation between the two movements. 35	With regard to the Shinto
Shrine Issue this point deserves more attention than has been given to
it elsewhere.	 The liberal Congregational or Kumiami Church,
openly
supporting government policy,	 . initiated the so-called 'Japanese
- 20-
Christianity' from the outset.
The present study owes much to J. Swyngedouw's "The Catholic
Church and Shrine Shinto" (1967). 36	Swyngedouw's work has remained
remarkably relevant as regards the formulation of the object of my
analysis.	 Swyngedouw, from the viewpoint of the sociology of
religion, compares the Protestant attitudes towards the shrine problem
with the Catholic position in Japan: in contrast with Protestants,
Catholics were able to arrive at a uniform attitude on the shrine
issue. This difference between the Protestant and Catholic attitude,
he argues, can be attributed perhaps to a difference of church-
structure.
37
	The structure of the Catholic Church is tightly
institutionalised and even authoritarian; thereby the faithful are
supposed to comply with a well-defined direction made by the Church.
On the other hand, because Protestant Christians are divided into many
denominations, its enforcement leaves much scope to individual
interpretation.	 Furthermore, in connection with this first
difference, Swyngedouw focuses on another point of difference:	 in
defining their attitude, Protestants laid stress especially on the
doctrinal aspect of the shrine question, while Catholics rather
stressed the disciplinary and pastoral aspect.
38
	This needs more
explanation. On the Catholic side, he argues, the question was seen
from a different angle: stress was laid not on doctrine but rather on
the practical problem of how Christians have to act in peculiar cases.
In this sense, he points out, the Roman Instruction of 1936 which
solved the shrine question in the Japanese Empire can be called
'disciplinary', although it seems to remain a point of controversy
among Catholics themselves in what degree such a disciplinary •
instruction needs a theoretical basis. 	 After discovering the
difference in the points of emphasis, on both Catholic and Protestant
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sideS, he finally notes another difference in the problem of
'Japanisation', of 'acculturation'. 39	For the Protestant Christians,
he argues, this adaptation movement, with its emphasis on doctrinal
adaptation, is mainly a response to the preferences of the Japanese
themselves, in contrast with what happens on the Catholic side.
Regarding the reasons for this, Swyngedouw maintains that 	 the
Catholic attitude towards the shrine problem is rather the application
of a more general principle of adaptation, holding good for the whole
Church.	 As a matter of fact, he adds, the solution of the shrine
problem in 1936 was not an isolated case: in 1935 the Catholics of
Manchuria received permission to attend Confucian rites. Swyngedouw
concludes that in the case of Japan we should consider the influence
of government pressure on the Roman decision, but we should not forget
either that the solution of the shrine problem in Japan remains the
concrete application of an ecclesiastical policy carried out on a
worldwide scale.
But what is interesting in this context is that the official
attitude of the Catholic Church in Japan towards the shrine problem
since 1952 is strikingly different from its counterpart in Korea.
Despite the fact that participation was forbidden after the end of the
Second World War, because the shrines became 'religion' again, the
Japanese bishops in 1952 returned to the pre-war attitude. 40 The
official attitude of the Church can be summarised as follows: "It is
lawful for the Japanese Catholics even now, according to the
instruction of 1936 which allowed Catholics to participate and act in
accord with the other citizens, to attend the rites of Shinto shrines,
if there is a sufficient reason for such a participation". 41	For the
Japanese bishops a great nation such as the Japanese people needs some
signs and symbolic manifestations of its tradition and national unity.
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In their view, the shrine problem is therefore a matter of 'national
symbolism'.	 In contrast Ch i linjugyo chOnglii kuhyOn chlin t guk sajedan
(CCKCS), the Roman Catholic Clerical Association for the Promotion of
Social Justice, in 1985 finally broke an absolute silence about the
Shine Shrine question in the Catholic circle. With regard to the
shrine question, the Clerical Association, unlike the Japanese
bishops, frankly labelled their own pre-war attitude as a compromise
,
and a subjection to the state because of the Church's defensiveness
and the reflexes of a persecuted minority at that time. 42 Given the
present different positions towards their pre-war attitude between
Japanese and Korean Catholics, Swyngedouw's conclusion that "the
Catholic Church cannot accommodate herself in the domain of content of
doctrine" 43 may be called into question.
Moreover, with regard to the Shinn" Shrine Issue, the difference
between the Catholic attitude and that of the various Protestant
churches should also be attributed to several othbr factors, e.g., the
and
Church's response to local cultures, A the Church's attitudes to the
political authorities. Otherwise we cannot grasp the reasons for the
difference between the two churches in the matter of such an important
and very delicate issue as to whether, and how far, they might be
allowed to participate in ceremonies of State Shintoism. 	 Also, given
H.B. Hansen's assertion that "the early, formative period of missions
is crucial for the lat,el
 er pattern of church-state relations", 44 we
should examine the early historical experience of missions considering
• religion and politics.
	 Nevertheless, as a whole, Swyngedouw's work
has served as the beginning of my own sociological investigation of
the Shinn- Shrine Issue.
As we have indicated, there are some serious studies on the
Japanese Shintifi Shrine question, whereas we have only a few scholarly
•_
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works on the Korean situation.	 Furthermore, most of the previous
writings on the Korean Shinfii question were written from the
perspective of Church/mission history or Christian theology or
descriptive history, not in any consistent and sustained manner with
meaningful reference to social theory outside the missionary
context.
45
As a result, they have on the whole failed to analyse the
reasons for a division of opinion and action on the matter of Shint6
shrine attendance among the various Christian Churches in Korea, which
followed to some extent denominational lines.
With regard to this denominational division of attitudes
regarding ShintU shrine worship, only a few studies have tried to
analyse the possible reasons for either the subservient attitude in
the Methodist and Catholic Missions or the stubborn resistance in the
Presbyterian Missions. Ryu Sing-hi (1985) states the reasons for the
Methodists' response as follows:
The main reason can be drawn from the fact that the
Methodist Church in Korea was introduced in 1885
through Maclay, Superintendent of the Japan mission.
Japanese Christians, as a whole, regarded the shrine
practices
46as	 expressions	 of	 loyalty	 andpatriotism.
On the other hand, on the .reason for the fact that after the
Japanese annexation the Roman Catholics had fewer conflicts with the
Japanese administration, Kang Wi Jo (1967) comments as follows:
The main reason was that the Roman Catholic Church
in Korea was not as strong as the Protestant
population and lacked as much strength to confront
the government. Also, the Roman Catholics did not
meet so frequently as their Protestant brethren nor
sing songs like "Onward Christian SolOers", to
arouse the suspicions of the authorities.
In relation to the reasons for subservience to Emperor worship on
the part of the Roman Catholics, Yi Chin-gu (1988), from the
perspective of the science of religion, rightly emphasises a
revisionist policy with regard to the banned rites by the Holy See in
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Japanese independence campaigns. In contrast, Yi Chin-gu51
- 25 - Yank,
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the early twentieth century. 48	A turning point in Catholic mission
history was the settlement of one of the most burning missionary
problems in the Far East by Pope Pius XI in 1936: the permissibility
of certain rites and ceremonies that are connected with 'ancestor
worship', such as the cult of Confucius, and State Shintoism.
49
	But
Yi Chin-gu does not examine this principle of wider latitude of
adaptation in Roman Catholicism further. The principle of adaptation
as an internal factor deserves consideration.
In addition, Yi Chin-gu admits the significance of political
factors in the decision of Roman Catholicism with regard to Shinto
shrine worship. 50	According to Yi, the 1929 Vatican-Italy Concordat
and the Tripartite Pact had in some way influenced the decision of the
Vatican in 1936. Given that in 1936 Japan joined Germany in a so-
called anti-Communist pact and this was extended to the Tripartite
Pact in 1940, Yi's point can be accepted with qualifications. The
Roman instruction of 1936 should be closely re-examined on political
as well as theological grounds.
Incidentally,	 regarding the stubborn resistance in the
Presbyterian Missions in Korea in the matter of the forced shrine
worship, a conservative Presbyterian historian Yi Man-nyt1 (1981)
maintains that the Non-Shrine Worship Movement (SPU) was the last
invaluable participation on the part of Korean Christians in the anti-
criticises such an interpretation: it attempts to reduce the Shint6
. shrine question to one of politics only. Yi Chin-gu correctly points
out that most of the members of the SPU, in point of fact, went along
with the policy of Japanese cultural assimilation, e.g., Ch'angssi 
kaemyO'ng (a campaign called establishing Japanese family names and
changing given names), and Hwangguk sinmin sna (an oath to the
Imperial Subject Rescript). 52	Moreover, Yi Y8ng-hslin (1978), a
moderate Presbyterian historian, has already stressed the case of Chu
Ki-ch'61 in 1930. He was a representative figure of the SPU, who
resisted the shrine worship and so lost his life; but he had admitted
himself to be a subject of the Japanese Empire. 53
It is interesting in this context to find that Kim Yong-Bock
(1981), a liberal Presbyterian theologian, traces the messianic
politics of the min'ung (the people of God) from the Tonghak Peasant
Rebellion of 1895 to the March First Independence Movement of 1919 and
on to the confrontation between Korean Christians and the Japanese
imperial authority in the 1930s over the issue of Shinto worship.54
He characterises the whole recent history of Korea, in which
Christianity has grown, as a battle between 'messianic politics' and
'political messianism'.
	
He delineates three forms of political
messianism in Korea during the last sixty years: (1) Japanese ultra-
nationalism in the form of colonialism; 	 (2) the North Korean
Communist movement; (3) the military technocracy in South Korea. In
the history of Korean Christianity before liberation it was a fact
that the conservative fundamentalists resolutely resisted Shinn-
shrine worship. In contrast to this, the liberals and Catholics as a
whole yielded to Japanese pressure at that time, thereby losing
credence in the eyes of the Korean population. However, since the
1960s, especially the 1970s, they began to display a messianic
political struggle against the military regime.	 Ironically, after
liberation from the Japanese rule, the KoryO Seminary faction (former
members of the SPU) have shown a rather conservative conformity.
Taking into account this contrasting fact I would dispute Kim Yong-
Bock's assertion that suggests a historical connection in motivation
between the Non-Shrine Worship Movement (1938-1945) and the recent
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political struggle for justice led by the liberal Protestants and
Catholics.	 But this theme goes beyond the scope of the present
study.	 Nevertheless from the foregoing discussion it seems to be
important to consider various churches' historical relationships to
nationalism in explaining their different attitudes towards the shrine
problem.
In terms of the study of 'church struggles' it would seem to be
an error to discount the influence of the 'pure' religious idea
working in history.
	
There are various interpretations of the major
motives for the SPU. On the motives, Lee Kun Sam, a conservative
Presbyterian theologian (KoryO Seminary), enumerates the following
aspects: (a) obedience to the Commandments of God and Love for the
Church; (b) eschatological expectation in its pre-millenarian form;
(c) faithful witness to the divine truth; (d) the high estimate of
martyrdom and the glory of God.
55
	Thus to re-examine the motives,
beliefs and actions of the SPU in terms of Christianity and its
rejection of the world would provide an indispensable argument to
explain the radical challenge and withdrawal on the part of the
conservative Presbyterians during the war time.
This study has two purposts. 	 One is to offer a detailed 
analysis of the content of the debate, the attitudes and actions of
the three major Christian churches - the Catholic, the Methodist and
the Presbyterian - towards the shrine problem in their historical
evolution, with the focus on the years since the 'Manchurian Incident'
of 1931 (Chapter IV). The second is to attempt, for the first time,
to explain the different positions of the three churches in terms of
the sociology of religion and the sociology of missions (Chapter V).
For this purpose, what we propose is that we should consider
several factors in order fully to explain the possible reasons for the
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different attitudes of the three Christian churches on the Shint5
Shrine Issue.	 In this context the sociological consequences of
religious experience provide a general framework. 	 J. Wach asserts
that the influence of a religion on social relations and institutions
will depend largely on 'the spirit which permeates the doctrines,
cult, and organisation of a religious group , . 56	The main assumption
here is that the difference in ideological elements is more important
in religious institutions than has been usually thought. 	 In
explaining the divisions of positions, therefore, I propose the
following eight factors:	 (1) Theological emphasis;	 (2) Church
structure;	 (3) World view: (4) Mission policy; (5) Relationship
to nationalism; (6) Relation to non-Christian religions;	 (7) Early
historical experiences; and (8) Nationalities of missionaries. The
theoretical framework of the factors by which the denominational
difference will be compared is presented separately in Chapter V.A.
Chapter I presents a	 review of the theoretical and
methodological literature which is relevant to the study of the Shint5
Shrine Issue. Chapter II generally surveys the introduction of the
two principal forms of Christianity, Roman Catholicism and
Protestantism in Korea.	 Chapter III examines modern Japan, State
Shint5 and Christianity.	 Chapters II and III offer background
information for the later discussion. Chapter IV analyses in detail
the responses of the three Christian churches towards the shrine
problem in their historical evolution. 	 Chapter V compares the
different positions of the three churches by employing the above-
mentioned eight factors systematically.	 In the conclusions of the
work, the attempt has been made to offer some key factors which are
related to the established body of sociological theory.
I believe that a sociological understanding of the contemporary
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religious situation should contribute to every seriously interested
person's grasp of the problems. Because I am a Christian, I care
about the problems I discuss here.
	
This study will, hopefully,
stimulate new insights into the nature and limitations of Korean
Christianity in the midst of explosive church growth. The subsidiary
result of this project would be to add a fresh insight into the study
of the 'church-state problem' in a colonial setting or the interaction
,
between mission, church and state.
-
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CHAPTER I
THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS
A. Sociology and History
This is a sociological study based on historical materials, and
accordingly it is necessary to consider whether sociologists and
historians would approach the subject differently.	 Sociology and
history are different academic disciplines, unlike each other in
origin and intention, but dealing with the same subject matter: human
1interaction. From the recognition of this complex relationship
arises the need to examine the actual or potential inter-dependence of
sociology and history. There is a considerable literature pertaining
to the interaction between historians and sociologists. 	 In this
context Richard Hofstadter anticipates the development of a somewhat
new historical genre, which will be a mixture of traditional history
and the social sciences. 2	Peter Burke in Sociology and History
(1980) supports the idea of a convergence of sociology and history:
What some of us would like to see, what we are
beginning to see, is a social history, or
historical sociology - the distinction should
become irrelevant - which would be concerned both
with understanding from within and explaining from
without;	 with the general and with the
particular; and which would combine the
sociologist's acute sense of structure w;th the
historian's equally sharp sense of change.
Similarly, E.H. Carr in What is History? (1961) had already noted
the positive influence of sociology on history, remarking that "the
more sociological history becomes and the more historical sociology
becomes, the better for both". 4 According to Carr, the reciprocal
process of interaction between the historian and his facts, what he
calls the dialogue between present and past, is a dialogue not between
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abstract and isolated individuals, but between the society of today
and the society of yesterday. 5 The past is intelligible to us only
in the light of the present. 	 It is to be noted here that Carr
emphasises that what distinguishes the historian from the collector of
historical facts is generalisation: History is concerned with the
relation between the unique and the general. 6 In Carr's words on the
relation between history and sociology:
Sociology at present faces two opposite dangers -
the danger of becoming ultra-theoretical and the
danger of becoming ultra-empirical. The first is
the danger of losing itself in abstract and
meaningless generalisations about society in
general. Society with a big S is as misleading a
fallacy as History with a big H. This danger is
brought nearer by those who assign to sociology
the exclusive task of generalizing from the unique
events recorded by history ... The other danger
is that ... of a sociology 'split into a series of
discrete technical problems of social readjust-
ment'. Sociology is concerned with historical
societies every one of which is unique and moulded
by specific historical antecedents and conditions.
... Sociology, if it is to become a fruitful field
of study, must, like history, concern itself wip
the relation between the unique and the general.
There would be no need for the sociologist to turn historian, if
the historians asked the questions that are crucial to the
sociologist.	 All he would then have to do would be to use the
historian's findings.	 The difference between historians and
sociologists would be not in the methods employed but in the kinds of
questions asked. 8	The requirement for a historically oriented
sociology could well be described as a combination of 'brains' and
'hard work', with 'brains' standing for conceptualisation and 'hard
work' for a willingness to go to the sources. 9
For the former, Max Weber regarded the formation of typological
concepts as the major contribution of sociology to history. 10	If
used as an auxiliary construct, typology mediates between the general
and the unique. Weber's 'ideal types' - both the widely generalisable
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and the historically specific variety - explicitly exaggerated and
simplified the cluster of variables under investigation and
simultaneously established the type as a measure of empirical
deviation.	 The inductive construction of what Weber calls 'ideal-
types' is an abstraction, an over-simplification and exaggeration of
empirical external facts in order to clarify meaning. 	 It is not
exhaustive in the sense that it brings the full knowledge of an
historical event to us. No method can do that. We can only 'impute
causation' and 'trace relationships'; which is what the 'ideal-type'
seeks to do.
The 'ideal-type', then, is a constellation of related facts,
movements and events in history which may be built up as reason is
applied to the empirical account of history in time. These concepts
constitute realities which are of 'interest' to men. Thus the more
theoretical and general our thought becomes about these realities, the
less our resultant conceptualizations will be filled with concrete
empirical events. The abstract theory is only roughly related to the
practice.	 Any abstract conception based on genuine 'interest' can
bring further understanding whether it has to do with the arts,
politics, economics, religion, the family, or the community. 	 In
practice the number of possible 'ideal-types' is limited by the
limited nature of man's interests. Thus we are saved from a hopeless
relativism.
Weber's 'ideal-types' are of two fundamental kinds: 	 an
individualising concept and a generalising one. The first states what
is to be explained. It takes the stuff of history. The phenomena
'capitalism' or 'socialism' may be outlined. A further division of
this first kind of individualising concept deals with the realm of
ideas, examples of which might be 'the Protestant ethic' in Weber's
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own work, or any particular theology, system of doctrines or
philosophy, examples of 'liberalism', 'modernism', 'fundamentalism'
etc. They influence actors much, even though the actors themselves
may not be able to explain them or even be consciously aware of
them. 11
If	 historical	 data	 are	 'unique',	 then	 no	 historical
generalisation is theoretically possible. Hence Weber suggested the
,
ideal types as conceptual tools (for the historian) rather than as
generalisations. 12 Weber asserted that the causal analysis of unique
events requires a prior knowledge of the regularities of human
conduct.	 In Weber's view it is this knowledge which sociology
provides. For him sociology was an attempt to ascertain these
regularities by means of a comparative analysis, which took the entire
known history of mankind for its province. 'Regularity' means that
certain types of conduct, or certain beliefs concerning the
legitimation of authority, or certain kinds of leadership, could be
formulated in such a way as to encompass the entire range of possible
forms of behaviour. 13 According to Weber, the task of the historian
is to explain the 'unique deviation' from the ideal type. In this
sense, therefore, it may be said that history seeks to explain the
unique, while sociology attempts to establish a complete 'inventory'
of human behaviour in order to provide us with a knowledge of the
range of recurrent types of individual conduct. As Cahnman and
Buskoff suggest:
Without such interplay between the general and the
unique no explanation would be possible. In
short, if some historians see no generalities in
their data, it is because they do not look for
them.
	
In that case, historically trained
sociologists,	 along	 with	 betigr-informed
historians, must step into the breach.
Sociology is neither history, nor economics nor political
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science.	 Sociology, especially when it is dealing with historical
material, is the attempt to interpret historical events in their
relationship to one another. One school of thought, represented by
Collingwood, can assert that an adequate description of what happened
produces the explanation of why it happened.
	 Of course, adequate
description is the crucial term:	 adequacy presumably refers to
sufficient causes and is likely to depend on implied or explicit
hypotheses. 15	Indeed, the processes - description 'S-nd analysis - are
reciprocal in practice.	 Thus for those who give prominence to
analysis	 and	 explanation,	 responsible description, 	 including
statistical evidence, is an indispensable base. But the selection of
facts for descriptive purposes always presupposes some criteria of
relevance which, in turn, are grounded in an explanatory scheme. 16
As a whole, the task of history is to be concerned with the
exacting, exhaustive interpretation of particular events. 	 The
historian must preserve the uniqueness of the concrete observation,
whatever he may add to it in terms of explanation or interpretation.
The sociologist is concerned with the why of the act. Since it is the
responsibility of the historian to guard the uniqueness of particular
events, he may appear to be dealing with less problematical material
than does the sociologist.	 However, in his concentration on the
particular or the unique, he may fail to discover the wider context of
events.	 To compensate for its lack of concrete content and
illustrative detail, sociology may well be able to offer, in Weber's
terms, "a greater precision of concepts". 17	The sociologist should
discover dynamic relationships and levels of meaning in human activity
that may otherwise be hidden.
Joachim Wach argues that there is a quantitative and qualitative
difference between the approaches, methods, and goals of theology and
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most indispensable. It is true that the sociological21
the general science of religion (phenomenology, history, psychology,
and sociology of religion). 18 While the method of theology is
normative, that of the general science of religion is descriptive.
According to Wach, the field of the sociology of religion is the
individual, typological, and comparative study of religious groupings,
religious fellowship and association as well as doctrine and rites. 19
Wach's brief, historical critique of the sociology of religion can be
a real point of departure.
Without the work of the historian of religion, the
sociologist would be helpless. Yet neither can
substitute for the other; whereas the former is
interested in longitudinal lines of development,
the latter tries to cut through these lines
vertically. It is the sociologist's hope that his
categories	 will	 prove	 fruitful 7tf	 the
organization of the historian's material.
In Roger Mehl's view, of all the auxiliary sciences of the
sociology of religion, the history of religions is undoubtedly the
interpretation of a religion must give an important and even decisive
place to the history of the religion: every religion is characterised
by a certain historical continuity and must be studied in space and
time. No descriptive sociology is complete which does not push its
inquiry as far as possible in time and correlatively in space. For it
is of the nature of a religion to be transmitted and diffused.
22
Only history permits us to understand how certain traits of religious
communities derive from the mode of diffusion of the religion being
considered, from the way in which it is established deeply or super-
ficially.	 Also, whether one considers a religion in its transmission
or in its diffusion, only history can enable us to understand how-
these processes have shaped the religious communities and the
understanding which they have of themselves.
But we should also emphasise the different attitudes which
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-history and sociology take regarding these phenomena. 23	History
restricts itself to recording and describing the succession of stages
and forms, in the attempt to see how they interact and condition one
another. Sociology must be in possession of these historical data, in
order, first of all, to avoid constructing an a priori conception of
the religion being considered. A conception of a religion cannot be
based solely on doctrinal considerations as they are presented to
sociology by the religion's theologians.
The objective of the sociologist, however, is to construct
religious types, types of religious communities, that are midway
between the particular datum and the conceptual generalisation. The
sociologist always moves between empirical particularity, which
history studies, and conceptual generality, which the physical
sciences study.	 Here we should add that this type constructed by
sociology is always an ideal type. 	 This concern to construct a
typology is the primary distinction between sociology of religion and
history of religions, which follows developments in their continuity
and in the indefinite sequence of their forms. 24	In brief,
sociology is not the negation of history, although it proceeds in a
different manner from history. 	 Sociology refers to history and
ultimately to historical events. But this reference which effectively
operates in the life of groups takes very diverse forms. 	 The
sociology of religion provides many examples of Georges Gurvitch's
'tendential regularities':	 the sect has a tendency always to take
identical attitudes vis-a-vis the church, for example, denunciation of
the corruption of the church, of its hypocrisy, of its institutional,
official nature, etc.
It is generally accepted that the credit for having been the
first to conceive of a systematic sociology of religion belongs to Max
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Weber. Max Weber and Ernst Troeltsch were close personal friends, and
the former influenced the latter deeply.	 In many respects Weber's
work was complemented by the exhaustive studies of Troeltsch, which
were limited exclusively to Christianity. 25	On the basis of his
studies of Christianity at the time of the Reformation, Troeltsch
concluded that Christianity had always taken either the form of a
distinct church or sect.	 As is well known, Troeltsch has had a
profound influence in turn upon the thought of H. Richard Niebuhr,
26
 a
theologian representative of a concern with the relationship between
Christianity and sociology.	 In this context it should be stressed
that Christian thinkers have been influenced directly or indirectly by
Weber, who recognised the autonomous nature of the religious
category.
27
	The point of prime importance to us is that in Weber's
theoretical recognition of the autonomy of the religious category,
along with other categories such as the political and the economic,
the insights of sociology become complementary to those of theology
rather than constituting another attempt to do away with them. Thus,
Wach, in following Weber, summarises that "the sociology of religion
will supplement but can never replace phenomenology, psychology, or
history of religion, to say nothing of theology".28
As Cahnman and Boskoff argue, in sociology types are not ends in
themselves;	 they guide investigation by focusing attention on
significant clusters and concatenations of fact and serve as a means
of evaluating factual evidence as variations from typological
patterns.
29
	Comparison offers indispensable support, because,
without the search for variations, typology would cease to be a means
to an end and become a dogmatic entity in its own right. If used as
an auxiliary construct, typology mediates between the general and the
unique, so much so that Weber regarded the formation of typological
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concepts as the major contribution of sociology to history.
Sociology, if it is to become a fruitful field of study, must, like
history, concern itself with the relation between the unique and the
general. But it must also become dynamic - a study not of society at
rest, but of social change and development. 30
With this in mind, the present study, based on historical
materials, searches for variations of the three churches towards the
Shint"6 Shrine problem during the war period.	 As a sociologist who is
concerned with the why of the variations, I have made an effort to
compare the different positions of the three churches by employing
several typological concepts. In this sense this work is C.W. Mills'
"Historical Sociology".
B. Sociological Understanding of Religion and Politics
1. The Relationship of Religion and Politics
The purpose of this section is to review, existing sociological
studies on the relationship between religion and the political order.
The sociological study of society and religion is incomplete until
their relations with each other on all levels are examined. In this
context, the state merits special consideration because it is
quantitatively and qualitatively the most important form of the
secular institutions of society.	 The question of the relationship
between religion and politics is of course a big topic, which has been
subject to extensive theological and sociological comment. 	 This
review is by no means exhaustive: some of these studies have been
selected in order to illustrate what seems to me a fairly common
approach underlying the study of religion and politics.
Theoretically, religion may be related to the state in three
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different patterns. Religion may actively ally itself with the state,
either dominating it or supporting it as its instrumental force;
religion may withdraw into seclusion by renouncing secular political
life;	 or it may actively struggle against the state either to
preserve itself or to gain political dominance. ' Most religions have
all three tendencies - fusion, disjunction, and creative tension
between religious ideals and the world - in some sort of combination.
2
According to Peter Worsley, religion is neither intrinsically
conservative nor revolutionary.
3
	It can be infused with any kind of
social content, notably political.	 The relationship of religious
beliefs, let alone movements and organisations, to the established
power-system therefore varies and is not a matter for metaphysical
pronouncement disguised as sociological generalisation. It requires
empirical investigation to see what the case is.	 We cannot know
a priori.
According to R.N. Bellah, the ability of religious values to
exert long-term pressure on a society is dependent on some degree of
structural differentiation of the religious institutions from other
social	 institutions,	 especially	 the	 political	 institutions.
4
Historically, religious and political institutions were relatively
well differentiated in historical societies, compared to primitive and
archaic societies.	 Purely secular political rationalisation in
historic societies gave rise to serious social disruptions when the
'limit images' of religions were too sharply abrogated. 	 Thus, as
S.N. Eisenstadt has pointed out, the possibility of structural
innovation in either the religious or political field and of the
contribution of each to the development of the other is partly at
least a function of the degree to which they are differentiated.
5
Too close a fusion tends to inhibit progress in either.
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Historically, the transitions from a priesthood serving a
political association into a religious congregation was associated
primarily with the rise of the great world empires of the Near East,
especially Persia. 6	Political associations were annihilated and the
population disarmed;	 their priesthoods, however, were assigned
certain political powers and were rendered secure in their positions.
This was done because the religious congregation was regarded as a
valuable instrument for pacifying the conquered. 7	Therefore, in
medieval Christianity in the Occident, in post-Reformation Lutheranism
and Anglicanism, and in both Christianity and Islam in the Near East,
a parish - a grouping different from the secular, political, or
economic community which is missing in the religions of China and
ancient India - was essentially a 'passive' ecclesiastical association
and the jurisdictional district of a priest.
According to Max Weber, the power of the 'apolitical' Christian
religion of love was not derived from interests in social reform, nor
from any such thing as 'proletarian instincts', but rather the
complete loss of such concerns.
8
The same motivation accounts for
the increasing importance	 of	 all salvation religions and
congregational religions since the first and second centuries of the
Roman period. This transformation was carried out, not only or even
primarily by the subjugated classes who in their slave revolts had
become the carriers of special anti-political religions, but
principally by those who had lost interest in politics, who were
without influence in politics, or who had become disgusted by
politics. Thus the attitude of the early Christians towards the state
was one of deep distrust and aversion. They refused to do homage to
the image of the Emperor as a god, and many also opposed war and
military service. The Christians regarded themselves as a separate
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nation, the people of God. 9	They withdrew from active participation
in the courts and in public life, and formed a separate community,
based on non-compulsion and brotherly love, which to their enemies
seemed to be a state within the state. 10	It should be noted that the
early Christians rejected the ideas of loyalty to a specific father-
land, and this tradition can be traced through the whole history of
Christianity.
,
The conflict of ascetic ethics, as well as of the mystically
oriented temper of brotherly love, with the apparatus of domination
(Herrschaft) which is basic to all political institutions, produced
the most varied types of tension and compromise.
11
	In Max Weber's
view, the polarity between religion and politics is least wherever, as
in Confucianism, religion is equivalent to a belief in spirits or
simply a belief in magic, and ethic is no more than a clear accommo-
dation to the world on the part of the educated. 	 Nor does any
conflict at all between religion and politics exist wherever, as in
Islam, religion makes obligatory the violent propagandising of a true
prophecy which consciously eschews universal conversion and enjoins
the subjugation of unbelievers under the domination of a ruling class
dedicated to the religious war as one of the basic postulates of its
faith,	 without,	 however,	 recognising the salvation of the
subjugated 12
Actual conflicts between concrete demands of a state and concrete
religious injunctions arise only when a religion is the pariah faith
of a group that is excluded from political equality, but still
believes in the religious prophecies of divinely appointed restoration
of its social level. 13	This was the case in Judaism, which never in
theory rejected the state and its coercion but, on the contrary,
expected in the Messiah their awn masterful political ruler, an
•_
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expectation that was sustained at least until the time of the
destruction of the Temple by Hadrian.	 Wherever communal religions
have rejected all employment of force as an abomination to God and
have sought to require their members' avoidance of all contact with
violence, without, however, reaching the consistent conclusion of
absolute flight from the world, the conflict between religion and
politics has led either to martyrdom or to passive anti-political
sufferance of the coercive regime. Hence, in Judeo-Christian cultures
religion is expected to be at odds with the world around it. 14 While
the religious life must perforce be lived in this world, it is not to
be of it. Indeed, it is held to be the duty of priests and prophets
to take those who become enmeshed in the trivial affairs of this world
and turn them towards more eternal concerns. Thus, the church is seen
to exist in a hostile and evil world, and to have a sacred mission to
denounce and resist matters of the flesh, for all this shall pass
away.
But, somehow, Christian churches rarely seem to act upon these
principles. Despite a long line of prophets, saints, and reformers,
who have condemned the worldliness of the church, the majority of
•
religious leaders have been practical men who have gone about the
business of managing the mundane interests of religion. Thus Ernst
Troeltsch suggests that the history of Christian churches is best
understood in a dialectical process of two contradictory yet
complementary tendencies:	 'compromise' with the world and 'tension'
with the world. 15	He summarises the problems and dilemmas of
institutionalised religion as follows: the central ideals and values
of Christianity cannot be realised within this world apart from
compromise, and therefore the history of Christianity becomes the
story of a constantly renewed search for this compromise, and a fresh
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opposition to this spirit of compromise. 16
Historically, the position of medieval Christianity in relation
to the state as a whole oscillated or, more correctly, shifted its
centre of gravity from one to another of several distinct points of
view. 17
	At first the attitude of the early Christians towards the
state was one of deep distrust and aversion. 18	There was a complete
abomination of the existing Roman empire. The empire was regarded as
the dominion of Anti-Christ. Thus the early Christians refused to do
homage to the image of the Emperor as a God. 	 A second view was
complete indifference to the state, and hence passive sufferance of
the use of force, which was deemed to be unrighteous in every case.
This entailed active compliance with all the coercive obligations
imposed by the state, e.g. the payment of taxes which did not directly
imperil religious salvation. For the true intent of the New Testament
verse about "rendering unto Caesar the things which are Caesar's" 19 is
not the meaning deduced by modern harmonising interpretations, namely
a positive recognition of the obligation to pay taxes, but rather the
reverse: an absolute indifference to all the affairs of the mundane
world. 20
	The early church was defeatist in its attitude towards the
'world', regarding the world as doomed, and expressed its optimism in
its millennial hopes. 21	In Weber's view, the first and the second
attitudes belong primarily to the period of eschatological
expectation.
When the millennial hopes began to wane and the church was forced
to assume responsibility for political and economic life, there was
little disposition to challenge the basic social customs and
relationships in the name of the Christian ideal. 22	Slavery,
injustice, inequality of wealth, war, these all were accepted as
ordained by the 'natural law' which God devised for man's sinful
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state.	 Eventually, the prevailing institutions were accepted, even
though the church was quite conscious of the conflict between them and
its own ideal.	 Its natural determinism, its faith that nothing in
nature or history could exist without the explicit will of God, gave
additional support to this tendency.
	 Thus, the third viewpoint
entailed withdrawal from concrete activities of the political
community such as the cult of emperors, because and insofar as such
participation necessarily led to sin. 	 Nevertheless, the state's
authority was accorded positive recognition as being desired by God,
even when exercised by unbelievers and even though inherently sinful.
It was taught that the state's authority, like all the institutions of
this world, is an ordained punishment for the sin brought upon man by
Adam's fall, which the Christian must obediently take upon himself. 23
Finally, the authority of the state, even when exercised by
unbelievers, might be evaluated positively, due to our condition of
sin, as an indispensable instrument for the social control of
reprehensible sins and as a general condition for all mundane
existence pleasing to God.
	 It is to be noted that ancient
Christianity did not really go beyond the last point of view in
principle, even after it had been recognised as the state religion in
313.
	 In this respect, it should be pointed out that the 'general'
schema according to which religion customarily solves the problem of
the tension between religious ethics and the non-ethical or unethical
requirements of life in the political and economic structures of power
within the world is to 'relativise' and 'differentiate' ethics into an
organic ethic of vocation and a contrasting ascetic ethic. 24	This
holds true wherever a religion is dominant within a political
organisation or occupies a privileged status, and particularly when it
is a religion of 'institutional' grace. Rather, the great change in
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the attitude of Christianity towards the state took place in the
medieval church, as the investigations of Troeltsch have brilliantly
demonstrated.
25
In the matter of the political ethic, according to Troeltsch, in
Catholicism the state belongs to the natural stage of existence, above
which there rises the supernatural stage of Grace, which is completely
indifferent to the state. 26
	
	In Catholicism, therefore, the state is
,
sometimes utilised and glorified, sometimes treated merely as the
material for and presupposition of something else, sometimes shorn of
all authority and trampled under foot by the world-organisation of the
Church.	 In this context it should be pointed out that the Eastern
Churches assumed a national character, while the Western Church
remained supra-national in spirit. 27	Whilst the Roman Empire had
elsewhere destroyed national independence, at all times the Eastern
Churches have been bulwarks of nationality.
	 Where history and
theology had combined in the West to set Church over state, or even
Church against state, the East preferred to view the church as
operating within the state. 28
The Greek Orthodox Church, the greatest of all Eastern Churches,
was directed by a Patriarchate which was a state department of the
Byzantine Empire, and her religious questions were often decided by
the Emperors, largely on political grounds. 29
	Consequently, Eastern
Christians did not fear a strong state, which is precisely what
Byzantium and Moscow gave them. 30	The Roman Pop-es, on the contrary,
came to assert their independence, and for some time even their
supremacy, in regard to the temporal powers.
	 The liturgical and
official language of the Roman Church everywhere was Latin. The cause
of this difference was that the Greek Church grew up on the soil of
ancient civilisations and under a government maintaining Roman
-
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traditions, while the Roman Church developed partly on the ruins of
the old Roman world, and partly among uncivilised peoples.
31
	The
Roman Church, therefore, was absolutely indispensable to the temporal
rulers for maintaining or building up an administration and
civilisation. This gave the Roman Church a unique authority, even in
purely temporal matters.
In Lutheranism the state is also a part of the natural order, but
as such it is a necessary form of the activity of Christian love and
of the Christian spirit; but since it is still essentially a product
of the natural evolution of reason which punishes and heals sins, and
as such is guided by God, it gains the supernatural dignity of a power
which has been directly appointed by God, which, above all, must be
endured and respected.
32
	The view of Luther, who absolutely
rejected religious wars and revolutions as well as any active
resistance, was that only the secular authority, whose domain is
untouched by the rational postulates of religion, has the
responsibilItj of determining whether political wars are just or
unjust. Hence, the individual subject has no reason to burden his own
conscience with this matter if only he gives active obedience to the
political authority in this and in all other matters which do not
destroy his relationship to God.
33
 Luther relieved the individual of
the ethical responsibility for war and transferred it to the
authorities. To obey the authorities in matters other than those of
faith could never constitute guilt. 	 Politics did not interest
Luther. 34	The Christian had simply to obey the orders of his
government, however unjust and cruel it was. Every government was .
ordained by God, and wicked rulers were a divine punishment for the
sins of their subjects. 	 No right of resistance was admitted by
Luther. In brief, Lutheran orthodoxy had appreciated the state, true,
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but it still taught that the state existed mainly because of sin and
that its chief function was to punish sin and protect the church. 35
But the romantic movement of the late eighteenth century lifted
the state out of this role of mere watchdog. 36	Napoleon's conquest
of Germany underlined even more the importance of the political state
to protect the 'Volk'. 	 During Prussia's 'Regeneration' (1807-15)
many preachers, like Schleiermacher, sought to indoctrinate people in
this new role for the state. Schleiermacher, whose influence was felt
far beyond the boundaries of his fatherland, merely realised, as did
Luther, but not the later German ecclesiastical leaders, that too
close an interlocking of the religious and political organisations
would in the long run accrue to the benefit of neither. In practice,
however, he, with nationalist aspiration, often conceded to the
omnipotent Prussian bureaucracy great ecclesiastical authority. 37
	In
spite of his demand for complete autonomy, he had clearly conceded the
primacy of the state and merely advocated that it voluntarily impose
upon itself certain limitations in ecclesiastic matters. Eventually
he sincerely believed that in the divinely ordained historic evolution
the German nation was destined to play a decisive role. 38
Schleiermacher taught that the state was, if not the kingdom of God,
at least an expression of the will of God. 39	Thus many German
Protestant clergymen in the twentieth century taught that the
Christian must obey his government in the name of God and religion.
In this context we can note that Marx's critique of religion was
directed specifically against the Protestantism of the Prussian state,
and therefore against other forms of European state Protestantism. 40
In his view, "it was not the downfall of the old religions that
brought the downfall of the old states, but the downfall of the old
states that brought the downfall of the old religions". 41	If, as in
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Protestantism, there is no supreme head of the church, he maintains,
the domination of religion is but the religion of domination, the cult
of the will of the government. Marx has raised the question of the
relationship between religion and the political order as follows:
Christians live in states with differing
constitutions, some in a republic, some in an
absolute, some again in a constitutional monarchy.
Christianity does not decide on the correctness of
the constitutions, it teaches, as religion must:
Submit to the authority, for all authoxity is
ordained by God. The correctness of state
constitutions is, therefore, to be judged not
according to Christianity, not according to the
nature, the essence of the state itself, not
according to the nature of Christian socl2ty, but
according to the nature of human society.
Thus, Marx's argument on religion and state was that since
religion is a bulwark of the state, to attack religion was to attack
the state.	 From his own experience, it was as much due to the
protection of the state as to the survival value of its dogmas that
the German version of Christianity survived in Prussia. The major
thrust of his critique was directly against the use of Christian
religion by the socially and economically exploitative Prussian State
for its own ends, and by other similar Western capitalist states for
the same purpose. Protestantism was a religion well suited, by its
own nature, to such use by political rulers, for its ideas had a
particularly close correspondence with the condition of men in a
capitalist society.
	 Marx's critique of religion in terms of its
involvement with political rule is an important item on the agenda for
the study of religion in its world setting. 43
Incidentally, however, we can say that in some respects
Christianity, and particularly Calvinism, made it a religious
obligation to defend the faith against tyranny by the use of force. 44
Calvinism knew principled violence as a means of defending the faith.
Here it is important to note that the main cause of separation between
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Lutheranism and Calvinism was the difference in their ethical and
social, rather than in their strictly theological doctrines. 45
Connected with the former was the divergence between Martin Luther's
intrinsic nationalism and the internationalism propagated by John
Calvin. Thus, though the fundamental theological doctrines of Calvin
are about the same as those of Luther, the influence of Calvinism on
the national character was very different from that of Lutheranism. 46
Luther paved the way for the quietistic, 'patriarchal' doctrine of
monarchical power which secured, and theologically justified, over-
whelming state control over ecclesiastical affairs. Calvinism, on the
contrary, began with the founder's radical use of state power and
ended with the formation of the least politically controlled churches
in the history of Christendom since 313. 47 From the outset Calvin and
his followers were far more internationally minded than Luther and his
disciples.	 To be sure, as a born Frenchman, Calvin resented the
empire's overbearing claims to universal leadership and generally
repudiated the idea of universal monarchy as "most absurd". 48
To Luther God appeared as the loving father whose grace was
extended to every fervent believer in him. Religion was primarily a
matter of pious and humble feeling. 49	Calvin conceived God as the
stern, majestic ruler who had arbitrarily selected some men for
salvation and condemned others to hell for enhancing his own glory.
To him God was primarily power and will, and energetic action in the
service of God was the best proof of belonging to the elect. While
Luther preferred patient suffering to action and left public affairs
to the existing authorities, Calvin aimed at founding the perfect
Theocracy, a community of saints, or a new Chosen People, on the model
of the Old Testament, and stressed strictest moral discipline. Thus,
there was no room for toleration in his community. 	 Though he,
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distrusting the people as much as Luther did, rejected any right of
revolution, events, nevertheless, gave Calvinism a revolutionary
tendency. 50
F. Hertz explains the events as follows:
In several countries it [Calvinism] was taken up
by the nobility in their fight against royal
absolutism. In Scotland John Knox organized the
Church on democratic and anti-hierarchical lines.
His successor, Andrew Melville, once took King
James VI by the sleeve, called him God's silly
vassal, and added that there were two kings and
kingdoms in Scotland, the commonwealth under King
James, and the Church under Christ. No wonder
that in France, where the national cause was
widely identified with royalty, Calvinism appeared
as a grger to national unity and this decided its
fate.
Here it is noteworthy that in his Institutes, written under the
impact of French persecutions, Calvin had to defend the conscientious
resisters. 52 Moreover, the obligation to bring about a revolution on
behalf of the faith was naturally taught by engaging in wars of
missionary enterprise and by their derivative sects. 53 From this
standpoint, the employment of force by the state can have moral
sanction only when the force is used for the control of sins, for the
glory of God, and for combating religious evils - in short, only for
religious purposes. In Weber's view, Calvinism, unlike Lutheranism,
knew principled violence as a means of defending the faith; thus
Calvinism acknowledged the crusade, which was for Islam an element of
life from the beginning. 54
In Ascetic Protestantism,
	 like the Puritan ethic, the
organization of the state is likewise in principle deduced from the
Natural Law of the fallen state, but it is always estimated according
to its rational purpose and subordinated to its responsibility not
merely to God, but also to the people from whom it has received its
mandate, whether legally or merely morally. 55
	Thus the honours,
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offices, and dignities of the state are functions appointed by God and
the people, but they do not proceed from inherent divine right within
the government. Within the state, therefore, there is a strong sense
of the equality of all in the presence of God. The main features of
the attitude of Ascetic Protestantism towards the state are inclined
towards a liberal or democratic conception of the state, apart from
egalitarian theories;
	
	 it tends to regard the state simply as
,
something which must be endured;
	 it glorifies its own national
inheritance more for its religious mission than for its political
greatness;	 and it likes to regulate international relationships
according to peace principles, which are also reasonable, and from the
business point of view desirable.
In this context it should be noted that the Puritans, the earlier
generations in the development of ascetic Protestantism, were, by and
large, not centrally situated in the main prestige structure. 56
 The
rank and file were yeomen farmers, craftsmen, small merchants, and the
like. The essential point is their extraordinary knowledge of and
concern with the details of the Bible. Almost as much as the Jews
they were 'people of the Book'.
Ascetic Protestantism views imperialistic and nationalist
movements with a good deal of misgiving. 57
	Sometimes it rejects them
on principle; sometimes it is able to justify them as an extension of
Christian civilisation, whose sole genuine representative it feels
itself to be; it has been entrusted with this destiny by God. It
then regards itself in the light of the Old Testament as a 'Chosen
People' and absorbs Imperialism into the aim of Foreign Missions.
In a discussion of the Western theories of Church-State relations
the contribution of Max Weber, Ernst Troeltsch and Karl Marx should be
considered. But it should be emphasised in this context that there
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are indeed some limitations in the sociology of religion.
	 Given that
sociology developed as a discipline originally in the context of
Christian culture, it would be no surprise that the early conceptions
of religion that sociologists entertained were heavily suffused with
the ideas, ethos, and atmosphere of Christianity. Some of the basic
categories of analysis were all too evidently drawn from Christian
theological concepts, such as the distinction between the sacred and
the profane. 58
	Thus it was perhaps too easy for sociologists to
assume that the Western case - that is the Christian case - provided
the paradigm by which all other cases might be analysed.
In this respect, Max Weber did consider similar phenomena to the
church/sect division in relation to other cultures, especially in his
work on China. 59
	It is generally accepted that Weber tried to deal
with the whole religious system, but, in his preoccupation with the
non-emergence of capitalism in China, he failed to reach a satisfying
synthesis. 60
 Moreover, at the beginning of his Sociology of Religion
(1964), he is uncertain as to how religion should be defined. Weber,
like all other writers on Chinese religion, restricted its range to
something less than the total system of religion-in-politics. Thus he
gives 'animism in China' as an example of religion among the lower
middle class, and particularly among the artisan. 61	Furthermore, in
Weber's view, official religion in China was merely formal and
conventional and so distanced from the religious fervour of the
masses.
62
	In contradistinction to Weber, C.K. Yang takes Chinese
religion to be one entity. In his view, there was a systematic
coherence between elite ideas and those of what he calls the common
people. 63
	Moreover, Yang argues that the universal acceptance of the
supreme power of Heaven over all gods and man provided the imperial
power with an important religious basis for the political integration
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of a vast country.	 In brief, he emphasises the interlocking of
official and popular cults in the Chinese context. 	 Similarly,
Maurice Freedman assumes that "a country of China's extent and
political cohesion would demonstrate a large measure of agreement on
religious assumptions among all its people". 64 Maurice Freedman's
last paragraph includes some of the reasons why the Western theories
of Church-State relations cannot be imported wholesale into the
Chinese context:
And this great community of religion was achieved
without a church, unless we choose to call the
state itself a church, in which case one of the
two terms becomes superfluous. Mandarins
performed rites and commanded spirits in their
official capacity; they were not priests...
Chinese religion was in a sense a civil religion -
not austere and cunningly calculated to serve
political interests, but based upon a view of the
interpretation of society and the universe, and
upon a conception of authority that in the last
analysis would not allow the religions to separate
off from the secular. Caesar was Pope, Pope
Caesar ... The Chinese state has on the whole been
very successful - and to this day - in muting
religious authority. Thgg is one aspect of the
religious unity of China.
Similarly, David A. Martin clearly points out that "there is no
institution in Confucian society which can be described as a 'church'
which exists separately from the pattern of conservative
institutions-” .66	 Just because Confucianism is the extreme case of
simple conservation, the 'church' is merged in the social pattern and
becomes invisible. 	 In Martin's view, Christianity views the world as
sacred only in principle (and not in fact), whereas Confucianism views
the world as an immanent sacred harmony maintained, with occasional
abnormal divergences, by the Mandate of Heaven. 67 Thus the Christian
Church must embody some reserve towards the world and towards 'natural
relations' (e.g. those of the family), whereas Confucianism sanctifies
these social relationships without reservation.
	
The element of
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Christian reserve, which is logically related to a sense of tension
between body and spirit, implies a tension between Church and state..
Christian societies tend therefore to achieve some distinction,
however vestigial in some cases, between Church and State, the
spiritual and the temporal.
On the traditional relationship of politics and religion in
China, C.K. Yang's Religion in Chinese Society (1961) stresses that
,
the 'diffused religion' of the Confucian State and social, economic,
and family groups predominated over institutional religion. Diffused
religion is conceived as a religion having its theology, cultus and
personnel so intimately diffused into one or more secular social
institutions that they become a part of the concept, rituals, and
structure of the latter, thus having no significant independent
existence. 68	Yang delineates three forms of Chinese institutional
religion: the classical religious tradition, universal religions like
Buddhism and Taoism, and syncretic religious societies.
69
	In most
periods of Chinese history religion consistently lent support to
government.	 He points out that "in China the political role of
religion was somewhat obscured by the dominance of Confucian orthodoxy
in the function and structure of the state, for Confucianism had very
prominent non-religious, secular features".
70
	The Chinese State
developed a tradition of regulating, penetrating, and controlling
institutional religion, as becomes apparent from the state persecution
of heterodox sects. Thus J.J.M. de Groot terms the Chinese State "the
most intolerant, the most persecuting of all earthly governments
"
.
71
In this sense it is generally accepted that universal institutional
religion is definitely an alien idea in Chinese tradition. In the
same vein, Chinese tradition is marked by the predominance of diffused
over institutional religion.
72
	It has not formed separate
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institutional churches on a Western model. The Confucian state sought
to restrict the worship of Heaven to itself. As a result, the state
always perceived religious heterodoxy as a political threat.
The Chinese religious conflict, therefore, was not between Church
and state, as in the West, but between elite and popular politico-
religious organisations. In C.K. Yang's words:
To assure itself of the desired support from
religion and at the same time to- minimize
religious organizations as competitive political
forces, the Chinese state exercised elaborate
controls over religious belief and organization.
But the success of such control was never
complete. From time to time, religious beliefs
and organizations rose to challenge the ruling
power, and religion played an active role in
rebellions and in the success of dynasties and
governments. The sanctioning function, the
governmental attempt to control religion, and the
active participation of religion in the struggle
for political power characterized plie political
role of religion in Chinese society.
It is a fact that the Confucian legitimacy continued to suspect
the institutional religions of Buddhism and Taoism. As a preventive
measure, therefore, the state regulated the number of Buddhist and
Taoist ordinations.	 It controlled the building of new temples and
monasteries.	 The coming of Christianity, the foreign universal
religion, into this traditional Chinese politico-religious milieu
produced great cultural clashes.
74
A Confucian culture like that of
sixteenth-century China demanded that Catholicism ally itself with
either Confucian or sectarian forms. 75
	In China Matteo Ricci and the
Jesuits first chose the Confucian culture. The Pope overruled them
with the Rites Decision, which had the inevitable effect of making
Catholics peasant sectarians.	 In the early twentieth century Rome
reversed itself and tried to reconstitute the Chinese State-Catholic
Church alliance.	 This point will be discussed in detail later. 76
Finally, it is to be noted here that the Chinese Confucian politico-
-
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religious tradition heavily influenced Korea. 77
	Korean Catholics
received their faith from Pei-ching and experienced many of the same
trials as their Chinese brethren.
Such a religion as Judaeo-Christian religion is a 'universal-
istic religion' in that its religious system is based upon universal
themes and applications, irrespective of race, colour, and social
status. In contrast, the socio-political system, which represents the
seat of authority and coercive power in modern polity, is based upon
particularistic values;
	 it must necessarily honour national
sovereignty, defence of interests and security of its national
community. Universalistic religion in its most uncompromising form
fosters supranational loyalties that transcend and contradict the
requirements of citizenship on which the very foundation of modern
polity is based. 78
	Herein lies the one important element of
potential tension and conflict between a universalistic religion and a
particularistic socio-political system. According to Milton Yinger,
if the church adheres too strictly to its universalistic ideals, it
may be eliminated by the hostile socio-political system, or at best it
may be replaced by a less universalistic church;
	 yet if it
accommodates too much with the particularistic claims and interests of
the existing socio-political system, it may lose much of its prophetic
appeal and ideals as a univeralistic religion. 79
	Out of this real
dilemma emerges religion's adaptive and accommodative adjustment to
socio-political system. 80
Since nationalism often serves as a surrogate for religion, the
problem of coexistence with other religions has always arisen when it
has been strong.
	 In relation to the present study modern Japan
provides an example of amalgamation of nationalism with the
traditional religion.
	
	 Shintoism actively allied itself with the
•_
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state, supporting it as its instrumental force. 	 Thus, in the
discussion of the Japanese Christian reaction to ShintE nationalism,
we should consider the fact that religion in Japan has usually been
subordinated to protection of the state. 	 But in the case of the
Korean shrine question, we should take into account that Christianity
presented the greatest problem because of its transcendental
reference, its claim of universality for its doctrines, and its
denunciation of parochialism.
2. Church, Denomination, Sect
The church/sect typology originally elaborated in the work of
Weber was drawn from the context of Christianity. In his typology
Weber emphasised a process of institutionalisation of sectarian forms
of religious grouping in the direction of a church-type organisation. '
That is, Weber conceived of the development of sectarian groups
towards a more church-based type of organisation. This implication
can be drawn from his insistence on the routinisation of charisma, and
it highlights a different interpretation from that of Troeltsch, who
envisaged a dialectical resolution of the church-sect opposition and
the development of a third type of religious organisation in the form
of mysticism.	 Troeltsch proposed a basic distinction in Christian
history between Church and sect, to which he added the concept of the
mystical group. 2 H. Becker translated the category of mysticism into
that of 'cult'. 3
As regards the distinction between Church and sect Troeltsch
regarded the Church as a socially inclusive institution which adapted
the absolute law of God to the relativities and necessities of
politics as well as tempering its demands to average possibilities.
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The sect, however, regarded itself as an elect minority, proclaiming,
or embodying the imminence of a new society and a judgement on the
world. 4
	According to Roger Mehl, Troeltsch's point of view was more
clearly sociological than Weber's in that Troeltsch asked the question
of the role of social factors in the historical development of a
religion. 5	Troeltsch emphasised in his The Social Teachings (1912)
that the church's social ethic and the idea of community which the
church holds also must be given their just due.
It is generally accepted that Troeltsch tried to show that the
necessities tied to the life of the cultic communities (the church,
the sect, the mystical groups, that is, the three sociological groups
engendered by Christianity) explain the development of dogma. 6	This
was true especially concerning Trinitarian doctrine and Christology,
which Troeltsch did not consider to be inherent in the primitive
evangelical deposit. Trinitarian dogma proceeded from the very nature
of the cultic community of the church. It took a totally different
form, much less objectivised and rationalised, in the sect and in
mystical doctrine. Thus dogma, according to Troeltsch is, to a great
degree, the fruit of a sociological determining by the religious
group. That is to say, religious doctrine is primarily the expression
of the religious vitality of a community gathered in worship. 7
Bryan R. Wilson's use of the term 'sect' designates, unlike
Troeltsch, simply the small religious group in which membership is
voluntary and conditional upon some mark of merit. 8
 Such sects often
claim extraordinary revelation which enables the significance of the
Scriptures to be properly understood; the membership of the group
tends to dominate a large part of the life of its members. 9
	It
should be noted in this context that the sect's domination of its
members need not be of a purely social character. 	 It may be the
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dominance of an ideology, a Weltanschauung. The sect is a clearly
defined community; it seeks itself to rigidify a pattern of behaviour
and to make coherent its structure of values; it contends actively
against every other organisation of values and ideals, offering itself
as an all-embracing, divinely prescribed society.
Joachim Wach distinguishes three types of organisation of
Christian fellowship: the ecclesiastical body, the independent group
or denomination, and finally, the sect. 10	He avoids the term church
as much as possible in this classification because it implies a
theological (normative) decision. 11	Martin points out that in the
discussion of the sociology of religion comparatively little attention
has been given to 'denomination' as an independent sociological
type.
12
	According to him, the sect is a type of organisation which
polarizes at extremes, that is, between omnipotence and impotence,
amorality and perfectionism, complete authoritarianism and total lack
of authority, intense activity and passivity, aggression and
•
withdrawal. However, not all religious groups fall neatly into the
division between Church and sect. In general the denominationalism
may be distinguished from the sect because it is a reformist body
which only rejects the wider society within the more embracing terms
of an overall agreement. It is not revolutionary, either in espousing
revolutionary violence or engaging in pacifist withdrawal.
The denomination is most clearly distinguished from the sect and
most nearly allied to the Church in the sphere of eschatology.
13
 From
the point of view of developing a set of theological indices of
sociological character eschatology, that is, the doctrine of the last
or final things, such as death, judgement, the state after death, is
of prime importance.	 The sect, having members who are largely
rejected and alienated, frequently expects a divine reversal of its
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secular position or a total destruction of the corrupt material world
in which members will be a select remnant miraculously transported to
the New Jerusalem. As regards these eschatological events sectarians
either wait passively, or actively prepare to engage in Armageddon
when the trumpet shall sound. Meanwhile they refuse to consider any
attempts to merely ameliorate present conditions and refuse to
participate in wars for secular purposes. When the Divine Advent does
,
not occur or when the holy war of Armageddon has failed in its object,
the concept of the New Jerusalem is sometimes spiritualised and
regarded as realized within the religious community.
By contrast, the denomination which has a genuine stake in the
present social order retains the traditional eschatology of heaven and
hell. 14
	This single fact places a sociological gulf between
denomination and sect. In this context it should be noted that the
Methodists, the Congregationalists and the General Baptists were never
sectarian.	 The most striking aspect* of the early history of these
three representative denominations is a lack of the sectarian
spirit. 15
 The non-sectarian origins of Methodism are even clearer.
The primary leadership of the movement was, of course, middle class,
and the whole ethos of Methodism reflected that fact.
According to Martin, another important, though neglected,
theological index of sociological character, is found in the field of
'moral theory'. 16
	Here 'moral theory' refers not to discussions
about the nature of 'ought' and 'good' but to religious dynamics of
faith and works.
	 In the field of 'moral theory' the sect may be
absolutely perfectionist or entirely licentious: extremely ascetic or
totally devoid of ethical notions. Whether it is one or the other and
to what degree depends on its particular historical experience and on
the other theological elements involved.
	 The denomination, by
--
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The
contrast, manages to avoid such extremes because it is fundamentally
individualistic.	 Insofar as the denomination conceives of social
perfection, it does so by beginning with the moralisation of the
individual will. This individualistic emphasis of the denomination is
of first-rate importance. By individualism one does not necessarily
mean an egocentric or anti-social attitude, but a nominalistic rather
than a realistic approach to the collective. 	 Eventually Martin
defines the term 'denomination' as follows:
The denomination does not claim that its
institutional borders constitute the one ark of
salvation. Its concept of unity is a unity of
experience and its historical sense is likewise a
unity of experience rather than an institutional
succession. Its attitude to organization and to
cultic forms tends to be pragmatic and
instrumental, while its sacramental conceptions
are subjective. This subjectivity is related to a
fundamental individualism. In the field of
eschatology its conceptions are traditional and in
the field of moral theory its conception of the
relation sod faith to works is dynamic but
balanced.
In brief, the Church, the denomination, and the sect each stand
in a specific relation to the twin polarities between individualism
and collectivism and between conservation and change.
denomination is individualistic while the Church is, on the whole,
collectivist. In this sense Emile Durkheim says:
The only difference between Catholicism and
Protestantism is that the second permits free
enquiry to a far greater extent than the first ...
It [Catholicism] is not restricted to mechanical
ceremonies, but seeks control of the consciousness
... Nevertheless, the Catholic accepts his faith
ready made, without scrutiny. All variation is
abhorrent to Catholic thought. The Protestant is
far more the author of his faith. The Bible is
put in his hands and no interpretation is imposed
upon him.	 The very structure of the reformed
faith	 stressm	 this	 state	 of	 religious
individualism.
Thus the Church is, in principle, at home in the unitary
collective state. The struggle in which certain Churches are engaged
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against contemporary Socialist States is basically on account of their
totalitarianism in combination with atheism, not on account of their
collectivism. 20 In this respect it is to be pointed out that, like
the sect, the Catholic Church can be classified as, in Lewis A.
Coser's terminology, a 'greedy institution'. 21	Greedy institutions
are organisations and groups which make total claims on their members
and which attempt to encompass within their circle the whole
personality. In other words, greedy institutions seek exclusive and
undivided loyalty. But unlike the sect, the Roman Catholic Church has
a certain tolerance for marginal members.
The sect either drives the individualism of the denomination to
the anarchist extreme or it drives the collectivism of the Church to
the Communist
	 extreme,	 although sectarian collectivism and
ecclesiastical 'organicism' are, of course, phenomena radically
different in kind. 22 In Coser's words:
Sects claim the adherence of the whole person and
are never content with segmental involvement. The
early Bolshevik, or the Trotskyist, the adherent
to a Protestant fundamentalist sect are all
totally devoted to their sectarian group. They
could partake of the pneuma of salvation or
regeneration that resided in their sect only to
the extent that they devoted themselves
unconditionally to its characteristic spirit. The
sect is typically intolerant of any departure from
the "straight path", so that any member who may be
tempted to bring forth ideas even minimally at
variance with approved doctrine is castigated as a
heretic and cut off from the community of his
fellows as unclean and unworthy. The world of the
sect is a stern world where the sheep and the
goats are continually sorted anew to assure that
only the most worthy - that is, those who are
totally committed - remain in the company of the
elect. z3
According to Coser, sects are groups that bring together men, and
women who consider themselves to be among the "elect" and who conceive
of themselves as possessing a special type of esoteric knowledge or
special personal qualities.	 In similar vein, Wilson says that the
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ideal-type established sect in Christianity is an essentially minority
religious movement, stressing doctrines, practices or experience which
are divergent from those of the orthodox religious groups. 24	A
special relation is posited between the believer and Jesus Christ.
The sect is without historical sense, and its self-interpretation
describes its own mission as uniquely the purpose of God, and its own
emergence as of special significance in the schemes of God. The sect
is typically totalitarian, seeking to organise, or to dominate, the
way of life of adherents.
In relation to conservation and change the Church is naturally a
force for conservation. 25	This accounts for the occasional ambiguity
of its relation to collectivism, for example, the totalitarian
ideologies in the modern age. The general psychological direction of
the sect, however, is towards revolutionary change, but in conditions
of acute disappointment or when the forces ranged against are over-
whelmingly formidable, it may take a quietist and pacifist attitude;
It is generally agreed that the sect which rejects politics may even
sometimes have to descend into the political arena, so as to defend
its own religious interests. 26
Martin concludes that the denomination flourishes in conditions
and in countries where social change proceeds at a steady pace
according to agreed criteria: 	 insofar as acute social conflict
exists, men either embrace the ascetic rigours of the sect or turn to
the sources of continuity and stability found within the Church. 27
As a social phenomenon the denomination is particularly characteristic
of the United States of America and the British Commonwealth.
To summarise, the 'church' should be regarded as the established
religious community, which is co-terminous with a widespread social
order. It may well be that, with the rise of large religious bodies
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within a particular national or secular community, the 'church' tends
to become a 'denomination', one among a number of religious
communities, which have to live together within the same social
order.
28
On the ideological level, the sect seeks to be divergent from, if
not actively opposed to, the more generally accepted teaching of the
'church' or 'society , . 29	In its behavioural aspect, the sect
endeavours to establish strict codes, separate from the world, whilst
its manner of worship is simple and intimate. In its organisation,
its leaders are unprofessional, its statuses and roles are based on
personal 'charisma', whilst its membership is mainly drawn from the
lower classes. 30
In contrast to this, ideologically, the 'church-type' has a
developed doctrinal structure and upholds tradition, as a conservative
force. 31
	In its behavioural aspect, this type reflects the folk-
ways of the social milieu in which it is placed, whilst its rites and
ceremonies are adjusted to meet most major occasions in the society's
life, with which its own life is deemed to be co-extensive. On its
organisational side, the members of the 'church-type' are born into
the community.
As Martin has done, the 'denomination-type' needs to be
explored 32
	
According to J.H. Chamberlayne, the 'denomination'
recognises the concept of 'Extra Ecclesiam nulla salus' but recognises
that other communions are embraced within the concept of 'Ecclesia',
though not yet recognised in institutional terms. 33
Incidentally, Charles Y. Glock and Rodney Stark maintain that "it
seems unjustified to consider Protestantism as a unified religious
point of view in the same sense as Roman Catholicism". 34	Not that
Roman Catholicism is monolithic either; clearly there are several
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theological strands interwoven in the Catholic Church too, but there
is at least some justification for treating them collectively since
they constitute an actual, organised body. 	 Protestantism, on the
other hand, includes many separately constituted groups, and the only
possible grounds for treating them collectively would be if they
shared in a common religious vision. But this is clearly not the
case. Thus, it is important to examine differences among Protestant
bodies (denominations).
According to Glock and Stark (1965), at least four and probably
five generic theological camps can be clearly identified among the
American denominations.
The first, which we shall call the liberals,
comprises the Congregationalists, Methodists, and
Episcopalians, and is characterized by having a
majority of members who reject firm belief in
central tenets of Christian orthodoxy.
The second group, the moderates, is composed of
the Disciples of Christ and the Presbyterians.
This group is less secularized than the liberals,
but more so than the conservatives, who are made
up of the American Lutheran groups, and the
American Baptists. The fundamentalists include
the Missouri Synod Lutherans, the Southern
Baptists, and the host of small sects.
Because of historic differences with
Protestantism, the Roman Catholics are perhaps
probably left to form a fifth distinct group by
themselves.	 But on most theological issues the
Roman	 Cathollgs	 consistently resemble 	 the
conservatives.
Here it should be recalled that, at the earlier stage of
evangelistic work, American missionaries of 'Puritanic zeal and
Wesleyan fervour' imposed on Korean Protestant churches the American
brand of religious fundamentalism. 36	The American missionaries were
trained in the background of conservative and fundamental theology and
rigidly sectarian ethical views. As a result, fundamentalism held
sway in the Korean peninsula.	 Higher criticism and liberal theology,
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therefore, were deemed as dangerous heresies.
In relation to the present study, it should be taken into account
that in the Korean context the denomination is most clearly
distinguished from the sect and most nearly allied to the Church in
the sphere of 'eschatology'. All the few Christians who resolutely
resisted the Shinta shrine worship in Japan and Korea were sectarian
fundamentalists.
	
In orthodox biblical fundamentalism,	
-
resistn"s
Christian were by and large 'Adventists', who believed that the
tn
second coming of Christ to the world was near.	 It is clearly
demonstrated that the sphere of 'eschatology' is the one in which the
denomination and the sect are most clearly distinguished. The
question the next review will attempt to answer is what elements
within religious fundamentalism are conducive to participation in
political change. Also the socio-political implications of religious
liberalism will be examined together.
3. Religious Fundamentalism versus Religious Liberalism
In this review, we will first of all make an effort to clarify
fundamentalism and millenarianism. Against this background we will
explore the phenomenon of American fundamentalism. Then the
revolutionary potential of all millenarian movements will be examined.
Finally, the review will cover the question of religious liberalism in
totalitarian situations.
Two types of interpretation of fundamentalism have prevailed to
date. The most common has been to look on fundamentalism as
essentially the extreme and organised defence of a dying way of life.
However, in 1970 Ernest Sandeen found the roots of fundamentalism in
genuine doctrinal traditions. 	 Basically, according to Sandeen,
fundamentalism was the outgrowth of the 'millenarian' movement that
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developed in late nineteenth-century America, especially through Bible
institutes and conferences concerning the interpretation of Biblical
prophecies. 1
	The movement's millenarian teachings, appearing in
their most common form as 'dispensational pre-millenialism', divided
all of history into distinct eras or dispensations.
	
The final
dispensation would be the 'millennium' or one-thousand year personal
reign of Christ on earth.
	 In Sandeen's view, these Bible teachers
acquired from conservative Presbyterians at Princeton Theological
Seminary the newly defined dogma that the Bible was 'inerrant' in
every	 detail.	 Similarly,	 Ernest	 Tuveson	 believes	 that
fundamentalistic Protestants in general are millenarian, and the
version of millenarianism most common among fundamentalists is part of
'dispensationalism', a new form of the seven-day theory of the history
of creation. 2	The millenarian tradition, rather than the events of
the 1920s, Sandeen argues, is crucial in understanding fundamentalism.
Marsden considers that Sandeen is certainly correct in supposing
that millenarianism and Princeton theology are two of the important
keys for understanding fundamentalism. 3	Indeed, avowed 'funda-
mentalists' today are almost all strict millenarians who also insist
on Biblical inerrancy. According to Marsden, if one traces the roots
of today's strictly separatist and dispensationalist 'fundamentalism',
Sandeen's central argument is seen to be basically correct. 4 Yet,
Marsden argues, this approach fails to deal adequately with the larger
phenomenon of the militantly anti-modernist evangelism of the 1920s,
known at the time as 'fundamentalism'. This broader fundamentalism in
turn had wider roots, cultural as well as theological and
organisational.
In Sandeen's view, "it is millenarianism which gave life and
shape to the Fundamentalist movement". 5 The great and lasting appeal
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of the millenarian idea may be attributed in large measure to two
elements:	 its promise of a utopian age, when the positions of
oppressed and oppressors are reversed, as the culmination of history;
and its suggestive outline of a revolution and a redeemer who will be
able to break down the seemingly impregnable fortress of power and
injustice. 6 By and large, millenarianism is the religion of deprived
groups.
7
	In general millenarian (or messianic) movements occur among
strata and groups with the most 'archaic', to use Hobsbawm's term,
consciousness, 8 that is, consciousness belonging to the past.
Incidentally, Yonia Talmon defines "millenarian" movements as
'religious movements that expect imminent, total, ultimate, this-
worldly collective salvation'. 9	Some of Talmon's major
characteristics of millenarian movements are worthy of recording for
the following discussion. 10
1) The majority of millenarian movements are 'messianic':
Salvation is brought about by a redeemer who is a mediator
between the human and the divine.
2) Millenarian movements tend to be 'ecstatic':
In many millenarian movements we encounter cases of hysterical
and paranoid phenomena, mass possession, trances, fantasies.
3) The basic 'dualism' of millenarianism:
This aspect is directly interrelated with the collective
orientation. A fundamental division separates the followers
from non-followers. History is viewed as a struggle between
saints and Satan.
Vittorio Lanternari, from the viewpoint of historico-religious
comparison, broadens the meaning of the word 'messianism'.
11
Therefore, as a working hypothesis, he uses the term 'messiah' to
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designate any being, singular or plural, more or less anthropomorphic,
expected by a community as the future saviour in a religious context.
From this he concludes:	 "we can therefore say that any prophetic
movement has its messianic aspect, because in it a salvation is
expected which will be brought by mythical beings of events, whatever
they might be". 12	Theologically, messianism is an eschatological
phenomenon closely linked to an apocalyptic perception of history. 13
Here it seems necessary to draw some line of demarcation between
millennial movements on the one hand and utopian movements and
revolutionary socialism on the other. Norman Cohn draws this line
primarily in terms of the element of salvationalism in the former. 14
He proposes to regard as "millenarian" any religious movement inspired
by the fantasy of a salvation which is to be collective, terrestrial,
total and accomplished by agencies which are consciously regarded as
"supernatural". The movements that this definition allows us to class
together as millennial, have frequently a political as well as a
religious character. 15
Marsden, acknowledging the importance of the millenarian
background to fundamentalism, stresses other contributing factors such
as nineteenth-century evangelical Protestantism, revivalism, the
erosion of a solidly Protestant culture, opposition and antagonism to
Modernism, and the emphasis on personal moral purity. 16
According to Marsden, one of the closest counterparts to American
fundamentalism is English evangelicalism, and the differences between
them are instructive. 17	To the extent that conservative
evangelicalism existed in the 1920s England, it differed significantly
from the American variety in its general lack of militancy and impact
on the culture and the churches. 18	From this Marsden asserts that
the American context provides a key for understanding 'fundamentalism'
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- a twentieth-century movement closely tied to the revivalist
tradition of mainstream evangelical Protestantism that militantly
opposed modernist theology and the cultural change associated with
•t 
19
.
What was it in the American situation that fostered militant
fundamentalism on such a large scale? 	 Marsden approaches the
question with three interrelated categories: 	 social factors,
,
religious-cultural traditions, and intellectual tendencies. 20 First,
for American evangelicals, until recently identified with cultural
influences, the experience of 'displacement' in the period of the
1880s through the 1920s was especially traumatic. In addition, when a
general sense of cultural alarm was felt just following World War I,
it heightened the intensity of fundamentalist reactions.
21
With respect to war and religious beliefs, one might assume that
war should have further religious effects and, similarly, that after
the war there should be religious changes.
22
	On this point Samuel
R. Friedman presents some hypotheses about religious effects of the
American Civil War (1861-1865): 	 i) The social reality of	 an enemy
should increase the strength of beliefs in Satan; ii) The particular
form of increased Christian religiosity would be revivalism.
In similar vein, Arlie J. Hoover in The Gospel of Nationalism
(1986) says:
During and after each war [1813, 1870 and 1914]
the German clergy claimed to see a definite
revival of interest in religion among the
populace. This revival expressed itself in
religious experiences in combat, more Bible
reading,	 increased	 church	 attendance,	 and
increased prayer. During and after each war
preachers warned their parishioners against ne
sins of national arrogance and over-confidence.
Second, to a remarkable degree American religious experience, and
hence American culture, was shaped by what may be called (to modify a
-
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The
phrase of Stanley Elkins) "the dynamics of unopposed revivalism". 24
In contrast with England, Revivalism had little competition when it
came to determining the distinctive characteristics of American
religious life.	 Also lacking a strong institutional church and
denying the relevance of much of Christian tradition, American
Protestants were unified behind the principle of Scriptura sola.
Indeed,	 the Bible played a major role in America's self-
understanding. 25	In the wake of the Revolution, Americans saw
themselves as inaugurators of a new order for the ages, that is, a
return to a pristine human condition. For Protestants this ideal was
readily translated into Biblical primitivism.
In addition,	 unopposed revivalism often fostered anti-
intellectualism. 26	Richard Hofstadter, seeing anti-intellectualism
as an important component of fundamentalism, asserts that evangelical
Christianity repudiated elaborate theological scholarship in favour of
emotional religious experience.
27
Furthermore, the strong revivalist
tradition in America doubtless contributed to the tendency to see
things in terms of simple antitheses or dichotomies.
revivalist believed that the universe was divided into the realm of
God and the realm of Satan, the righteous and the unrighteous.
Revivalist hymns were full of simple contrasts between sorrow and joy,
turmoil and rest, weakness and strength, darkness and light, defeat
and victory, purity and impurity, guilt and forgiveness, the world and
heaven. 29 The whole revivalist impulse was based on the perception
of an antithesis between the saved and the lost. In this dichotomised
world view, ambiguity was rare.
Incidentally, it should be pointed out that fundamentalism arose
primarily among groups with Reformed origins, such as Baptists and
Presbyterians, and was quite rare on the Methodist side of American
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revivalism, which emphasised the ethical rather than the intellectual
aspects of Christianity. 30	In this respect Pentecostalism is the
movement	 of	 this	 tradition	 that	 parallels	 fundamentalism.
Pentecostals also rejected modern culture but more in terms of intense
personal piety than individuals separated from the world and than in
terms of doctrinal warfare. 31
Third, whilst in British church life and especially in English
constitutional history there was a deeply rooted awareness of the
gradual development of traditions, the newness of America seemed to
demand new departures and a break with the past. 32	Americans had
relatively little history of their own, and their national experience
often seemed like a new dispensation, totally discontinuous with the
past. Thus, primitivism was one response to this situation.
The characteristic view of history among fundamentalists has been
dispensational premillennialism.
33
	Dispensational-premillennialism
was originated in England in the early nineteenth century. Yet in the
twentieth century it has apparently had relatively few adherents in
England except among Plymouth Brethren, while in America it remains
tremendously popular.	 The popularity of dispensational-
premillennialism in twentieth-century America reveals that Americans
lacked certain typically modern concepts of history. 	 The assumptions
central to most modern historical scholarship were that history is a
natural evolutionary development and the corollary that the present
can best be understood as a product of developing natural forces from
the past.	 American historiography had long been dominated by
supernatural, or at least providential, interpretations.
34
Much of the sociological literature dealing with religious
fundamentalism stresses its conservative, right-wing, and frequently
apolitical character. 35	Seymour Martin Lipset, for example, argues
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that fundamentalist religion 'drains off' energies and activities that
would normally be channelled into political protest ventures and
points out how centres of fundamentalism in Europe later were
transformed into areas of Communist strength:
Direct connections between the social roots of
political and of religious extremism have been
observed in a number of countries.	 In Czarist
Russia, the young Trotsky recognized the
relationship and successfully recruited the first
working class members of the South Russian
Worker's
	
Union	 (a	 revolutionary	 Marxist
Organization of the late 1890s) from adherents to
religious sects. In Holland and Sweden, recent
studies show that the Communists are strongest in
regions which were orye centres of fundamentalist
religious revivalism.
In general, as a theological label for traditional religious
dogmatism and textual literalism, fundamentalism is-seldom perceived
as a vehicle for political change. 37 Fundamentalism has been fond of
arguing that a moral society could not be created by legislation, but
only by changing the hearts of individuals.	 Therefore, political
involvement was traditionally viewed as incompatible with the primary
task of fundamentalist religion. 38
Recently, however, some writers have shown interest in the
politicisation of fundamentalism as a new and significant
phenomenon. 39	In "Religious Fundamentalism and Political Change"
(1975), Harry H. Hiller sought an explanation for the sudden rise to
power of an innovative and new political party (based on an ideology
with roots in England) called Social Credit in the province of Alberta
in Canada. According to Hiller, the party's leaders were well-known
fundamentalist figures who were not previously engaged in politics but
who brought religion and politics together to initiate legitimate
political change. 40 The original political victory of 1935 involved
considerable protest and criticism of the established social order,
but the party slowly moderated to the point of being quite
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conservative in tone. Why was fundamentalism conducive to this type
of political participation?
	 First of all, Hiller concludes, "because
fundamentalism demands a prior allegiance to the religious text (in
this case the Bible) over man-made religious institutional
structures.
41
He adds:
A recent definition of fundamentalism from within
the camp illuminates the possibility of the
emergence of this radical streak within the
movement. Fundamentalism was referred to not only
in terms of unswerving Biblical literalism but
also as the 'militant exposuie. of all non-Biblical
affirmations and attitudes'. 4[ Such a religious
position could easily legitimate political
criticism and 4ac.3 tivity when contextual factors
facilitated it. 
Lastly, Hiller emphasises that fundamentalism is always likely to
participate in political change. In this respect, fundamentalism can
be put into the category of pre-political movements. 44	In fact, the
opposite perhaps is more often the case. But when the socio-economic
circumstances are appropriate, we might point out how fundamentalism
can make political change tolerable, orderly, and possible. 45
James E. Wood, Jr., the editor of Journal of Church and State,
wrote "Religious Fundamentalism and the New Right" (1980). In his
view, clearly, fundamentalist Christians are forming a burgeoning new
force in American politics and are shifting away from their
traditional view that 'religion and politics don't mix'. 46
	The
recent emergence of Christian fundamentalism as a new political force
in American life, both as to its extent and its character, is
significantly unlike earlier examples of the conservative role played
by organised religion in American politics. Thus, Wood stresses that
"the politicization of Christian fundamentalism is a very recent
phenomenon"
	He asserts that the Moral Majority shows little
awareness of the disparity between religious vision and political
reality in a democratic society.
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With regard to the reasons behind the emergence of the
fundamentalist political movement, Wood explains that "the movement is
no doubt meeting genuinely felt needs and frustrations of multitudes
of people". 48
	Moreover, he warns of the dangers and defects of the
movement as well:
	 "There is, of course, the danger of religion's
simply being used by politicians and religionists alike for the
accomplishment of political ends". 49
In this context, Thomas M. Gannon, in his "The New Christian
Right in America as a Social and Political Force" (1981), concerning
the	 nature and potential influence of the emerging Christian
Right in the U.S.A., dealt with the groups that comprise the movement
- their numbers; religious affiliations; their political, economic,
and social-cultural attitudes.
	 To interpret the meaning of this
movement, he paid attention to the relationship of the New Christian
Right to previous major religious revivals in American history. From
this he offered a tentative and preliminary assessment of the
movement's actual and potential political impact. Gannon concludes
that the fundamentally anti-political attitude of the New Christian
Right largely explains their inability to function with any degree of
success in the American political system. 50
 In other words, Gannon
emphasises that the present-day New Christian Right, though it can be
driven by moral indignation into the political arena, hardly proves
able to move beyond denunciation to a long term political plan. 51
All millenarian movements contain progressive-revolutionary
potential. According to Robert M. Anderson, the degree to which the
revolutionary potential of a millenarian movement is realised depends
upon how it views the coming Millennium. 52
 He asserts:
If the movement sees itself as the divine agent
for building the Millennium within the present,
then reform or revolution will be the likely
result. If it sees the Millennium being brought
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in miraculously from the outside without human
effort, then withdrawal and accommodation will
more likely be the consequences. The choice
between these conceptions is not accidental, but
is determined by such things as the class
character, material and intellectual resources,
ideology, and psychology of the movement, as well
as the structure and stability of the social
order. .53
In this sense, Timothy P. Weber maintains that the descendants of
the militant fundamentalists in the 1920s are still almost exclusively
dispensationalists. 54	Thus, first of all, it is worth clarifying
'dispensationalism' in the light of the revolutionary potential of a
millenarian movement.
Dispensationalism is a theological system whose basic schema
involves dividing history into periods corresponding to a particular
form of intervention on the part of God. 55	The schema claims to
reconcile all the biblical prophecies of the Old and New Testaments
read in a literalist fashion.	 The theory ends up devaluing the
present, as it regards the time of current dispensation (the time of
grace) as a parenthesis in the course of the history of mankind which
will irrevocably end with the 'Great Tribulation', from which real
believers will be spared through collective, secret 'abduction'.
We might agree with Sandeen (1970a and b) that dispensationalism
induces withdrawal from the political sphere and leads to a lack of
concern for public affairs.
	 But Sandeen did not take into
consideration the immense flexibility of the premillennialist
system. 56
 In relation to this, we can assume, from the perspective of
Anderson (1979), that if the movement's members, seeing themselves as
the divine agents, view the coming Millennium as 'imminent', then
reform or revolution will be the likely result.
	
Thus, to better
understand the revolutionary potential of a millenarian movement, we
should consider dispensationalism in the light of premillenniarist
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eschatological vision. Furthermore, we should note that there is some
'ambivalence' in the fundamentalist project, which sometimes sees the
world as heading for disaster which one can only hope to get out of in
time, and at other times believes in the possible return of the model
of the ideal nation blessed by God. 57
The end of the Victorian era had seen some significant
developments in Protestant religious thought. 	 Perhaps the most
important was the popularity of what was rather arrogantly called 'the
higher criticism' 58
	
The so-called Fundamentalist movement in
America looked at 'modernism' or 'liberal Protestantism' as heretical.
Roman Catholicism's official response was one of almost exclusively
negative impulse. Pope Pius X felt it necessary to condemn the so-
called 'Modernist' heresy for its willingness to accommodate new
thought. 59 It ought to be stressed here that 'the higher criticism'
acquired one of its major strongholds among the Protestants of north
and central Germany influenced by the Enlightenment. 60	German
scholars had begun to search for the historical Christ, the real
figure who had been buried under the various myths of the early gospel
writers and the early Christian church. Steve Bruce expresses the
intellectual approach of German scholars as follows:
Every civilization has its own world-view; its
own set of background beliefs expressed through
its language. The early Christians were not
different in this respect. Thus while Christ was
a real historical figure, what we know about him
has been heavily overlaid with the world-view of
the people of his time. In order to discover what
God really intends for us we must strip away the
Hebrew and Aramaic myths gyd get to the real heart
of the Christian message.
The 'higher criticism' was coupled with a desire to remove the
miraculous and supernatural elements from Christianity in order to
produce a rational version of the faith which would be acceptable to a
culture which knew about science and technology. The rationalism of
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the higher criticism gradually permeated all the major Protestant
denominations. But the confessional Protestant churches were little
touched by the excesses of liberal theology. 62
	The 'higher
criticism' was not only a theological movement. It tended also to be
socially liberal and progressive. 63
 The liberals believed that the
gospel entailed Christians being socially reformist, because the
improvement of people's material conditions would make them more
,-
receptive to the preaching of the Word. But the conservatives tended
to the view that man was past redemption and that only religious
conversion could improve anything. For this reason they thought that
one should preach the gospel, get men saved, and then social and
economic reform and prosperity would follow naturally from a saved
population acting righteously.
With regard to theological circles, it was in the Presbyterians,
especially in the U.S.A., that the fundamentalist-liberal controversy
became noticeable.	 In this context we can recall that scriptural
literalism was a prominent characteristic of Protestantism in the
U.S.A.
64
	The other main root of fundamentalism was the modern
revival of millenarianism, traceable in the United States as far back
as 1878.	 The connection between scriptural literalism and
millenarianism was clear. Therefore, historically, the creeds were a
major obstacle for liberal Presbyterians. Although Presbyterians, as
Protestants, accepted the Bible as the only standard of authoritative
knowledge, they accepted the Westminster Confession of Faith and the
Longer and Shorter Catechisms as 'subordinate' standards. 65	These
were documents drawn up by a group of 'divines' in the 1640s and
accepted by the Church of Scotland in 1647. They had long been an
embarrassment to liberal Presbyterians.
In Steve Bruce's view, therefore, "liberal Protestantism appears
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as a continual impulse to modernise the faith, to abandon the confines
of old creeds, and to accommodate the thought and practice of the
churches to that of the secular world".
66
	It is also to be noted
that liberal Protestantism is historically and sociologically close to
ecumenism. Liberalism is probably essential to the modern ecumenical
movement, that is, 'a movement within the Christian church towards
unity on all fundamental issues of belief, worship, etc.'
67
 In this
respect ecumenism can be viewed as the interactional counterpart to
liberalism. The former depends on the latter and reinforces it. But
it should be emphasized in this context that "ecumenism is only made
possible by moderating claims about one's own uniqueness".
68
Some have stressed that there is an affinity between liberal
Protestant circles and the idea of a National Church.
69
	As Bryan
Wilson observed, the ecumenical spirit provided a strategic defence
against creeping secularisation. 70	The ecumenical aspect of the
National Church concept was just as attractive in this respect to
North Americans as to Englishmen, allowing for a broadly based effort
to advance the social role of the churches. The liberals maintained:
'The Church should not content herself with saving individuals out of
the world, but should save the world. 	 Society is the subject of
redemption' h1
	
For the supporters of the National Church idea,
generally speaking, the State was the nucleus of the National Church.
It can be recalled in this connection that in English Canada, the
movement for a National Church also made some headway. The concept of
church union ultimately bore fruit in a most concrete way with the
formation of the United Church by the Methodists, Congregationalists
and some liberal Presbyterians in 1925. 72	Here also a consistent
blending of the concept of the National Church with Social
Christianity, similar in pattern to groups in England and the United
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States, was maintained. We should not underestimate the influence of
the German historical school on the minds of many socially reforming
liberal Protestants.
Here we can point out that in the eighteenth and nineteenth
century, the most critical period that Christianity has ever endured,
nationalism as a secular surrogate for religion grew as orthodox
Christianity declined. It does not seem an accident of history. It
arose immediately after the Enlightenment had showered its caustic
criticisms on Christianity.
73
Lutheran orthodoxy dominated the religious scene in northern and
central Germany at the beginning of the nineteenth century, but it was
by no means unopposed. One of its major opponents was pietism, a
movement that had its roots, like orthodoxy, in the Reformation.
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Because they emphasised personal piety and the practical and ethical
aspects of Christianity rather than the dogmatic, they were called
'pietists'.	 They opposed the creedal intolerance of Lutheranism.
Pietism attacked traditional orthodoxy by belittling dogma.
Rationalism - another component of the eighteenth-century mind -
attacked dogmatic religion by contrasting it with secular scholarship
and science.	 Hence both pietism and rationalism worked to undermine
dogmatic orthodoxy.	 Both rejected the authoritarian and doctrinal
approach to religion.	 Thus E. Walter Zeeden says:	 'Rationalism
turned Christianity into a matter of practical living so that it
actually did give up dogma and sacrament , .
75
With regard to Germany as the home of religious modernism, both
pietism and rationalism stressed religious toleration.
76
 In Prussia
one found more champions of tolerance than any other part of Germany.
It was largely due to Prussian tolerance that northern Germany was to
lead the world in the development of religious liberalism. The new
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theology had its roots in German rationalism.
It is generally accepted that pietism contributed to the rise of
German nationalism. In Germany, the movement of pietism came before
the rise of rationalism and thus, by its rejection of dogma, helped
prepare the people for a reception of rationalism. According to Arlie
J. Hoover, "the most important contribution that pietism made to the
rise of nationalism was to combine with the general rationalistic
attack upon orthodoxy and thus help to create a void in the minds and
hearts of men, a void which in turn was soon to be filled with a new
loyalty, the nation". 77
In this context we should point out that the theology of
Friedrich Schleiermacher (1768-1834) altered the traditional picture
of God. 78
	He did not consider God to be transcendent, but almost
wholly immanent.
	 This is a very crucial distinction in the sense
that "it is easy for a man to make a God of the State or the Volk if
he already believes that God is immanent in the creation" .79 As
German theology approached the twentieth century it emphasised
immanence and cultural Protestantism more and more. Hence, the First
World War, by no accident, contained the most vigorous efforts at
blending nationalism and religion.
	 The German Protestant pastors
contributed to the worship of the nation-state by trying to harmonise
their German nationalism with their Christian universalism.
The theoretical implications of the 'German Christian' position
represented the standpoint of Liberalism or Modernism in other
lands. 80
	In Hitler's Third Reich the Confessing Church was
persecuted because it did not 'co-ordinate' with the new religion of
National Socialism.
	 The sect or movement of the so-called 'German
Christians'	 attempted	 to combine Christianity with National
Socialism. 81
	One of the distinctive elements in the teaching of the
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'German Christians' was their attitude to the myth of Blood and Race,
to the National Socialist philosophy in general, and to the person of
Hitler.	 Positive' Christianity had no proper theological
content;
	 it indicated merely a positive attitude to National
Socialism.
In similar vein some have focused on the relationship between the
suicide of Liberalism and the emergence of the totalitarian state.
George Andrew Beck argues that by a strange confusion of ways and yet
by an inner logic the Liberal movement brought us to the verge of the
totalitarian state.
This idea of nationalist aspirations brings us to
the other great fruit of Liberalism, the extension
of state interest in, and eventually of state
control of, education. It may seem at first sight
strange that the Liberal mind, which sought the
emancipation of individuals from the restrictions
of control, helped in fact to establish a form of
control which has perhaps done more than anything
else to condition the minds of citizens to the
service of the state and the government. The
trouble with the Liberals was that they never
thought out their principles - nor followed them
to a logical conclusion ... They represent, in
fact, a curious compromise between a pacific
cosmopolitanism which was a hangover from the 18th
century and an aggressive nationalism which became
so violently effective in the latter part of the
19th century. Thus the Radicals in France, the
left Liberals in Italy, the Austrian Liberals,
were all more ready supporters of conscription and
military expansion in the 1860s and 1870s than any
of the so-called Conservative groups. It was in
like manner the Liberals who were the supporters
of policies of admingitrative centralization and
national unification.
According to Paul J. Tillich, the present social situation in the
Western countries of 1937 was marked by a disintegration of the older
moral standards and social groups which had accompanied the economic
crisis of late capitalism. 83
	This resulted in a general and far-
reaching social and psychic insecurity which in turn expressed itself
in a rejection of individual moral responsibility and in the flight
- 83 -
into collectivistic totalitarianism. In this situation, in his view,
liberal Protestantism could not furnish a principle of reintegration
because its awn principles did not themselves transcend the
disintegrating secularism. 84 This was true of its thought, in which
it depended on the increasingly meaningless intellectual life in
general; and it was true of its action, in which it was drawn into
the increasingly contradictory social life both within and between
national states. Tillich concludes:
Consequently people who are embarrassed by the
meaningless of their existence generally prefer
the	 opposed	 tendencies:	 fundamentalism,
Barthianism, Buchmanism. These people want to
have a principle transcending their whole
disintegrated existence in individual and social
life. But the difficulty is that these movements
use ununderstandable symbols which are powerless
for dealing with the present. Barthianism, for
example, has shown its power of saving the German
church from paganization in giving theological
aims to a group of struggling ministers, but it
has not been able to reintegrate the younger
generation or the masses of disintegrated
proletarians or even middle-class persons ...
Hence Protestantism still has to discover a
possible approach which 
E
will enable it to cope
with the world-situation. b
Incidentally, with regard to the problem of intellectuals and
Fascism, some have shown that in any society liberal intellectuals who
want direct political impact often, to a great extent, risk
sacrificing much of their independence of thought in exchange for the
chance to affect national policies. 86	Fascism had great
intellectual appeal because it promised a 'new society'. 87
As Bruce has shown, in order to explain sociologically the fact
of liberal Protestantism vis-a-vis the secular world, one must
consider the internal dimension of the relationship between liberal
Protestantism as a set of beliefs and its social organisation. 88
 When
liberal Protestantism is to be compared with conservative
Protestantism, the former can be distinguished by its particularly
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precarious belief system. 	 The Word of God may still be the ultimate
source of authority for liberal Protestants but the Word must be
'interpreted', 'de-mythologised' and 'understood'. Human reason and
culture act as a filter between the Word of God and consciousness.
Recognising the role of reason and culture in interpretation opens up
the possibility of relativism.	 How does one authoritatively define
what is needed for salvation? 	 This is not a serious problem for the
Catholics and the Orthodox because the tradition and the officials of
the Church resolve disputes. Also conservative Protestants can avoid
relativism by sticking firmly to certain historic statements of faith.
Creeds and catechisms are used to police the boundaries of the
faith. 89
Beliefs must be organised for the commitment of the believing
community. In this sense Georg Simmel emphasised the significance of
individual affiliation with the groups:
	 "He is determined
sociologically in the sense that the groups 'intersect in his persons
by virtue of his affiliation". 90	Similarly Coser established 'the
functions of social conflict' as a sociological verity. 91	Punishing
those that reject what one believes as well as promoting it are very
good for the commitment of the believing group. Generally speaking
the adherent to a Protestant fundamentalist sect is totally devoted to
his sectarian group. 92	The sect is typically intolerant of any
departure from the 'straight path'. If creeds cannot be constructed,
as in the case of liberal Protestantism, then the world cannot be
divided into those with the saving truth and those without it. There
is no sense in which heretics can be identified and punished.
In contrast to liberal Protestantism conservative beliefs can be
stated dogmatically and simply. They can be used as membership tests
and hence as means of identifying the unsaved. However, liberals tend
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to see their aim in serving the secular world in a way that eventually
erodes what is distinctive about their faith. 93
	
Liberal
Protestantism has been unable to prevent its accommodation to the
secular world coming very close to absorption by the world. Also it
makes sense to note that there are conservative Protestants in large
bodies (denominations), who are more sectarian than liberal
Protestants.	 Regarding the present study, although in general it is
religious conservatism and the church bureaucracies which finally come
to terms with the secular regime, it is correct to maintain that
religious liberalism is more vulnerable to ideological infiltration in
a totalitarian situation.
C. Sociology of Missions
The purpose of this section is to review existing sociological
studies on Christian Missions. In 1932 Kenneth S. Latourette said:
It [the Christian missionary enterprise] is
conducting its activities on every continent and
among the large majority of the nations and
peoples of the earth ... It is operating in the
midst of a fluid world ... Surely no other
enterprise demands for its largest usefulness more
continuous, fearless, honest and painstaking
investigations of the conditions which it
confronts, and of its methods and results.
Given the social significance of missions, and the vast amount
that has been written about them, it is ironic that there is not so
much literature on the sociology of missions. Although there are
certain valuable documents, many histories of missions, the reports of
missionary societies, the monographs from the mission fields, it is
true that these documents rarely have been utilised from the
sociological point of view. 2	Thus the characteristic of the
sociology of missions is that it constitutes 'virgin' territory. In
this respect T.O. Beidelman's Colonial Evangelism (1982) 3
 is worthy of
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note. This study is about Africa, but raises some general questions
about the relationship between missions and colonialism; also Ch. I
discusses general questions about the sociology of missions.
According to Beidelman, anthropologists and sociologists have
been remiss in studying colonial institutions even though they give
lip service to considering the total social context of societies they
investigate. In fact some missionaries themselves wrote considerable
studies in the form of histories and analyses to facilitate mission
work, though not in any consistent and sustained manner with
meaningful reference to social theory outside the missionary context
(e.g., Max Warren, Social History and Christian Mission (1967)). In
this respect, 'colonial institutions' should be studied not only
because they provide invaluable insights into the development of the
Third World but also because they reveal striking similarities With.
Western complex social organisations. 4
The social universe of the Third World today resembles the
colonial world which preceded it. It is in this sense that the study
of 'defunct' institutions of colonialism would provide insights into
social features still evident in contemporary situations. Studying
such aspects of contemporary societies is often discouraged, although
little opposition is met today in studying the colonial past. It is
easy to criticize colonial rule in terms of exploitation, injustice,
and ethnocentrism; such accounts are common and have led to cheap and
easy judgements.
	 Rather than this, in Beidelman's view, "what is
required is analysis and review that allow us to perceive the colonial
world as a system, both in terms of its thought and values and in
terms of the ways it was organised". 5
	A basic feature of what is
usually termed colonial activity is simply the interaction between
disproportionate social groups which possess in different degrees the
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powers to dominate.	 Although all colonial organisations display
similar characteristics, missions are the quintessential example;
they aim at the most far-reaching domination, attacking the most
deeply held traditional beliefs and values as well as economic and
political forms. 6
In this present review, it might be appropriate to itemise
explicitly the sociological problems that relate to missions: 1) the
,
concept of mission; 2) sources of missionary effort in Christianity;
3) Western penetration of non-Western societies and the position of
missionary effort within that historical situation;
	 4) social
composition of missionary organizations, and recruitment patterns of
missionaries (these vary according to the church in question 7
 ); 5)
missionary response to local cultures (this varies through history of
mission effort; it varies according to the church in question, and
according to the culture where the mission is found);
	 and 6)
missionary attitudes to the political authorities in the mission field
(these can be indigenous, or from the mission's own government at
home, or from an alien colonial government).
An issue of the American Journal of Sociology (1944) was largely
-the
devoted to missions. Robert Ezra Park in "Missions and
A
 Modern World"
maintains that "the task of missions has been to create from the
existing social and cultural units a common culture and a moral
solidarity in which all can share". 8
	According to him, Christian
missions are outposts of European civilisation;
	 their staffs are
intermediaries and interpreters between the two worlds. Hugh Stuntz,
from a Christian perspective, emphasises in his "Christian Missions
and Social Cohesion" that despite its division and disunity in time of
crisis "Christianity has proved to be a binding influence for social
solidarity" .9
	
Eventually he concludes that "unless Christian
-
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missions can offer the healing influence of a great loyalty in
situations where former faiths have been disinherited, the result of
the impact of Western culture on non-European life will produce
confusion and chaos". 10
In contrast to the 'sententious and glib' 11
 papers of Park and
Stuntz, G. Gordon Brown in "Missions and Cultural Diffusion" shows
some insights into the sociology of missions.	 According to Brown,
missionaries represent a subculture within Western culture. 	 They
stress theology and the moral taboos more than do their fellow-
countrymen. "Missionaries and the groups which actively support them
are definite subcultures". 12	They are a religious subculture; this
again can be analysed with a theological subculture and an ethical
subculture.	 Also he distinguishes two methods of transmission of
culture on the part of the missionary: 	 the deliberate and the
inadvertent method. 13
	As a man with a purpose, the missionary will
deliberately and systematically teach theology, ethics and morals.
But also, as a participant in a culture, he will have certain basic
attitudes which are not part of the essential ethic of Christianity.
These attitudes will manifest themselves in unsystematised but
nevertheless consistent reactions to situations. It is to be noted in
this context that some of the content of culture transmitted is
changed in the process of transmission.	 Or what missionaries
accomplish is characteristically a compromise between Western and
indigenous ways. In his view, if an alien culture which has its own
systems of thought, its own morals, and its own attitudes and values,
is complex, if it is what is called a civilisation, there will be
conscious resistance to a new theological system. 14	In this sense,
many histories of missions show that missionary attitudes to Africa
and Asia seem to be different.
•-
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The diffusion of new ethical concepts and the introduction of new
social groupings may modify, weaken, or destroy the indigenous social
organisation. 15
	In a society which practises ancestor worship, G.G.
Brown argues,	 Christian theological beliefs may weaken family and
kin solidarity.	 Cultural arrogance reaches its heights in the
missionary because of the very nature of the attitudes and values
which induced him to become a missionary: "Go ye into the world and
preach the gospel to every people" is at once the charter of the
missionary's activities and an expression of his intention.
In brief, according to G.G. Brown, missions are simply one of
several agencies for the diffusion of Euro-American culture.
	 The
missionaries	 stress the theological and the ethical. 	 So they
propound a theological system which other members of their society do
not take too seriously. And they are more intensely concerned with
the minor taboos of their culture:
	 tobacco, drink, and verbal
prohibitions against obscenity, profanity, and blasphemy. 16
It is Roger Mehl in Traite de sociologie du protestantisme
(1965) 17
 
who explicitly suggests that "the missionary phenomenon can
be viewed as a sociological phenomenon".
	 For the simple reason, Mehl
stresses that mission is a well-dated historical phenomenon. Given
that the emergence and expansion of Christian mission, in the first
place, can be situated in the context of the historical development of
Christianity, Mehl's point on sources of missionary effort in
Christianity should be examined in detail.
It is true that mission is part of the essence of the church,
since the gospel is not a doctrine for initiates but a good news to
proclaim to the ends of the earth.
	 In this sense a non-missionary
Christianity is a contradiction in itself. In spite of the profound
dynamism of the gospel which enabled the diffusion of Christianity
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throughout the ancient world, however, at the same time, it is a fact
that the church, once established, sometimes ceases to be missionary,
and for long periods. It is a fact that when 	 Western Christendom
was established, protected by
	 political power, it was more pre-
occupied with shoring up the outer walls to protect itself from the
Infidels than with being missionary.
	 Particularly, although the
Reformation has not lost sight of the idea of an apostolate, it was
not at all missionary.	 In other words, it was content with
evangelizing Christians. In the sixteenth century, the real aim of
the first 14 Calvinist missionaries was to create a Brazilian refuge
for the persecuted French Reformed. Whereas Catholicism showed signs
of great missionary vitality, especially in China, Protestant missions
did not really begin until two centuries after the Reformation. But
then it came about as a sort of explosion. Protestant missionary
societies multiplied at an accelerated pace, overtaking and even
outstripping Catholic missionaries. What is its sociological meaning?
On this import, Roger Mehl proclaims the following two important
facts.
Firstly, the Protestant missionary movement began before the
churches had commenced their process of 'disestablishment', 18 that is,
'deprivation of the church of established status'. 19	The missionary
work itself was 'contemporaneous' with the signs of 'disintegration' -
a greater freedom and a greater mobility of the churches - which
showed up here and there in a Christendom which continued to alienate
itself from the civilisation and politics of the Western states. In
this context it should be pointed out that the principal missionary
enterprises initially were orAnglo-Saxon origin', that is, 'Anglo-
American Protestantism' rather than 'German Lutheranism'. This was
due to the fact that while the latter was centred on the state and
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closed in upon itself, the former saw already existing signs of a
greater freedom and a greater mobility of the churches. 	 Finally,
within the established churches (France and Germany) themselves there
already existed small 'revivalist' and 'pietist' circles which took
missionary work in charge. As these signs multiplied, missionary work
expanded, but for a long time, missions appeared as 'private'
enterprises. It was only during the years 1930-1940 that a radical
change of perspective took place. Thus it is important to note that
the early development of Protestant missions was based on the
'margins' of the established churches, and the frontiers were strongly
tainted with 'pietism' and 'individualism'.
Secondly, in regard to the general evolution of society, it is
necessary to mention that missionary expansion was contemporaneous
with 'colonial expansion'.	 At the end of the eighteenth century
colonisation took a new form:	 the colonial powers no longer were
content to establish commercial settlements on the coasts; they began
to want to exploit colonial territories in depth. 	 The missionary
appeared in the wake of the colonialist, merchant, or soldier. Thus
it was a fact that a solidarity was established between 'colonisation
and mission'. It is necessary to emphasise that this solidarity was
the
not consciously desired by
A
 missions; Indeed, there are numerous facts
that attest to the existence of conflicts between colonization and
+he
missionS. However, it is inevitable that Christianity often appears to
A
the indigene to be one of the forms of 'White superiority'.
A confusion between colonialising nation and mission was often
possible, even more so because the utilisation of the mission by the
colonial power for political ends was often observed; the first Dutch
missionaries from the end of the seventeenth century were practically
without ties with their church. They were dependent on the state and
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on the Indies Company, and consequently had to follow their
directives. The missions therefore were in danger of becoming the
'camouflage' for a political operation in the midst of international
competition.
	 Facts of this type abound in missionary history and
they counterbalance numerous other facts witnessing to a real
independence of mission in relation to politics. Briefly speaking,
Mehl emphasises that mission must be aware of its 'sociological
conditioning', not with the pretension of escaping from all
sociological context or of somewhat discarnating itself, but of making
a critique of its context. 20	In a similar vein, Jozef Boel in
Christian Mission in India: A Sociological Analysis (1975), stresses
the contextual element of missionary work: 	 the society in which
missionary work is carried out. 21
Max Warren, Canon of Westminster
	 IM 1967, in Social 
History and Christian Mission (1967), said that the British missionary
movement was in part an expression of a far wider development - the
social emancipation of the 'under-privileged' classes in Britain. 22
According to him, this development owed its inspiration to influences
as diverse as the Evangelical revival, the Industrial Revolution, and
the social upheaval across the Channel in France. 	 The nineteenth
century in Britain was full of 'fundamentalist by conviction', that
is, 'inner-directed' men, and not a few women, and it was an age of
incredibly expanding horizons, geographically speaking as well as in
the mind. The Industrial Revolution, for all its brutality, provided
for a greater number than ever before 'an age of opportunity'. In
Warren's view, this sense of 'inner-direction', believed implicitly to
be that of the Holy Spirit, is the true secret of the dynamism shown
by the missionaries of that century. Another fact to be noted about
the men who in the first half of the nineteenth century offered for
•_
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missionary service is that a number of them were ordained men drawn
from the same social and economic background as the 'skilled
mechanics'. Warren emphasised that the modern missionary movement in
the first part of the nineteenth century was essentially a movement of
the 'petit bourgeoisie'. With the middle of the century a change took
place. Every sending society can record offers of service from men
who had acquired not only secondary education but also university
degrees.	 From this we can support Mehl's first assertion that the
early Protestant missionaries were restricted by the boundaries and
frontiers.
In the matter of the concept of mission, incidentally, "Christian
missions', as Beidelman says, "represent the most naive and
ethnocentric, and therefore the most through-going, facet of colonial
life" 23
	
Imperialistic colonialism involves a sense of mission, of
spreading a nation's vision of society and culture to an alien,
subjected people'.	 Colonialism exhibits an expansionist and
proselytising ethos based on a sense of both duty and domination and
manifested in a policy of paternal guardianship. 24
	Here Rene
Maunier's insight should be noted: colonialism is not mere contact
between races but 'a contact of social types' providing some source of
relationship between human groups. 25
	In this sense colonialism is a
social and therefore an ideological and moral phenomenon. It is a
fact that anti-imperialism is a relatively new cause; very few people
of whatever political persuasion rejected imperialism in Britain,
until fairly recently.
According to P. Beyerhaus and H. Lefever's summary26
 of the views
of six missionary thinkers (Anglo-American:
	 Henry Venn, Rufus
Anderson, Roland Allen, J. Merle Davis;
	 German:	 Gustav Warneck,
Bruno Gutmann) whose writings have had great influence over the last
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150 years, all of them consciously or unconsciously belong to the
colonial era. This supports Mehl's and Beidelman's assertion [ - of the
confusion between colonisation and mission. The six thinkers were all
influenced, naturally, by the climate of their times, though not all
in the same way. In this sense, all over the Third World 'zones of
missionary comity', that is to say, allocation of territory among
major missions were established.	 This reflects missions as
examples of colonial organisation.
Mission, in the very exercise of its activity, causes a certain
number of sociological problems in the mission field, by reason of its
profound and subtle ties with Western civilisation.
28
	In this
context,	 therefore,	 Latourette stated that nineteenth-century
Christian missions were largely a paternalistic enterprise, a kind of
spiritual imperialism. 29
Generally speaking, we can say that Christian mission has not
always been very attentive to the 'social disturbance' which it
introduced, by the very fact of its evangelical action, among the
peoples of foreign lands. 30	In this context it should be stressed
that the Christianity which engaged in missionary action beginning in
the eighteenth century was the Christianity of an already profoundly
secularised society, in other words, of a society where the churches
had become societies differentiated in relation to the global society.
They certainly exercised a large influence over this society, but the
principal structures of this society were in the process of
'secularisation'. It was already possible to live in these societies
without being Christian.	 Denominational membership had become a
•
'private' affair or was on the way to becoming it.	 The 'pietist'
overtones of many missionary societies were precisely a 'reflection'
of this situation.	 Furthermore, the whole of technical, economic,
27
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political, and social evolution was produced, especially in the
nineteenth century, outside the influence of the churches. A common
morality existed, undoubtedly impregnated with Christianity but
distinct from it.	 It was this situation which led the Christian
missions to think through their apostolic action. However, they could
not measure the 'sociological' far-reaching and unexpected effects of
their action.
Christian missions went out to confront completely different
civilizations. To attack the native religion through the preaching of
the gospel was, consequently, to call into question the whole social
structure.	 Thus it was important to have a policy of social 're-
rooting' of the individual converts. However, the missions, because
of their Western point of view and because of the 'undeveloped state
of sociological reflection', could not have had such a policy. The
type of community which the missions develop is, in effect, 'totally
different' from that of the surrounding communities. Various forms of
co-operation must be set up between them and pagan society. Otherwise
the indigenous people will run all the risks of 'uprooting'. The
church will then play only the role of a 'temporary refuge'. On this
matter Beidelman says:
The most poignant and destructive aspect of
evangelism in Africa was the missionaries' failure
either to appreciate fully the integrated quality
of traditional African life or to appraise
realistically the discordant bases of their own
societies [which underwent profound secular-
ization]. Yet missionaries thought they could
introduce modern life and beliefs into Africa
according to their own ideal Christian terms,
devoid of disruptions by the secular forces
present at home. It was never clear whether
missionaries wished to convert Africans into Black
Europeans or to create a new type of Christian,
innocent about material goods and politics ... In
their attitudes toward Western modernism and
African tradition, missionaries appeared confused
and contradictory ... Missionaries introduced
disruptive	 attitudes	 characteristic	 of	 the
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supposedly materialistic and corrupt societies
they left behind, even as they attempted to stamp
out traditions which . actually supported the
communal cohesion they admired.
Beidelman was, it is true, hostile to the activities that
missionaries were engaged in; and it is true that the missionaries
studied by him were very rigid in outlook. But it is generally true
that missionaries failed to appreciate the full implications of their
actions. Hence the new society - the church - did become 'isolated'
from the global community. 	 In offering the individual a new
community, the church must not 'isolate' him from the human community
to which he belongs. It must not 'denationalise' him in Christian-
ising him.	 In other words, the church must try to avoid being a
community closed in upon itself, which isolates its members and
prepares a 'refuge' for them that shelters them from all social,
political, and cultural problems.
It is much more difficult to resolve this problem for
Protestantism than for Roman Catholicism. Protestantism, since its
beginnings, has presented itself as a form of Christianity that
stresses the breaks between faith and doctrine on the one hand and
traditions and rites on the other hand. Thus Catholicism is more
'adroit' in the working out of syntheses and more easily shelters
certain forms of 'syncretism' than does Protestantism.
32
In this
sense the Catholic missionary theorist, L.J. Luzbetak, defines
accommodation as "the respectful, prudent, scientifically and
theoretically sound adjustment of the Church to the native culture in
attitude, outward behaviour, and practical apostolic approach".
33
The most famous example of such ideological compromise involved the
sinecisation of Jesuits in China.
34
It is well accepted that while Roman Catholics show tolerant
accommodation towards indigenous beliefs and institutions, Protestants-
- 97 -
are in more aggressive hostility toward them. 35	Several factors are
cited, the most common being that Catholics view conversion as a
gradual affair while Protestants demand dramatic, radical change in
conduct. It is also maintained that Roman Catholics view their work
in terms of a broader community while Protestants tend to emphasise
the individual.
However, these are merely tendencies; 	 generalisations are
dangerous where we are considering, in the case of Catholics, a huge
international institution and, in the case of Protestants, hundreds of
different systems of belief and conduct. 36 In this connection we can
point out that the German missionary thinkers, e.g., Gustav Warneck,
unlike the English and American thinkers, particularly emphasised the
'indigenous' character of the young churches as churches related to
the soil of the country in which they were planted. 37 Warneck, thus,
deplores the introduction of Western denominational differences into
mission churches.
	 He lays very great stress on the need for the
church. to be 'truly indigenous':
	 Any folk customs which are not
spiritually incompatible within the Christian religion are to be
preserved with imagination and warm-heartedness.
Similarly, the Scottish Presbyterian missionaries in northern
Malawi showed an understanding of 'Africanity'. 38	For example, T.
Cullen Young in the Livingstonia mission urges that Christianity
should build on what already exists;	 thus many had spoken of
'planting' of 'Christianity', but 'rooting' was a different matter.
Pursuing this analogy he argues that it is important to analyse the
soil as well as the seed. He also repeatedly criticises the notion of
'ancestor-worship', suggesting that rather one should think in terms
of a conclave of the living and the dead. He argues throughout that
traditional beliefs need enlargement through Christianity. 39
	It is
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widely agreed that the Scottish missionaries, who showed a much more
sympathetic attitude to African culture than was usual, have been
unusually forthright in their support for African nationalism.
40
 In
this respect it should be pointed out that the first Protestant church
in Korea was founded under the influence of Scottish Presbyterian
missionaries who studied Korean and then translated scriptures in
Chinese Manchuria in the 1870s. 41
In addition, many have shown that the Roman Catholics tend to
form more concentrated missionary colonies whereas Protestants favour
more diffuse groups scattered over the countryside.	 This may be
because Catholics enjoy a centralised autonomy. According to David R.
Heise, the 'concentrated' approach is more characteristic of churches
with multi-level, centralised organisations while the 'diffuse'
approach is more characteristic of churches with flat, decentralised
structures.
42
	In a sense, tighter control by a Catholic hierarchy
reduces internal conflicts within a mission. It should be noted in
this context that Catholics more readily accommodate themselves both
to government policies and to local cultures, presumably because of
their more international perspective.
43
According to Beidelman, Protestants and Roman Catholics have
sharply different views on the religious significance of literacy.
44
Protestants place deep importance on individual reading and
inspiration from scriptures and therefore give priority to translating
the Bible into indigenous languages. 	 Thus R.E. Park stresses that
Protestant missions have made native peoples literate, thus paving the
way for a secular press among the so-called colonial peoples - a first
step in developing a sense of themselves. 45	This new literacy which
the missionaries are responsible for has also brought 	 incipient
nationalism.	 The relation between conversion and literacy assumes
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greater importance because of the relation between literacy and wider,
secular aspects of European life.
But the degree of literacy is dependent primarily upon the
educational resources of the mission. 46	In this respect we should
recall that mission education underwent further secularisation after
the First World War when diminished economic support led missions to
seek government subsidies.
47
	Although conservative missionaries
objected that this would confuse the Gospel with Western civilisation,
few missions rejected the course. 	 Missionaries had little choice
between subsidisation and giving up schools altogether.	 Without
government support they could not absorb modern standards and
techniques.	 To mission purists, although educational and medical
services earn secular praise, they dilute the energy and funds for
evangelism and make missions vulnerable to government control. An
earthly organisation corrupts the Church. This view, however, is not
typical of most modern missionaries, who emphasise such social
services.
While Protestants remain in the front of linguistic research in
many parts of the Third World, Roman Catholics discourage unsupervised
study of the Bible and attach more religious significance to the
liturgy and priestly instruction. 48	Roman Catholics do not see
education tied to enabling natives to read mainly for religious
purposes.	 Hence Roman Catholics accommodated themselves to the
colonial government's needs and support for more secular education. 49
In an essay on missionaries in the Far East, R.P. Beaver contends
that nationalism has little importance for missionaries.
50
	In this
sense it is interesting that A. Carleton, a missionary, criticises
D.R. Heise, one of the few sociologists who wrote about missions, for
failing to grasp this. 51	In contrast, M.D. Markowitz emphasises the
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important relations between Belgian colonial politics and the Roman
Catholic	 Church,	 in	 contrast	 to	 non-Belgian Protestants.
52
Beidelman's words on the relationship between mission education and
the new nationalism led us to explore further the problem of the
relations of missions to governments:
... The uneasy relation between Christianity and
modern society in Europe and America drifted to
Africa as well, often transmitted by mission
education until it bred "the new nationalism which
desired to be both African and technological at
the same time and had at least the suspicion that
Christianity was an enemy of both". 5-1
During the course of the missionary years, one of the most
serious issues for the Western missionaries was the problem of the
relations of missions to governments. At the Edinburgh Conference of
1910, the most important Protestant missionary conference ever held,
the Report of the Commission on Missions and Governments strongly
recommended to the Conference that it take steps for appointment of a
special committee to draw up a brief statement of recognised
principles which underlie the relations of missions to governments.
Finally, a preliminary statement of principles prepared by the
committee was published in The International Review of Missions,
54
 for
the information of the missionary authority and of the missionary
body. The essence of the preliminary statement is as follows:
1) The missionary remains a subject of his
own Government, unless he chooses to
naturalize himself elsewhere.
2) The convert in the foreign mission field
remains a subject of his Government.
3) The relation of the missionary to the
convert is purely religious.
4) Every independent state has full control
of municipal regulation within its
borders.
5) The	 admission,	 or	 regulation,	 of
missionary work is no exception to this
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principle. As towards the Government of a
Country, the right of a missionary to enter,
and to pursue his work, when Such right
exists, is civil, not religious, in nature;
and as such is conditioned and controlled by
the Government, just as any secular
occupation is.
6) Care should be taken to distinguish moral
and natural rights and duties from legal.
One should not infer a legal right to preach
the Gospel from a spiritual obligation.
There is no connection between two.
Among the above six formulations, it is noteworthy that the last
principle which distinguishes legal rights from moral ones, to some
degree, reflects the aforesaid general schema of Weber.
55
 According to
him Christianity as an institutionalized religion customarily solves
the problem of the tension between religious ethics and the non-
ethical requirements of life within the world by differentiating
ethics into religious ascetic ethics and contrasting political ethics.
We can still maintain that the Christian church belongs to the
conservative forces.
Nathan nderblom, who was the Archbishop of Uppsala, clarified
the relationship between Christian missions and national politics:
"Like all Christians, missionaries are enjoined by the New Testament
to offer up prayers for the authority governing the country in which
they live and to observe impeccable obedience and respect for its
orders, as long as these are not incompatible with the commandments of
God. But it is also required that missions and missionaries should be
regarded and treated as being first and foremost servants, not of
politics and temporal authority, but of Christ. Any other principle
could only mean death and corruption for missions".
56
	Here again we
can note that even the twentieth-century Bishop SOderblom was standing
on the aforementioned fourth position of Weber which evaluates the
authority of the state positively.	 As far as this position is
- 102 -
concerned, according to Weber, ancient Christianity did not really go
beyond it in principle.
Historically, modern non-Roman missions have generally adopted
the policy of 'non-interference' in the political affairs, either
domestic or foreign, of the nations where their missionaries work.
Therefore, G. Fisher, who had gone from the United States to the
mission field (Japan) in 1898 and was honorary National Secretary of
,
the Young Men's Christian Association of Japan, attacked some
Protestant missionaries in the Far East who violated this rule on the
ground that the meddling of the Roman missionaries with political
matters in Japan let the country seal itself against Christianity for
250 years. 57 After the First World War, it was in the Far East that
the issues of the relations of missionaries to international political
questions were sufficiently 'acute'. It was true that the political
conditions obtaining there were unprecedented and complicated and the
missionaries were, Fisher saw, inevitably in the very thick of the
maze 
58	
The conditions were unprecedented for obvious reasons,
growing out of the economic and political rivalries of various
nations, but also out of the presence of a highly civilised,
aggressive but non-Christian nation, Japan, which was at the same time
an 'object' of Christian missionary effort.
Moreover, in Fisher's view, the situation in India and other
British territories was somewhat different, at least for the British
missionaries, by virtue of the fact that they were citizens of the
nation in control, whereas in China, Korea, and Japan all missionaries
alike were 'aliens' and should therefore be guided by the same
principles. Thus Fisher's assertion seems to have more validity than
James L. Barton's simple view: "If he is in a country over which his
own government rules, his position is made doubly difficult because of
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the tendency on the part of the native populations to regard him as a
department of the government itself".
59
In this respect, Beidelman
illustrates how ethnicity must be considered within a larger and
shifting context. 60 The following examples show how ethnicity relates
to patriotism and imperialistic sentiments.
During the earliest period of missionary contact,
the British exerted political influence at
Zanzibar and Mombasa. Without British
connections, the CMS could not have _meddled in
Arab and African affairs. During the subsequent
period of German rule, the CMS was critical of
colonial rule and defended African interests. In
contrast, after the British received the
Tanganyikan mandate, the missionaries warmly
supported local colonial doctrine and were hostile
to African criticisms of the status quo.
As a second illustration of ethnic variables,
contrast the Belgian Congo with Tanganyika. In
the Congo, Belgian Catholic orders were integrated
into the colonial power structure and until
shortly before independence were uncritical of the
regime, whereas Protestants, mainly from English-
speaking nations, were less sympathetic. In
Tanzania, Catholics were rarely of British back-
ground and were unsympathetic to British rule.
Shortly before African independence, Catholics
covertly backed nationalist activities, while
Protestants, manly British, remained conservative
and uncritical.
George F. Steward, in 1912, examined the policy of the United
States of America insofar as missionaries in foreign parts, especially
China, were concerned. 62	The continued intercourse of China and the
United States led to the treaty of 1903. Article 14 of this treaty
not only stated in detail the rights of missionaries but at one and
the same time indicated the policy of the United States in regard to
missionaries in foreign parts. The treaty specifically provided that
"missionaries shall not interfere with the exercise by the native
authorities of their jurisdiction over Chinese subjects". 63	A
failure to comply with this provision would undoubtedly cause the
United States to withdraw protection to the missionary or to the
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mission implicated, because such action would be not merely
inconsistent with the treaty but a distinct violation of its express
terms.	 In brief, Steward calls attention to the role which the
missionary should play in the land of his residence; 	 for, if he
attempts in any way to interfere with the political development of the
country where he is located, he not only involves the home government
in controversy but defeats the purpose of the mission.
Thus, as Fisher has already shown, in China, Korea and Japan,
where all missionaries alike were not citizens of the nation in
control but 'aliens', the missionaries had to decide about their
attitudes on international political questions. In this context, it
should be noted that the most 'thorny' missionaries were the
missionaries in Korea. 64	So Edwyn Bevan, who visited Korea and was
an Honorary Fellow of New College, Oxford, described the problematic
situation in Korea as follows:
Here they have before them one of those states of
conflict between a foreign government and an
inflamed nationalism in which any missionary may
well find it hard to show unconcern, if he [the
missionary] desires to be a human friend to people
among whom he lives, whilst it is impossible for
him to side with the Japanese Government without
seeming to set Christianity against liberty, or to
side with the Korean nationalists without 6,5abusing
the confidence of the Japanese Government. 
The church-state problem in a colonial setting, or, those
features of the church-state problem which are peculiar to a colonial
society can not be approached without distinction.	 In the case of
colonial Africa as a whole, two European agencies - the church and the
state in the process of establishing and organising themselves - each
with different objectives, were appearing on the African stage. 66
Their links with Europe, their mutual relations and their
relationships with their respective counterparts are all factors which
must be taken into consideration. 	 Moreover, we can also consider the
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influence	 of	 'the	 ancient	 European	 institution	 of	 the
Establishment'. 67	On the other hand, Korea under Japanese Empire was
in a unique situation in the sense that there existed three different
forces together: a Korean indigenous force, Japanese colonialism, and
Euro-American influence through missions.	 In relation to Euro-
American influence, it was mainly American influence through
Presbyterian and Methodist missions that moulded Korean Protestant
churches.	 As is well known, unlike the European tradition, the
American tradition has stressed the total separation of church and
state. This tradition naturally precludes an established church. It
makes religion a subject of no official concern, relegating it to the
sphere of private affairs. Thus, in the case of colonial Korea we can
not employ categories and generalisations which have been developed in
the other colonial contexts where two European agencies existed.
It was true that a very real problem confronted missionaries in
Korea.	 According to Fisher, practically no one, whether foreigner or
Japanese, doubts the assertion of the missionaries that they knew•
'nothing' in advance of the Samil Independence Movement in 1919, and
did 'nothing' to foment it, but rather encouraged the Koreans to aim
at gradual reforms.	 But the Japanese government and public, not
unnaturally, accused the missionaries of meddling in these events.
68
In this respect we can recall that nationalism in the Orient came into
being as a reaction to Western and Japanese political, military, and
cultural Imperialism. Historically, while in Japan the introduction
of Christianity (Protestantism) coincided with the rise of aggressive
nationalism, in Korea Christianity (Protestantism) became the vehicle
for the preservation of national hopes in reaction against Japanese
domination. 69	The fundamental conflict between the claims of Christ
and Japanese messianic nationalism were recognized by many.
70
This
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charge that Christianity is unpatriotic is met from first to last in
the history of the mission. 71	In contrast, Korea presented the
outstanding instance of the identification of nationalism with
Christianity in the Far East. 72
But the American missionaries, possessed of their own peculiar
ideas about separation of Church and state, non-interference in
politics, and the supranationality of missions, from the early period
attempted to minimise the political factor, although they have had to
acknowledge its existence.	 The missionaries, convinced of the
necessity of keeping the Church entirely out of politics, discouraged
nationalism and endeavoured to keep the converts from participation in
anti-Japanese movements. 73 The missionaries thought that they were
being neutral and impartial, but in the eyes of Koreans they were
committing themselves to the Japanese.	 Moreover, in fact, many a
missionary was far less dispassionate and objective in analysing the
policies of his adopted country than those of his own home land.
74
This could easily be demonstrated in the case of missionaries to
Japan, for example, from the time of Verbeck to that of Bishop Harris,
whom the Koreans considered to be a Japanese agent, down to the
apologists for the nation during the last Japanese invasion of China.
In this connection, R.P. Beaver quotes a part of the volume entitled
The Missionary Outlook in Light of the War, published in 1920:
Provincialism is always a bar to progress, whether
exercised in a village, or at a capital, or in a
mission area. It is religiously no less than
politically belittling. ... It is pleasing to the
traveller in mission areas to note the real
enthusiasm of the true missionary for his adopted
people and their interests, political as well as
social. ... Yet it must yield to the demands of
Christian internationalism, which seeks to promote
friendliness among all nations. China, Japan, and
Korea must eventually become in some sense a Far
Eastern unit. Only the missionary who can think
soberly in terms of the Far East as a whole,
whether his definite task is Manchuria, Korea,
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China, Japan, or the Philippines, will be a w3ge
and helpful leader in the next quarter century.
The Missionary Outlook rebuked the partial attitude on the part
of missionaries, admonishing them. In his paper, Fisher classified
two possible attitudes for the missionary to take on international
political questions which involve the nation where he resides: 1) a
public declaration of his convictions regarding the question at issue;
2) strict neutrality and reticence. 76	According to Fisher, the
first attitude is one of 'openly' taking sides, on the ground that
political questions, almost without exception, are inextricably bound
up with the moral and humane principles for which Christianity stands.
One objection to this attitude is that, no matter how
emphatically the missionary disclaims partisanship and political
motive, his action is in danger of being resented not only by the
nation criticised, but even by members of the very nation he is
defending. As a matter of fact, Fisher continues, the open activity
of missionaries in China in opposition to Japan's claims in Shan-tung
has unquestionably raised an 'obstacle' in the path of Christianity in
Japan.
In contrast with the popular objections to the first attitude, it
is noteworthy that J.H. Oldham, who was editor of The International 
Review of Missions in 1920, proclaimed a rather liberal, active
viewpoint on the issue of nationality and missions. It deserves a
long citation:
Nationality is thus both for good and for evil one
of the most powerful forces in human life ... A
force so powerful [nationality] is one which
Christian missions cannot 'ignore'. Among the
peoples of Asia and Africa the sense of
'nationality' has been stimulated by the
experience and fear of political domination and
economic exploitation by Western nations ... Among
peoples with different mental and emotional
characteristics, with a different history and
different social institutions, the Gospel in
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proportion as it is really apprehended by them
must inevitably express itself in forms of thought
and worship 'different' from ours ... We are
confronted with the undesirable fruits of
'denationalization' (in many parts of the mission
field) ... Christian missions must take 'a
definite attitude' towards the political and
economic aspects of Western nationalism ... If the
hearts of Asiatic and African peoples are
embittered against Western nations on account of
their 'selfishness' and 'injustice' ... The task
is far from easy. The line which separates
faithful witness to Christian principle from
advocacy of a particular political programme is
often difficult to find. To reach a 'sound'
judgement in complex and intricate questions of
political and economic relations demands 'wide
knowledge' and 'trained intelligence' ... But the
recognition of these difficulties does not mean
that the task should be avoided but that it must
be approached with the necessary caution,
knowledge and wisdom. If missionary bodies fail
to enter their protest where it is needed against
the unchristian elements in Western nationalism
their Christian witness is to that extent
impaired. We cannot preach convincingly in word
what we deny in national act and policy. The range
of missionary duty has expanded until it includes
not only to winning of individual souls but the
endeavour to Christianize the national policies of
the professedly Christian nations, and the former
part of the task will be handicapped if the latter
is ignored. 71
Welcoming the work undertaken by the Federal Council of the
Churches of Christ in America, a Commission on Oriental Relations as a
step in the right direction, Oldham finally declared the need of 'a
Christian doctrine of nationality'. 	 He demanded that Christian
missions take a 'definite' attitude towards the political and economic
aspects of Western nationalism. In addition, he also maintained that
responsible missionaries must 'actively' oppose policies And practices
of selfishness and injustice. Given that the situation of 1920 was
dominated by the policy of 'non-interference' in the political
affairs, his point of view seems quite impressive in the light of
'real' Christianization.
The majority of missionaries, the conservative proponents of the
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policy of non-interference, in the 'embryonic' state of sociological
reflection which was due to their• lack of knowledge and trained
intelligence chose the 'easy' way. Thus they could not confront the
critical issue actively.
The second attitude which Fisher classifies is that of 'strict
neutrality and reticence' towards the whole question at issue,
regardless of the fact moral principles may intimately be concerned. 78
It rests primarily on the ground that the missionary, like his Master,
is commissioned only to establish the spiritual kingdom of God
directly in the hearts of individuals, and that any attempt to deal
directly with political matters would 'jeopardise' his spiritual
authority as well as his friendly relations with the people and the
government whose guest he is, and would thereby defeat his ultimate
purpose.	 The proponents of the neutrality principle based their
argument on the example and teaching of the Lord. They said:
The records show Him not as protesting against the
abuses • of Roman rule, but as teaching His
disciples to support it by paying taxes and
acknowledging its authority. He appears also to
give some warrant to the doctrine that mundane
political and economic power is under the
domination of the 'prince of this world', and that
the children of the Kingdom must be 'resigned' and
not surprised if the world does 'go to devil', but
simply devote themselves to serving out of the
world those who will constitute the 'invisible'
and eternal realm of the Spirit. Any attempt to
build the city of God in the corporate life of men
on 'this' earth is 'foredoomed' to failure. It
cannot be let down from God out of earth, but its
citizens must be snatched out of earth into
'heaven 1 . 79
The strategic response of the Christian mission to nationalistic
pressure has followed three main lines: recruiting and training an
indigenous clergy to whom the control of the churches is committed,
fostering the adjustment of the Church and Christian community to the
indigenous culture, and an attempt to establish the supranationality
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of the missionary. 80
In this respect 'devolution' or the transfer of control from the
mission organisation to the responsible national church body
accompanied the rise of a more native clergy in Protestant circles. 81
The counterpart of devolution in the Roman Catholic mission is the
establishment of national hierarchies with indigenous bishops. China
led the way in this development. So the first six Chinese bishops
were consecrated in 1926 together in Rome, and others were constantly
added to their ranks.
	 Archbishop Tien was elevated to the dignity of
Cardinal.	 The first native Japanese Bishop was consecrated to the
see of Nagasaki in 1927.
	 All foreign bishops offered their
resignations in 1940, and since then the Japanese hierarchy has been
entirely under native leadership.
Finally, as Beidelman stresses, it is essential to consider any
missionary group in terms of the nationality, socio-economic
background and cultural background of its members. 82
	In relation to
nationality, in the case of Japan, since the clergy and laity were
ardently nationalistic and the missionaries were in the main also
warmly pro-Japanese, a sharp clash between the government and the
Church and mission was long avoided. The fact that in World War I
Japan was an ally of the United States, Britain, and France, from
which most missionaries came, helped to postpone the conflict. Here
Beaver explains.
The decade of the 1920s was the time of
transition, and after the Manchurian Incident of
1931 militaristic totalitarianism was firmly in
the saddle, hostility towards former allies was
manifested, the national citizenship of the
majority of missionaries became a handicap, and
increasing pressure was exerted on all Christian
agencies and institutions. After the invasion of
China in 1937 many Protestant missionaries were
forced to give up their pro-Japanese position and
some found it necessary to leave the country. The
Roman .Catholic Church brought in new orders with
missionaries of German and Italian nationality,
countries with which the nation was to be allied
in the next war.	 The shrine issue brought
conflict into the open. The Roman Catholic
hierarchy in 1932 accepted the assurance of the
Ministry of Education that the rites were
patriotic and not religious, and in 1936 the
Propaganda confirmed this decision. Protestants
were divided, but the nationals on the whole
accepted the government's view while missionaries
were more83 likely to regard the rites as
religious.
The cultural background of missionaries exerts an influence in
ways not necessarily determined by their Christian beliefs and work,
and it also relates to the broader colonial milieu in which these
missionaries function. Yet most studies of missionaries ignore the
socio-cultural background as well as nationality and tend to consider
all missionaries as essentially the same. 84 These features should
be considered in any discussions of missions in the modern world.
And it should be noted that there are striking differences
between Roman Catholics and Protestants, yet the differences within
Protestant or Catholic groups seem nearly as great. 	 This caution
leads us to do closer study.
-
- 112 -
CHAPTER II
HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF KOREAN CHRISTIANITY
A. The Pre-Christian Religious Heritage of Korean Society
Historically, Korea's first contact with Christianity (Roman
Catholicism) was made in the 17th century, when Confucianism was the
State religion of the Yi dynasty (1392-1910 AD). 	 When the two
different cultures met, the Korean people had lived under the Neo-
Confucian belief system, which was based upon Zhu Xi's
1
 strict
doctrinal interpretations, for over four centuries. The process
scholars call 'Confucianisation' may be traced to late fourteenth
century Korea, when literati, inspired by the Neo-Confucian vision of
a virtuous society, in the service of the newly risen Yi dynasty
attempted a thorough transformation of Korean society. 	 By the
seventeenth century Korea was an overtly Confucian society, an
identity some Koreans maintain to this day.
2
	It is an interesting
fact that Confucianism in no other society in East Asia took as strong
a hold on the culture as it did in Korea during the ChosOn dynasty
(1392-1910). Although Confucianism originated in China, it never had
the overall impact on Chinese cosmopolitan society that Neo-
Confucianism had on Korea over the 500 years of the last dynasty. As
James H. Grayson has pointed out, "it is only in Korea that we find a
society in which the predominant political, cultural, and social
influences were and are Confucian".
3
	It should be noted in this
context that "it has been a curious fact of Korean religious history
that Koreans have tended to preserve cultural traits which have been
lost or distorted in their homeland". 4	The vitality of both the
Buddhist and Christian traditions in Korea might be understood against
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aspects of Korean Neo-Confucian life.
6
,
Yi dynasty Confucian
this background.
No outline history of Korean Confucianism fails to stress the
sharp break between the centralised, formalistic, and institutional
Confucianism of pre-Yi times and the far more diffused, intellectual,
and philosophic Confucianism of the Yi period with its powerful and
widespread influence on Korean social as well as institutional life.
5
In this respect, 'ancestor rites' became one of the most emphasized
reformers were to transform the , _	 loosely structured clan
system of the Buddhist Koryii dynasty (918-1392 AD) into a tidy
configuration of patrilineal, primogenitural families and lineages.
The Neo-Confucians saw in 'ancestor worship' a demonstration of the
moral content of proper social relationships. A well-tended ancestral
shrine and a chesa ritual scrupulously performed demonstrated and
perpetuated 'propriety', ethical and orderly behaviour in a harmonious
society. 7	The form and content of ancestor rituals, the mode of
storing tablets, and the designation of ritual heirs were vigorously
specified. Ancestor worship was the major instrument for imposing a
patrilineal pattern on Korean society at the beginning of the Yi
dynasty, and Confucianism was used to stamp out Buddhism and 'spirit
worship'.
For Confucians, contrary to the Buddhists' belief that the dead
would disappear into the air, the ancestor ritual was a medium through
which the living could express filial piety by recruiting the
ancestors' favours (pobon) and keeping their memories alive (ch'uwOn).
Indeed, the failure to perform ancestral rites was taken as evidence
of insufficient filial piety and was punishable by law.
8
The Japanese of the early Tokugawa period used Neo-Confucian
doctrine sparingly, to provide the rationale for their political
-
- 114 -
hegemony, not as in Korea to reshape the basis of social relations.
9
In Japan, Confucianism was primarily a concern of the ruling elite and
the associated scholarly class. 10	The Neo-Confucian scholars of
Japan, like those of Korea, dealt with the critical issue of ancestor
worship and in that context stressed the importance of agnatic
descent. But Japanese society was destined to handle these matters in
ways quite outside the Neo-Confucian formulation of the proper rites
for the ancestors.	 Not only did women participate fully in the
rites, but also ancestor worship in Japan came to be observed in an
almost exclusively 'Buddhist mode'.
Wlien	 _ the Roman Catholic Church, regarding 'ancestor
worship' as an act of idolatry and forbidding its practice in 1715,
met with the rigid Neo-Confucianism in Korea, the end result was
bloody persecutions. 11	Those who actually responded quickly to
Catholicism were fundamentally the avowed Confucians, in education and
even in the earliest experiences of their childhood. 12 They had been
born under a dynasty which tried to be 'more Chinese than the Chinese'
by imposing what were regarded as the 'pure' Confucian values upon all
its subjects. They were searchers for truth and they felt they had
found the way to the truth in the Catholic books. Nevertheless, it is
difficult to conceive of their understanding the new-found doctrines
in a way that would be fundamentally at variance with their Confucian
backgrounds. They might reject the 'ancestor rites' at the command of
their new religious leaders, but nothing could quickly change the
basic habits of thought and underlying values inculcated in them since
their earlier days and, consciously or not, influencing all their
perceptions and behaviour.
In terms of Confucian dualistic spatial symbolism, the people
thought of the world as mutually incompatible large spheres.
13
	In
A_
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the Neo-Confucian vision, ki 'material force', the mundane vehicle of
or the Supreme Ultimate, is divided into ytint (the negative
principle in nature) and yang (the positive principle in nature), the
opposite but interdependent and complementary forces that represent,
respectively, darkness and brightness, quiescence and activity, cold
and heat, female and male, Earth and Heaven, and a broad range of
similar dualities. 14	Both forces are involved in every concrete
being in the universe. In line with this, for example, C goe Che-u,
the founder of the Tonghak (Eastern Learning) movement, compared Shak
(Western Learning) or Catholicism to yin and Eastern Learning to yang,
with the purpose of controlling yin with yang.
Thus, Confucian spatial symbolism caused, in E.J. Hobsbawm's
term, 'archaic' consciousness among the people, and as a result
'simple dichotomies' prevailed in them.	 In this respect, it is
noteworthy that Confucianism, the most 'archaic' of the historic
religions, best shows a permanent possibility of 'regressive'
tendency.
15
	In brief, the 'dichotomised world view' as an
authoritarian, militaristic and exclusive (cliquish) ideology was a
basic character of the pre-Christian society. 	 Indeed, more than any
of the other Confucian political cultures, 	 Korean culture had been
characterised by 'extremes'. 16
Moreover, the Confucian valuing of family relationships no doubt
contributed to the strong sense of division between in-group and out-
group which characterised all the East Asian cultures. In Korea the
basis of social relations was the feeling that trust would
automatically be extended to family members and to those in analogous
groups, while all others should be viewed with suspicion.
Clannishness was understood and accepted as normal behaviour.
17
However, this Confucian society in Korea was not entirely
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Confucianistic.	 Buddhism, though oppressed, exerted its influence
continuously upon the people after the Buddhists were ostracised by
the Confucian society.
	
Prior to Zhu Xi Neo-Confucianism, MahSyana 
(Sanskrit "greater vehicle") Buddhism from China influenced the
Koreans for over ten centuries, until the end of the Koryo Dynasty. 18
in
It flourished most . Silla and was adopted as the state religion as a
measure calculated to gain the favour and protection of China. While
of -the state
the ruling class accepted Buddhism as the 	 protectioix the other
popular sects of Buddhism, the MatrUya (Sans., the Buddha-to-be)
Buddhism, combined with the indigenous folk shamanism, prevailed among
the commoners.
According to J.H. Grayson's Early Buddhism and Christianity in 
Korea (1985), it was Hui-yuan, following the example of his teacher
Tao-an, the founder of the lay cult of Mitt-637a, who founded a cult of
Amita-bha for the laity in A.D. 402. 19	Amongst the masses, this new
movement, 'Pure Land' • Buddhism, quickly became the most important
force in Silla Bucidhism. 20	'Pure Land' places emphasis neither on
scriptural study nor on a life of good works, but simply in faith in
the grace of Amitabha. By the mid-eighth century in Silla, Buddhism
was no longer a foreign religion but an integral part of Silla's
culture. Buddhism had taken firm hold of the minds of members of all
classes of the society.	 In this context it should be pointed out
that Grayson's final stage of Buddhism in Silla (A.D. 742 to 936) saw
the rise of non-doctrinal sects, which attracted the masses of that
time by appealing to a mixture of simple faith in the grace of
AmitUbha and shamanism, in the midst of their increasingly chaotic
conditions.
	 As Silla grew and expanded culturally and politically,
doctrinal and intellectual Buddhism flourished, but when the social
and political structure came unhinged, a more inward-looking and
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individualistic form of Buddhism became fashionable. 21
MditrUYa, known as the 'Messianic Buddha' who comes from the West
Paradise to rescue the people from suffering, formed a decisive
ideological backbone for the Unified Silla dynasty of the Three
Kingdoms Period.
	 Towards the end of that dynasty, the Maitreya
Messianic Buddhism influenced the popular resistance movements against
dynastic regimes. Even during the Neo-Confucian Yi dynasty, the idea
of the MaitrEya Buddha was 'alive' among the people. 22
The Confucianistic society was not free from Taoistic influence
also.	 Taoism was formally introduced into KoguryO in 624 from
China. 23	Taoism has never been an organised religion in Korea, but
it has also continuously influenced the society as a philosophy as
well as 'superstition'.
As for the 'messianic' traditions, we can note the popularity of
ChOnggam nok prognostication. ChOnggam nok is a number of books of
prophecy, handed down from ancient times. 	 It combines prophecy and
geomancy to speak specifically and apocalyptically about the southern
part of Korea. 24	As a kind of 'theodicy of the unprivileged', this
prognostication with its potentially subversive prophecy, especially
aggravated the sense of crisis in the individual members of society,
and became a menace to the government. 25
Behind all these imported religions there existed a pre-
Confucian, pre-Buddhistic and pre-Taoist religion, an indigenous
belief.
	 In its primitive stage, Shamanism, a faith common to all
tribes ranging throughout North-eastern Asia, particularly Mongolia .
and Siberia, grew into the national ethos of the Korean people. 26
The primitive ethos of the Korean people derives from Shamanism, a
polytheistic and polydemonic religion based on nature worship. The
core of Shamanism is the animistic belief in the presence of spiritual
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beings.
	 Shamanism adopted from Buddhism, most of the accretion of
magic, of	 charm-making, crystal-gazing, and dream interpretation. 27
Thus, Mircea Eliade describes Shamanism as 'techniques of ecstasy'.
In brief, spiritual exorcism, direct communication with the Holy
Spirit and healing are the major aspects of Shamanism.
In addition to the animistic belief, one of the important
characteristics of Shamanism is the unity of religion-philosophy and
,
the state in the primitive way of life.	 For this feature, the
foundation myth commences with the Heavenly Emperor (God) who had a
son who wanted to come to the world to help people. 29
In Korea's shamanistic pantheon there developed a concept of a
hierarchy of the gods. 30 Above all the spirits stood one supreme
ruler named Hananim. Koreans regarded Hananim as the celestial God of
the Heavenly Kingdom. 31 Korean faith in Hananim was an integral part
of Korean thought from primitive times. Conviction of belief in him
was strengthened, not reduced, by the introduction of the amorphous
Confucian concept of din (Chinese: t'ien).	 Furthermore, Korean Neo-
Confucianists of the Yi dynasty fell strongly under the influence of
their own indigenous religious beliefs, which in part called for a
personalized view of God. Their interpretation of Zhu Xi, long the
accepted exponent of Confucian doctrine identifying God with reason
and law, proved to be a Korean deviation. Whereas Zhu Xi tended to
rule out a personal God, Korean Confucianists tended to affirm one. 32
At the very outset of their proselyting effort missionaries
recognized Hananim as a distinctive Korean deity, unusually suited to
their own conception of God. 33	It was easy to accept him as the
counterpart of the Christian god; there was no need for dispensation.
As Robert Scott observed:
The Koreans have always Hananim, a name which
covers the idea of the one supreme mind, one God.
28
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This God of the Koreans is similar to the God of
the Jewish Old Testament.
... On this deep-seated monotheism the Rristian
missionary has built the amazing success.
Hananim was a point of contact with Korean culture the like of
which missionaries in China did not have. In Korea and Christianity
(1967), Spencer J. Palmer concludes that "As a personal transcendent
God, clearly the supreme deity of the Korean people, Hananim was
uniquely suited to prepare the Korean people for belief in the
Christian God". 35
Thus, we can assume that the Korean religious heritage, such as
the monotheistic concept of God, longing for salvation, messianic
hope, eternal life in the Great Beyond, and so on, were helpful,
rather than harmful, for the rapid progress of Christian evangelism.
36
Likewise they could serve to mould the characteristics of the young
Korean Christianity.
B. The Early Korean Churches
1. Catholic Missions
"Korea presents an ideal historical laboratory to compare the
introduction of the two principal forms of Christianity, Roman
Catholicism and Protestantism".
1
	The results of this comparison
would provide useful information for a comparison with the growth and
development of Christianity in China and Japan, but this goes beyond
the scope of the present historical overview. 	 This section is based
upon the assumption that the early, formative period is crucial for
the later pattern of church-state relations.
Catholicism was introduced to China through Matteo Ricci (1552-
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1610), a Jesuit priest.	 He took 20 years to work his way step by
step from the Portuguese community at Macao to the court at Pei-
ching. 2 The Jesuits brought modern European science and published
several hundred scientific works in classical Chinese. Ricci, on his
part, believed that if Christianity were to enter deeply into the life
of China, it had to find contact with Confucianism.	 He permitted
Chinese Christians to 'kowtow' 3
 to their ancestors and the emperor
,
because he felt that these kowtows were basically 'secular' rites. 4
He gave up the Western practice of preaching in a chapel and talked to
small groups. The Jesuits established friendships with several high
officials of the late Ming dynasty, including some in the Tung-lin
Academy group of moral reformers. 	 In the waxing and waning of
political influence, Jesuit fortunes were tied to the reform groups.
The Pei-ching Jesuits served as the link between Europe and China
for more than 100 years. However, the Rites Controversy ended their
effectiveness.	 The Jesuits had approved the Chinese veneration of
ancestors as merely 'civil' rites. They had also maintained that the
classical terms shang-ti and t'ien could be considered equivalents of
the Western 'God'. 5 Dominican and Franciscan friars, newly arrived
from the Philippines, accused the Jesuits and their converts of
participating in pagan rites and destroying essential monotheistic
articles of faith.
	 After a long ecclesiastical struggle, the Pope
finally supported the Dominican and Franciscan position with the bull
Ex illa die in 1715. In the eyes of the Jesuits, it was the death
blow to the Chinese church. 	 The local Chinese churches went
underground as a consequence of the succeeding proscription of
Christianity.
We can only understand the early Catholic missions against this
socio-cultural environment of China: Korean Catholics received their
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faith from Pei-ching and experienced many of the same trials as their
Chinese brethren. 6	Through the Korean envoys, who visited China
annually, Catholicism spread to Korea. 7
	Donald N. Clark in
Christianity in Modern Korea (1986) writes on Catholic beginnings:
The Korean church began with a small group of
eighteenth-century Confucian scholars from the
out-of-power political faction, Silhak, or the
School of Practical Learning. The purpose of
Silhak was a rejuvenation of Korean Confucianism
through a clearer understanding of man's relation
to nature - "the investigation of things". Among
the texts studied by the Silhak scholars was a
smuggled copy of The True Doctrine of the Lord of 
Heaven [T'ien-chu Shih-i], a Chinese work by the
seventeenth-century Jesuit missionary Matteo
Ricci. Ricci's description of the Christian God
seemed much like that of the Neo-Confucian Supreme
Ultimate, and they decided to learn more. This
was risky.	 The Pope's condemnation of ancestor
worship in 1742 had scandalized Korean
Confucianists; the church was therefore anathema
to the8 orthodox atmosphere of the Yi dynasty of
Korea.
Some have pointed out that Catholicism may have been practised in
Korea a full generation prior to the time when it was first believed
to have begun around 1770. 9
	The ChCingjong taewang sillok states that
in 1758 many of the inhabitants of Hwanghae and KangwOn Provinces had
ceased the performance of the chesa rites, or memorial rites for
deceased ancestors. "As Catholics were forbidden to perform the chesa 
rites", Grayson says, "it is possible that the cessation of their
performance may have been due to Catholic influence" .10
But it is generally accepted that it is not until the last
quarter of the eighteenth century that particular intellectual
circles, that is, disciples of the thought of Yi Ik took up the
practice of Catholicism avidly. 11	The Silhak scholar Yi PyOk and his
friends persuaded Yi Siing-hun, son of a recently-appointed Korean
tribute envoy bound for China in 1783, to accompany the envoy, find
out everything he could, and bring back books. Yi Sting-hun did more:
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in Pei-ching he became a Christian himself and was christened Peter, a
name suggesting his destiny as founder of the Korean church. When he
returned home in 1784, he carried books, crucifixes, images and
information about Christian rituals. Then he joined with Yi Pytik to
found a small lay congregation of Catholics. This was Korea's first-
known Christian church. 12	It is important to note here that in the
history of Christian missions the Korean recipients of the Gospel took
the initiative in the establishment of an organisation to carry out
most of the functions of the Church by themselves.
13
	Unlike many
other lands, where the Christian religion was first brought by foreign
missionaries, in Korea it began with a kind of 'self-study' (self-
directed study) of Christian literature by natives. 14
Grayson points out that, given the very rapid spread of
Catholicism within the intellectual circle of Yi Ik, it is not
surprising to learn that the first known opposition to it came from
another member of the same circle. 15	Some disciples of the thought
of Yi Ik became convinced that the doctrine of Catholicism threatened
the basis of a Confucian society. This was not the only opposition to
the young church.	 Numerous Korean Christians were put to death as
waves of persecution followed. The persecution of the Korean Neo-
Confucian Yi Dynasty exceeded that of the Ch'ing. 16	It should be
noted in this context that the initial persecution of the Catholic
Church was not simply a matter of the suppression of unconventional
beliefs, but was also a matter of containing the political power of
certain factions at the royal court.	 The political affiliation of
certain upper class Catholic adherents was a factor in the rejection
of the Church.
17
	From the outset Catholicism had attracted many
yangban scholars from among the Namin scholars who were excluded from
access to political power.
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The Four Great Persecutions took place in 1801, 1839, 1846, and
1866.	 Catholic scholars invariably gave up their rank and assumed
humble trades, especially that of potter, in remote villages. The
fact that potters could travel freely from market to market helped
them to arrange for the clandestine movement of priests. Potters, of
course, were socially too insignificant to attract much notice from
the authorities. 18
	Persecution brought a general decline in the
,
number of Catholic believers, and by the turn of the nineteenth
century most converts were drawn from among people from the lower
social status. In short, it was people from the lower social classes
rather than the higher, the uneducated rather than the educated, and
the poor rather than the better off who were now attracted to
Catholicism.
	 Catholicism in the nineteenth century no longer had an
appeal to the intellectual class, but continued to survive because it
offered hope to members of the inferior class in traditional Korean
society.
One can observe that the two belief systems - Neo-Confucianism
and Catholicism -, claiming the absolute truth, can take extremes,
particularly when Catholic Christians uncompromisingly and resolutely
rejected the Confucian state's claims of pre-eminent political
power.
19
	The end result was persecution and bloody martyrdom of
Christians.
	 Aside from factional strife (political), the ancestor
worship issue at the court and the orthodox doctrine of Neo-
Confucianism became acute causes of confrontation. In Grant S. Lee's
views, therefore, if the ancestral worship issue had been treated by
the Church merely as a custom and permitted, an unnecessary clash
could have been avoided and many lives of the faithful could have been
saved. 20
	A Confucian culture like that of Korea demanded that
Catholicism ally itself with either Confucian or sectarian forms. In
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this sense the Pope's overruling of the Jesuits with the Rites
Decision had the inevitable effect of making Catholics peasant
sectarians. 21	In the Korean case persecution fostered rural Catholic
ghettos with a special religious ethos. According to W.E. Biernatzki
et al. in Korean Catholicism in the 1970s (1975), Korean Catholic
texts stressed the eternal dichotomies: this world and the next, body
and soul, time and eternity, secular and sacred.
22
 Thus Min Kyong-
suk, a Catholic scholar, stresses that the Church in the nineteenth
century selected only those aspects which were most consoling to the
psychology of a suffering and persecutect . Church. 23	Min Kyong-suk
continues:
Such escapism and individualism, perhaps, were
excusable during the era of persecution, but the
fact that such a mentality continued to prevail
through the modern period of Korean Catholicism
seems to show that it was not something accidental
to individual Catholics at a particular time but
rather was endemic to the Catholic ethos as such.
The primary function of the Church, it seems, had
been to provide a camp and shelter for refugees
not merely in the physical sense but, more
important, in the psychological sense ... in the
majority of cases, the Church remained a final
shelter and an end in itself. Other charact-
eristics of conventional Catholicism, whose
meaning we earlier located in a fundamental
dualism, such as authoritarianism and a ghetto
mentality are likewise traceable to the joint
operation of the Catholic world view, the
mentality of Shamanism and Confucianim and the
social conditions which reinforced both.
We can conclude that the ethos of Korean Catholicism was not an
accidental phenomenon, that its origin was deeply rooted in the past,
and that such a past was chiefly constituted by the soil of the
indigenous personality shaped by Shamanism and Confucianism and
further vitiated by the result of government persecutions.
In this respect, L.G. Paik, a Protestant scholar, criticises the
Catholic Church of the modern period:
... the infallible Roman Church has a great many
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shortcomings. Their converts are untaught of the
Scripture. From the foundation of the church by
Yi Sling-Hun in 1784 to 1866, eighty-two years had
passed, but no attempt had been made to translate
a single Gospel or any portion of the Bible.
Their emphasis on ecclesiastical institutionalism
occupies such a paramount place that even new
converts began the practice of their faith by
setting up a hierarchy, rather than by growing in
grace and life. Their political activities
perhaps are the most undesirable features of the
missionary proselyting methods of Roman Catholics.
... As in Vietnam, Korea saw the French
missionaries25 as the forerunners 9f Frenchimperialism. 
It was a fact that the Catholics became involved in political
activities which were seen to be traitorous to the Korean state. In
contrast the Protestant missionaries, mostly Americans, stressing non-
interference in politics, from the early period of their mission
attempted to minimize the political factor, although they had to
acknowledge its existence. 26
Finally, it is important to point out in the present context that
Roman Catholic missionaries in Korea before 1911 (the year in which
the German mission was founded) all came from France. 27 The French
mission was founded in 1831. At the turn of the twentieth century,
Catholic mission was carried on primarilrnAtile.: Missions Etrangeres de
Paris (the Paris Foreign Mission Society, hereafter MEP), a great
French missionary congregation that had long been at work in the Far
East.
28
The Society recovered sufficiently from the ruin brought by
the French Revolution and the Napoleonic wars to resume foreign
missionary work. The French MEP in the Far East had	 close ties
with government and the armed forces that Catholics maintained at
home.	 Because the French missionaries identified with their
government, they were accustomed to deal directly with governments.
To summarise the early history of Catholic missions, acceptance
of the new doctrine by some led to general rejection by the majority
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of the Confucian literati and the government, resulting in nearly a
hundred years of direct and indirect persecution. 29
	Nearly a third
of Catholic history in Korea was under conditions of severe
suppression. A further third of the Church's history is taken up by a
period of slow recuperation from the shock of persecution and passive
acceptance of a totalitarian regime. During the early period. Korean
Catholicism showed '-13. slow rate of growth and
	 development in
spite of extreme persecution.
After waves of repression, Korean Catholics finally won legal
protection through Korea's treaty with France (1886), which guaranteed
the safety of Catholic converts. As the years passed, the work of the
French MEP fathers was augmented by the work of an international
Catholic missionary force, whose different orders were assigned to
different areas of the peninsula:
	 German Benedictines in the
northeast (1911), American M9kno11etS in the northwest (1927), and
Irish Columbans in the southwest (1933). 30
2. Protestant Missions
When Catholicism entered Korea, social criticism was confined more
to the intelligentsia, and the power of the government was unimpaired;
however, Protestantism came in at a time when the structure and values
of traditional society were being widely criticised, and when the
central government's ability to function was greatly impaired. 1
 While
the Korean Catholic community was suffering in the nineteenth century,
the Protestant faith was also putting down roots.
	 In Chinese
Manchuria, in the 1870s Scottish missionaries studied Korean and then
translated scriptures, which they passed
	 loat itinerant Korean
merchants. The merchants in turn set up small family congregations in
Korea. The first Protestant church was founded in Sorae, Hwanghae
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Province, by a merchant named SO Sang-yun. 2
	In this context, we can
assume that the Scottish cultural and religious background and the
democratic structure of Presbyterianism in some measure influenced the
founding of the first church.
	 Here again we can note that the
development of the Church in Korea from the first depended upon the
efforts of the Koreans themselves. Before any foreign missionaries
actually engaged in evangelism on Korean soil, Christianity had been
brought there by local evangelists. 3
The late nineteenth century was marked by ceaseless challenges
from outside powers to open Korea's gates, and she was finally
pressured into signing a series of treaties with such Western powers
as the United States of America, Germany and France, a g
 well as with
neighbouring	 Japan and Russia.
	 With the opening of the
country to foreign interests came freedom of religion, and foreign
missionaries poured into Korea during the period from 1884 to 1908.
The first Protestant missionary societies to begin evangelistic
efforts in Korea were the Board of Foreign Missions of the
Presbyterian Church in the United States, and the Foreign Missionary
Society of the Methodist Episcopal Church. These two agencies started
their work simultaneously, carried it on side by side, and have
organised the majority of the churches existing in Korea today. 4
In the history of the missionary enterprise in America, the year
1880 marks the birth of a new missionary interest among students in
theological seminaries. Among the early missionaries to Korea, many
made their decisions for foreign mission work either during or
following the first Inter-Seminary Convention held in October, 1880.
In the Convention, they believed that the Lord would hasten his coming
and that the time had come to preach the gospel of the kingdom in all
the world for a witness unto all nations. 5
	Paul A. Varg asserts, in
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his "Motives in Protestant Missions, 1890-1917" (1954), that "it was
in the prevailing spirit of Moody revivalism that the missionary
movement found its deepest religious source". 6 The Moody type of
revivalism did not emphasise theology. Instead it exploited the guilt
complex and preached justification by faith. Varg comments on the
Moody revivalism:
What is conceived to be the evils of its day
raised no questions about the social order and the
solution to all ills it conceived to lie in the
redemption of the individual. Stated in religious
terms, it had a passion for souls and it was this
sense of urgency which served as la major impetus
to the foreign missionary crusade.
The dynamic force underlying the missionary movement was the
revivalistic spirit. 8 The theological liberals, for the most part,
frowned on both revivals and the missionary crusade.
	 It was the
conservatives who provided the leadership for the missionary cause.
Thus the typical missionary of the first quarter of the century after
the opening of the country was a man who still kept the Sabbath much
like his New England forebears a century earlier. He looked upon
dancing, smoking, card-playing, and the drinking of liquor as sins in
which no true follower of Christ should indulge. 9 In theology and
biblical criticism he was strongly conservative, and he held as a
vital truth the premillenarian view of the second coming of Christ.
Thus higher criticism and liberal theology were deemed as dangerous
heresies. The dichotomy of literal Biblicism and the social gospel, a
mark of Protestant missions in China (and for that matter, Japan),
never found a place in Korea.
	 Under the impetus of a programme
directed by American missionaries of 'Puritanic zeal and Wesleyan
fervour', fundamentalism held sway in Korea. For example, in the case
of baptised members, failure to keep the Sabbath or to attend worship
regularly without legitimate excuse was considered sufficient reason
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for discipline. Such members were debarred from taking part in the
communion service.
The first Protestant missionary to come with the intention of
residing permanently in Korea was Dr. Horace N. Allen, of the
Presbyterian Church in the U.S.A.
	 He was appointed by the
Presbyterian Board of Foreign Missions to China as a medical
missionary in 1883, and drifted around in Shang-hai and Nan-king until
September of 1884.
	
To gain access to Korea, he came not as a
missionary but as physician to the U.S. Legation in Sul. A short-
lived palace coup in December 1884 gave him the chance to heal the
wounds of a Korean prince, thereby earning the gratitude of the king
and permission to start a clinic.
	
He also won toleration for
religious missionary work in Soul. In 1885 missionary work began in
earnest with Horace G. Underwood and Henry G. Appenzeller,
Presbyterian and Methodist, respectively. 10
Missionaries, mostly American, of two leading denominations,
Presbyterian and Methodist, initiated various cultural and social
welfare activities, in addition to regular mission work, and
established high schools, junior colleges, medical clinics, Bible
translation (Korean), publication of periodicals, and youth movements
such as the YMCA and the YWCA.
	 Through these activities and the
organization of democratic churches, early Protestantism in Korea
resulted in promotion of democratic values and became associated with
the ideology of an independent national state. Thus R. Pierce Beaver
says:
Korea presents the outstanding instance of the
identification of nationalism with Christianity in
the Far East. Within a few short years many
citizens of a nation which had ruthlessly
persecuted Christianity and made martyrs of scores
of Roman Catholics and their missionaries, found
in	 the Church,	 especially the Protestant
denominations, the vehicle which could most
- 130 -
effectively preserve the national language, keep
alive national aspirations, and strengthen the
character of the people under oppression. The
defeat of China by Japan on Korean soil, Japanese
pressure on the King, and the murder of the Queen
at Japanese instigation, all in 1895, gave birth
to Korean nationalism, and subsequentnaggression
and domination continued to foster it.
In similar vein, many have emphasised that the prestige of
Protestantism was reinforced by the presence of many Christians among
the nationalists.	 In spite of the fact that there were also
Christians who collaborated with Japanese in the latter part of the
colonial period, Korean Christianity never became associated as such
with imperialism. 12 Whereas Christian missions and churches in other
colonies were seen as part of the imperialist presence, in Korea the
church was associated with a new nationalism. 13
	Christianity in
Korea became the vehicle for the preservation of national hopes in
reaction against Japanese domination. 	 Protestantism was warmly
welcomed not only as a religious creed but also for its political,
social, and cultural ideals and activities. 	 The strength of its
appeal was due in part to a psychological factor - the acute feeling
of the Korean people that belief in Christianity would atone for the
failings of their society that led to the loss of Korea's nationhood.
Thus, it is very interesting to note that, in spite of the deliberate
effort on the part of the Japanese . westernisers, the Korean public
seems to have never ceased to identify	 Western civilisation with
Christianity.
It was a fact that, at the earlier stages of evangelistic work,
American missionaries imposed on Korean Protestant churches the
American brand of religious fundamentalism. 14	The American
missionaries,	 trained in	 .tk. background of conservative and
fundamental theology and rigidly sectarian ethical views, preached
love and perseveranceto the Korean Christians who were burning with
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resentment over the loss of national sovereignty.	 The Korean
Christians accused some missionaries of playing 'traitor', threatening
them with death. 15	The missionaries led a revival movement in 1907
in an attempt to steer the Korean church towards non-politicisation. 16
As they intended, the nature of the Korean church switched to a
'revival passion'. Furthermore, the missionaries, who had checked the
theological growth of the Korean church, hoped to confine Korean
clergy within their own theological and socio-ethical boundaries.
Therefore, the intellectual level of Korean clergymen was extremely
low. When the first World Mission Council met in Edinburgh in 1910,
the theological destitution of the Korean church emerged as a major
issue. 17
A second feature of the Korea mission programme was indifference
to the social application of Christian theology. 18	The Presbyterian
missionaries in Korea invited Rev. John Nevius, a missionary to China,
to Korea for a week's discussion of a mission policy in 1890. The
"Nevius Method" (Appendix B), named after John Nevius, was elaborated
originally in a series of articles appearing in the 1883 issues of the
Chinese Recorder.	 The plan was not popular in China but gained
practically unanimous acceptance among the Korean missionaries after
Dr. Nevius visited S6111 in 1890. In addition to the Nevius Method -
self-support, self-government and self-propagation - the Presbyterian
Mission Council adopted a written mission policy as early as 1893. 19
This is the first and a remarkable statement of the policy of American
missionaries in Korea.	 The first article of the policy states: "It
is better to aim at the conversion of the working class than that of
the higher classes", and the second article was: "The conversion of
women and the training of Christian girls should be an especial aim,
since mothers exercise so important an influence over future
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generations". Thus American missionaries consciously made the lower-
class populations and women and children their sociological targets
for evangelisation.	 The missionary outreach towards the mass of
common people was certainly the major reason for such increase in
church membership.	 The thought of the Korean churches, particularly
among the common people, was fixed on a new world. For the deprived
and the oppressed converts the present world was regarded as so
utterly lost that it could not possibly be saved. 	 The duty of
Christianity was to preach deliverance:	 to exhort, baptise, and
gather in the elect preparatory to Christ's second coming.
The non-intellectual, and indeed almost anti-intellectual,
approach of the American missionaries in proselytising the Korean
masses became quite apparent when missionaries began to reflect on the
question of theological education, that is, the training of Korean
church leaders. 20	The Rev. W.D. Reynolds in 1896 had set forth some
ideals and principles for the training of the Korean ministry
(Appendix C). There were three negatives and four positives, but the
most important part was the restriction on "higher education" for
Protestant ministers. 	 The initial setting of a low standard of
theological education has hindered the educational level of Protestant
ministers ever since.	 In this sense, Yi Kwang-su a talented young
Korean writer, in 1917, writing on "Defects of the Korean Church
Today", made the following interesting observations:
Another bad fruit is the contempt for learning.
To say that the church which founds schools
despises learning, sounds like a contradiction;
but a real Christian so-called treats learning
with the greatest contempt, calling it 'worldly
knowledge'. Arguing that the 'worldly knowledge'
weakens faith, he regards learning as a temptation
of the devil and an enemy of the soul ... In
church schools no attention is paid to natural
science, geography or history - the essential
subjects in a modern curriculum. The most
surprising thing is the opposition of church
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officers, like pastors and elders, to the 'worldly
knowledge' ... Be the cause what it may, to
despise knowledge is the sure road to destruction.
It is indeed a regrettable attitude. z1
The anti-intellectual approach of the missionaries on the
training of the Korean ministry was the root cause of the long
criticised anti-intellectualism of Korean Protestantism in its
eventful century of growth and progress.	 At the earlier stage of
evangelistic work by the missionaries, it was too easy for them to
impose on Korean Protestant churches the American brand of religious
fundamentalism. 22 This choked the development of Protestant theology
by Korean theologians until the 1970s. Thus various schisms within
the Protestant churches in Korea since 1950 have been deeply rooted in
American Protestantism and American religious anti-intellectualism.
23
Schisms and divisions in Korean churches since 1950 also have
missionary roots.
	
When the American missionaries drew up mission
policy in 1893, they adopted a comity system and divided the country
into the several mission 'territories' (Table 2. Map of Korean
Missions). 24 The agreement was never made official, but it became an
important working principle.	 The Northern Presbyterians and the
Northern Methodists occupied the northwestern provinces, including
PWngyang and Lju.	 The Southern Presbyterians, the Baptist and the
Northern Methodists were working in Ch'ungch'Ong Province. The middle
provinces such as Hwanghae and KangwOn went to both Northern and
Southern Methodists.	 The southeastern province, KyOngsang Province
except for the Pusan area, which the Australian Presbyterians had
occupied, was occupied by the Northern Presbyterians. 	 To make the
demarcation of mission territories complete, the liberal Canadian
missions later claimed the northeastern provinces of HamgyOng.
This division of Korea into mission territories according to the
missionaries' own denomination wasa direct carry-over from American
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denominationalism.
25
 This hampered various continued efforts on the
part of Korean Christians for church union, that is, the establishment
of one united Christian Church in Korea.
26
	This almost innocent-
looking division of mission territories along geographic lines also
made later church schisms very intense and harmful for the healthy
ecumenical development of Korean Protestantism.
Incidentally, the Presbyterian missionaries began their work
under the wing of the government.
27
	Consequently, their policy was
to win the favour of the state, that obstacles might not be
unnecessarily placed in their way. 	 Once having gained a foothold
through the establishment of the government hospital, they pursued the
policy of maintaining the status quo and of avoiding the opposition of
the conservative party.	 Presbyterian policy was, therefore,
conservative and cautious. 	 The Methodists, however, were more
aggressive. The appointment of Dr. R.S. Maclay of Japan, as the first
superintendent of the Korea mission, led to friendly relations with
the Japanese. Maclay was deeply impressed by the prominent position
and liberal policy of the Japanese government in Korea during his
visit in 1884.	 Methodist missionaries entered with letters of
introduction from the Japanese to acquaintances in Korea, and at once
began their missionary labour among the Japanese connected with the
legation.	 To break down prejudices among the Koreans, they built
hospitals and dispensaries in different sections of the city,
constructed one of the first prominent school buildings in the heart
of the capital, and inaugurated extensive school work for girls. 	 The
Board increased the missionary force and budget as rapidly as
resources at home would permit. Thus the Presbyterians won favour
with the government by acquiescing in its policy, and the Methodists
gradually gained the confidence of the populace through their
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philanthropic institutions.
In brief, when we review the early history of Protestant missions
in Korea, we can grasp the outstanding characteristics of the Korean
church which were not, despite Dr. L.G. Paik's view, transitory
defects: (1) the inherent conservatism of the Church, 	 (2) the want
of the social application of Christianity, and (3) the low
intellectual standard of the Korean Christians. 28	Moreover, we
,
should pay attention to the significance of the division of Korea into
mission territories according to the missionaries' own denominations
in the light of schisms in Korean churches in post-liberation
Christianity.	 Also it is interesting to note the difference in
missionary policies between the Presbyterians and the Methodists.
Around the time that Christianity was first introduced into
Korea, the country was in the process of being taken over by Japan.
Enlightened Christians took the lead in anti-Japan struggles; this
national movement, however, was never supported by missionaries nor
had it any theological backing. Missionaries were, in general, against
the participation of Korean Christians or churches in the political
(anti-Japanese) movement. 29 In fact, they endeavoured to thwart such
anti-Japan struggles by all available means.	 Missionaries had to
protect the church - they did not want to see church members hurt in
an anti-Japanese uprising, and they did not want to antagonise the
Japanese for fear of losing their right to work in Korea. 30
Missionaries were successful in de-politicising the Korean church
through the emotion-filled revival movement of 1907. 	 The great
revival movement should be understood from this perspective. Emerging
victorious in the Russo-Japanese War of 1904, Japan placed Korea under
its de facto control and in reality began its colonial rule of Korea
with a support from the Roosevelt's United States and other Western
•_
- 136 -
powers. In 1904 American President Roosevelt mediated the Portsmouth
Peace Conference between the Russians and the Japanese. Presbyterian
missionary, Dr. H.N. Allen, struggled to represent Korean interests to
the American government, urging it to take a pro-Russian line, but to
no avail. Roosevelt and the Japanese traded Korea for the Philippines
by the Taft-Katsura Agreement.
31
On March 1, 1919, a nationwide independence movement was formed
against the Japanese colonial government, and Korean Christians were
participants.	 But missionary involvement was conspicuous by its
absence. 32	The movement was organised by Korean laymen and Korean
church leaders, together with Ch q5ndogyo followers in Korean style,
with no violence and with no plan for armed resistance. Again, out of
humanitarian concern, American missionaries wrote reports and letters
about Japanese atrocities and Korean suffering. Certainly, they could
not do anything for Koreans in concrete terms, except taking care of
the wounded, the imprisoned and the fugitives. It must have been a
frustrating position for them. According to an announcement by the
Japanese resident-general, there were 3,200 anti-Japan demonstrations
from 1 March to 31 December 1919, in which 19,525 persons were
arrested, including:	 14 Sich igngyo followers, 55 Catholics, 2,283
Ch'Ondogyo	 followers	 and	 3,272	 Protestants	 (Methodist	 560,
Presbyterian 2,486, Congregational 7, and other Protestants 320)
(Table 3. The Religious Affiliation of Those Arrested between March
and December 1919).	 Also 16 of the 33 signatories of the new
"Declaration of Independence" were Christian leaders.
Whilst not a few missionaries denounced the barbaric massacres
perpetrated by the Japanese, Methodist Bishop H. Welch expressed
discontent at the fact that the Independence Declaration was read at
many churches. 33 Moreover, Methodist Bishop Smith argued that the
•_
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Table 3: The Religious Affiliation of Those Arrested Between March and 
December 1919*
Denomination Male	 Female Total	 Percentage
Ch'Ondogyo 2,268	 15 2,283 11.7
Sich'Ongyo 14	 -
,
14 .1
Buddhist 220	 - 220 1.1
Confucianist 346	 - 346 1.8
Methodist 518	 42 560 2.9
Presbyterian 2,254	 232 2,486 12.7
Congregational 7	 - 7 .0
Other Protestants 286	 34 320 1.6
Catholics 54	 1 55 .3
Other Religions 21 	 - 21 .1
No religious affiliation 9,255	 49 9,304 47.7
Unknown 3,809	 98 3,007 ' 20.0
19,054	 471 19,525 100.0
* ((Japanese)	 Gendarmerie	 Headquarters	 in Korea,	 Ch5sen san-ichi
dokuritsu	 s5j6	 jiken (The	 March	 First Independence	 Disturbance
Incident in Korea), Tokyo, qennand6, 1969, p. 449).
.1_
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sufferings incurred by Christians during the March 1 Independence
Movement were of the Christians' own making. 34
According to Song KOn-Ho, Korean leaders, in particular leading
Christians, in connection with the Independence Movement, misunder-
stood the principle of national self-determination that then United
States President Wilson had advanced. 35	The principle of national
self-determination was the shortest and last item of the four
principles Wilson put forth with an eye to eastern Europe. In other
words, the principle was intended chiefly to call on European
countries to maintain a power balance among themselves.	 Korean
Christians, however, pinned excessive expectations on the principle,
wishfully believing that Wilson would work for the independence of
Korea.	 This wishful thinking was one of the stimulants of the
Movement. Wilson, however, gave no word of support for the Korean's
struggle for national independence, although they struggled for nearly
one year. The Koreans' independence struggles, for which they shed so
much blood, were completely ignored in the international community,
especially by the United States government. 36
From this there appeared two new phenomena in Korean society. 37
The first was the public's departure from the church. Because the
church had taken the lead in anti-Japan struggles, the public had had
faith in it, and conscientious youths thronged to the church. When
their struggles were ignored by the United States, which they had
expected would support their movement for national independence, the
youth sought another direction. 	 Thus the movements of workers,
farmers and students were begun. These new popular movements dealt a
blow to the church. Now the Christian church was in a serious crisis.
The people's general attitude towards Christianity Was strikingly
different from the past.
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Japan invested its huge surplus profits earned through World War
I in its colony of Korea and steadily expanded industrial facilities
for arms build-up, consolidating a system of colonial exploitation.
38
Workers and farmers suffered from colonial and semi-feudal
exploitation.	 The number of labour disputes and tenancy disputes
increased sharply in the 1920s.	 As the struggles of workers and
farmers increased in number, they became organised movements,
developing into anti-Japan campaigns. Towards these anti-Japan drives
the church, then under the control of missionaries, not only remained
aloof but also tended to disapprove.	 In this context, it is note-
worthy that, after the March 1 Independence Movement, as a reaction to
the world opinion, the new colonial administration tried to improve
its relations with the missionary community. The Sait6 government
modified the policies governing missionary work in Korea.
39
	The
Japanese authorities sought to have the conservative churches counter
the anti-Japan sentiments that were sweeping Korean society.
In September 1919, while the Independence Movement was going on,
the Presbyterian Church launched an extensive revival drive called the
Forward Movement. 40	In the three-year crusades, provincial
Presbyterian meetings staged revival drives of their own. 	 The
Methodist Church too launched a great revival campaign, named the
Century advance, in 1919.	 In 1923, it again initiated a drive to
double the number of Methodist followers. As a result of the movement
the numbers of churches and followers increased from about 1,700 and
111,000 in 1919 to 2,200 and 195,000 in 1926. Once the revival drive
was over, however, Christian influence waned.	 In the case of the
Presbyterian Church alone, the number of churches declined by 12 and
the number of followers by 35,000.
Shocked at their influence despite the earlier revival movements,
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the Presbyterian and Methodist churches launched yet another revival
drive in 1929.
	 The new crusade began with street-side preaching at
Kwanghwamun in Sul, which coincided with a national fair in Sul and
thus drew quite an audience. A total of 98 evangelical lectures were
given over a 50-day period, with remarkable success.	 Here, the
Japanese government made an attempt to have the conservative churches
oppose the anti-Japanese drives that were sweeping the country.
In 1930, the Presbyterian Church established the Committee for
the Study of the Means of the Advancement of the Church to begin
studies on the numerical growth of the church. 41	Instead of
standing with the people who struggled to ensure their own survival,
the church remained within the church-yard, trying to solve the
people's troubles through preaching and Bible reading. In 1929, 80
percent of the Korean population lived in the rural areas, and up to
75 percent of Korean Christian followers were in the rural areas. The
Presbyterian synod established a rural division in 1928 and a branch
at each meeting, launching such programmes as the creation of model
villages, founding of farmers' schools, publishing of a farmers'
newspaper and the operation of credit unions.
	 Similar programmes
were also launched by the Methodist Church and the YMCA. Of course,
they were better than none, but they failed to have any sizable effect
on farmers' lives, since they could not go beyond the rural
organisation of the Japanese authorities. The basic cause of farmers'
poverty lay in colonial exploitation by Japanese imperialists.
As Korean Christianity remained within the precincts of the
church, refusing to take part in the new popular movements or to bear
the cross, mysticism as an unusual phenomenon swept Christian circles
during the 1920s and 1930s. In addition, the church faced a serious
problem with the demand by Japan for worship at ShintU shrines.
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Before closing this section, we must add some points about the
development of the early Protestant Church in Korea. 	 The Church
accepted and rejected certain key values of the traditional cultures.
In Grayson's words:
It [the Church] found in the belief in Hananim,
the Lord of Heaven of the traditional religion of
Korea, a parallel to the God of the Hebrews. By
adopting this term for God, the early missionaries
were saying to the Koreans that the God whom they
knew was the same God who revealed-Himself in
Jesus Christ. On the other hand, they felt quite
proper about rejecting the polytheistic system in
which this belief in a Supreme Being was enmeshed.
In this, they were supported by the Confucianists
who likewise scorned superstition. Just as they
felt compelled to reject polytheism, the early
missionaries likewise rejected the chesa ceremony.
This brought them into conflict with the
Confucianists who helq it to be the centrepiece of
morality and virtue.
Also, as did the Catholic Church, the Protestant churches
proclaimed a doctrine of hope, but coupled this emphasis with a
programme of social and political involvement. 43 In the case of the
Catholic Church, the mentality of the ghetto, of an isolated group
shut up within itself and profoundly satisfied with its own comforts
and glories had continued long after the end of persecution, thereby
depriving the Church of significant involvement in society. 44 For the
most part, the Catholic Church showed tranquil development during the
period of colonial domination. The Japanese do not seem to have been
as harsh with the Catholics as they had been with the Protestants.45
The penetration and growth of Protestantism in Korea can be explained
in some measure by the association of Christianity with a sense of
Korean nationalism (Table 4. Statistics for Christianity [1920] in
Korea).
But, as Song K8n-Ho (1985) has already pointed out, Christianity
and nationalism (the nationalist social movement) in Korea is
controversial.	 It was a fact that the Christians, especially
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Protestants, had lost their leading roles in anti-Japan struggles
after the Independence Movement of 1919 had been ignored by the United
States of America.	 This trend was certainly reinforced by
the-	 lack of
missionaries' i. concern for some of the realities of life in Korea at
A
the time. 46 It should be noted in this context that the attitude of
the,
missionaries waSi mixed with their other-worldly spiritualism. 	 In
line with these attitudes, the conservative Christian majority in
Korea stressed spiritual questions and tended to avoid conflict over
temporal issues. 47	To express this in Max Weber's terms, for
conservative Protestants, "the world would remain as it was until the
Master would come again " . 48	Thus the Saitii government in the 1920s
tried to make the conservative churches move in opposition to the
anti-Japan sentiments on the part of the Korean populace.	 In the
political realm, the majority of conservative Christians, as a whole,
heeded the Apostle Paul's advice in Romans 25:40: "He who resists the
authorities resists what God has appointed".
On the other hand, however, as D.N. Clark concludes, "earlier in
this century Christianity (Protestantism) in Korea was very important
as an alternative to the other great force for change - Japan".
49
Christianity gathered strength and support from Koreans who used
church institutions as havens from Japanese oppression. When Japan
ruled Korea, conditions combined to neutralise the contradictions
between nationalism and Christianity that existed at the same time in
China. 50	Whereas Christian missions and churches in other colonies
were seen as part of the imperialist presence, in Korea whose master
was a non-Western power, the (early) church was associated with a new
nationalism.
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CHAPTER III
MODERN JAPAN, STATE SHINTO-
 AND CHRISTIANITY
A. The Roots of Imperialism in Japanese Culture
It is generally accepted that nationalism is associated with
awareness of cultural identity, i.e. the nation's image of itself with
regard to those characteristics - geographical, racial, historical,
religious, linguistic - that are held to be common to its members.
In Japan's case, among the various components of national
identity, we can note that the geographic setting of the Japanese is
one of relative isolation. '
	Throughout most of its history Japan has
been perhaps the most isolated of all the major countries of the
world. As a result, long before the Japanese embraced nationalism in
the modern sense, 2
 there was a well-established convention among them
that Japan was a single state, subject ultimately to one monarchical
authority. 3
Certainly isolation has produced in the Japanese not only a
distinctive pattern of culture but also a strong sense of self-
identity. On this matter Reinhard Bendix comments as follows:
Japan is an island empire that was successfully
conquered only once (at the end of World War II)
in her entire history. Thus the tremendous
internal divisions which mark Japanese medieval
history had no adverse effect upon the cultural
coherence of the country. Because of her insular
position, Japan's political divisions and
instability never exposed her to the cumulaive
effect of wars and alliances from the outside.
Here we should point out that "there already existed by 1868 (the
Meiji Restoration) a set of assumptions about what constituted
'Japaneseness' - a Japanese self-image - which Meiji nationalism was
to incorporate and extend".
	 "This self-image", W.G. Beasley argues,
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"was a product of the Edo experience". 5
Until the sixteenth century Japan was restlessly in contact with
its two closest neighbours, Korea and China. Then for more than two
centuries, from 1638 to 1853 (Edo or Tokugawa Period), Japan's rulers
took advantage of their natural geographic isolation to fix on the
country a firm policy of seclusion from the outside world, whereby the
Japanese were almost completely kept apart from foreign contacts. It
-
was a unique experience at a time of quickening international and
interregional relations elsewhere in the world. 6
Against this background of separation from the rest of the world,
however, potentials for nationalism were emerging in the Edo society
of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Relations with China in
this period contributed more pervasively to Japanese self-knowledge
and so in the end to national consciousness. 7	Since the fifteenth
century there had been a resurgence of Chinese cultural influence in
Japan, especially in such fields as painting, Zen Buddhism and
Confucian Philosophy.	 Despite the continuing process of emulation,
in sixteenth-century Japan there were recognisably 'Japanese' cultural
traditions. Thus in Edo Society Chinese and Japanese traditions were
co-existent:	 beside Buddhism stood Shint5;
	 beside Confucianism,
Bushid6 (the Way of the Warrior).
After more than a century of civil war the Tokugawa family
adopted Neo-Confucianism as the social ethic of the warrior class
samurai with a view to reinforcing social and political stability and
civilising them from soldiers to bureaucrats. Certainly the Confucian
teaching on the virtue of loyalty had a considerable effect on the
evolving ethic of the warrior class: BushidU. 8
 The introduction of
Chinese Neo-Confucianism into Japan by the Tokugawa family caused
almost no friction or disharmony; only the doctrine of abdication and
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rebellion presented difficult problems. 9	This needs some
explanation. Neo-Confucianism as a validation of imperial absolutism
remained in some degree at odds with Japanese political realities:
the authority of the Japanese imperial house rested on a claim to
direct descent from the sun-goddess Amaterasu, not on the Emperor's
observance of Confucian precepts. 10
	In G. Sansom's view, the
emperors of Japan described themselves as 'manifest gods', which was
contrasted with the Chinese concept of 'mandate of heaven'. 11
In the eighteenth century Shint5 scholars eventually denied the
validity of the Chinese tradition itself. 12
	The eighteenth century,
the period immediately preceding contact with the modern civilisations
of the West, saw the development of a challenge to Confucianism in the
name of a specifically Japanese set of alternatives.
	 For example,
Motoori Norinaga (1730-1801), as a famous scholar of National Learning
(Kokugaku), rejected Confucianism and Buddhism as imported ideas. In
Motoori's thought we may find an indication of the results of Japanese
self-awareness, which had matured in the peaceful society of the Edo
Period. 13
	Motoori, the second great leader of the Shinn" revival,
upholds the traditional account of the divine creation in all its
unembellished simplicity while rejecting the rationalistic cosmogony
of the Chinese:
The true way is one and the same, in every country
and throughout heaven and earth. This Way,
however, has been correctly transmitted only in
our Imperial Land.
	 Its transmission in all
foreign countries was lost long ago in early
antiquity ... The 'special dispensation of our
Imperial Land' means that ours is the native land
of the Heaven-Shining Goddess who casts her light
over all countries in the four seas. Thus our
country is the source and fountainhead of all
other countries, and in all matters it excels all
the others ... our country's Imperial Line, which
casts its light over this world, represents the
descendants of the Sky-Shining Goddess ... The
Imperial Line is destined to the nation for eons
until -the end of time and as long as the universe
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exists. That is the very basis of our Way ... But
their [foreign countries'] dynastic lixs, basic
to their existence, do not continue ...
In Motoori's view, the Sun Goddess is a universal deity as well
as a national one, but she has shown special favour to the Japanese
and guides them to a special destiny. Not only by asserting that
Japanese kami (the term 'Icami' corresponding to 'deity'), not Chinese
sages, were the original creators of the Way, but also by dismissing
ethical principles as something appropriate only to peoples whose
behaviour needed correction, like the Chinese, not to those whose
behaviour was 'naturally' good, like the Japanese, Motoori reversed
the Confucian criteria of cultural primacy in favour of Japan. 15 In
this reversion, it is noteworthy that he did emphasise the dynastic
continuity of Japan and the relative turbulence of China as evidence
of their respective moral standings, which deserves our special
attention.
It is generally accepted that the thoughts of Motoori came to
function as one of the main sources of Japanese nationalism. 16 Given
the assertion that "one cannot understand the imperialist mentality
without taking account of its roots in nationalism" 17 , it is not
surprising that Maruyama Masao, 18 the authority on. Japanese
intellectual history, has turned his attention to the early roots of
Japanese thought, going as far back as the Ko iki (Record of Ancient
Matters), discerning in the 'ancient substraWkos6) certain patterns
that have persisted to the present , . 19 In the study of theory and
psychology of ultra-nationalism, Maruyama says, "His Majesty was heir
to the Imperial line unbroken for ages eternal and he rules by virtue
of the final injunction of his ancestors". 20
Similarly, emphasising that Japanese ultra-nationalism did not
suddenly appear in the post-Meiji period, Nakamura Hajime traced its
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beginnings to the very remote past.
21
	"It goes without saying",
Nakamura asserts, "that ultra-nationalism developed in close relation
with the worship of the Emperor as a living god".
22
	The divine
nation-concept and the principle of ultra-nationalism have thus a
close connection with Emperor worship. 	 According to Nakamura, the
motives for compiling histories (e.g. Ko'iki and Nihon shoki) in Japan
was, in contrast with China, to record selectively, on the basis of
Japan's consciousness of itself as a state distinct from the rest of
the world, the facts of Japanese history, emphasising as central the
genealogy of the Imperial House. 23	Historically, the continuity of
the imperial institution (and the Imperial House) constitutes one of
the undeniable and remarkable 'facts' of Japanese political history. 24
Japan has literally been a 'single country' from the beginning of
its political history. In other words, in Japanese nationalism the
particular state of Japan came to be the sole standard upon which all
• judgements were based. 25
	For the important reasons of Japan's
exclusive concern for herself, Nakamura noted the insular position of
Japan:
The natural basis for Japan's exclusive concern
for herself is, I believe, the insular position of
Japan, isolation from the Continent by water;
there is also the historical fact that Japan has
known the existence of foreign nations only
indirectly, as in the wes of the Mongolian
Invasion and World War II.
The Western threat from the time when the seclusion policy came
under challenge in the late eighteenth century led some Japanese to
think of their own country as being the same kind of entity as those
which threatened it. 27
	Moreover, Honda Toshiaki, writing in 1798,
had seen Japan, not only as a country in the European sense, but also
being politically and economically in competition with other such
countries. The reforms he advocated were designed to make Japan 'the
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richest and strongest country in the world'.
	 Specifically, he
maintained that if his advice were followed there would eventually be
"a great island of Japan in the East comparable with the island of
England in the West ... two most wealthy and powerful nations n . 28
By the 1850s and 1860s, this sort of competitive international
ambition became almost a cliche of Japanese documents on foreign
affairs, 29
 the so-called 'Britain of the East' analogy enjoyed its
greatest publicity in the early days of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance of
1902. 30 For a time in TOky.5 it became customary to couple the toast
to the 'Empire of the rising sun' with that to the 'Empire on which
the sun never sets'.
	 Thus Yazu Masanaga's 'Universal Regional
Geography for Middle Schools', 31
 published in 1896, states:
Generally speaking Britain can be compared with
our Japan. This similarity to Japan is
particularly noticeable in such respects as
Britain's character as an island kingdom, its
relationship to the continent, the size of its
territory and population, its maritime climate and
the nature of its coastline. Should we 42refore
say that Britain is the Japan of the West?
The Japanese sense of being somehow a separate people or being
unique, as 'the Britain of the East' analogy in modern Japan shows, is
probably a
	 natural product
	 of Japan's relative
	 isolation
geographically and throughout early history.
	 The Meiji period
inherited a belief that Japan was engaged not only in a struggle for
survival against countries that could be described as its peers, but
also in a process of emulation of which the aim was to achieve parity
of esteem. This determination to be 'civilised' which had long had
China as exemplar, was now directed towards the West. 33
Given that traditionally the most blatant assertions of national
superiority have usually been associated with obvious fears of
inferiority, "Japan's early expressions of nationalism were", we can
safely assume, "largely in reaction to a Japanese sense of inferiority
- 150 -
to China"
	
Certainly, we cannot deny in Japan's pre-Meiji history
the conscious use of Chinese models. The traditional consciousness of
cultural borrowings from China and of catching up with the West in
modern times has helped make the Japanese very self-conscious in
developingthejr distinctive culture and national identity.
A
Finally, in clarifying the historical evolution of Japanese self-
image in the world, one should not underestimate the implications of
,
the relative isolation of the Japanese populace, which mainly derives
from its insular position. 	 Also we may admit that the beginnings of
Japanese ultra-nationalism in the post-Meiji period, especially in the
catastrophic events after 1930, can be traced to the very remote past:
Maruyama has remarked that "a tendency to military expansion was an
inherent impulse in nationalism long before the so-called age of
imperialism in the nineteenth century . ; 35 furthermore Nakamura has
stressed that "the boast that Japan was the best country in the world
has existed from very early time ... The notion of Japanese
superiority is most boldly expressed in the concept of the Divine
Nation"; 36
 while Bellah comments that "the structural weakness of
national Shinto in the earlier period should not lead one to
Chamberlain's conclusion that modern state Shinto was an invention of
a few clever leaders of the Meiji Restoration. 	 Almost every
expression of Japanese nationalism in both the Tokugawa and Meiji
Periods (and, indeed, earlier) can be seen as an expression of
national Shinto". 37	The cultural significance of the institution of
the Emperor is a thing unique to Japan, for it is not to be found
among other peoples, and it did not appear suddenly after the Meiji
Restoration (1868) 38 ; on the contrary, an incipient tendency of this
kind had existed since ancient times. The legend of the ancestors of
the royal house was successfully connected with the legend of the
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creation of the universe: the divine authority of the Imperial House
is enhanced by the fact that its lineage is connected with the legend
of the creation of heaven and earth. The doctrine of imperial divine
descent was, no doubt, reinforced by the undeniable and remarkable
'facts' of the continuity of the imperial institution itself in
Japanese political history.
Here we again note the insular position of Japan which kept her,
in contrast with the relative turbulence of China, from breaking the
dynastic continuity. On this matter Hall explains:
Isolation and the homogeneity of the Japanese
populace also meant that warfare was always civil
war, a condition which may account for the
frequent lack of completeness in the outcome of
greater power struggles in Japan.
Protected from conquest by foreign powers because
of their isolation, the Japanese islands
themselves never seem to afford a geographic base
of sufficient size so that a rival indigenous
dynasty might gain sugicient power to challenge
the established order.
The phrase 'Dai.Nippon .40
 (Great Japan) and the concept of the
Divine Nation expressed by some religionists - e.g. "Our Great Nippon
is a Divine Nation.
	 Our Divine Ancestors founded it" (Kitabatake
Chikafusa, a Shintii writer of the 14th century), "Japan is a Divine
Nation" (Nichiren, the Buddhist reformer of the 13th century) 41
 -
were, we can safely assume, in the Japanese view, derived from Japan's
association with the Sun Goddess (Amaterasu).
	 Nichiren, in the
context of his messianic view of history, regarded the Japanese
emperors as the spiritual embodiments of the Sun Goddess and
considered the God of War to be the guardian of the Japanese nation. 42
According to D.M. Brown, the geographical isolation of Japan. has
not only made the Japanese feel that they inhabit a separate area, but
it has kept them apart from the life of their nearest neighbours,
leaving them free from invasion and giving them a- historical
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continuity and cultural unity that have been very significant in the
rise of national consciousness. 43
We are now ready to draw some conclusions from the above
sense o-F
examination of the Japanese self-image. Japan t wuperiority in the
world was,
	 we could assert, deeply rooted in the very
remote past in two historical facts: one is the continuity of the
imperial institution and the other is a Japanese inferiority complex
in relation to continental China.
	 But it is true that we cannot
analyse these two factors without taking into account ° the insular
position of Japan as an important causal force that helped to produced
these two effects.
This assertion can be further justified by the so-called 'Britain
of the East' analogy: the post-Meiji Japan had for some time 'Great
Britain' as exemplar.
	 What seems particularly noticeable in this
analogy is Japan's identification with Britain in such respects as
Britain's character as an island kingdom and its relationship to the
continent.	 "What was the main ideological factor that kept the
Japanese people in slavery for so long and that finally drove them to
embark on a war against the rest of the world?". 44
	In order fully
to clarify the intellectual structure of Japan's ultra-nationalism our
concern should be directed "not merely to the external system of
coercion that determined the low level of political consciousness we
find today in Japan", but rather "to the all-pervasive psychological
coercion, which has forced the behaviour of Japan into a particular
channel"
The	 following,
	 therefore,
	 is	 an explanation
	 of	 some
characteristics of Japan's religious history in the light of religion
and politics (nationalism).
	 One of the primary assumptions of this
part is that "nationalism and religion arise from the fact that both
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give the individual a social framework and then both elicit an
emotional and enthusiastic devotion to that framework ... both can
become totalitarian in their demands". 46 In Japan, we can find that
nationalism has been so inextricably combined and co-ordinated with
the traditional religion that the two almost lost their separate
identities.
B. Characteristics of Japan's Religious History
1. Religious Primitiveness
Generally speaking, as time elapsed, many of the great 'national'
religions 1
 in history have perished. Others survived, but there were
changes and reconstruction. 	 An interesting example of a religion
preserving its original character with but minor transformation is
_Shinto. 2	In clarifying the epochs of Japanese history of religion,
Anesaki Masaharu classified two aspects of the ShintU religion -
communal and national - and emphasised the enduring vitality of
ShintU. He states:
These two aspects of the Shinto religion, communal
and national, were gaining in force at the dawn of
the historical age, and that tradition plays even
nowadays a considerable pars in the social and
spiritual life of the nation.
Similarly, in Wach's view, "Shinto is one of the most impressive
examples of the quasi-identification of a people or nationality with
deities considered to be its representatives (ancestors)". 4 Shinto
has existed in Japan without any founder since the time the ancestors
of the Japanese people began living in this land. The core of ShintU
belief is the communal religious experience accumulated in the actual
lives of the Japanese for many centuries.
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Thus, A.K. Reischauer, as a missionary in Japan, noted "a
persistence of religious primitiveness" in religion in Japan.
6
 In his
view, "an amazingly large percentage of the population is still quite
religious but clings to religions of a crude and primitive type". It
was, and is, a fact that in spite of the somewhat lofty elements in
Japan's spiritual possession there have persisted alongside it a large
number of things that belong to the primitive, e.g. the native Shint6.
,
Primitive Shint6 can be characterised as animism or belief in
spirits generally referred to as 'tama'. 7	'Tama' can be thought of
as a kind of 'mana'. 8	From the south the Japanese people got their
earliest and still perhaps their deepest religious impulse.
9
	The
idea of 'mama' is familiar in the oceanic world. 	 In Japan this
mysterious dynamism is called I Kami';	 the element of power that
inhabits and activates all unusual objects and persons. We may call
this primitive animism;	 in Japan it has come to be called Shint6,
"the Way of the Gods".	 It lives in the village shrine with the
patron deity and the year-round festivals of the food cycle, and in
the household shrine, recalling the presence of the ancestors. At the
peak of veneration stand the Sun-goddess and the Chieftain of the
tribe. Given that ancestor worship rested on belief in the spirits of
the ancestors, it appears that 'spirit-belief' has stood at the centre
of Japanese religiosity from primitive times to the present day. 10
With the spread of rice agriculture in Japan, rice-planting
rituals began to assume a central position in Shint6; particularly
emphasized was the relationship between the rice plant and its tama.
People seem to have thought that the spirit of their land entered the
rice plants and brought them health, wealth, long life and other
blessings. Since prehistoric times rice has been the prevailing crop,
and in modern times more than one-half of the entire cultivated area
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of Japan is still in rice. Therefore, it is not strange that one of
the most popular Shinti5 cults - Inari 11 , even now, is the rice cult. 12
2. Protection of the State
A second characteristic of Japan's religious history, which has a
close connection with ultra-nationalism, is that religion in Japan has
usually been subordinated to other interests, especially "protection
of the state .1 and treated as a mere instrument for achieving other
ends, that is, a convenient instrument of state. 2
It is widely accepted that Japanese culture rewards intuition
rather than analysis, emotion rather than rationality. The Japanese
people are better in practical matters than they are in abstract
thinking.	 In this sense, Nakamura points out the absence of a
critical spirit based on universal human reason as a conspicuous
characteristic of the Japanese way of thinking in the past, and this
uncritical attitude appears in the way of thinking which reveres the
living emperor as divine. 3	These characteristics, to be sure, have
helped to determine Japanese culture. Japanese religion, which has
affected Japanese traditional culture and its reformation for many
years and has influenced Japan below the surface, in its more
indigenous expressions follows the genius of the people in being
empirical and practical rather than metaphysical; ritualistic instead
of abstruse. 4
In early Shinta centred on the animistic worship of natural
phenomenon there was no theology or even a concept of ethics, beyond a
abhorrence of death and defilement and an emphasis on ritual purity. 5
Shinn' was originally an unorganised religion, having hardly any
system of doctrine. 6	The native cult was entirely lacking in
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metaphysics.
The original interest in Confucianism was not in its
abstractions, but in the ethical relations it bore to Chinese
governmental and political institutions. 7	Buddhism's chief
attraction was that it was the vehicle of continental culture, and
could be used to centralise the Japanese state.	 Roman Catholic
Christianity was admitted in the later middle ages because the
Japanese rulers believed they had to accept the Portuguese religion in
order to engage them in commerce. 8
Being eclectic, the Japanese mind is receptive to contrasting
religious systems. 9	Once established in Japan, therefore, the new
religion becomes subject to the eclectic processes at work in the
environment.	 In this context it should be pointed out that "the
Japanese never developed the idea, so prevalent in South and West Asia
as well as the West, that a person had to adhere exclusively to one
religion or another". 10	Certainly pre-modern Japanese were usually
both Buddhists and Shintoists at the same time and often enough
Confucianists as well. It seems true that religion in Japan has never
really stood in its own sovereign rights or been widely accepted as
the supreme thing in life. 11	'What will the given religion do to or
for the existing social institutions - the family, the state, the
Kokutai (National polity in its spiritual foundations)?' 	 This is a
question that should be asked of any religion in Japan, for religion
ought to have a real bearing on these values. 12
We can assume that there is an intimate relation between religion
and the fundamental structure of society.	 Although religious
exclusivism may turn out to be confined to only a few religions of
which Christianity is one,	 some. specifically Japanese factors
need to be examined as well.	 Thus we can safely say that Japanese
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clearly a primitive tribal religion. The Yamato people15
society, unlike the West, with greater emphasis on particularistic
relations and relativistic judgements, has reinforced Japanese
people's relativistic attitude towards religion. In a society like
Japan, in which intergroup relationships may reasonably take
precedence over universal principles, ethics may be more relativistic
or situational than universal. 13
	Thus, some observers have
characterized Japan as having a shame culture rather than a guilt
culture like that of the West, that is, shame before the judgement of
society is a stronger conditioning force than guilt over sin in the
eyes of God. 14
It is against this relativism that one needs to set the
instrumental character of religion in Japan. It is generally accepted
that all three of the great religious strands in Japan - ShintU,
Buddhism, Confucianism - had close relations to the political sphere
in the early periods of Japanese history. The earliest records we
have of Shint5 indicate the emergence of a state cult out of what is
consolidated their hegemony over central Japan about the middle of the
sixth century. It is clear that Yamato was the base for the ancestors
of today's emperor. Yamato managed to establish its own version of
the mythology.	 The oldest political myths, the Kojiki (Record of
Ancient Matters) and the Nihon shoki 16 (Chronicles of Japan) that tell
of how Yamato, with the emperor at its centre, conquered other realms,
were written by government order at the beginning of the eighth
century.	 In mythological terms, they tell of how the heavenly kami
(amatsukami), with the sun goddess Amaterasu 5mikami at their centre,
brought the earthly kami (kunitsukami) under control.	 These
kuntsukami are thought to be the kami of the early tribal kingdoms,
_
the deities of the primitive Shinto.17
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Given this mythic past, we can assume that the Japanese pre-
historic relationship between government and religion should have been
virtually indistinguishable. This basic assumption about the harmony
between religion and the polity was early formulated in the
expression, saisei--itchi, which means the "unity of religion and
government, or of the ceremonial and the political dimensions. 18
This unity of religion and government is reflected in the ancient
Japanese word for government, matsuri-goto, which literally means
'festival affairs', or more broadly, 'religious observances' or
'worship , . 19
	It should be noted that the Japanese national myth was
officially taught as historic fact in the decades immediately prior to
Japan's military defeat in 1945.20
In the process of the Japanese assimilation of Buddhism we can
point out that Buddhism was accepted by the Japanese as significant
for the support of the state. 21
	It is particularly noted here that
the adoption of Buddhism was begun in the diplomatic relations between
the Imperial Family and a foreign country (Paekche, Korea).
Buddhism was adopted by the Court with the first regard for the
protection of the State.
In concrete terms, when Buddhism was first introduced in the
sixth century, both those who favoured the new religion and those who
opposed it did so avowedly on the grounds of what it would do for or
against the welfare of the State. 22
	Historically Japanese Buddhists
carefully picked out such doctrines as would be convenient for, or not
inconsistent with, their nationalism.
The attitude which Indian Buddhism assumed toward the State was,
A
from the time of its origin,
	 one of cautiousness. This attitude
was unacceptable to the Japanese, according to whose realistic,
nationalistic view the Japanese State was absolute, and its sovereign,
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the Emperor, sacred. Thus the Japanese who accepted Buddhism on a
large scale refused, nevertheless, to adopt its concept of the State,
which to them appeared to run counter to the native idea of the 'state
structure' (Kokutai). 23
	Instead, they welcomed the sutra KonkOmy3- 
ky6 (The Golden Radiance Sutra) and some later scriptures of MahäySna
Buddhism because these have a theory that a monarch is "a son of
divine beings" (Tenshi, devaputra) to whom has been given a mandate of
Heaven and whom Heaven will protect. The traditional and conservative
Buddhism of the primitive type came here to be called the "Lesser
Vehicle" (Hinffyl-na) in Japan and looked upon with contempt;
	 the
Buddhism which came to be called the "Greater Vehicle" (Mah7gyana),
which allowed the Japanese to pursue their religious ideals in
conformity with their view of the State, was adopted by them.
The above mentioned theory of 'divine monarch' was not
peoldiar
	
to Buddhism; however, this idea came especially to be
stressed by the Japanese. 24
	Then, when Buddhism was finally
propagated, it was done so largely under official patronage, and early
in its history care was taken to see that its teachings were properly
harmonised with the existing order of things. 25
According to Nakamura Hajime, the concern for the State as an
idea, however, did not belong logically to the doctrines of most sects
of Buddhism in Japan. 26
	It was with the Nichiren Sect that it came
to constitute an essential motive. In Nichiren's view, religion must
serve the State.	 To him the existence of the State was the pre-
requisite for the flourishing of Buddhism. He said:
The nation prospers because of Buddhism;
	 and
Buddhism becomes precious because people revere
it. If the Nation perish and people disappear,
who will revere Buddhism? ... If there be no
overthrow of the State and no destruction on
Earth27 thy body will be safe, thy mind will be at
ease. 
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Thus, in Japan, Buddhism, which is a universal religion, was
adopted and spread as a religion serving the interests of the State.
A similar tendency can easily be discerned in the process of the
Japanese assimilation of Confucianism.
	 Although in the past the
Japanese adopted Chinese thought and culture on a large scale, still
they have exercised particular care not to injure the distinctive
characteristics of the Japanese State .28
	Since the Confucian concept
,
of the State was formulated in accordance with the needs of Chinese
society, it naturally contained a number of points with which the more
thorough-going of the Japanese nationalists could not agree. In this
sense the doctrine of abdication and rebellion presented difficult
problems. Thus, in regard to the government of the State, although
reference was made to the 21 Chinese dynastic histories, the political
practices of abdication and righteous rebellion were not initiated.
The State conceived by Chinese philosophers was an ideal or model
state; on the other hand, the state that the Japanese nationalists
had in mind was the actual Japanese state. 29
	This was the reason
why Japanese nationalism, nurtured, so to speak, by Confucianism, had
ultimately to deny the authority of Confucianism.
Hence, in spite of the widespread acceptance of Confucianism, the
Chinese and Japanese forms of it have differed in their emphasis. In
this context the comparison of the place of political and integrative
values, of the polity and the integrative system in China and Japan,
can perhaps reveal the differences of the two countries. 30
	The
relative importance of loyalty and filial piety may be taken as an
important index of this comparison. The basis of Chinese Confucianism
was the virtue of filial piety. Thus, since a basic element in their
thought was the idea of the change of dynasties, the idea of loyalty
to the State could not occupy the central place in their ethical
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scheme. 31 Not only did the value of filial piety take precedence over
loyalty, but loyalty itself had a very restricted focus. 32 In Japan,
on the other hand, loyalty clearly superseded filial piety. Filial
piety did not compete with loyalty, it reinforced it. We may see in
the following quotation from Nichiren that filial piety in the last
analysis for the Japanese meant loyalty:
... When a father opposes the sovereign, dutiful
children desert their parents and follow qs
sovereign. This is filial piety at its highest.
Certainly, in Japan, due to the hierarchical structure of
society, the particular virtue of loyalty to the Emperor occupied the
highest place among all virtues. Thus while most Confucianists kept
silence and avoided coming to grips with a contradiction between the
ancient Japanese form of government and Chinese Confucian theory, some
nationalistic Confucianists, e.g. Fujita T5ko (1806-1855) of the Mito
school, 34 argued that the doctrines of abdication and of righteous
rebellion were "definitely not applicable" to Japan. Consequently,
there was no other course than to interpret this contradiction as did
Fujita T5ko. 35
'Protection of the State', one of the most dominant concerns in
the Japanese mind, was thus firmly established in religion.
	 This
attitude towards religion with its insistence that everything,
including religion, be subordinated to the State was essentially
incompatible with the idea that religion should stand in its own right
or be accepted as the supreme thing in life. Hence Christianity,
which condemned subservience to the monarch, was thought to destroy
the very foundations of the social order in Japan.
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3. Hostility Towards Christianity
It is generally accepted that the charge that Christianity is
'unpatriotic' is met from first to last in the history of the mission
in Japan. 1
	The fundamental conflict between the claim of Christ and
Japanese messianic nationalism were recognised by many. 2
	Thus most
of the replies of missionaries to the questions sent out by Commission
IV of the Edinburgh World Missionary Conference (1910) remarked on the
supposed contradiction between loyalty to the Emperor and loyalty to
Christ, which saw Christianity as opposed to patriotism in Japan. 3
One cannot hope to understand the profound distrust of
Christianity on the part of the Japanese without some understanding of
its early historical roots in the Tokugawa period. The events in the
early period offer a background to what was to happen to Christianity
three centuries later. It may be recalled that St. Francis Xavier, a
Jesuit missionary, went to Japan in 1549 and that Roman Catholic
missionaries were most active throughout the remainder of that
century. It is to be noted that this was a period when the Tokugawa
were not yet securely in power; in 1603 they secured the Shogunate
and retained that power until the restoration of the Emperor in 1868.
Many of the lords who were against them, for example, in Hizen and
Choshu, took a lively interest in the new faith and this, as much as
the fear of foreign imperialism, accounted for the opposition of the
Bakufu (Tokugawa government) to Christianity. 4
	E.E. Best in
Christian Faith and Cultural Crisis: The Japanese Case (1966) points
out the reasons for the Bakufu's hostility towards Christianity:
The Tokugawa had closed the country to foreign
contact during the seventeenth century not only
because they felt their enemies within the country
to be in too close association with persons from
foreign powers.	 Christianity took root and
therefore the greatest number of priests and
converts were to be found precisley in the fiefs
most opposed to the Bakufu, that is to say, in
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Satsuma, Choshu, and Hizen. The government5felt
>threatened both from within and from without. <
The. des-Elny of early Cheistianity Tn Pan	 was
	
lar4ely	 de-ke ririecLby its irrLerac},011 with-thete succeSswe military dic.ta+bys n4,41° aceomplis	 Ore.
tight control of Japan, namely Oda Nobilnaga, Toyotomi Hideyoshi, and
Tokugawa Ieyasu. 6 According to G.D. Lama, the first part of Japan's
Christian century, from 1549 to 1587, may well be described as the era
of patronage; the second part, from 1587 to 1614, may be described as
the period of antagonism. 7
In the first era, it should be noted that Francis Xavier, a
typical sixteenth-century European in several ways, did not
particularly separate the cause of Christ and the cause of Portugal. 8
Jesuit missionaries following Xavier, thus gained the co-operation or
allegiance or even the conversion to Christianity of feudal lords
through suggesting the advantages of Portuguese trade or military aid.
In this sense, they could be accused of confusing their religion with
their nation.	 Jesuit missionaries used their connections, and local
rulers benefited. 9
 This was particularly true in western Japan. From
1569 the Jesuit fathers eagerly sought and gained the favour of Oda
Nobunaga, who was then not aware of the facts of Portuguese and
Spanish colonialism. 10	Oda Nobunaga encouraged the Jesuit6 as a
reaction of his avowed hate of Buddhist institutions. The political
and military activities of the Buddhist warrior monks posed a major
threat to the ascendant Oda Nobunaga.
11
	So he found the Jesuits
useful for his
A
 purposes.
After Oda Nobunaga's death, Toyotomi Hideyoshi seemed favourably
disposed towards the Jesuits at first, but finally became suspicious
that the Jesuits who had been involved in manipulating and playing the
market in the Portuguese silk trade in order to support its mission in
Japan might become the basis for subversive co-operation among the
Christian feudal lords of Kyushu. 12	Toyotomi Hideyoshi issued his
famous edict of expulsion in 1587, thereby giving no room for
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participation in the profits of commerce on the part of the Jesuits.
13
From this time the missionaries were seen as a possible threat:
Christianity was seen as 'an external force and one engaged in
political intrigue'.
During the second era, from 1587 to 1614, the suspicions of
Toyotomi Hideyoshi toward the missionaries were deepened by religio-
political and commercial rivalries among Roman Catholics, that is,
Portuguese Jesuits and Spanish Franciscans. 14 He became increasingly
aware of the association of missionaries and European soldiers in
colonial outposts such as Manila.
After the San Felipe incident in 1596 Toyotomi Hideyoshi became
more determined than ever to banish Christianity from the land. 15 In
an effort to save a rich Spanish galleon, the San Felipe, wrecked near
the harbour of Tosa in modern Shikeku, one of the officers told the
Japanese officials of the method by which Spain had conquered the
world. Illy we told that this method was first to send in agents of
her Christian faith to win people to her and then to take over
political control of the country. Thus Laman concludes as follows:
No doubt the religious and political rivalries of
Europe that were reflected so virulently before
the eyes of Ieyasu strenthened his determination
to banish all missi?garies and drive the Christian
faith out of Japan.
The prevailing impact left on the Japanese mind over the
centuries has been that "Christians are people of strange
disobedience, of alliance with subversive elements in Japanese
society, and of direct connections with conquering powers from the
West".
17
This fear and hatred of Christianity was a tragic legacy
from Japan's first chapter of the foreign Christian mission and it
came to life with redoubled force in the modern century. 18
 Given the
religious and political rivalries of Western missionaries in the first
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century of Christianity in Japan, "the missionaries seemed incapable
of distinguishing between their apostolic mission and their
nationalism". 19
In the proclamation of Toyotomi Hideyoshi against Kirishitan
(Japanese form of Christian) missions issued in 1587, the first clause
of the edict expressed the Shint6 idea that Japan was the land of the
gods, and that Japan could not tolerate a religion denouncing the
national deities as false ones.
	 It is to be noted that emphasis of
the	 , writer (Yakuin Zensa or Tokuun) on the national gods was not
an independent Shinto tenet but an expression of the prevailing
syncretic Buddhico-ShintO idea. Similar was the case with Tokugowa
Ieyasu's proclamation of 1614 which was directed against Christianity.
In this context, Fabian's book Ha Daiusu (Deus Destroyed) 21
published in 1620 deserves our attention. This book which marks a
milestone in the exclusion of Kirishitan missions from Japan can be
seen • from his confession of the reason why he had deserted the
church. 22 In the seventh section, treating of the Ten Commandments,
his refutation is concentrated on the first commandment, pointing out
that herein lies the source of all the evils of the Kirishitan
religion because it justifies one to be disobedient to parents, to
violate national laws, and even to commit parricide or regicide when
deemed necessary for observing the first commandment. The polemic in
this section is a most violent one, evidently intended for the
justification of any severe measures against the Kirishitans. 23 Also
Fabian bitterly complains of the haughtiness of the foreigners and
expresses his personal dissatisfaction with them.
	 Thus, it was the
incompatibility of Christianity and the native morality of self-
dedication to the clan and the Emperor which resulted in the
persecution of Christianity. 24
20
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In similar vein, Buddhist and Confucianist refutations in the
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries also shared the view of Fabian's
critics of Christianity, that its propaganda aimed at upsetting
national traditions and at subjugating the people to a foreign
religion. Moreover, the Buddhist pantheistic stand attacked Christian
monotheism. 25
The denunciation of Christianity as a means of political conquest
was common to all the critics of Christianity and was unquestionably
accepted by the whole people during the centuries of seclusion and
prohibition.
	 The nineteenth century Japanese also remained deeply
hostile to Christianity. 26 As one missionary historian, J.B.
Piolet, already noted in 1902, the distrust the Japanese had of
doctrines coming from outside the country was one of the chief
impediments to Christianity in Japan:
	 the Japanese suspected that
embracing the Christian faith also meant embracing a foreign nation. 27
C. Ultra-Nationalism and State Shint5 1
Brown describes the so-called 'ultra-nationalism' or 'extreme
nationalism' in Japan's modern history as follows:
At the time of the February Twenty-sixth Incident
of 1936, tension in Japan's relations with China
was building up once more. And in the next year a
War broke out which did not come to an end until
Japan's surrender to the Allied Powers in 1945.
In those eight years the Japanese government
constantly attempted to arouse the people to a
greater awareness of the danger facing the nation,
and to a deeper sense of loyalty to the Emperor.
Political, religious, and educational
institutions, as well as all forms of communi-
cation and all types of entertainment, were
utilized in a broad 'spiritual mobilization'
program. Nationalism thus reached a level of
development that has been identifiel - and with
justification - as ultra-nationalism.
The post-1936 ultra-nationalism was in large part a government-
propelled movement which engendered feelings-that included a powerful
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sense of Japanese mission to establish a new order in East Asia
3
 and
also a strong fear of foreign enemies - Britain and America. All news
and other propaganda efforts were constantly pointing out the
injustice of Anglo-Saxon attitudes and policies towards Japan.
It goes without saying that, in the Japanese context, ultra-
nationalism developed in close relation with the worship of the
Emperor as a living god. In fact, Emperor worship Was-c_	 the most
influential form of belief in Japan up to 1945; and even today after
the defeat, the Emperor holds his position by virtue of his
significance as a symbol of the unity of the Japanese nation.
4
 Here
we should explore how Emperor worship has directly moulded the way of
thinking of the entire Japanese people.
Such a tendency of thought did not appear suddenly after the
Meiji Restoration (1868).	 As we have demonstrated earlier, it would
seem that the tendency to regard the Emperor as divine has existed in
Japan since very ancient times. 5	In the older Japanese language, the
word oyake (public) originally had the sense of the 'principal
family', which meant the Imperial House. In contrast, all the people
were called koyake (minor families). Thus the Imperial House came to
be regarded as the principal ancestral family of all the Japanese.
6
Thus the author of 'The Way of the Subject' even writes as follows on
the relationship between the public and the private domains:
What we normally refer to as 'Private life' is, in
the final analysis, the way of the subject. As
such, it has a public significance, in that each
so-called private action is carried out by the
subject as part of his humble efforts to assist
the throne ... Thus we must never forget that
even in our personal lives we are joined to the
Emperor and rust be moved by the desire to serve
our country.
Maruyama in 'Theory and Psychology of Ultra-Nationalism' (1963)
points out the negative implications of the failure to draw any clear
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line of demarcation between the public and the private domains:
"there was in principle no basis in Japan for freedom of belief up to
1945".
8
Further, since the Imperial House was originally conceived as
having the position of ruling the entire Japanese people, the Imperial
House has no 'surname ,9
	Consequently, there _	 SeletoM
appeared anyone aiming at becoming the highest ruler in place of the
Imperial House. Of course, in Japan's long history there were a few
rebels, but even they recognised the Imperial authority. The unique
. fact that Japan has been ruled by Emperors belonging to a line
unbroken for countless generations has, we can assume, reinforced the
divine nation concept in the way of thinking of the whole Japanese
people.	 The divine nation concept and the principle of ultra-
nationalism have a close connection with Emperor worship.
R.N. Bellah, attacking the view that modern State Shinn' was an
invention of a few clever leaders of the Meiji Restoration, asserts
that by the end of the Tokugawa Period there would have been general
consensus on the primary tenets of national Shint5 concerning the
special divine ancestry and nature of the emperor, and Japan as 'the
land of the gods' among those of almost all religious commitments. 10
In line with this Japanese nationalism, Bellah continues, "national
Shinto was not incompatible with other religions and this is the basis
of the assertion by the Meiji government that State Shinto is not a
religion . 11
	
In this context we recall that the Japanese government,
determined to establish 'State Shint5', a new religious super-
structure, from 1882 to 1945 advocated Shint5 as a 'non-religious'
emperor cult and a 'patriotic' national morality to which every
Japanese, regardless of his or her religious beliefs and affiliations,
was expected to pay homage. 12
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We turn our attention now to government and religion as Japan
came into the modern period. The 'modern'period', beginning with the
opening of Japan to the West in the middle of the nineteenth century,
has spanned about 100 years. Here we can only highlight the several
major policies relating to government-religion relations, within the
context of rapid modernisation.
In the immediate pre-modern period, a conjuncture of the
Confucian stress on loyalty and a revived interest in Shint5 began to
have explosive consequences. 13 The ruiership. at this time was in
and was
• the hands of a military dictator, or Shagun, Ahereditary in the
Tokugawa family.	 The emperor was relegated to purely ceremonial
functions in the palace at Kydto. With the Tokugawas incapable of
rallying any kind of effective, unified national response to the
Western threat in the mid-1800s, imperial loyalists stepped into the
power vacuum with the cry, "Restore the Emperor!". 14 Though Emperors
had pretty much lost their prominence for many centuries in the
Tokugawa Period, the Emperor was the latent symbol of national unity.
In the words of R.N. Bellah:
As economic and social conditions deteriorated
under Tokugawa rule, important elements in the
population became alienated from the political
status quo. They proved extremely receptive to
the religious message of the revival Shintoists
and legitimist Confucians, who insisted that the
true sovereign was the emperor and that the Shogun
was a usurper. According to their conception, the
emperor is divine, descended from the sun-goddess,
and his direct rule of the Japanese people could
be ivected to bring in a virtually messianic
age.
Now, in the national emergency, imperial loyalists appealed to
the ancient tradition of the sacred imperial family as the focal point
for pulling the nation together. It is to be noted in this context
that the emperor, as a religious symbol, appears to have remained
alive in popular memory. 16	No doubt the people's attitude towards,
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and feelings about, the emperor became an important element in
establishing Japan as a modern nation. The combination of factors -
the seclusion of the real emperor, and the enhancement of the emperor-
image through literature, song, and drama on the one hand, and through
the mission work of the itinerant onshi 17 on the other - made the
religious symbolism of the emperor stronger than ever before. 18 It is
against this background that we can understand the development of the
Meiji government's national unification policy.
Historically the government's national integration policy
.depended heavily on two devices: the device of the imperial tour and
the nation-as-a-family ideology. The most important way through which
the government fostered devotion to the emperor among the common
people was the device of the imperial tour, until the kazoku kokka 
(the nation as a family or household) ideology had become firmly
established through the Imperial Rescript on Education of 1890 as a
chief sacred text of State Shinta and a basis of all Japanese
education. 19 In Mori Koichi's words on the tour device:
The common people regarded the emperor as a mana-
laden being whose presence would bring them
worldly benefits ... They received the emperor as
a marodogami, a kami whose visit they hoped would
bring them bumper crops and happiness ... People
regarded the emperor-spirit as remaining in things
even after the emperor himself had returned to the
imperial court. In the Meiji erageir faith in
the emperor-spirit remained strong.
During the early part of the Meiji era, the imperial tours gave
substance to the common people's notions of the emperor. To a certain
degree this policy was successful. 	 This faith, however, was not
sufficient to mobilise them for rapid, nationwide modernisation. On
the foundation of popular faith in the emperor, quickened by the
tours, the government erected and institutionalised the nation-as-a-
family ideology. This ideology reflected not only a German theory of
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state absolutism (kokka yukitai, or "state organism") but more
importantly Japanese tradition, namely a Confucian element centred in
filial piety and loyal devotion to the Emperor, the father of the
nation, and a more prominent Shinta element focused in the sacred
charge given by the highest ShintU kami, the "Sun Goddess" Amaterasu,
to the imperial line of emperors. 21
It has been recently revealed that the Japanese people, who co-
operated in the emperor's war (World War II), generally lacked a
principle that might have enabled them to resist the nation-as-a--
family ideology, since "the Japanese State, being a moral entity,
monopolized the right to determine values". 22	This ideology, in
fact, was from the outset immanent in the national structure. The
primarily particularistic orientation of Japanese society prevented
them from discovering any viable alternative to an emperor-centred
nation. 23
	The attitude of absolute submission to a specific person
of a specific authority can be by no means treated simplyas a social
phenomenon of a feudal society.
	 Rather this attitude of total
submission could be clearly observed among the modern Japanese, and it
culminated in ascribing absolutely divine attributes to the individual
at the top of the hierarchy of Japanese society. 24	Emperor worship
is thus established. Ultra-nationalism developed in close relation
with this worship of the Emperor as a living god.
The modern Japanese state was deliberately established on a
foundation which unified government and religion. 25
 There was in the
early Meiji period an attempt to make ShintU into the national (state)
religion, the official patriotic religion of Japan, and a determined
effort to root out all rival religions including Buddhism, the chief
religious tradition with little relation to the imperial claims
to divinity. 26
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Nevertheless, the grave and forceful protests of Western powers
on the subject of Christianity, plus serious unrest among the masses
devoted to Buddhism, forced the abandoning of the policy of religious
persecution. 27	Consequently, the government included in the
constitution of 1889 a clause guaranteeing freedom of religion. Here
it should be emphasised that the Western countries which had recently
inflicted on the Japanese certain unfair trade treaties, which the
Japanese hated and resented, made it clear that these treaties would
not be revoked unless the Meiji government established a policy of
religious freedom. 28	The Westerners feared that a Shint5 state
religion would generate anti-Western sentiments, thereby blocking
trade relations with Japan.
At the same time the government continued its support of the
State Shint6 cult, whose main aim was the veneration of the emperor.
It is to be noted that the Shint5 priesthood tended to identify
religion as a whole with Christianity; their dislike of-Christianity
hastened their conclusions that Shinti5 should not be regarded as a
religion. 29	At the same time, intellectuals were drawing the same
conclusion, but for a different reason: because they discerned in
Shint6 neither doctrine nor ethics.	 The result was a limited
consensus that Shint5 was not a religion. 	 In this intellectual
atmosphere, the government declared that State Shint5 was not a
religion but merely an expression of patriotism, thereby solving their
seemingly contradictory support of the state Shint5 cult. 30 This
time, unlike the first effort in early Meiji, the second effort to
exalt State Shinn' not as a religion but rather as a "non-religious"
patriotic cult was a success. 31
	In W.M. Fridell's words:
If State Shinto was to be treated as a religion,
it came under the position of the Meiji
Constitution, which guaranteed freedom of
religious belief. This would make Shinto a matter
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of personal choice, for, if it was a 'religion
among religions', a Japanese subject would be free
to align himself with it or not, according to
inclination. This was not good enough for the
authorities. When it came to participation in the
national Shinto patriotic cult, they did not wish
to permit any choice.	 For this reason, State
Shinto was officially understood to be a
nonreligious national ethic,	 to which the
religious	 freedom provislon of	 the Meiji
Constitution did not apply.
It should be pointed out in this context that the idea of
divine kingship is very common throughout the world, and the identity
of state and religion is not uncommon. Also the predominant form of
political civic ritual in the modern world, and certainly including
industrial societies, is the ritual of nationalism. 33
	Given all
this, the government's definition of religion for political purpose
was not a distortion of religion in the Japanese context: 	 State
Shinta was but a modern expression of the prehistoric Japanese
formulation, saisei--itchi, 'unity of religion and government'.
Furthermore, the ultra-nationalistic decades prior to and during World
War II saw the systematic propagation of the state ideology and
national mythology, with no contrary positions permitted, all within a
police-state context.
It is generally accepted that the political civic rituals
surrounding the monarchy, such as the Coronation of Elizabeth II as
head of the Church of England in 1953, served to unite people of many
different denominations. 34	The Coronation as a ritual of communion,
brought the whole nation into a ritualistic dedication to the basic
values of	 English society. The symbolism of the monarchy has been
one of the major symbols of English nationalism. Similarly, in the
case of modern Japan, the fact that observance of State Shinta rituals
was incumbent on every loyal subject, regardless of his private
religious associations, in effect made State Shint5 a kind of
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superfaith of national loyalty. 	 Hence this time, unlike the first
effort in early Meiji, the second effort to exalt State Shintii not as
a religion but rather as a 'non-religious' patriotic cult was a
success.
It is of incidental interest (although Anglicanism is not one of
the main examples considered here) to note that some Anglican
missionaries were aware of this comparison and drew it explicitly.
The British missionaries of the Anglican Church in Japan simply - and
naively - identified the Japanese imperial institution with their own
romantic view of the British crown. 35	This identification made it
easy for their Japanese converts to accept their own social system as
compatible with Christian teaching. Little of the tension between
loyalty to emperor and faithfulness to Christianity, discernible among
the Japanese converts, seems to have been present in the Seikiikai (the
Anglican Church). 36 But as C.H. Fowles, an ordained priest of the
Anglican Church of Canada who has worked in the Nihon SeikUkai (the
Anglican Church of Japan) since 1949, rightly comments, "the great
weakness of the Anglican position - affirming variety and even
identifying with it - lay in its inability to grapple with the factors
in Japanese culture which logically contradicted Christian belief". 37
For Christians to accept that "there is not a supreme power which
transcends the Emperor", basically a ShintU doctrine, meant that they
would have to neglect the transcendent element in their own faith.
From as early as 1899, the government had attempted to pass bills
in the national Diet to tighten supervision of 'the religions', which
meant everything except State Shinti5. 38
 But the 1899 bill failed in
the Diet. In 1926 the authorities appointed a Religious System
Inquiry Commission (Shliky(7) Seido Chosakai) to consider how the
government should regulate the religious bodies of the country. In
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1929 they created a corresponding Shrine System Inquiry Commission
(Jinja Seido Chosakai) to study the whole question of State Shinta,
especially the nature of State Shinn- . The Commission eventually came
up with the conclusion that it was a national ethic, not a religion.
It is to be noted that from the Manchurian Incident in 1931, when
nationalistic tensions mounted in connection with Japan's military
ventures on the Asiatic mainland, that the authorities increasingly
looked to State ShintU as the main force for intensifying patriotic
loyalties. It is generally accepted that the period down to the
Manchurian Incident of 1931 might be called the preparatory period of
Japanese ultra-nationalism. 39 While it should be emphasised that the
fascist movement was not something that suddenly arose after 1931,
there is no doubt that the Manchurian Incident acted as a definite
stimulus to Japanese fascism. 40
	The extreme nationalism was
illustrated by the 'new policy' of 1933. In the platform it was
stated that the first line of Japanese defence must be Manchukuo and
the mainland South Sea Islands. Policy sections dealing with 'popular
thought' asserted that "the spirit of the national foundations should
be vindicated and developed", the educational system should be
reformed with this in mind, and religious sentiment (of course,
Shinta), should be cultivated among the people. 41 After the outbreak
of the China Incident in 1937 the 'spiritual moblisation' programme
(Kokumin Seishin SEIdOin Remmei, 1938) was more carefully planned in
order to provide a more effective means of channelling the thoughts
of the populace along approved lines. In carrying out 'spiritual
mobilisation', State Shint5 and the publication system were of course
relied on. 42
D.C. Holtom,	 . a Baptist missionary in Japan and authority on
Shinta, in 'State Shinto and Religion' (1938) rightly points out the
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problem of the status of State Shinti5 in the ultra-nationalistic Japan
and the colonised Far East:
One of the most important and difficult problems
of modern Japan undoubtedly centres in the status
of State Shinto. Are the ceremonies of the Shinto
shrines, maintained by the Japanese government as
a primary agency for giving unified official
direction to the national mind, essentially
religious in nature or are they non-religious?
Issues connected with this question are momentous
for the fate of Christianity in Japan and perhaps
the entire Far East ... The consideration of
State Shinto carries us over at once into the
realm of sacred institutions and ideas that are
regarded as having ultimate significance for the
integrity of Japanese national organization and
polity. Phases of the situation that seem
essentially valid are intricately commingled with
super-rational racial sentiment and lopagated by
a strong bureaucratic utilitarianism.
Though in the 1920s there was a strong tendency to differentiate
religion and state ideology, in times of stress, such as the late
1930s and early 1940s, religion was completely subordinated to and
fused with a monolithic ideology, an ideology which had demonic
consequences both for Japan and for the rest of the world, especially
Korea.	 In the case of Korea, after the Manchurian Incident, the
Japanese interests of political unification resulted in requirements
of Shint6 conformity even more severe than those in Japan proper. 44
Here Bellah in "Religious Aspects of Modernization in Turkey and
Japan" (1958) concludes:
But, in fact, serious religious problems remain.
All religious groups with the exception of the
Christians were compromised by their connection
with the nationalistic orgy. In the absence of
any really vigorous religious life, except for the
popular faith-healing cults and the small
Christian community, the religious impulses of the
Japanese people find expression for the more
radical in the symbol of socialism, for the
conservatives in a longing for 0a new and moreinnocent version of State Shinto. 
From the Judeo-Christian point of view, like that of Bellah, we
would have to say that to exalt a national ideology above God was
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clearly a blasphemous perversion of religious reality. 46 To evaluate
a Japanese religious pattern on the basis of such Western assumptions
seems to be unfair. The more correct question would be: was State
Shint6 a distortion of religion in the Japanese context?
Given that the Japanese government has always used religious
rites for the support of political rule, State Shinto was but a modern
expression of that prehistoric Japanese formulation, saisei—itchi, or
the "unity of (Shinto) rites and government". 41	There has been no
transcendent religious norm for judgement over society: 	 political
symbols and institutions have always been at the very top of the
Japanese value system.
48
If we consider the consistent pattern throughout Japan's
religious history in the light of religion and politics, modern State
ShintO was not so much a distortion of Japanese religion.
49
 In most
Japanese eyes, to be religious was not incompatible with the demand to
co-operate with and support government. 	 In this sense, Japanese
Christianity as a whole was, in fact, no exception. 	 (This problem
will be explored further in the next part). 	 'Co-operation' with
government has not been seen as a corruption of religion; rather, the
Japanese have instinctively felt it was a good thing that the two most
basic dimensions of society, government and corporate religion, were
harmoniously compatible, rather than fighting each other, as has been
the most characteristic pattern in the West. 50
In the case of Japan, "nationalism may be so inextricably
combined and co-ordinated with the traditional religion that the two
almost lose their separate identity" .51
	
This relationship is, no
doubt, the most desirable for the nationalist, especially for the
ultra-nationalist;	 amalgamation of nationalism and religion is
preferable to coexistence or conflict.
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However, in general terms, not all religions are amenable to
amalgamation with nationalism. When nationalism comes into conflict
with the universal religions, e.g. Christianity and Buddhism,
nationalistic thinkers have found it necessary to modify the
traditional religion.
	
Here we can note that Japanese (ultra)
nationalism took most of its primary symbols from a mixture of
(ShintO) primitivism and Confucianism, both because these were central
to Japanese tradition and because the agrarian military class played
the major role in the shaping and protection of the modern nationalist
movement.
52
	Maruyama's excellent analysis of Japanese Fascism
supports this point:	 the insistence on the family system may be
termed a distinctive characteristic of the Japanese fascist
ideology. 53
In this context we must not fail to consider the important role
played by Confucianism, which is closely linked with the central cult
of the family, or, more strictly speaking, Neo-Confucianism, in the
development of the 'immanental theocracy' of the new imperial regime
in modern Japan. 54	Despite the fact that Confucianism never claimed
to be a religious system, it provided the ethical foundations of the
'immanental theocracy', exemplified by the throne in which both God
and Caesar were rolled into one.
55
	This helps us to understand the
Confucian development after 1891, especially the Confucian revival
from 1918 to 1933, in modern Japan.
W.W. Smith is the author of Confucianism in Modern Japan (1973),
a study of conservatism in Japanese intellectual history, which
deserves some review in the light of ShintU and Confucianism as
conservatism. According to Smith, it is true that in such important
changes as the development of mass movements in modern Japan, the
growth of Japanese nationalism, or the industrial transformation of
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Japan, Confucianism played a minor role. Despite this, interest in
Confucianism existed in modern Japan, and after some years of neglect,
Confucianism began a period of recrudescence which reached a climax in
the Second World War.
56
It was during the Tokugawa period (1603-
1868) immediately preceding the modern era that Confucianism
flourished most widely in Japan. But in the Meiji period (1868-1912)
Confucianism no longer satisfactorily explained natural phenomena or
was effective in dealing with the kind of problems which Western
industrial and commercial techniques were bringing to Asia. Under
such circumstances, Confucianism suffered a severe decline and was
notably disregarded during the first decades of the Meiji period.
Nevertheless, according to Smith, in contrast to its disappearance as
a force in modern China, Confucianism never died out in modern Japan.
During the Meiji period, Confucian ethical principles had to be
subordinated to the claims of nationalism. 	 As a result, in the
Imperial Rescript on Education of the Emperor Meiji (Kyaiku Chokugo,
1890) the five Confucian virtues associated with the Confucian social
relationships were declared to be a fundamental part of the Japanese
heritage. Confucian ethics were henceforth no longer foreign, but a
part of pristine Japanese traditions; 	 and while this did not
automatically imply a revival of organised Confucian institutions in
Japan, it suggested that the most effective way for Confucianists to
re-establish their prestige and influence was by having Confucianism
serve the aims of the state. Smith concludes:
This emphasis on the practical value of
Confucianism in modern Japan is crucial for under-
standing the development of Japanese intellectual
history, for the situation in 1890 was basically
a repetition of that in the Tokugawa period when
Confucianism also had been adopted becaw it was
deemed useful in achieving desired ends.
Historically, after 1933, the trends apparent in the development
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of Confucianism in Japan from 1918 to 1933 became accelerated, but the
most prominent of these was the growing identification of Confucianism
with the Japanese spirit, the Imperial way, and the Japanese kokutai 
(national polity). 58
	In this context, to appreciate this amal-
gamation of Confucian ideas into the increasingly nationalistic
ideology of Japan during these years, it should be borne in mind that
the nationalisation of Confucianism was not an experience unique to
Confucianism alone.	 Universal religions like Christianity and
Buddhism also were made to play a part in fostering Japanese
nationalism and ideas of loyal service to the state.	 D.C. Holtom
rightly pointed this out in his book Modern Japan and Shinto 
Nationalism (Chapters IV and V).	 In Smith's view, however,
Confucianism came to be characterised as purely Japanese - far more
so than the other universal creeds, Christianity and Buddhism. At the
same time, in propaganda and political activities on the Asiatic
continent, Japanese leaders continued to emphasise the common heritage
provided by Confucianism for uniting all Asia. 59
In this respect, Smith also points out Japanese support for
Confucianism in Korea. He comments:
One of the earliest examples of how the Japanese
attempted to take advantage of the universal
appeal of Confucianism in 6utheir political
activities in Asia was in Korea. 
Briefly speaking, Japanese encouragement of Confucianism in Korea
was one of a number of measures made primarily to indicate the
devotion of the Japanese to certain Korean traditions. By choosing
traditions such as Confucianism, which had existed in both countries,
it was possible to appeal to a common background which served to
minimise the attraction of Korean nationalism. In the same vein, Kang
Wi Jo in his dissertation - "The Japanese Governments and Religions of
Korea" -(1967) - stresses that Korean Confucianism under the Japanese
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administration maintained a considerable continuity with traditional
observances and did not undergo any drastic changes. 61
 According to
Karig, it was a fact that the response of Korean Confucianists to the
Japanese administration was not as antagonistic as that of other
elements in Korean society. 62
Lastly,
	
as Maruyama has shown,	 the other distinctive
characteristic of Japanese fascist ideology relates to the
emancipation of the Asian nations In the so-called Greater Asia
Principle. 63 The ideal of the emancipation of the Asian peoples from
European colonialism flowed strongly through Japanese fascism. But
this ideal was tied up with another, namely, that Japan should seize
hegemony in Asia in place of European imperialism. Maruyama discusses
'Asianism' simply as a characteristic of Japanese fascist ideology.
This 'Asianism' is important for us to understand the underlying
motives of Japan's overseas expansion of State Shintii during the war
period, 1931-1945. 64
	This point will be discussed later.
D. Japanese Christianity and the Shint5 Shrine Issue
1. Nationalism and Christianity
Since people respond similarly to both nationalism and religion, it
does not surprise us to find that in history the worship of the State
or nation very often tends to be associated with periods of scepticism
in religion. 1	History shows that nationalism arose immediately
after the Enlightenment had showered its caustic criticisms on
Christianity; and it acquired one of its major strongholds among the
continental peoples most influenced by the Enlightenment, the French
and the Protestants of north and central Germany. Thus of all the
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countries of Europe, Germany was peculiarly suited to become the home
of 'religious modernism , . 2
	In the case of Germany, it is widely
accepted that German Protestant pastors, except a minority of
supporters of the 'Bekennende Kirche l , tried to harmonise their German
nationalism with their Christian universalism. 3 The sect or movement
of the so-called 'German Christians' attempted to combine Christianity
with National Socialism. 4
Historically,	 in Japan the introduction of Christianity
(Protestantism) coincided with the rise of aggressive nationalism. 5
Hatred and suspicion of Christianity, nurtured for over two centuries,
were not easily driven from the people's minds. Rather, from time to
time, when the so-called Christian nations in the West did something
contrary to the interests of Japan, such as the passing of the
Oriental Exclusion Act by the U.S. Congress, anti-Christian sentiment
flared up. 6
With the promulgation of the Constitution (1889) and the Imperial
Rescript on Education (1890), the l immanental theocracy' of the Meiji
regime was firmly established. 7
	In this situation, Christianity came
under severe attack as an unpatriotic religion. Among all religions
practised in Japan, Christianity presented the greatest problem to the
government because of its transcendental reference, its claim of
universality for its doctrines, and its close ties with the churches
in the West.
	 Christianity was considered a foreign religion which
was a threat to the traditional Japanese faith. Under the pressure of
this national sentiment, it should be pointed out that there were a
number of Christians who attempted to show that there was no basic
conflict between Christianity and Japanese patriotism. As a reaction
to the serious charge that "Christians lack patriotism", Christian
leaders became more earnest in displaying their patriotism. 8 And the
•-
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morbid nationalism thus fostered increased friction between them and
the foreign missionaries. For example, Reverend Yokoi Tokoi advocated
a 'Japanese Christianity' independent of all foreign influences.
It needs to be noted in this context that those who were most
radical theologically were also the most nationalistic in Japan.
This suggests that there was a real connection in motivation between
the two movements. 9	In the same vein, N. Micklem displays an insight
into the theological implications of the 'German Christian' position,
indicating that in principle, though not in form, it represents the
standpoint of Liberalism or Modernism. 10	Here we can trace the
impact of the new theology, with its roots in German rationalism, on
Japanese Christianity. 	 German liberalism exercised a pervasive,
permeating influence within the church in Japan. 11	In 1885 what is
sometimes termed the 'older liberalism' of Germany made its entrance
into the Japanese Christian world with the coming of the General
Evangelical Protestant Mission Board (Allgemeiner Evangelisch-
Protestantischer Missionsverein). 12	This society was the first
attempt of liberal Christianity to enter the field of Christian
missions on a specific and declared liberal basis. Thus Best says:
No consideration of the way in which the Japanese
Church expressed its faith during this period
(1890-1911) would be complete without a more
detailed account of the influence of the "new
theology" and of higher criticism in general upon
the life of the Japanese church.
In the 1890s ... Internal problems arose in the
church as a result of the spirit of nationalism
and the "new theology" both of which tended to be
embraced by the same
13 group indicating a
relationship between them. 
The liberal Congregational or Kumiai Church, supporting
government policy, initiated the so-called 'Japanese Christianity'
from the outset.
14
Bruce, in "A Sociological Account of Liberal
Protestantism" (1984), shows- exceptional insight into liberal
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Protestantism as a particularly 'precarious' belief system.
15
	Unlike
conservative Protestantism which avoids relativism by sticking firmly
to certain historic statements of the faith, in his view, essential
features of liberalism, e.g. the possibility of relativism, made it
especially vulnerable to assimilation by the secular world. 	 When
applying this to the case of Japanese liberal Christianity, we can
safely say that creeds and catechisms were not used to police the
,
boundaries of the faith and that thereby the Japanese Church
compromised with nationalism.
	 The Roman Catholic Church in Japan
easily justified its adoption of the principle of accommodation on the
grounds of the alleged purely civil character of the official
ceremonies of State ShintU in 1936. 16
 This point will be discussed
further later.
Sumiya Mikio	 points out that the weakness of Japanese
Christianity was that it possessed a strong moral and ethical
orientation without, at the same time, possessing a deep sense of the
transcendent	 character	 of	 Christianity. 17	The	 practical,
rationalistic background which resulted from the ethical school of
Confucianism and BushidU made it easy for the young church to accept
an	 interpretation	 of	 Christianity	 which de-emphasised	 its
transcendental character. 18	The growing spirit of nationalism was
reflected within the life of the church. 	 In Best's view, Japanese
Christians were, on the whole, 'confused by the issues of
nationalism'. Apart from Uchimura KanzU, who sensed the idolatry in
the Japanese emperor-institution and who from the time of the Russo-
Japanese War was radically opposed to Japanese expansionism, and a few
of the Christian Socialists, the great majority of Christians were
completely confused as to their relationship to their own society. 19
In the war years until the end of the Second World War it became very
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apparent that Christians in Japan, with the exception of some martyrs,
found no other recourse except to succumb to the principle of
'immanental theocracy' of the governmment.
20
Best maintains that Uchimura Kanz5, unlike most of the Japannese
Christians, did not fail to understand the pressures which his own
culture was exerting upon him.
	 Similarly, the editors of Sources of 
the Japanese Tradition (1958) writes that "Uchimura Kanz5 (1861-1930)
stands as a striking example of the attempt by a deeply dedicated man
to integrate his new-found Christian faith into his personal and
public life as a true Japanese". 21
But some dubious points of his thought regarding nationalism and
Christianity are to be noted.	 He publicly defended the moral
rectitude of Japan's war against Ch'ing China only two years later; 22
his 'No Church' (Muky5kai) Christianity reached its culmination in his
nationalistic millenarianism or eschatological yearning, deepened by
World War I, that saw 'Japan as the central locus of the Second Coming
of Christ'. 23	For the latter, World War I shattered his remaining
hope for the Christians of the West, which led him to the conviction
that Japan, no longer the West, was now called to serve as the
mediator between the past and the future, between the West and the
East, all for the whole world. He considered it providential that
Japan was geographically situated between America as the western
frontier of the western culture and the eastern frontier of the Indo-
Chinese culture. He regarded modern Japan as the confluence of both
the eastern and western cultures and therefore the microcosm of the
whole world. 24
Many have pointed out that Uchimura's prophetic vision or his
nationalistic eschatology haS. , precedents among the founding fathers
of Kamakura Buddhism, particularly Nichiren, who set Japanese Buddhism
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apart from its continental counterparts. Nichren regarded the centre
of the Buddha land no longer to be India or China but Japan.
T.J. Kodera notes that in Representative Men of Japan 	 Uchimura
counted Nid4ren among them. 25
	Thus it should be borne in mind that
even in Uchimura's nationalistic millenarianism, like Nichiren's
nationalistic eschatology, there exists a strong 'Japan-centred
mentality' which drove Japan into a disastrous war. Given the example
of Uchimura, we can conclude that in the time of victories 26 Japanese
Christians, not unlike the populace, naturally developed religious
nationalism. When war broke out, many Christian leaders, having never
developed what might be termed a 'Christian political philosophy',
simply accepted the government's stand and supported the war effort in
both the Sino-Japanese and the Russo-Japanese wars. 27	There was,
however, a small group of articulate Christian socialists and
pacifists.	 Thus,	 like all religious groups, Japanese Christians
compromised with the nationalistic orgy: Japanese Christianity showed
a full accommodation to the Shinta political standards. 28
A survey of representative materials of the years just before and
during World War II indicates, as one might suspect, three general
theological movements in Protestant circles in relation to the issue
of nationalism:	 (1) syncretism, or another venture in 'Japanised
theology';	 (2) dualism, or a theology of the two realms; 	 (3) a
theology of resistance. 29 It is suggested that the movement towards
resistance drew its greatest undergirding influence from biblical
orthodoxy.	 Patriotic Christian leaders, with their non-theological
and ethical tendencies and their unsophisticated biblicism, for the
most part made a passive adjustment to the authoritarian government
and concentrated on the expansion of their respective churches. 30
Finally, it is interesting to note that, while the problem of war
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crimes is the subject of heated debate among Protestant theologians in
Japan since the late 1960s, there is hardly any sign of such re-
evaluation on the Catholic side. 31 	Similarly, the Catholic Church
in Korea also maintains a perfect silence about the shrine problem.
This point will be covered later.
2. Korean Assimilation and Japanese Christianity
It has been pointed out by many that many Japanese Christians
strongly supported the so-called government policies of doka
(assimilation of the Koreans). 1 	Since the annexation of Korea in
1910 there were sweeping campaigns to eradicate the Korean national
identity under the slogan "Japan and Korea are One Entity" (Nai-Sen
ittai). 2
	
Before turning to the general views which Japanese
Christians (especially Protestants) held about Korea during the
colonial period, the overseas expansion of State Shint5 and the policy
of 'Japanisation' should be examined very briefly. The following are
Holtom's words:
The rise of modern Japan to ascendancy in Far
Eastern affairs has been accompanied by an
impressive geographical expansion ... Japan is
'moving in' onto the continent of Asia with the
totality of her cultural possessions. This
movement is not merely military and political. In
... education, religion, Japan is projecting
something like a migration onto the mainland ...
The tenacity which the Japanese government has
pressed the Shinto issue in Korea and elsewhere
points to its significance as the guarantee of the
establishment of inner authority over subjected
peoples.
The expressed policy of the Japanese government in
these districts (Formosa and Korea) is to make all
members of the indigenous populations into
standardized Japfnese subjects, both legally and
psychologically.
W.G. Beasley in Japanese Imperialism 1894-1945 (1987) points out
that after 1930 (though there had been indications of it as early as
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the First World War) Japanese leaders set out to substitute a 'Japan-
centred' system of imperialism in East Asia for that which they had
inherited from the nineteenth-century West. 4 To do so required both
a restructuring of economic patterns and the promotion of a
specifically 'Asian' ideology. We may recall here that, according to
Maruyama (1963), 'Asianism' is a characteristic of Japanese fascist
ideology.
In this context it is to be noted that the Japanese attempted to
bring about cultural assimilation of Koreans at any cost. This needs
explanation. The international and domestic situation of Japan after
the outbreak of the Manchurian Incident in 1931 demanded an intensifi-
cation of the policy of 'Japanisation' in Korea. In more concrete
terms, since 1931 Japan needed not only the material resources and
strategic position of the Korean peninsula, but also the "native
manpower". 5
 In C.S. Lee's words:
The government had, of course, a choice of more
than one way of conscripting Koreans. There was
the precedent of the British in India during the
First World War, when independence was promised as
a reward for submitting to conscription. But this
alternative was not very attractive. The promise
of independence would only enliven the nationalist
movement, as it had done in India, and complete
independence of Korea aster the Japanese victory
would weaken the empire.
Thus, the only practical alternative was to accelerate the
assimilation process. The efforts to 'Japanise' the Koreans can be
divided into two categories:
	 (1) to discourage or suppress
communication of symbols that tended to perpetuate the memory of
Korean independence, and (2) to inculcate a new Japanese identity. 7
For the latter, Japan's interest in political unification in Korea
resulted in requirements of Shinta conformity even more severe than
those in Japan proper. This extended even to the prohibition of the
right to discuss whether or not State Shint5 is a religion. 8 But -
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forced worship at the ShintU shrines or daily bows in an easterly
direction - to TOky6 - (Tongbang yobae) annoyed rather than converted
Koreans. And in Korea, where Christianity became the vehicle for the
preservation of national hopes in reaction against Japanese
domination, the fundamental conflict between the claims of Japanese
ShintU nationalism and Christianity were naturally more serious than
in Japan. Here we can note that one of the other reasons for the
failure of the policy of cultural assimilation was the widespread and
institutionalised practice of racial discrimination. 9
Now we turn to the general views which Japanese Protestants held
about Korea since 1910.	 In this respect, Matsuo Takayoshi's detailed
study on "The Japanese Protestants in Korea: the Missionary Activity
of the Japan Congregational Church in Korea" (1979), is one of the
pioneering works on the matter. The Congregational Church stands at
the 'extreme left' among the various Japanese Protestant sects in
emphasising 'liberal theology'. The missionary activity of the Japan
Congregational Church was launched in 1911 to play the role of
religious spearhead to help achieve Japan's spiritual conquest of the
Korean race with direct aid from the Government-General of Korea,
which was trying to suppress the existing Korean Christians who would
not co-operate with the 'doka' policy. 10
Uyama Tosuke of the Congregational Church, under the toxin of
Japanese imperialists, maintained that one of the objectives of the
missionary activity in Korea was "to rid Christianity in Korea of
foreign influences and to develop a new, voluntary Christianity of an
Oriental nature". 11	Moreover, he emphasised that "if the Japanese
Christians were not able to assimilate the Korean Christians, this
would permanently and irreversibly antagonize the whole Japanese
nation against Christianity".
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In flYama's assertions we can find that at that time every
Japanese Christian still faced the historically rooted charge that
"Christianity is unpatriotic". Doubtless the charge against Japanese
Christians, who were still a minority group, led them to be more
earnest in displaying their patriotism.
In contrast with the Congregational Church leaders, there were a
few leading Protestants - Uemura Masahisa, Yamaji Aizan, and Uchimura
Kanz.3 - who not only approved of the patriotism of the Korean people
but also attacked Japanese missionary work in Korea. 12
With the beginning of the Manchurian War in 1931 began the state
of emergency (hij3ji) that lasted until the end of the Second World
War. In 1936 Japan joined Germany in a so-called anti-Communist pact.
This was extended to the Tripartite Pact in 1940.
	
At home the
Ministry of Education published, in 1937, Kokutai no Hongi 
(Fundamentals of Our National Polity), stressing the unique mission of
Japan ruled by a divine emperor. 13	In 1937 representatives of major
religions were called upon to form the Great Unity League of
Religions. The Roman Catholics established the National Committee of
Catholics for Foreign Propaganda, for enlightening Catholics of other
countries in regard to the nation's true aims and motives. In 1939
the infamous Religious Organisations Law was enacted in order to place
all aspects of	 religions under strict government control. In 1940
34 Protestant churches were compelled to form one "Nihon Kirisuto
Kyadan" (Church of Christ in Japan - commonly referred to as "the
Ky6dan"), in order to be recognised as a religious organisation, the
only other Christian body recognised by the Religious Organisations
Law being the Roman Catholic Church. 14
In 1944, eventually, the Kyadan, along with the Roman Catholic
Church, joined the Japan Wartime Patriotic Religious Association, in
- 191 -
co-operation with the Shintii and Buddhist bodies. 15 As Joseph M.
Kitagawa, the authority on Japanese religion, admits, during the war
period the Christian churches as much as other religious groups were
exploited by the government as an ideological weapon. 16
 In brief, the
majority of the Protestants, precisely because they, as a minority
power in Japan, had accepted the State and had been so integrated into
the mainstream of Japanese society, could not stand outside that
stream and judge their nation's actions. 17
	In regard to their
attitude towards Korean assimilation, Japanese Protestants adopted the
conformist attitude during the last war, which, to be sure, did
precipitate a crisis for Christianity in Korea. However, the church
in Japan, in spite of her compromising attitude towards the
militaristic absolute government in war time, could not draw a
definite line between pre-war and post-war. 18
	It was more than 20
years later that the church in Japan awakened to her failures. This
was expressed in "Confession of Responsibility During the Second World
War" issued in 1967 in the name of the moderator, Suzuki Masahisa of
the Church of Christ in Japan.
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CHAPTER IV
KOREAN CHRISTIANITY AND THE SHINTO SHRINE ISSUE (1):
THE RESPONSES OF THE THREE CHRISTIAN CHURCHES TOWARDS
THE SHRINE PROBLEM IN THEIR HISTORICAL EVOLUTION
A. Japanese Government Policy on State Shinto and Religious Education
The attitudes of the Christian bodies in Korea towards the shrine
problem cannot be fully understood without some knowledge of the early
history of the Japanese government's policy on State Shint6 and
religious education since the annexation (1910). 1
	Here I only give a
summary.
2
Shinta shrines had existed in Sul (Seoul) and Pusan before the
Russo-Japanese War of 1904. But only Japanese nationals worshipped
there. In 1910, at the time of the Japanese annexation of Korea, the
government officially adopted a policy of building shrines in Korea to
meet the increased needs of the Japanese who would be living there. 3
In response to the recommendations of the Governor General of
Chasen (ChosOn, Korea) for a National Shrine in late 1918, the Central
Shrine of Chasen on Namsan in SOul was built in 1925. 4
	After that,
throughout the country, in each County a shrine was established. In
1925 the temple at SOul was changed in name from ChOsen jinja5, to
ChUsen jingil, giving it the highest designation and prestige. 6	This
change triggered a protest among Japanese Shintoists as to who
specifically would be worshipped. 	 Some Japanese scholars insisted
that Korea's mythological founder, Tan i gun, should be enshrined rather
than Japanese kami. 7
	They argued that should a Korean god be
enshrined, this would be favourably regarded both in Korea and Japan;
that ShintU shrines were foreign to Korean traditions and could only
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generate resentment and ridicule among Koreans; but if approached and
imposed in terms of what would be compatible with Korean traditions,
it would be best for government colonial policy. 	 Of course, the
government did not give heed. 8
Japanese government leaders were caught on the horns of a
dilemma. After a meeting to deal with the question - how best to
designate the shrine in Korea so as not to imply that it was a
National Korean Shrine, something separate and independent of Japan,
yet also avoid confrontation over the issue of worship of a
specifically Japanese kami - the decision was that the Namsan shrine
should be dedicated to the spirit of the land, or chirei rather than
kokurei, the spirit of the nation.	 "This", Spencer J. Palmer says,
"was an ingenious artifice for composing a Shrine-board that would not
be emotionally objectionable to Koreans, representing the essence of
the Korean spirit without admitting in the least that Koreans were
unique or distinctively non-Japanese". 9 There was also a subtle
prejudice against the Koreans involved here, since this was a tacit
affirmation that Korea did not have a god which was equal to the Sun-
goddess. "Amaterasu Umikami" (founder of the Japanese state).
Incidentally, the so-called "Educational Crisis", in terms of the
question of the formal teaching of religion, came between the years
1915 and 1925. 11	In 1911 the colonial government made known publicly
that "the essential principle of education in Chosen shall be the
making of loyal and good subjects by giving instruction on the basis
of the Imperial Rescript concerning Education". 12
	Thereafter, the
new regulations of the Government General made it plain that if the
school was to exist at all new regulations must be secured.13
Article VI.2 14 of the revision of regulations for private schools in
1915 (Appendix E) was the chief stumbling block. It was against the
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10
teaching of the Bible and the holding of religious exercises in the
schools. 15
 No new charters or permits were to be granted for schools
so attempting to combine education and religion, while existing
schools were given but ten years of 'grace' to conform in this and
other aspects.	 Confrontation was therefore not only about shrine
worship.	 A further dimension of religious objections to the revision
was the fact that in Japan Shintoism ha been declared not a religion,
but merely a system of state and national ceremonies, a cult of
patriotism.
So far as could be judged at the time, mission and church schools
were offered the choice of giving up all Bible teaching, chapel
services, prayer at school ceremonies, etc., etc., or closing their
doors altogether at the end of the ten-year period. In short, 'ten
years of grace' were given in which to conform to the new ordinance,
after which all unregistered schools would have to be closed.
This presented a serious problem and test of faith both to the
missionaries and to the Korean Church. 16
	Why should we run schools
if we could not teach our Christian religion in them? . On the other
hand, if our schools were closed all Christian children would be
compelled to go to government schools and be taught by non-Christian
teachers. Some of the missionaries argued in favour of registration
on the grounds that half a loaf is better than no bread.
As the 'years of grace' went by, the government put pressure on
mission and church schools, saying that if they wished to continue
their schools they should make application at once.
	 On this the
division of opinion was not strictly along denominational lines, but
•
in the main the Methodist missions took the position that existence of
the schools and their efficiency was of greater importance than the
retention in the curriculum of formal religious instructions. 17
•-
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Following this policy the Pai Chai Hak Tang (Paejae haktang), the
oldest of the mission schools, early conformed to the revised
regulations and became a recognised Higher Common School. A great
deal of feeling was aroused by the oldest mission school falling in
line with such haste, and denominational divisions were greatly
deepened by the action and policy.
The Presbyterians in many cases went to the other extreme. A
promising school under the charge of the Southern Presbyterian Mission
in Sunch"On was closed rather than take out a permit under the new
regulations.	 Many Church primary schools also closed mainly on
account of the religious exclusion article.
18
	At the Northern
Presbyterian Mission meeting held in P'yOngyang in 1917, the question
of registration or non-registration was acute.	 A number of the
leading educational workers insisted that they should decide at once
to comply with the new educational ordinance. They said that the
students in their schools were demanding that they register because
students from non-registered schools were not admitted to government
high schools. Eventually, however, by a large majority the mission
decided that they could not support with mission money schools that
could not teach the Bible.
19
After the "Manchurian Incident" in 1931, used by the militarists
and those in power to unify the mind and strength the loyalty of the
people,	 ShintU's nationalistic character was more and more
accentuated, and shrine worship was urged.
20
	This was a further
development; not only were church schools to have their Christian
teaching undermined, but a positive attitude to the Shinta ceremonies
was also to be expected. 	 Especially the loyalty and devotion of the
Korean people who were resident in a new significant place for the
defence of the Japanese Empire, became, from the Japanese viewpoint,
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more urgent than ever before. 21 To make Koreans loyal subjects to
the empire, the Japanese government in 1935 urged all Koreans,
including mission school students, to participate in Shinto
ceremonies. 22	In trying to bring all Koreans to the Shinto
ceremonies, the government took the position that Shinto ceremonies
were not religious but patriotic acts. The government explained:
The veneration of her illustrious dead in places
specially dedicated to their memory- has been a
national custom of Japan for ages past, and the
state ceremonies for this purpose are treated by
the Government as2 Aistinct from those of a purely
religious nature. .3
Japanese efforts to force Christian obeisance at Shint5 shrines
in Korea reached a crisis point with government demands that worship
must be carried in Christian schools at P'yOngyang,	 where Christianity
was largely concentrated. 24	Statistics show that as late as 1938,
about 80 percent of the churches and of the Christians in the
territory of the Presbyterian Mission were in that area of North
Korea.	 It is estimated that about 75 percent of all the more than
600,000 Protestant Christians were situated there. 25	In 1936 George
S. McCune, President of Union Christian College at P'yOngyang, was
removed as President because of his refusal to take his pupils to the
Shint5 shrine.	 From the beginning Presbyterian missionaries at
P'yOngyang were among the first to make a strong and uncompromising
stand against the shrine ceremony. They concluded that the issue was
clearly	 'religious'	 between Christian monotheism and Shint6
polytheism. 26	In the end, the southern Presbyterians closed their
schools altogether rather than compromise. The northern Presbyterian
mission followed suit or turned over its schools to Korean control for
a while, but in 1938 eventually decided to close all schools including
ChOng Sin girl's school and to withdraw from ChosOn Christian College.
It should be noted in this context that the populace of Korea at that
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time expressed their deep regret at the decision to close on the part
of missions. The Tonga Ilbo, a leading nationalist newspaper, treated
the decision with great regret. 27
After the pressure on Christian schools, the government increased
pressure here and there 	 upon Christian individuals, pastors and
prominent elders, to attend the shrines. 28 As the editors of The
International Review of Missions, who had received a great mass of
documentation on this matter, recorded in the special issues for
April, 1940 and July, 1940, one of the gravest questions confronting
the Church at that time was that of State Shint5 observance in the
Japanese Empire, especially in Korea.
	 Before the issues of IRM
The Japan Christian Quarterly also noted the shrine issue under the
title of "the missionary's dilemma" in its editorial notes. 	 Its
cynical ending reflects the seriousness of the problem: "What is the
missionary to do? There seems to be no answer to this". 29
B. The Catholic Church
The Roman Catholic Church, which readily accepted the Government's
definition after 1936,11
A
A 
lunderstood the Shint5 ceremonies to be
'religious' in earlier years; '	Catholics in Korea before 1936
understood the participation in Shrine ceremonies as 'idolatry'. Thus
when attendance at shrines was demanded of all schools in the country
in 1931, it was refused by Presbyterian and Roman Catholic educators.
A Korean Catholic priest at that time frankly told the authorities
that he would die rather than concede attendance. He further declared
that the issue was so fundamental that it allowed no local solution,
but must be settled between TOky5 and the Vatican. 2
	Therefore we
should clarify the historical evolution of the Japanese Catholic
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Church in terms of its attitude to the Shinto shrine question, because
Rome's instructions in 1936 solved the "Shrine Issue" for the
Catholics in the Japanese Empire, which included Korea at that time.
For the Roman Catholic church, this issue was fundamental in a way in
which the educational issue had not been, since in Korea and Japan
Roman Catholic educational activities had been minimal.
Even the earlier position of the Roman Catholic Church of Japan
on the shrine problem, in Holtom's view, reveals beyond doubt the
reservations that Catholicism in Japan entertained towards Shinto as a
state religion.	 For example, a Bishop of Nagasaki told his people in
1918: "It [Shrine worship] is an organised form of reverence paid to
supernatural beings and must be regarded as a religion. ... We regret
exceedingly that as Catholics we cannot accept the interpretation
given by the government nor can we visit the shrines and engage in the
services for the dead nor can we ever pay respect to the so-called
gods". 3	 As late as 1931, the Bishop of the same diocese, himself a
Japanese, declared that State Shint3 was only a primitive religion.
4
After the Manchuria Incident in 1931, Shinta's nationalistic
character was more and more accentuated, and shrine worship was urged
by the militarists in power to unify the mind and strengthen the
loyalty of the people. 	 Under the stress of circumstances, the
attitude of the Christian Churches moved in a new direction. The
negative attitude prevalent up to now seemed impossible to maintain.
5
In the same year occurred a protest by a group of students of Sophia
University who refused to perform shrine worship at the Yasukuni
Shrine. The reaction of public opinion was vehement. Finally, the
following year, the Archbishop of TOky6- requested the Ministry of
Education to pass an official judgement about the significance of
shrine worship for schools. The answer of the Ministry of Education
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stated that "making students perform shrine worship has an educational
basis. It is nothing but an expression of patriotism and loyalty".
The church accepted this declaration, and Catholic students were
allowed to participate without conscientious objections. 6	In other
words, the Church changed their former attitude for the protection of
their own organisation. 7
Despite	 the	 'practical'	 solution of the problem,	 the
-
confrontation between the State and the Catholic Churches, in fact,
grew sharper. A violent anti-Catholic movement, partly attributed to
the negative attitude of the Catholics towards the shrines, launched
by the military authorities in 1933, destroyed Churches, banished the
missionaries (Canadian Franciscans) and compelled many faithful to
leave the villages. 8
As a result of this defamation, the Catholic Church felt herself
forced to take a clear stand towards this national polity.
	 It is
noteworthy in this context that exactly from the years 1934-1935
Catholic reviews began to publish more articles about the patriotism
of the Japanese Catholics in a much more positive sense than before. 9
And until 1935 the confrontation between Church and State seemed
restricted to the Church and its authorities in Japan, but now, for
the first time, Rome entered the scene.
	
A letter, which was sent to
the Apostolic Delegate in TOky5, from the Congregation of the
Propagation of the Faith 10 (1 May, 1935) reads:	 "The integral
explication of Catholic doctrine should not be altered, not even in
case it does not agree with the Japanese spirit. Yet it is not only
becoming but even a duty to recognise and accept, as a basis of the
supernatural work of the Church, the natural good which lies in the
national Spirit of the Japanese". 11
Furthermore, Rome's decision on May 28 of 1935 to permit the
-
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Catholics of Manchuria to attend at Confucian shrines influenced the
Japanese Catholics to support more positively the policy of the
government of placing the shrines outside the sphere of religion and
of making shrine worship a kind of spiritual basis for the people. In
this context, Rome's authorisation to allow ceremonies in honour of
Confucius throughout Manchukuo (Manchuria) deserves our special
attention. This point will be discussed in detail later (Ch. V,E.
"Mission Policy").
Before the Rome instruction on imperial Shintoism in 1936, in
consequence of the official approbation from Rome (28 May 1935) on the
rites in honour of Confucius in Manchukuo, Mgr. Marella, the Apostolic
Delegate, issued an instruction to the superiors of the various
religious institutes and congregations in Japan:
... If, after examination, the religious or civic
character of an act remains dubious, it is
preferable not to give any explicit solution. It
is sufficient to give the general principle to the
faithful, namely: if-the act which is at issue is
not considered in public opinion as a profession
of faith in a pagan religion, but rather as the
traditional manifestation of natural feeling, it
can be considered in practice as being not in
opposition to the faith ... This broad view of
things is by no means a purely opportunistic
attitude inspired by the present difficulties, and
does not imply at all a contradiction with the
attitude of the Japanese Church in the past. It
is without any doubt that the significance,
commonly attributed to these semi-religious, semi-
civic, manifestations has evolved very much, and
that, what was considered 21 years ago as an act
above all religions, is more and more interpreted
as a civic manifestation under a form externally
traditional and religious. The Church does not
but adapt herself to this evolution in a spirit of
large comprehension of the traditions and ofipe
legitimate aspirations of the Japanese people.
This instruction of the Apostolic Delegate, however, was not yet
an official declaration from Rome, but it took only five months before
formal approval came.
13
The Roman institution is dated May 25, 1936
and dealt with Catholicorum officia erga patriam.	 Because- this
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instruction is the official position of the Church towards the problem
of the shrines, we can consider it as the most important document in
the relations between the Catholic Church and the Japanese State, and
accordingly between the Church and Shrine Shinta. The New Catholic 
Encyclopedia informs us about the background for the Roman instruction
in 1936 as follows:
A year later (1936) Pius XI, the Pope of Missions,
gave further emphasis to the movement of
harmonizing Oriental traditions with Catholic
culture when, through a SCPF decree in favour of
the Church of Japan, a far-reaching programme of
permissions was promulgated with respect to
certain ceremonial usages in imperial Shintoism
(the Jinja Shrines), as well as matrimonial,
funeral, and other soci& customs, all hitherto
under the Christian ban.
On May 25, 1936, the SCPF instructed the Catholics in the
Japanese Empire, which included Korea at that time, to accept the
government order. The instruction with regard to shrine worship is
summarised at the end of the document in the following terms:
The Ordinaries in the territories of the Japanese
Empire should inform their faithful that the civil
authorities (as is clear from their explicit
declarations frequently given) and also the common
estimation of cultured persons attribute to the
ceremonies held at the National Shrines (Jinja),
civilly administered by the Government, a mere
signification of patriotism, namely, a meaning of
filial reverence towards the Imperial Family and
the benefactors of the country. Therefore, since
rites of this kind are endowed with a purely civil
value, it is lawful for Catholics to join in them
and act in accord with the other citizens, after
having made known their intentions of this be
necessary for the removal of any false
interpretations of their acts. i5
As a result of this official pronouncement of the Church, the
Church and State relations in Japan developed from then on without any
trouble. Likewise the instructions solved the "Shrine Issue" as far
as the Roman Catholics in Korea were concerned. 16 • In consequence of
this Vatican decision, Korean Catholics had the duty to obey the laws
A_
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of the State. 17
	As a matter of fact, however, in most Korean
Catholics' eyes the Church was seen to collaborate with an
unprecedented imposition by the imperialist Japanfte government upon
Korean national institutions. 18 The standing of the Church in
Koreans' eyes was seriously affected when Archbishop Marella, the
Papal Ambassador to Japan, went so far as to recommend ShintU worship
to the Church's Korean members. Their disappointment with the Church
seemed to be ignited earlier by the very fact that the Roman Catholic
Church reversed its position surprisingly and in 1931 permitted the
faithful to practise ancestor worship, whose prohibition by the Church
61004
had been a chief cause of the Korean	 - persecution.
But unlike Protestants (especially Presbyterians), Catholics in
Korea who had been indoctrinated to remain 'neutral' by the Church did
not protest against Japanese oppression. 19	Only towards the end of
the Japanese occupation did the Church begin to show resistance to
such oppressions. 20
	In R.T. Baker's report, there were three or four
priests who were imprisoned for the matter of obeisance to Shinta
symbols. 21 According to a few sources, 22 there were several priests
and laymen who resisted individually against the instructions of Rome
and were finally jailed. But all the sources do not give the names of
resisters.	 As a whole Catholics reported very rough times during
the war period, although their position vis-a-vis the Japanese was
eased somewhat by the Vatican's recognition of Manchukuo. 23
C. The Methodist Church
Korea is a somewhat unique mission field in that it has been
organised on a comity plan among the major denominations from abroad,
and there are really only two major Protestant churches in the field,
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Presbyterian and Methodist. 1	The 1937 statistics of church member-
ship are revealing:	 109,963 Roman Catholics and 120 missionaries;
281,939 Presbyterians and 140 missionaries; 54,654 Methodists and 67
missionaries; 10,445 Holiness adherents with most of them removed in
1937; 8,688 Episcopalians and 27 missionaries; 6,387 soldiers of the
Salvation Army and 19 missionaries; 5,096 Seventh Day Adventists and
9 missionaries. 2
As for the Shrine Issue, in general, the Methodist Church like
the Catholic Church, acquiesced in State ShintO observance. 3
	Unlike
the Presbyterians, the Methodist and the Catholic missions quietly
accepted Japanese pressure (1935) with the edicts of the government
regarding observances before the Shinto shrines, so their schools were
allowed to remain open. But it should be noted that, according to
C.A. Saucer, Treasurer of the Central Council of the Korean Methodist
Church at that time, since 1930 when the new autonomous Korean
Methodist Church was organised, Methodist schools were not directly
under mission control. 4	Each school had a board of trustees
consisting of both missionaries and Korean Christians. As a rule,
Methodist missionaries kept silent on the issue of students of
Christian schools attending shrine ceremonies. It is noteworthy in
this connection that the closure of schools was action taken by the
Presbyterian Missionary Community, while at the same time Korean
organisations were seeking permission to take over the schools and
operate them.	 In point of fact, the great majority of Korean
Christians of all denominations protested vigorously, even violently,
against the policy of closing the schools. There were some Korean
Christians who would be willing to die for their faith, if need be,
yet they had no scruples against the students and teachers going to
the shrines. 5
	Finally, the Korean Bishop of the Methodist Church
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felt that parents whose children were involved should be the ones to
decide the circumstances under which the schools should continue to
operate.
	 The Methodists decided to continue to operate mission
schools. On this IRM reports:
Korean Methodist Christians as a body, and
generally as individuals, have no objection to
conformity. The Korean ex-Bishop [J.S. Ryang] and
the present Bishop [Chung Choon-soo] were both of
the party who visited Ise [the National Shrines].
The schools have made no difficulty about
attending the shrines. The policy of Methodism in
Korea does not provide for separate mission
opinion. The missionary point of view has not
been voiced by the missionary body as such. There
are strong6 differences of individual opinion in
the group.
As is evident from the last sentence of the quotation, the
missionaries of the Methodist Episcopal Church ('Northern Methodist')
were divided in opinion. 7	While the efforts of the Northern
Methodist Mission were concentrated upon west Korea, those of the
Southern Methodist Mission were focused on a triangular territory,
from Songdo to Soul and thence to Wnsan. 8	Accordingly, in R.E.
Shearer's view, 9 it was the education-centred Southern Mission rather
than the Northern one that felt much more pressure from the Japanese
government, which always wanted to control the schools. 	 For example,
on 29 January 1936, the Hon. T.H. Yun, Dr. J.S. Ryang (General
Superintendent of the Korean Methodist Church), both of Southern
Methodists, and seven other leading Christians (Presbyterians and
Methodists), went on invitation to the educational department of the
Governor-General.	 On that occasion, Mr. Watanabe, the head of the
educational department, declared: "Attendance upon the shrine is not
religious but a government ceremony. It is not an act of worships but
is the paying of the highest respect to ancestors. The educational
system has the object of training loyal subjects as well as giving
them knowledge.	 Therefore, school teachers and pupils must make
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obeisance at the shrines".	 In face of this demand the General
Superintendent and T.H. Yun showed compliance. When the government
urged the Methodist General Assembly in 1938 to put the ShintiT
ceremonies to the vote, the then General Superintendent J.S. Ryang
arbitrarily asserted that the decision was unnecessary since the
shrine worship was indeed a duty of loyal subjects. In September of
the same year, Bishop Ryang, with Mr. Watanabe's approval, had printed
and circulated Watanabe's statement widely to all Methodist schools
and churches, and had advised observance of the required shrine
attendance. Thus the sufferings of the Methodists became not very
serious afterwards. 10
In general, the Methodist missionaries had no conscientious
objections to accepting the statements of the authorities and
attending the ceremonies when attendance was required. 11	The
Methodist Mission agreed with the Korean Methodist Church, accepting
at face value the word of the Japanese authorities that the ceremonies
were patriotic and had nothing to do with religion. 12
	They kept
their schools open, although, by the end of the war years, their
Christian character had been radically altered. So "these schools",
C.D. Fulton evaluates, "survived the war, but not as Christian
schools 13
	
Eventually a statement presented to the Foreign Work
Committee of the Board of Missions of the Methodist Episcopal Church
(South) on 3 May 1937, concludes thus:
Having reviewed the educational situation in Korea
and being fully aware of the grave difficulties
Christian education faces in that country, the
Joint Committee records its confidence in the
Methodist missionaries and nationals and its
appreciation of the consecration and division with
which they have met the government educational
requirements. We assure them of the prayerful
sympathy and support of the Joint Committee in
their efforts to keep clear and strong the
Christian witness in the Korean church schools.
We agree with the position of the Japan Christian
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Council for the present: that Christians should
accept the government's interpretation that these
shrines are not religious, and help to make that
interpretation known and understood iin4 their own
circles and among the people at large.
Thereafter the document of reform - "Reform Plan for the Korean
Methodist Church" (Appendix F) by Bishop Chung Choon-Soo - adopted by
the Korean Methodist Church on 2 October, 1940, was one of the extreme
cases of its utter obeisance to the reigning Japanese ideology. 15
But it should be borne in mind that throughout the whole reform
campaign of five long years the rank and file of Korean Methodists
held out against the leadership. 16 So R.T. Baker, a Methodist
missionary, judges, "It was not the case of a defecting church, but
simply of defecting leaders, because the church never went along with
the reforms but was powerless to stem the pro-Japanese tide". Thus
Baker's assertion deserves more attention, but it will be considered
in the next part (Ch. V. H.2, "Early Historical Experience").
As regards the rejection of worship at the shrines, there were
some Methodists 17 who resisted individually against the Shintii shrine
observance, but, generally speaking, the net result for Korean
Methodism itself was, in Holtom's terms, 18 as for Catholicism, 'full
accommodation' to the ShintU political standards.
D. The Presbyterian Church
As has been shown, after concentrating on the schools in the mid-
1930s, the government pressure to go to the Shint5 shrines quickly .
became a major problem for the missions largely in control of the
schools. Having accomplished the compliance of the Christian schools, -
after 1938 the government pressure for control placed the Korean -
national church in the spotlight.	 The Governor-General called -
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offering obeisance at Shint3 shrines
v
a patriotic duty, and many
Christians simply went along with it. Many Protestants, including
majorities of several foreign missionary organisations, left the
Shinta shrine observance for individuals to decide as a matter of
conscience. 1	The Presbyterian establishment, however, from the
outset called it	 'idolatry', setting the stage for a major
confrontation between church and state, and also among members of the
church who dissented from the views of the leadership. As for the
shrine issue and closing the Christian schools, the attitude of the
Presbyterian missionaries, unlike that of the Methodists, was
generally against participation in the shrine obeisance.
The missions in Korea of the Presbyterian Church in the United
States ('Southern Presbyterian'), very strongly conservative in
theology, held that it was better to close the schools than to conform
to the government requirements. 2 The 'Southern' Presbyterian
Mission's attitude was outlined by the executive secretary at the
time, Dr. C. Darby Fulton:
The mission was unanimously of the mind that we
could not participate in the shrine ceremonies
without compromising vital Christian principles.
We -were not dealing with something that lies in
the realm of non-essentials, but with basic
beliefs of the Christian Faith: something so
elementary as to be a Vmple question between
monotheism and polytheism.
The Southern Presbyterians refused conformity and closed all the
schools.	 A statement of policy to be followed was promulgated in
February 1937 by the Executive Committee of Foreign Missions of the
Church. It contains 13 clauses, of which the following may be quoted:
IV. Nevertheless, in view of recent developments
that seem to render impossible the continuation of
our educational work without compromise of
Christian principle we hereby reluctantly instruct
our Korea mission to take appropriate steps for
the closing of our schools in due process.
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XI. Regarding the disposal of school properties
in this emergency, we cannot approve their
transfer for school purposes either by gift, loan,
rental or sale to any group or organization that
would be unable to maintain the Christian
principles upon which our schools have stood ...
As there are essential reasons of conscience for
the closing of the schools, we cannot see our way
clear to transfer the property given for
distinctly Christian education to other agencies,
however well intentioned, in order that dry may
conduct schools under the same limitations.
This action was endorsed by the General Assembly of the Church,
meeting at Montreat, North Carolina, in May 1937.
Recognising the increasing difficulties of maintaining the
mission schools, the commissioners from the Board of Foreign Missions
in New York made some recommendations to the missions in Korea of the
Presbyterian Church in the U.S.A. ('Northern Presbyterian') in July
1936, of which the following as the key policy may be quoted:
We recommend that the mission approve the policy
of retiring from the field of secular education.
To do this in an orderly manner will require some
time; it will also involve the questions of the
future management of the schools and of the use or
disposal of the property. Close co-operation with
the offisials of the government will be
necessary.
The majority of the Northern Presbyterians held it was better to
close the schools than to conform to the government requirements,
though there was a 'strong' minority that protested vigorously against
this position.	 The minority of these missions were in favour of
conformity in shrine attendance on the part of schools.
	 It is
noteworthy in this context that the voices urging moderation were
primarily those of the 'educators' of the mission staff, the group, in
H.M. Conn's view, traditionally more 'liberal' than the ministers. 6
Eventually, the Northern Presbyterian Mission withdrew from the
field of higher education also, although not without strong
disagreement within the Mission as to how to withdraw, and not without
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some notable lapse of time before the completion of the withdrawal.
The disagreement seems to appear most clearly in the debate that raged
at the annual meeting of the Korea Mission in July, 1936, over the
proposed recommendations of the Executive Committee regarding the
disposal of the Mission's educational institutions. 7	The
recommendations were eventually adopted by a vote of 69-16.
	
A
substitute motion, proposed by Dr. Horace H. Underwood, the then
President of ChosOn Christian College in Sul, was eventually defeated
by a vote of 67-19.	 Underwood's proposals provided that Mission
schools should be closed separately and only when the actual:
persecution materialised. As a result of the motion, some schools
were closed and others were transferred to Korean management. 8	It
was in 1941-1942 that the final school relationship was severed by the
"Northern" Presbyterian Mission, five to six years after the initial
action taken. By contrast, it should be noted that, the 'Southern'
Presbyterian Mission decided in late 1935 to withdraw, and by
September, 1937, the last of the ten mission schools had been closed.
The reason for the delay on the part of the 'Northern' Mission might
be explored in terms of mission policy. This will be examined in the
next chapter (Ch. V. E. "Mission Policy").
A minority in the "Northern" Mission took the position that they
could accept the government's statement that the ceremonies were not
religious and comply with the order. However, it should be added that
only a few of this minority actually went out to the shrines. 9 Also
we can stress ... . here that ChosOn Christian College in SOul did not
close but continued to function until 1941, under the presidency of
Northern Presbyterian missionary H.H. Underwood.
10
	Underwood, a
leading missionary, accepted the Government definition of Shint5 as
non-religious. 11	The Mission voted in 1938 to withdraw from ChosOn
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Christian College, but action was delayed.
Another minority in the "Northern" Mission including Rev. Bruce
F. Hunt felt such strong dissatisfaction with the home Board over the
shrine issue and over liberalism in the Korea Mission that many
resigned. 12	About 15 resignations from the Korea Mission since 1936
were mainly due to these reasons.
13
The missionaries who resigned
were a small but vociferous faction.
In 	 1936 the mission of the Presbyterian Church of
Australia passed its resolutions, of which the following may be
quoted:
We recognise our obligations to promote the
virtues of obedience and loyalty in our students.
We desire that our schools should participate in
all national ceremonies. But since we worship one
God alone, Creator and Ruler of the Universe, and
because to comply with an order to make obeisance
at shrines which are dedicated to other spirits
... would constitute for us a disobedience to His
expressed commands, we therefore are unable
ourselves to make sui obeisance, or to instruct
our schools to do so.
This motion was unanimously carried: The Mission spoke strongly
against the shrine. 15	Later, however, in conformity with the desire
of certain of the educationists and influenced by suggestions from the
board in Australia, in practice a certain amount of concession was
made, though there were never stated alterations of the mission
policy. Actually, by arrangement with and consent of the provincial
modern
authorities	 yong-Nam Province), it was permitted that mission
schools attend the shrines at times when no Shintii ceremonies were in
progress;	 the schools gave token of their loyalty not by the
conventional obeisance but by standing in prayer to God for Japan.
This compromise proved unsatisfactory alike to the authorities
and to the mission.	 In other words, the mission did manage to
establish a semi-official arrangement with provincial authorities,
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omitting obeisance, but later the arrangement was condemned as
unacceptable.
	
The authorities asserted that the only reason why
schools had so conducted themselves (i.e., with prayer to God at the
shrines instead of obeisance to the kami) was official interpretation
that the prayer to God was obeisance to the kami. 	 No other
interpretation was acceptable to the highest authorities. 16 Late in
1938 the provincial authorities demanded full conformity. 17 It should
not be overlooked here that in the Mission there were apparently
enough voices (mostly educationists) suggesting 'a certain amount of
compromise' that the Mission found it necessary to repeat its action
again in January 1939. 18 Finally, the Mission met in January 1939 and
passed the following:
In development of mission policy as enunciated in
February 1936 we now resolve that both in church
and school we dissociate ourselves from attendance
at the shrines.
This we do from a conviction that in the act of
bowing at the shrines is inherent a token of
assent to claims which we believe to be contrary
to the truth of God, truth concerning which it is
our primary duty as Christians to bear witness.
Further, that we seek to maintain our Christian
witness in education and our goodwill and
helpfulnw to Japan by efforts to continue our
schools.
The Board of Foreign Missions of the United Church of Canada (the
former Presbyterian Church of Canada) 20 did not issue instructions to
the missions in Korea regarding policy of the ShintU shrines, but the
missionaries were preponderantly in favour of conformity. 21 This
decision also was not unanimous. There was at least one resignation
in protest; one woman educationist resigned from her school rather
than conform.
It is noteworthy in this context that in the 1930s the United
Church of Canada, being a union of several denominations since 1925,
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could not be held to the doctrine and confession of the Presbyterian
Church. 22	In September, 1926, the 25th General Assembly broke with
Young, who had favoured the Presbyterian Confession and form of
government, and decided to work with those who differed greatly from
Presbyterian Church ideas, because the latter were in the majority.
So the Canadian Mission began afresh. After the departure of Young,
William Scott came from Manchuria to become Mission chairman in
Hamhtng, and Kim Kwan-sik and Cho Hui-yOm came from America to join in
the educational work. The Rev. Kim Kwan-sik was later elected the
first Congnisa of the United Korean Christian Church, which was
completely under control of the government in July 1945. 23
The turning point for the Christian churches, especially the
Presbyterians, was the approval of Shint6 shrine worship by the
Presbyterian General Assembly of 1938, P'yZingyang. 24	Before the 27th
General Assembly, the government coerced the presbyteries into
accepting	 shrine worship. Eventually in February 1938 P'yOngbuk
Presbytery, the biggest one, approved
	
Shinn' shrine worship, and
earlier in time than the General Assembly 17 out of 23 presbyteries in
the country obeyed the government. 	 The 'surrender' of the
Presbyterians was made by unusual use of police power and pressure.
When the session began, high police officials sat in front facing the
delegates and no debate or negative votes were allowed. Under such
pressure the assembly resolved that participation in shrine ceremonies
was not religious and thus did not conflict with the teachings of
Christianity, but was an act of patriotism. 	 With this, a serious
rift opened between the Korean church and the missionaries. 25
	The
missionaries 26 denounced the assembly for its action and, as legal
owners of the mission schools, voted to close the schools rather than
allow their students to participate in Shinn- rituals.	 And most
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missionaries resigned from all presbytery organisations, though
continuing to help as individuals whenever possible.
27
 This, in turn,
alienated many Christian families, whose children's education was at
stake. 28
The Korean Church at large after 1938 followed the same course
which the Church in Japan took, compromise and surrender to the power
of the State. 29 The 'official approval of the shrine attendance by
the largest and most powerful Christian denomination in Korea gave an
effective tool to crush any Christian resistance to participation in
shrine ceremonies.	 Now the "Shrine Issue" was virtually solved as
far as the government was concerned. However, government dealing with
Christians became tougher and more oppressive30
As the Presbyterian General Assembly and other ecclesiastical
bodies collapsed in their witness to the uniqueness of Christianity,
Presbyterian ministers and Christians met the issue by opposing the
action of the General Assembly. The resisting ministers, evangelists,
elders or deacons, visited the still courageous, sympathetic church
groups and individual Christians to persuade them against Shrine
worship, which activities were often called Sinsa pulch'ambae undong 
(SPU, Jinja Fusampai Undo in Japanese) or Non-Shrine Worship Movement
(1938-1945). The strongest resistance was shown in the provinces of
P'yOngan south and north, and KyCingsang south, and also among the
Korean Christians in Manchuria.
31
	As a result, nearly 200 local
churches closed their doors, about 2,000 persons were arrested, and
among them more than 50 died in prison because of the shrine issue in
Korea, and 20 or so were released at the end of the Second World
War.
32
SPU leaders had already judged their Christian 'co-religionists'
who bowed at the shrines to have 'apostatised' from the faith, and to
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be no longer worthy of fellowship. A deep rupture based on what was
morally right had already taken place. In the view of these 'die-
hard' conservatives, new 'unorthodoxy' and 'liberalism' had entered in
and adulterated the church.
	 To SPU leaders it was a form of
'spiritual adultery' that Christian pastors bowed before the Japanese
kami.
The Korean resistance to shrine worship had three centres:
, y
first, in the P'ygngan provinces in the north (Yi Ki-son, leader) and
the south (Chu Ki-ch igl, leader); second, Ky gngsang south Province
(Han Sang-dong, leader);	 and third, Manchuria (B.F. Hunt, leader)
(Table 5. The Leaders of the Non-Shrine Worship Movement).
The Korean resistance in P'yOngan both south and north provinces
centred on P'y gngyang,t6Protestant city of 'Jerusalem' in Korea. In
P'ygngyang the Presbyterian Seminary was located since 1902.
	 The
stronghold of the Presbyterian Church in Korea was P'ygngan Provinces,
north-western areas, and P'yOngyang city came to be the centre of the
resistance to shrine worship. 33
The motives, beliefs and actions of the SPU Korean Christians are
well illustrated in the experience of one of the most prominent
V 34
'	`jexponents:	 Yi Ki-son (1879-1950). Yi Kl-son was a revivalist
minister of P l ygngan north Province.	 He believed in a clear-cut
distinction between the Creator God of the Bible and all the so-called
false gods and idols. He judged ShintU kami worship to be a violation
of God's commandment against idolatry.
	 He believed that Christ's
second coming was at hand. Shrine worship was 'spiritual adultery'
and contradictory to Christian doctrine.
	 He was a very important
voice in heaping accusations of sin upon those who compromised. He
urged other Christians to come back to their original faith. After
his activities for the SPU, he was arrested and imprisoned in 1940.
- 216 -
Kim Hwa-jung, Evangelist
Yi Kwang-nok, Deacon
Yi Sting-yong, Deacon
0 Yang-un
Kim Ch'ang-in
Sim Ul-ch"g1
SOnju
Kim Rin-htii, Evangelist
Kim Ui-hong, Evangelist
Chgngju
Kim Hygng-nak
Table 5: The Leaders of the Non-Shrine Worship Movement (1938-1945)*
I. P'ygngan North Province
Yi Ki-sgn, leader 
Pak Sin-ggn, Deacon
Kim Ki-sOng, Evangelist
Yi Pygng-hgi, Deacon
Kanggye
Ko eing-bong, Minister
Sg Chgng-hwan, Evangelist
Chang Tu-hi, Deacon
Yang Tae-nok, Deaeon
Ygngbygn
Pak Kwan-jun
Pakju
An I-suk
II. P'yOngan South Province
Chu Ki-ch"61, leader 
P'yOngyang
Pang Kye-sOng, Evangelist
0 Yun-sgn, Evangelist
Kim Ki-sOng, Evangelist
Ham Il-don, Missionary
Na Tu-wgn, Missionary
Yi Yak-sin, Minister
III. KyOngsang South Province
Han Sang-dong, leader 
Ch'ae ChOng-min, Minister
Kim Ui-ch'ang, Minister
Yi Chu-wgn, Evangelist
0 Chgng-mo, Deacon
Pak Kwan-chun, Elder
An I-suk, Missionary
Yi Pygng-hi, Deacon
Pusan
HO Tae-si, Missionary
Cho Su-ok, Female Evangelist
Son Mygng-bok, Evangelist
Kim Myo-nygn
Pak Kygng-ae
Ch'u Ma-in, Missionary
Kgch'ang
Chu Nam-go, Minister
Namhae
Ch'oe Sang-rim, Minister
Hadong
Pak S gng-gun, Minister
Kim Chgm-yong, Evangelist
T'ongygng
Ch'oe TOk-chi, Evangelist
Pongchign
Pak Ui-hum
Masan
Ch'oe TOk-chi, Evangelist
Yi Ch'an-su, Evangelist
Yi Yak-sin, Minister
Haman
Yi Hygn-sgk, Evangelist
Pochign
SO Vik-ki
Ru 0-ran, Missionary
Kwang Ch'gl-do, Evangelist
Ch'angnygng
An Ygng-wgn, Evangelist
Hygpch'gn
Kang Ch'an-ju, Deacon
Sanch'gng
Kim Yo-won, Deacon
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Table 5 (continued)
Harbin ..,
Kim Yun-sop, Deacon
IV. Manchuria
Han Pu-s8n, Missionary, Leader 
Pougch'gn
Pak Ui-hum
Musun
	
Andong (Antung)
Pak YOn-ji, Deacon	 Ch'oe Yong-sam
Ch011a South Province
Son Yang-wOn
,
* (S.J. Palmer, "Korean Christians and the Shinto Shrine Issue", in
Korea's Response to Japan, 1977, pp. 147-9).
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(After his release in 1945, he was active in re-establishing
Christianity in North Korea until he was killed there in 1950).
The most prominent foreign missionary to undergo imprisonment at
the hands of the Japanese was B.F. Hunt (Han Pu-sCin), a leader of the
SPU in Manchuria. 35
	The Rev. Hunt was born in Korea of a
Presbyterian missionary home and was a missionary himself in Korea
until 1936, belonging to the Presbyterian Church in the U.S.A., but he
withdrew from the Home Church on the issue of modernism and joined the
American Presbyterian Church which later changed its name to the
Orthodox Presbyterian Church of America. 36
	In his tenacious stubborn
faith, the shrine issue was perceived as a purely religious problem, a
stark confrontation between Jehovah and the false gods of the
Japanese.
Here we should note a sect called Sionsan cheguk (the Mount Zion
movement, 1944) centred at the PohyOn mountain, Ch'Ongsong, KyOngsang
north Province. 37
 This sect changed its name to Sionsan kyohoe (the
Zion Presbyterian Church of Christ) on the 20th August, 1945. This
extremely pietistic, premillenarian (Adventist) sect was an offshoot
from the Northern Presbyterian Church. It put up one of the last,
strongest shows of resistance to the Japanese shrine demand in all
Korea.
The Mount Zion sect owed its distinctive teachings to the sect
founder Pak Tong-gi's biblical studies and exegesis.
	 In his early
days Pak learned Chinese classics for seven years under the
supervision of his paternal uncle Cho Pyong-guk, a prominent figure of
the anti-Japan resistance movement. 38
	Later in 1926 Pak Tong-gi
entered the Tongsan Bible School in Taegu carried on by the Northern
Presbyterian mission. In 1940 he, the then evangelist of the Todong
Presbyterian Church, Kyiingsang north Province, claimed to have
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experienced a prophetic vision of the resurrected Jesus Christ during
his prayer.	 In 'the vision-trance type of transformation' (A.F.C.
Wallace's terms 39 ) Pak attested that the Old Testament was unfolded in
front of him at Joel 2: "Sound the alarm in Jerusalem! Let the blast
of the warning trumpet be heard upon my holy mountain! Let everyone
tremble in fear, for the day of the Lord's judgment approaches (Joel
2:1) ... Sound the trumpet in Zion! Call a fast and gather all the
people together for a solemn meeting (2:15) ... Everyone who calls
upon the name of the Lord will be saved; even in Jerusalem some will
escape, just as the Lord has promised, for he has chosen some to
survive (2:32)".
As a protest against the collapse of the Presbyterian General
Assembly of 1938, which eventually resulted in the closing of his
church in 1942, Pak withdrew from his job and settled down in the
rural village of Ch l Ongsong.	 Over 1,000 followers, with increased
individual stress as a result of the intensified policy of
l Japanisation l
 in Korea during the Pacific War, gathered around the
charismatic leader Pak, who strongly proclaimed that salvation could
be achieved only by withdrawing from the 'apostatised' churches which
bowed at the Shinta shrines. Among the followers there were three
ministers (Hwang Yu-ha, Cho SOng-dae, Yang Ha-u) and four elders
(Chong Son-jun, Hwang Tal-su, Ch l oe Chong-su, Chong Un-hun). 40
Under the charismatic leadership of Pak Tong-gi, the members of
the schismatic Mount Zion sect considered themselves to be those who
had been given an opportunity of becoming a people chosen to be saved.
Their numbers remained small and rarely exceeded 1,000. The very name
'Mount Zion' was introduced by the founder of the movement, who cited
Hebrews (N.T.) 12:22 and the Revelation (N.T.) 14:1 at the time of
severe stress: "But you have come right up to Mount Zion, to the city
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of the living God, the heavenly Jerusalem; and to the gathering of
countless happy angels"; "Then I saw a Lamb standing on Mount Zion in
Jerusalem, and with him were 144,000 who had his Name and his Father's
Name on their foreheads". 41
	Like other adventists in history, the
message of the Zion sect centred upon the kingdom of God, and its
early establishment on earth, preceded by the second advent of Jesus
Christ.
The members of the Zion sect accepted the Bible as the only
source of knowledge of God and His revealed purposes.
	 As all
adventists tend to relate biblical prophecies to their own times and
to recognise contemporary events as fulfilling these pronouncements 42 ,
from the evidences of the Scriptures and from the signs of the times,
the members of the Zion sect believed that the second advent of Jesus
was now imminent: the occasion of wars, great earthquakes, famines in
many lands, and so on, was believed to be predicted in the Scriptures
(Luke 21; Matthew 24; Mark 13) - all served to make evident to the
Zion sect concerned that their own time was indeed the time of the end
of the existing dispensation. 43
	Thus, the present time was seen as
an interim period before the establishment of the millennium, and the
political events of the present time were regarded from the point of
view of the fulfilment of the prophecies of the Bible, preliminary to
the end of this dispensation: "But when you see Jerusalem surrounded
by armies, then you will know that the time of its destruction has
arrived. Then let the people of Judea flee to the hills. Let those
in Jerusalem try •to escape, and those outside the city must not
attempt to return.
	 For those will be days of God's judgment, and the
words of the ancient Scriptures written by the prophets will be
abundantly fulfilled" (Luke 21:20-2). The Mount Zion sect believed
the Second Advent imminent on the basis of allegorical and
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dispensational interpretations especially of Daniel (0.T.) and
Revelation (N.T.). 44
Among the leading members of the Mount Zion sect, like the
adventist sect Christadelphians, or brethren in Christ in Britain
begun by Dr. John Thomas 45 , careful scrutiny of international affairs
was prevalent in their attempt to see how biblical prophecy was being
fulfilled. A wide variety of international events were received with
great excitement and in one way or another fitted into the pattern of
things prophesied. 46
 Regarding World War II as the 'Armageddon' (the
Revelation 16:16), the Zion sect prayed publicly for an Allied
victory. 47
As regards the Shint5 Shrine Issue, the Mount Zion movement
judged worship at the Shinto shrines and daily bows in an easterly
direction - to TOkyO - to be a violation of God's commandment against
idolatry. What is interesting in this context is that the Zion sect
tried to identify particular biblical passages with the warning
against worship at ShintO kami (Amaterasu Emikami, the Sun-Goddess):
"Then he brought me into the inner court of the Temple and there at
the door, between the porch and the bronze altar, were about twenty-
five men standing with their backs to the Temple of the Lord, facing
east, worshipping the sun! 'Have you seen this?' he asked. "Is it
nothing to the people of Judah that they commit these terrible sins,
leading the whole nation into idolatry, thumbing their noses at me and
arousing my fury against them" (Ezekiel 8:16-7). 48
The members of the Zion sect, therefore, burnt Japanese flags and
every ShintU symbol, for example, kamidana (god-shelves) in the homes,
they could lay their hands on, closed churches and ex-communicated
members and pastors who had traffic with the Japanese, gloried in
deaths as martyrs, took their sons out of schools rather than have
- 222 -
them receive a 'Babylonian education'. 49
	For all this they were
persecuted by the Japanese authorities and removed from all
Presbyterian connections in Korea. In May 1945, the leader, the staff
and some followers (33 people) were arrested and imprisoned at the
PohyOn mountain, Chqingsong. 50
The radical aspect of the Presbyterian Church, especially the SPU
and the Zion sect, in repird. to. the 	 world view On -_:	
_ the
,
state deserves some attention. This point will be explored further in
Ch. V.D. "World View".
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CHAPTER V
KOREAN CHRISTIANITY AND THE SHINTO-
 SHRINE ISSUE (2):
THE CATHOLIC, THE METHODIST AND THE PRESBYTERIAN
POSITIONS COMPARED
A. Theoretical Framework
The central focus of this study is an inquiry into the possible
reasons why some religious groups, such as the Roman Catholic Church
and the Methodist Church, should choose the way of compromise and
others, such as the Presbyterian Church, especially the individual
missionaries, the Non-Shrine Worship Movement, and the Mount Zion
Sect, the way of radical challenge and withdrawal. Historically, as
regards the attitude of the Korean Churches to the Issue, the
Presbyterians (the largest Protestant group), unlike the Methodists
(the second largest Protestant group) and the Roman 'Catholics, did
not yield to Japanese pressure easily. It was a fact that there was a
division of opinion and action on the matter of ShintU shrine
attendance among the various Christian Churches, which followed to
some extent denominational lines. Thus the following is a theoretical
framework of comparison of the three major churches - the Roman
Catholic, the Methodist and the Presbyterian - in connection with the
Shint6 Shrine Issue.
Sociology is the social science that deals -with the development,
organisation, and behaviour of human groups. Sociological study of
religion is based on the recognition that both religious life and the
church as its institutional expression are profoundly social. Every
religious organisation has some degree of formalism or institutional-
isation. This is true even of religious groups whose ecclesiasticism
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is least developed and of those so informally and loosely organised
that they claim to lack organisation altogether.
	
In point of fact,
in religious groups whose formal and established organisation in
connection with the church is least developed, formalised group
judgements defining and evaluating the person are more frequent and
burdensome than in the ritualistic churches. '
 The ecclesiasticism of
the sect is a different sort from that of the established church, but
it is not a whit less institutionalised.
	 Religion cannot have
currency without developing some generalised form, and generalised
form implies habits resistant to change which are the essence of
institutionalisation. In brief, the church is a social structure. In
the pursuit of its goals it functions as a social entity in a social
world. This means that, like other institutions, it is subject to the
play of social forces in both its formation and its operation. 2
The church as a social institution is a major subject in the
sociology of religion. The church is a peculiarly appropriate object
for sociological study because it is a collective undertaking, an
association of people organised to act together.
	 As such, the church
is subject to the play of all the basic social processes operating in
human societies. The character of each organisation is affected by
the conditions out of which it originates. It must develop some kind
of structure on behalf of its mission or objective. 3
 This structure
involves separation of people into different roles.
	 This entire
organisational structure is peculiarly subject to the play of such
sociological processes as formalisation or institutionalisation,
bureaucratisation, conflict, and integration.
	 As a consciously
functioning enterprise with an identity recognised by its membership,
it is confronted by the surrounding world in which it must operate.
The institution must deal with this world; it devises policies and
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practices to meet the problems and requirements that flow from its
efforts to exist and operate in its own specific social setting. It
tries to protect or advance its particular interests and values. All
of these matters are conditions and needs that confront every human
organisation.	 But since beliefs are so important in religion,
social'
scientists analysing the church must be even more involved in the
A
study of normative behaviour and group values than those who study
most other segments of society. 4 The intensity of meaning involved in
the practice of religion as a causative variable is very important.
The definitions and explanations men attach to situations in which
they find themselves are of great importance to their conduct. In
this context, because of the way it combines empirical research with
experiential insight (Verstehen), the sociology of religion has been
viewed as an art as well as a science. 5
The cardinal aspects of the church can be and have been studied
from many different points of view. While the historian's perspective
focuses upon unique or distinctive factors in the case of a specific
church or set of churches, sociological analysis of the church
pertains to many of its general features. In its concern with general
processes, sociological analysis relies heavily on comparative and
conceptual study of churches. However, the process of establishing an
adequate sociological typology to categorise various religious
communities is still being hammered out, though certain terms have
come to have a wide acceptance, e.g., Max Weber and Ernst Troeltsch's
distinction between the 'sect' and the 'church'.
A religious institution may be considered as composed of
conceptual and ideological elements;
	 of usages, ritual and
behavioural patterns; of associational and organisational elements as
well as the material and instrumental aspects - which together serve
- 226 -
to channel the activities of human beings towards the satisfaction of
religious needs. 6
As for the first and second elements, much has been written on
the relation of belief and practice in religion. What are the
respective relations between doctrine and cult, theology and worship?
The most plausible interpretation would seem to be that which
considers the theological and the practical as being inextricably
intertwined. 7
,
No act of worship can exist without some conception of
the divine, nor can a religion function without at least a modicum of
cultic expression.
Given the integrating power of doctrine and worship, we can
safely assume that "the attitude of the individual towards society in
all its forms and the influence of a religion on social relations and
institutions will depend largely on the spirit which permeates the
doctrines, cult and organisation of a religious group" . 8
	In a
brilliant study Max Weber has attempted to characterise typologically
different religious attitudes as they are found in some of the world
religions. 9
	Religious experience itself stimulates the development
of characteristic attitudes,
	 e.g.,	 the support of Christian
exclusiveness or the openmindedness to the non-Christian religions.
These in turn are concretised in thought and action, e.g., martyrdom
or apostasy. Thus differences in religious experience itself seem to
be key factors.
In connection with this, it is noteworthy that Joachim Wach
asserts that religious experience is basically composed of: a)
theoretical expression:doctrine; b) practical expression:cults; and
c) sociological expression:communion (the state of sharing religious
beliefs and practices). 10
 Wach's assertion needs to be reworded in
terms of etymology.
- 227 -
Firstly, as regards 'theoretical expression', 'doctrine' means 'a
principle of belief', 11
	'doctrina-doCire' in Latin is 'to teach'.
Thus by referring to 'doctrine' we should emphasise 'teaching' or 'a
thing taught' in a religious context. The 'content' of the doctrine
(intellectual expressions of religious experience) revolves about
three topics of particular importance - God, the world, and man. 12 In
other	 words,	 theological,	 cosmological,	 and	 anthropological
conceptions are continuously being evolved in terms of myth, doctrine,
and dogma. The nature of God or the gods, the origin and growth of
deities (theogony), and their attributes, the relation of the deity to
the world and its justification (theodicy) - all are delineated and
expounded in the theology (a system of theological doctrine).
Cosmogony is a theory or a myth of the origin of the universe, while
theological anthropology, including soteriology (the doctrine of
salvation) and eschatology (the doctrine of the last or final things,
such as death, judgement, the state after death), ponders over the
origin, nature, and destiny of man.
Secondly, in connection with 'practical expression', 'cultus'
means 'formal worship'. 13
	'Cultus-coAre' in Latin is 'to worship'.
Wach calls 'cultus' the act or acts of the homo religiosus: worship. 14
E. Underhill divides these acts into (1) ritual (liturgical pattern),
(2) symbols (images), (3) sacraments (visible things and deeds), and
(4) sacrifice. 15 Underhill's classification is very useful for a
systematic inquiry into the nature, relation, and meaning of cultic
acts.
16
Thirdly, regarding 'sociological expression', 'communion' means
'spiritual intercourse, fellowship, interchange of transactions, union
in religious service , . 17 In Latin 'commilniii' came from 'commUnis'
which means 'common'. By communion Wach refers to the sociological
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expressions of religious experience, which complement the theoretical
and practical expressions. 18
 In other words, he stresses that vital
religion, by its very nature, must create and sustain a social
relationship.
	 Eventually he concludes that "the sociologist of
religion will have to study and to classify with care the
typologically different organizational structures resulting from
divergent concepts of religious communion.
	 He will trace their
historic development, and it will be his task to investigate different
ideas of fellowship in religion, a concept ubiquitous in all periods
and in all parts of the world , . 19
From the rewording of the foregoing, and recognising the
advantages of the typological approach, I propose two crucial factors
to compare the different positions of the three churches:
	 1)
'theological emphasis' (in Wach's terms, the theoretical and practical
expressions of religious experience), and 2) church structure (in
Wach's terms, the sociological expressions of religious experience or
organisational structure).
With regard to 'theological emphasis', • 	 it
is possible to classify on a continuum at least five distinguishable
parties:	 fundamentalist, conservative, moderate, liberal and
modernist. 20
	Moderate fundamentalists and liberals often remain
together in the same church. But, hyper-fundamentalists, failing to
gain control, often depart to establish new churches or to joir; those
they know to be "true to the Word of God". In this context it should
be noted that the fundamentalist-Modernist controversies in the 1920s
was transplanted to foreign lands through missionaries.
Although most Protestant fundamentalists were strongly anti-
Catholic, Catholicism meets all theological requirements of the
fundamentalists' minimum five-point definition. The chief difference
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is that the ultimate authority is not an infallible Bible but an
infallible Church. 21	Ritual is, for the Catholic, a conservative
force that firmly binds him to a system.
In connection with 'church structure', as a whole, I follow the
Congregational, Presbyterian and Episcopal models. 	 Roger Mehl
provided three types of Protestant ecclesiastical structures from the
perspective of the sociology of missions: a) the episcopal type; b)
the Presbyterian synodal type;	 and c) the Congregational type.
Mehl's typologies can be summarised in the following way. 22
1. The episcopal type is represented by Anglicanism and, with certain
variations, by the Lutheran Church of Sweden. Both refer to the idea
of a hierarchy in continuity with the apostles. The Church of England
resembles the Roman Catholic church in the sense that it is
theoretically a church directed by one sole hierarchy, under the
authority of two bishops, one being primate. Anglicanism is usually
more in line with Swedish Lutheranism, by contrast to both Methodism
and other forms of Lutheranism, which has maintained or restored the
Episcopacy constitution although in a less distinct type.
2. The Presbyterian synodal type, generally of Reformed tradition, is
characterised by the fact that the organisation consists of a
hierarchy of assemblies and councils, which rests on the base of the
parish, the basic cell of the church. This regime has been called
democratic and anti-Episcopalian. Whereas the Episcopal system became
more flexible by the intervention of synodal assemblies, the
Presbyterian synodal system tends to take a step towards the Episcopal
system.
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3. The Congregational type certainly is a rather late product, which
expresses a very strong individualism.
	 Nevertheless, it also
expresses one of the components of Reformed ecclesiology, in the sense
that it accentuates the single local congregation, which in its eyes
expresses the whole reality of the church. It is present in Baptist
churches and in many Congregational churches.
Current conceptualisation of the Congregational, Presbyterian and
Episcopal models of church structure suggest that the differential
allocation of authority represents the distinguishing characteristic
between various forms of church organisation. In this respect D.O.
Moberg offered useful typologies of church structure including the
Roman Catholic Church. 23
	In his view, the three basic organisational
forms of churches, the Episcopal, Presbyterian, and Congregational
types, roughly correspond to political monarchies, aristocracies, and
democracies, respectively. Episcopal polity, best illustrated by the
Roman Catholic Church, is dominated by an ecclesiastical hierarchy
which controls appointments of the parish clergy and exercises
discipline over them. Authority flows from the highest offices down
to the members. Presbyterian polity is dominated in theory by the
constituent church bodies, but in fact by the clergy, who control the
denomination's synods or presbyteries and comprise a hierarchy of
ecclesiastical oligarchs. Elders in the local church tend to exercise
a similar aristocratic type of control. The Presbyterian Church is an
example.	 Congregational churches, such as Baptists, are loosely
organised, with members collectively as the source of authority.
According to Moberg, in Episcopal churches power flows from top
levels of the denomination downward to the local churches and its
members, while the opposite prevails in congregational bodies.
Presbyterian groups fall between the two, with authority flowing out
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from the middle level of elders and presbyters to both the lower level
of the local church and the higher level of the denomination.
The present study has concentrated on the three churches - the
Roman Catholic, the Methodist and the Presbyterian. Thus, it seems
proper for the study to use parts of both Mehl's and Moberg's
typologies. For the Roman Catholic Church I would use Moberg's, for
the Methodist Church Mehl's. Regarding the Presbyterian Church, it
seems reasonable to consider both assertions:
	 Mehl stresses its
democratic and anti-Episcopalian character;
	 Moberg emphasises the
role of the middle level, elders and presbyters, in its polity.
Incidentally, as was shown, 'religious experience' itself
stimulates the development of characteristic attitudes towards society
in all its forms, e.g., the support of Christian exclusiveness or the
openmindedness to the non-Christian religions.
	 In relation to the
ShintU Shrine Issue in the Japanese Empire, therefore, I add three
factors:
	 1) 'world view':
	 2) 'relationship to non-Christian
religions', and 3) 'relationship to nationalism'.
As regards 'relationship to a non-Christian religion', the
question whether Korean Christians did support Christian exclusiveness
or not is crucial in the sense that, if not, there would be no
religious objection to worship at Shinta shrines. In general terms of
the sociology of missions, missionary response to local cultures
varies through the history of mission effort; it varies according to
the church in question, and also according to the culture where the
mission is found.
Similarly, with reference to 'the relationship to nationalism',
missionary attitudes to the political authorities in the mission field
can be indigenous, or from the mission's own government at home, or
from an alien colonial government. In this respect Korea, under the
•n _
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Japanese Empire, was in a unique situation in the sense that there
existed three different forces together: the Korean indigenous force,
Japanese colonialism, and Euro-American influence through Christian
missions.
	 The Christian missions were, unlike Africa or India,
independent of the colonising power. Thus the church was associated
with a new nationalism.
Finally, another three factors should be included in the
comparison:	 I) 'mission policy', 2) 'early historical experience',
and 3) 'nationalities of missionaries'.
The strategic	 emphasis in mission policy has often been a
variation of theological emphasis in a religious institution. More
significant than the variation of outward form of mission such as
education, evangelisation, etc., have been the inner differences in
the understanding of the nature of missionary work, which have led to
the wide variation in practice in the course of missionary history. 24
In relation to the shrine question, the goal of education and the idea
of conversion were controversial among missionaries.
	 In general
terms, the inner differences in the understanding of 'education' and
'conversion' on the part of missionaries can be set out in the form of
pairs of opposites: (1) Either: education is to be supplied without
discrimination to all who are desirous of receiving it - Or: education
is to be reserved for Christians; its aim is not evangelisation but
the production of a Christian elite.
	 (2) Either: conversion, or
decision for Christ, is the aim of all Christian preaching - Or: the
idea of conversion should be excluded from the start; the aim is the
creation of a climate of mutual understanding.
In general, Catholicism is more adroit in the working out of
syntheses and more easily shelters certain forms of 'syncretism' than
does Protestantism. 25
	The most significant characteristic of
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Catholic mission policy is its world-wide policy of 'accommodation'.
Although generalisations are dangerous, there are striking differences
between	 Roman	 Catholics
	 and	 Protestants	 with	 regard	 to
'accommodation'.
Regarding the significance of 'early historical experience', it
is generally accepted that the early, formative period of missions is
crucial for the latter pattern of church-state relations. 26	The
Shintii Shrine Issue in the Japanese Empire is important because it
reveals the problem of 'Church-State Relations' in the colonial
setting. Thus we should examine the early historical experience of
three missions considering religion and politics.
In addition, as T.O. Beidelman stresses with great insight, it is
essential to consider any missionary group in terms of the
nationality, socio-economic background and cultural background of its
members. 27 These features should be considered in any discussions of
missionaries in the modern world.	 Among these, the factor
'nationalities of missions' needs more attention than has been given
to it. At the time of the shrine issue, 1931-1945, there were three
(American,	 Australian,	 Canadian),	 one	 (American),	 and	 four
nationalities (French, German, Irish, American) in missions of the
Presbyterian, Methodist and Roman Catholic churches respectively.
To summarise, the difference among the positions of the three
churches can be attributed to the differences of: 1) theological
emphasis; 2) church structure; 3) world view; 4) mission policy;
	
5) relationship to nationalism; 	 6) relationship to non-Christian
religions;	 7) early historical experience, and 8) nationalities of
missionaries.	 With this framework in Chapter V some sociological
observations will be made in an effort to compare the Catholic, the
Methodist and the Presbyterian positions.
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B. Theological Emphasis
1. The Catholic Church
'Accommodation' is the technical term used especially in Roman
Catholic missionary circles to describe attempts to adapt or
assimilate the gospel to local situations and, by omission or
suppression of certain Christian customs which might be regarded as
offensive to non-Christians, to make the acceptance of the gospel
easier for them. 1
 The two most famous instances of accommodation are
the work of Matteo Ricci in China and of Robert de Mobili in South
India.
As regards expressions of religious experience, among the
Christian Churches the Roman Catholic Church is notable for her
emphasis on 'worship' and for the richness of the complicated and
elaborate patterns of ritual and symbolism used to express it. So
'liturgical practice, otherwise known as the Mass, has always occupied
the very centre of Roman Catholicism. The Mass is the very centre of
Catholic worship and the heart of Catholic belief. 2
 Hence, in the
case of 'accommodation', the Roman Catholic Church, unlike the
Protestant circles, has historically laid stress not on the
theological expression of religious experience, i.e., doctrine, but on
practical expression, i.e., the matter of cult. 3
According to J.B. Pratt, we can distinguish between two types of
worship, one of which aims at making some kind of effect upon the
Deity or in some way communicating with him, while the other seeks
only to induce some desired mood or belief or attitude in the mind of
the worshipper: the former he calls "objective worship"; the latter
"subjective worship". Objective worship appears more distinctively in
Roman Catholicism, and subjective worship in Protestantism. 4
	The
•-
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Catholic Church in every part of the world means to be (as the Hindu
temple means to be) not a meeting house for worshippers but a place
where, in a particular sense, God dwells. The heart of Catholicism
for its most spiritual children is its belief in the peculiar presence
of God within the Sacrament; and it is this that makes the Catholic
church building mean so much more to the good Catholic than the
Protestant meeting house can ever mean to anyone.
	 The subjective
,
effect of the objective methods used by the Catholic Church is very
considerable. 5
The Catholic Church in Korea supports Pratt's argument. After
waves of repression the church finally won legal protection in 1886
as a consequence of Korea's treaty with France, which guaranteed the
safety of Catholic converts.
	 French missionaries began their work by
constructing some conspicuous church buildings.
	 The following
description is interesting:
The Catholics made conspicuous changes in the
skyline of Sul by erecting major churches at Yak-
hyon and in MyOng-dong. St. Joseph's Church at
Yak-hyOn was the first brick building in Korea.
The Cathedral in MyOng-dong, today the mother
church of Korean Catholicism, designed by
Frenchmen and built under the supervision of
Chinese contractors, was consecrated in 1898.
Some Koreans grumbled that the building's height -
the steeple was 69 metres high - violated
conventions forbidding construction of anything
which could overlook the royal palace; but the
king let it stand, partly because in the volatile
international atmosphere of Korifa he thought it
best not to alienate the French.
Similarly, we can also note the fact that from 1912 to 1918 the
Japanese government had saved money for the purpose of establishing a
National Shrine on Namsan, a hill overlooking the City of SOul, and
between 1918 and 1925, for eight years, they spent 1,570,000 yen to
build the Central Shrine of Chosen on Namsan. 7
	In this context, with
regard to the practical expression of religious experience, as Wach
.._
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points out, both Roman Catholic systems of divination and Japanese
Shintoism commonly have the performance of cultic acts as part of a
comprehensive system of interpretation of the cosmos, of the will of
the deity. 8
	Here, as for worship, we can assume that there is a
similarity between Roman Catholicism and Japanese Shintoism.
	 This
matter will be explained further afterwards.
On the side of theoretical expressions of religious experience,
Roman Catholicism meets all theological requirements of 'the
fundamentalists' minimum five-point definition. 9
 On most theological
issues the Roman Catholics consistently resemble the conservatives. 10
As Moberg stresses, the chief difference is that the ultimate
authority is not an infallible Bible but an infallible Church. 11
Revelation as interpreted by the Church hierarchy and tradition rather
he
than empirical rationalism is to Catholic the basic source of truth.
Contemporary modernism in Catholicism sprang up at the same time
as it did in Protestantism and for basically the same reasons. The
centralised organisation of the Church, however, made it simple to
compel modernists either to conform to its teachings or to leave the
Church. The Encyclical Pascendi Gregis in 1907 by Pope Pius X brought
an end to modernism's development in the official Catholic press and
pulpits. 12
Modernists in Catholicism have been less likely to leave their
Church than those in Protestantism. 13
 The emotional effects of mystic
ecstasy, the subjective effect of the objective methods, come to the
Catholic modernist in the religious ritual which centres on the Mass,
even if he no longer believes in the truth of the articles of faith.
Ritual is, for the Catholic, a conservative force that binds him so
firmly to a system that the appeal of reason is of no avail in his
efforts to break his church bonds.
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In the case of Korean Catholicism, the theology was not so much
"Korean" as European.
	 It was formed first indirectly through the
theological and devotional works written by the Jesuits in China,
later through the preaching and catechesis by French missionaries
during the persecution, and since 1886 also through the translations
from European theology and spirituality. 14
 The greater part of the
old Prayerbook as well as of hymnals, catechisms, and theological and
devotional literature read in the Korean Church have been in fact
direct translations from Europe and, as such, have
	 reflected the
outlook of pre-conciliar popular European Catholicism.
The early Church stressed only those aspects which were most
consoling and appealing to the psychology of a suffering and
persecuted Church. 15
 A consequence of the theology of "withdrawal"
from the world was the emphasis on solitude, contemplation, and the
abnegation of the flesh.
	 Given that Catholic behaviour is, to a
certain degree, determined by the specifically Catholic outlook on
life, of which theology is the conceptual expression, the theology of
"withdrawal" should be emphasised in the conformist attitude of Korean
Catholicism. The Catholic world-view or theology in the wide sense
will be considered closely later (D. "World View").
2, The Methodist Church
As for the expression of religious experience - doctrine, worship
and communion - the Methodist Church, in general terms, shows a
'moderate' (median) character.
The proclamation regarding the Unification and organisation of
the Korean Methodist Church declared:
	 "1. The evangelical faith
(which has been interpreted by Mr. Wesley in the Articles of Religion
and in his Sermons and Notes on the New Testament) is our heritage and
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our glorious possession;	 2. As with Mr. Wesley in the earliest
General Rules in the United States, the conditions of membership are
moral and spiritual rather than theological. We sanction the fullest
liberty as his character and his works approve themselves as
consistent with true godliness".1
Methodism places particular stress on personal religion and
social responsibility. 2
 Under the tradition of John Wesley who was
first of all the advocate of a 'practical' Christianity and was
antagonistic to a 'theological system', theological soundness is less
important than good conduct. 3
	Wesley was to be the mediator between
the "traditional" Protestantism of the Reformation which had
flourished in England during the seventeenth century and the "modern"
Arminian	 Protestantism which
	 had	 become	 characteristic	 of
Latitudinarian4
 Anglicanism. 5
 Wesley appealed to both the Puritan
sense of man's degenerate state as well as to the Arminian insistence
on personal responsibility, on free will and good works. Departing
from the determinism, the doctrine of predestination of Calvin
the 	 Arminians saw man as endowed with free will, capable of
choice and morally responsible for his conduct. The heart of the
Arminian doctrine, "conditional justification" - election is not
absolute but conditional - is contrasted with that of antimonianism, 6
which stresses justification by faith alone under the influence of the
Reformation Protestantism of Calvin and Luther.
And there are, in fact, important links between Wesleyan
Arminianism and Enlightenment liberalism. 7
	Wesley stood firmly in
the tradition of John Locke, the apostle of English liberalism. Thus
Wesley was distinctive in his theology (evangelical Arminianism), in
his flexibility (willingness to use laymen), and in his optimism
(Methodists unlike the Reformed Churches, refused to give way to
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religious community, and emotional fervour. Arminianism,10
apocalyptic speculations).
Within a generation Methodism became the largest American
denomination, due to the appeal of an Arminian theology whose
individualistic, democratic, and optimistic emphases found a positive
response in an expanding society where traditional patterns of
authority and deference were succumbing to egalitarian challenge. 8
This missionary optimism is the main reason why English Methodists in
the mass never surrendered to the millenarian speculations of the
Reformed Churches. 9
The cohesive features of Methodists were its Evangelical
Arminianism, itinerant ministry, connectional structure, sense of
itinerancy, connectionalism and piety made up Methodism. As a result,
intricate theological disputes troubled Methodism a good deal less
than the more cerebral Puritanism of the seventeenth century.
The fundamentalist-modernist controversy generally did not create
much furor within Methodism. 11 Reasons for this seem to give
important clues to the understandign of the conformist attitude on
the part of the Methodists regarding the Shint6 shrine observance.
According to Donald Burton Meyer, "Theologically, the principle of the
personal experience of the individual as the only test of faith left
Methodism open on the one hand to dilution of its testimony, depriving
it of a clear tradition of witness, while on the other hand left it,
of all the major denominations, least susceptible to the polarisation
of the fundamentalist-modernist controversy , . 12
Given that all the Christians who resolutely resisted against
shrine worship in Korea and Japan were religious fundamentalists in
their theology, we can regard the Methodists' moderate (mediating)
character of religious thinking, represented by Wesleyan Evangelical
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Arminianism, as the germ of the
	 Korean Methodist Church's
accommodation in the 1930s.
Moreover, we should note that the period of 1919-1934 (after
World War I) signifies the dominance of evangelical liberalism
throughout the United States, and the Methodist theological seminaries
in America, at least in the North, unlike the Presbyterian theological
seminaries, were for the most part dominated by the 'liberal'
spirit. 13
 Here and there a conservative voice was heard and respected
because of its quality, but for the most part the Methodists' mood was
'liberal'. So Gerald Kennedy, the editor of The History of American
Methodism, says, "There was a tendency to adjust our religious
thinking to the spirit of the age n . 14
	In evangelical liberalism,
creedal affirmations and doctrinal formulations, including biblical
statements, were acknowledged to be but human interpretations of
religious experiences and thus subject to continual restatement. 15
The credo of evangelical liberalism envisaged
	 less emphasis upon
ecclesiology and displayed a lack of interest in the question of the
sacraments and worship.
The members of the episcopacy in the United States generally
reflected the prevailing mood of liberalism of the time. 16
	In
Southern Methodism, Bishop John Monroe Moore indicated his allegiance
to and dependence upon liberal theologians.
	 Bishop Edwin Du Bose
Mouzon cautiously placed himself - and Methodism - as 'mediating'
between the fundamentalists and the modernists, favouring the latter
and their living dynamic theology.
It was a fact, in this context, that the liberal Methodists, in
contrast with the extreme conservatives (mostly Presbyterians),
generally did not see a great harm in the Shintii shrine worship in the
1930s.	 This can be partially explained by the credo of liberalism
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itself which had less emphasis upon 'ecclesiology' and a lack of
interest in the question of the 'sacraments and worship'.
3. The Presbyterian Church
On the matter of religious experience, the Presbyterian Church in
Korea was and is very conservative in theology. When the Japanese
began to put political pressure on the American missionaries over the
question of Shinta shrine worship, the stand of the Presbyterian
Mission was particularly strong, and this led to the closing of the
mission school by 1938. Similarly, after the Korean Presbyterian
General Assembly's unavoidable decision of participation in the Shinto
ceremonies in 1938, unlike the Methodists and the Roman Catholics,
resisting individual Presbyterians, known as the Non-Shrine Worship
Movement (SPU), visited Christian church groups and individual
Christians throughout the peninsula to strengthen them against shrine
worship. 1
It is widely agreed that most of the early Presbyterian
missionaries were, on the whole, strict fundamentalists. 2
 And, since
subsequent theological education was almost solely in the hands of the
missionaries, strict fundamentalism was the pattern taught to Korean
converts. The method of theological education was a kind of
indoctrination of certain fundamental creeds, with no room for
objective criticism. This kind of approach, to a certain extent,
brought satisfaction to the Korean people during the colonial period,
since they had little opportunity to participate in their national or
cultural life. Thus any theology other than fundamentalism was
carefully suppressed by an incessantly growing ecclesiastical
hierarchy within the Presbyterian Church.
Fundamentalism, generally, can be defined as follows:
	 (1) the
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infallibility and inerrancy of the Scriptures;
	 (2) the Trinity,
including the Virgin birth and deity of Jesus Christ; (3) the fall of
Adam and the need for personal regeneration based on the
substitutionary atonement of Christ; (4) the bodily resurrection of
Christ and his ascension;
	 (5) the personal and imminent return of
Christ; (6) the everlasting bliss of the righteous dead after their
resurrection, and the everlasting and conscious torment of the
unbelieving following the final judgement. 3
Some men and groups, of whom J. Gresham Machen and Westminster
Theological Seminary are examples, who have been identified popularly
with Fundamentalism, have vigorously denied kinship.
	 Yet it is
undeniable that many who deny kinship with Fundamentalism hold similar
theological viewpoints but are demarcated by sociological differences,
primarily concerning standards of Christian conduct.
In Korean Presbyterianism we can recognise the emphasis of some
theological features drawn from strict fundamentalism:
	 Moody's
Revivalism and pietism, biblical literalism and eschatological
thinking. 4
 Furthermore, Korean Presbyterian churches seem to have
some common emphases in their missions: 1) the tradition of solid,
careful, biblical preaching; 2) a belief in the value of education
for its own sake but also as a means for the inclusion of the gospel;
3) a strong church sense. 5
 Thus John C. Smith, a missionary of the
Northern Presbyterian Mission, depicts three major features of the
Presbyterian Church in Korea; 1) the concentration of missionaries of
one theological emphasis, that is, a 'conservative' one;
	 2) the
Church in Korea is a Church which studies the Bible; and 3) the Church
of Korea has also demonstrated once again that there is an 'extreme
fundamentalism' which rates 'orthodoxy above ethics '.6
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Here we should remember the fact that stubborn Presbyterians
refused to follow the order of Shint6 shrine worship on 'religious'
grounds.
	 According to J. Wach, we can distinguish between the
theoretical expression of religious experience, i.e., doctrine, and
the practical expression of religious experience, i.e., worship or
cults.	 When applying this to the Presbyterians' case of shrine
Shinta, we can say that
	 the orthodox Presbyterians would not
accommodate themselves in the domain of content of 'doctrine' because
of their Reformed belief in a theology based on the Word of God or the
Presbyterian tradition, which pays special attention to Scripture. 7
Historically their particular emphasis on doctrinal orthodoxy has been
exhibited in their successive schisms over doctrine in the Korean
Presbyterian churches (See Table 6). 8
C. Church Structure
1. The Catholic Church
On its church structure side, the Roman Catholic church offers us
an example of a perfectly hierarchical religious society. 1
	In
contrast to the Protestant understanding of authority, which is
indeed 'hazy', the Roman Catholic position has the virtue of being
'unambiguous' and 'clear-cut'. 2
 The Catholic church is, in fact, one
of the few world-wide hierarchical organisations which have effective
power. Max Weber ranked the Catholic Church among those "distinctly
developed and quantitatively large bureaucracies" . 3
 It rests entirely
on the hierarchy, the sole dispenser of the sacraments which guarantee
salvation. For a Catholic, the church is first of all the Roman See,
whence emanates all initiative.
	 In this society, it is certainly
not impossible for initiatives to come from the base, but they must
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attain considerable magnitude before they can affect the decisions of
the Holy See, which alone can give them authority.
The Pope, elected for life by the Assembly of Cardinals, is the
supreme head of all the bishops, of all the clergy, and of all the
faithful. As the visible representative of Christ and holding his
power only from God, the Pope has a power of absolute jurisdiction in
questions of doctrine and of morals, and generally in whatever touches
the lives of the faithful and of the parishes. To be sure, these
monarchical powers do not mean that the Pope absorbs all the
functions. The Episcopal organisation is the essential relay system
of pontifical authority, with the bishops acting only under the
authority of the Sovereign Pontiff. 4
 Within their dioceses, however,
all secondary powers have been left open to the course of evolution.
Theoretically, the powers of the bishop are considerable; in fact,
however, these powers are very restricted. Within this Roman Catholic
tradition, therefore, most pronouncements of the Pope and of the
hierarchy have always tended to be understood by the laity as
authoritative statements of the interpretation of divine truth.
Although in the teaching of the Roman Catholic Church a distinction is
made between statements of doctrine, which are infallible, and matters
of discipline, which may vary from time to time and from place to
place, in practice this distinction is not readily recognised by most
Catholics. 5
In 1831 the vicariate of Korea was separated from the diocese of
Pei-ching and entrusted to the Paris Foreign Mission Society, which
provided the nine bishops to 1942. 6
 Bishop A. Mute (1890-1933), who
succeeded F. Ridel and J. Blanc, became the first apostolic vicar of
Sgul in 1911, when Taegu was separated as a vicarate. On Bp. Andrian
Larribeau's resignation, Paul Ro, the first native Korean bishop, was
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made apostolic administrator (Jan. 8, 1942) and vicar (Nov. 10, 1942).
The Vatican appointed a Korean bishop in 1946. 7
Thus, at the turn of this century Catholic mission work was
carried on primarily under the auspices of the Paris Foreign Mission
Society (MEP), whose missioners, with emphasis on ecclesiastical
,institutionalism, managed the Catholic headquarters in Soul. 8
 The
Catholic Church, unlike the Protestants, operated hierarchically under
,
the direct authority of the pastor and bishop. Here we might expect
the early Korean Catholics to have carried over from their Confucian
and monarchical tradition a highly authoritarian view of God. From
the same source they could be expected to have inherited a tradition
which sacralised hierarchy and authority in social relationships. It
should be noted that, in this respect, when applied to the clergy this
authoritarian tendency would be reinforced by the central role played
by the priest in the Catholic communities during the persecutions
(1791-1866). 9 Thus wider ecclesial identity and sense of unity came
not from a regional or national council, but through the Holy See, as
the symbol of unity for the universal Church. In short, the structure
of the Catholic Church is tightly institutionalised and even
authoritarian.	 In this respect the Church of Korea was and is no
exception.
The major consequence of the fact that the Catholic Church has
had a teaching authority in morals that is foreign to Protestant
experience is a much greater diversity in the kinds of Protestant
ethics than in those of Roman Catholic moral theology. 10 Thus, when
the Church prescribes a well-defined direction, the faithful are
supposed to comply. While within Protestantism, which is on the whole
inclined to place stronger emphasis on the individual and on his
direct responsibility to God, whereby there are wide ranges of
- 250 -
difference in the evaluation of the role of the individual according
to the various conceptions held by the different denominational
communities, within Catholicism, which is marked by collectivism
mainly due to the authoritarian organisational structure, the social
and organic communion, and the integrating power of worship, there is
a uniform attitude. 11
Here it is important to point out that the Roman Instruction of
1936, which solved the "Shrine Issue" as far as the Roman Catholics in
the Japanese Empire were concernedogas not stringent obligations
emanating from the infallible Church magisterium;
	 moreover,
attendance at shrine worshipOlas not an obligation but a permission. 12
However, that the Catholics showed a uniform tendency to conform to
the instruction reflects their collectivism.
2. The Methodist Church
As regards church structure, the Methodist Church-, as a whole,
shows the episcopal type which is best represented by Anglicanism and,
with certain variations, by the Lutheran Church of Sweden. ' It is
important to stress in this context that John Wesley and George
Whitefield were English and their religious movement began as a part
of the established Church of England. 2
	In more concrete terms, with
its prime movers, John and Charles Wesley, who had had some
traditional link with the Church of England, Methodism, in contrast to
some sects, retained 'church-type' features from the beginning. 3
 Even
in the early Methodist Societies, though the emphasis lay on
individual conversion, the collectivist spirit was strong.
	 Since
1930-1940 (the decade of unification within British Methodism) the
Methodist Church of Great Britain has developed into a church-type. 4
Methodism owed much to the Anglican via media. 5
 Anglicanism and
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the Lutheran Church of Sweden refer to the idea of a hierarchy in
continuity with the apostles. For the Anglicans this succession has a
dogmatic value and assures the validity of sacramental acts; for the
Swedish, it is a historical fact without dogmatic significance. The
Church of England resembles the Roman Church in the sense that it is
theoretically a church directed by one sole hierarchy, under the
authority of two archbishops, one being primate.
	 Each province
contains an assembly which can make canonical decisions and which is
composed only of representatives of clergy. 6
As a matter of fact, while Anglicanism would come more in line
with Swedish Lutheranism, the Methodist form of churches has
maintained or restored the episcopacy constitution in less distinct
types of Episcopalianism. The Methodist Church attaches no doctrinal
significance to the episcopacy: the episcopacy is not a higher order
of the ministry but an office. 7
	The episcopacy is primarily a
structure which maintains the principle of autonomy in the church and
removes it from the movements of governments of assemblies. But it is
a fact that "the Methodist churches have tended to work on a highly
centralised system" ,8
	 therefore, by whatever name a Methodist
superintendent be called, he has always had the power (though this has
come to be greatly limited through the years) to station ministers in
Amer can
the respective charges. 	 Since the
A
 Methodist Church is an episcopal
form of government, the control of the Church rests in the hands of
the bishop, and it is clear that the leadership problem would be
settled only by the selection of a bishop.
As regards the church structure, in organising the autonomous
Korean Methodist Church in 1930, Korean Methodist Christians carefully
tried to avoid the autocratic methods of government. 10
	In keeping
with this democratic trend they adopted the term episcopacy, election
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of district superintendents, inclusion of laymen in the annual
conference and on the committee of appointments, and other changes
from traditional Methodist polity.
However, Richard T. Baker, a Methodist missionary in Korea,
stresses	 that "the Methodist connection, with its episcopal polity
was seized upon by the Japanese police for control through its top-
down organisational structure". h1
	
Here, in addition to its episcopal
polity, we should not miss the fact that especially the leaders of
Korean Methodists presented a sad record of defection. This problem
will be examined further afterwards.	 (H. "Early Historical
Experience").
In fact, all the democracy was set aside by 'the adoption of the
new constitution ,12 under police pressure in March 1941. The head of
the church became a dictator and the independent Korean Methodist
Church went into eclipse. Methodists were regimented under a t'ong-
ni-sa or director-general, selected by the police for a term of four
years. This director-general selected all district supervisors, the
members of all central committees. He could dismiss pastors, suspend
them from appointment, or cancel their ministerial qualifications at
will.	 The annual conferences were dissolved.
	
That mass arrests
during World War II were less among the Methodists than among other
denominations showed the fact that the Methodist church was fully
under control. 13 By contrast, in the spring of 1942 many Presbyterian
ministers were imprisoned, some forced to resign.
3. The Presbyterian Church
As regards church structure, the Presbyterian synodal type,
generally of Reformed tradition, is characterised by the fact that the
organisation is constituted by
• 
a hierarchy of assemblies and councils,
- 253 -
which rests on the base of the parish, the basic cell of the church.
1
The parish is administered by a Presbyterian council which often has
the prerogative at least of choosing the pastor and recommending his
nomination. Above the parish there are elected national and regional
consistorial assemblies, composed of both laymen and clergy.
Generally, the Presbyterian polity has been called democratic and
anti-episcopalian:	 democratic in the sense that it rests on the
people, the members of the parishes; anti-episcopalian in the sense
that the presidents of the various executive councils are elected for
terms, and are presidents only in their councils, hence they do not
have an intrinsic authority.
According to Moberg, the Presbyterian Church is an example of
'Presbyterian' polity. Presbyterian polity is dominated in theory by
the constituent church bodies, but in fact by the clergy who control
the denomination's synods or presbyteries and comprise a hierarchy of
ecclesiastical oligarchs. 2	Elders in the local church tend to
exercise a similar aristocratic type of control. In Moberg's view, in
the Presbyterian Church, authority flows out from the middle level of
elders and presbyters (ministers) to both the lower level of the local
church and the higher level of the denomination. 3
In the case of the Presbyterian church polity in Korea, the
Presbytery adopted the Presbyterian form, which provides three courts;
an individual church is governed by the session, which is composed of
the minister and the elders elected by the members of the church; the
Presbytery is a higher court composed of the ministers and elders from
sessions within a defined district; while the General Assembly, the
highest court in the Presbyterian Church, is composed of ministers and
elders elected by the Presbytery. 4 With regard to the relationship of
the foreign missionaries to the Korean Church, the form of government
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provided that:
Ordained foreign missionaries working in
connection with the Presbyterian Church of Korea
shall be members of the Presbytery and of the
General Assembly, but, in respect to discipline
and appointment by the parent Churches and their
Missions, shall remain under the parent Churches
by whom they were commissioned. Their connection
as full members shall cease when by a two-thirds
vote of their number, they think it wise to
withdraw, at which time the Supreme Court shp
determine their relation to it as may seem best.
It should be noted in this context that, in the 1930s, unlike
Methodist missionaries who had already lost their control over the
Korean Methodist Church and mission schools, Presbyterian missionaries
were not only voicing their opinion in educational work, but also in
church circles. 6 In 1938, the Presbyterian General Assembly meeting
in P'yOngyang was so under the control of the police that it approved
attendance at the shrine unanimously.
	 But this did not prevent some
eight or ten missionaries from very briefly stating their opposition
to the measure. A serious rift opened between the Korean church and
the missionaries. 7 The missionaries denounced the assembly for its
action and, as legal owners of the mission schools, voted to close the
schools rather than allow their students to participate in Shint5
rituals.	 This exemplifies the strong authority of missionaries
regarding government of the Korean Presbyterian Church in 1938.
Moreover, the missionaries took the lead in the Non-Shrine Worship
Movement afterwards. 8 Seven of the 60 leaders of the SPU were
missionaries. B.F. Hunt was assigned to be the leader of the Movement
in Manchuria. In brief, the fact that ordained foreign missionaries
in the Presbyterian Church of Korea still retained membership of the
Presbytery and of the General Assembly at the critical time of 1938
should be considered in the discussion of the different positions
between the Methodist and the Presbyterian Church with regard to the
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Shint45 Shrine Issue.
As regards the Presbyterian polity, two other points can be
pointed out. Given that the individual church (parish) is the basic
cell of the Presbyterian Church and the Church rests on the members of
the individual church, we can assume that the decision of the General
Assembly, the highest court, is not as influential as in the case of
the Methodist Church. Here we can recall the fact that, after the
approval of the General Assembly of 1938, Presbyterian ministers and
laymen opposed the action of the General Assembly and, finally, under
the leadership of the Rev. Chu Ki-ch'ed, launched the Non-Shrine
Worship Movement independently.
In similar vein, unlike the episcopal polity which had the top-
down organisational structure, the local presbyteries of the
Presbyterian Church in Korea, with a looser democratic organisation,
were not so easily controlled by the Japanese police. 9 For example,
in 1938, while 17 Presbyteries, including the biggest P'yiingbuk
Presbytery, were controlled by the police, six Presbyteries did not
submit to the government on the matter of the shrine worship.
D. World View
1. The Catholic Church
As for the attitude towards 'the world' in general, that is, the
world view, the outlook of the Korean Catholic Church from the
persecution period up to the eve of Vatican II (1962) was extremely
homogeneous.
1
 The Four Great Persecutions took place in 1801, 1839,
1846, and 1866, whereby Catholic scholars - the initial converts -
invariably gave up their rank and assumed humble trades, especially
that of potter, in remote villages. 	 During the long persecutions,
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Korean Catholics had withdrawn into scattered rural ghettos, far from
the mainstream of the nation's life. 2
Given that religious experience itself stimulates the development
of characteristic attitudes towards the world in general and towards
society in particular, to clarify the world view of the Korean Church
in the 1930s requires an examination of the major themes and
tendencies of the official Catholic prayerbook, SCInggyo Konggwa (The
Prayerbook of the Holy Church). 3
 Between 1886 (the French treaty) and
1968 (the year of publication of the new prayerbook, SOnggyo Konggwa)
the prayerbook went through at least 40 printings and served as the
spiritual guidebook of nearly every Korean Catholic of that period.
It should be noted that little evolution took place in the text
between 1886 and 1966.
The prayerbook was by no means unorthodox, and parallels to it
could easily be found in Europe and America during the 19th century. 4
In the prayerbook God is seen as an absolute monarch whose main
interest is to preserve his own power. The violation of the least
prescription of the complex legal system God has 'imposed' on man
seems to be interpreted as a slight to his royal dignity, demanding
severe and exact punishment. Certainly, Korean Catholics had ample
experience of earthly kings and yangban who inflicted severe
punishments precisely because they saw their power threatened. With
this the Confucian background of the Church's founders should be borne
in mind. The extension of this to their idea of God was the most
natural thing for simple people with limited sources of information
about their religion. In this respect it is noteworthy that, although
the initial converts were scholars, this situation changed as
Catholics fled to rural villages. Many later converts came from low
social origins and included numerous widows, orphans, and outcasts.
,
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Catholicism remained a religion of farmers and potters. 5
In addition, throughout the prayerbook the virtues most
emphasised are those of 'conformity', such as obedience, humility, and
filial piety, and those of 'withdrawal', such as virginity and
silence. 6
 The emphasis on conformity, it seems clear, is in accord
with the monarchical conception of God and the hierarchical conception
of the Church, while the emphasis on withdrawal is the logical
,
corollary of the negative conception of the world.
	 The negative
attitude towards the world and great stress on eschatology in the
Korean Catholic Church emerged from the persecution period.
	 The
present study will deal with this point later. (H. "Early Historical
Experience").
	 Signally absent is the balancing reference to the
virtues of 'freedom' and 'involvement', i.e., the virtues required for
the exercise of independent rational judgement, responsible freedom,
courage to challenge social injustice, etc.
It was this interpretation of Catholicism, then, that was
presented to Korean Catholics for their belief and practice during the
formative years of the Korean Church. For the most part, of course,
it was not Korean but was, in fact, a distilled and selected version
of the popular theology current in Europe during the 18th and 19th
centuries. Much of it was, in fact, written by European missionaries,
starting with the Jesuit pioneers in China.
	 We must examine the
religious environment in which the European expressions of Catholicism
took root, the pre-existing framework of religious world views which
determined Korean's basic religious values. 7
It is important to stress in the present context that Roman
Catholic missionaries in Korea before 1911 (a German mission was
founded in that year) all came from France. 8
 At the turn of the 20th
century, the French MEP enjoyed a complete monopoly of Catholic
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missionary work. 9
	Thus we can assume that it was the French
Catholics' religious world views which, to a great extent, determined
Korean's basic religious values. The French missionaries in the Far
East were innately conservative and unwilling to pioneer in the manner
that their Jesuit forebears had done. 10
 Their conservatism resulted
not only from the theology of culture but also from the position in
which Catholics found themselves in French society at that time.
The Catholic view of culture, traditionally enunciated by Saint
Thomas Aquinas, assisted in the dual approach. 11
 It consisted of a
twofold view of the world, in which nature and grace, reason and
revelation, the world and the Church, each stood in hierarchical
relation to the other. The two areas were autonomous and separate,
but did not oppose each other.
	 So, as for the attitude towards
government, from the New Testament onwards, the Catholic Church has
upheld a high conjection of the right of governments to be obeyed, and
sees civil society as ordained by God as the natural framework of
human life. 12
 The Church recognises that civil society exists in its
own right, and that those who come to hold authority are themselves
the judges of what policies they will pursue; "The Catholic Church
strives always to render unto government the things that are
governments'''.
13
. The Church is exceedingly slow and reluctant to say
anything which could trouble the minds of the faithful about their
duty as citizens, or about indicating to individuals that they should
refuse to obey a command of their government. 14
As for the posture of Catholics in post-revolutionary France,
French Catholics first supported the revolution of 1848 but later,
terrified by the socialism of its leaders, they became overnight the
conservative party and supported the counter-revolutionary coup of
Louis Napoleon. 15
 During the Third Republic the Roman Catholic party
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was mainly 'monarchist'. Their political views moved steadily to the
right. 16
The French MEP in the Far East had the same close ties with
government and the armed forces that Catholics maintained at home. So
L.G. Paik, an authority on the history of missions in Korea, wrote:
"As in Vietnam, Korea saw the French missionaries as the forerunners
of French imperialism and the priests as the pilots of the gun
boat". 17 Because they identified with their government, they were
accustomed to deal directly with governments.
Under the supervision of the conservative French fathers, the
Roman Catholics in Korea, unlike the Presbyterians, lacked as much
strength to confront the government, and therefore
	 had fewer
conflicts with the Japanese administration. 18 The following report by
one officer of the Government General of ChUsen supports this:
Scarcely a single Korean follower of the Roman
Catholic mission, the English Church, the
Salvation Army and certain other denominations was
arrested or imprisoned, for the simple reason that
members of these missions stood aloof from
politics and19
 took no part whatever in the
disturbances.
In sum, as far as Korean Catholics' world view during the
formative years is concerned, passivity and obedience to authority,
already "virtues" highly valued in the post-reformation Catholicism
brought from Europe, especially France, were reinforced by an almost
identical emphasis in Confucianism.
2. The Methodist Church
The dominant theme of the Methodist world view was 'evangelical
pietism', an attitude at once complex and contradictory. 1 In order to
understand Methodist political attitudes, it is necessary to examine
evangelical pietism as the moral structure of Methodist politics. The
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constant element in the attitude of Methodists, who followed a more
humanistic or Arminian tradition, was the attempt to define the issue
of secular politics, particularly power politics, in 'moral' terms. 2
This attempt could be termed 'evangelical pietism'. 3
 In terms of this
pietist viewpoint, all secular conflicts over matters of power are
treated as epiphenomena of basic moral issues emanating from the
character of men as individuals.
Historically, the position of medieval Christianity in relation
to the state as a whole shifted its centre of gravity from a complete
abomination of the existing Roman Empire to complete indifference to
the state, and hence passive sufferance of the use of force, which was
deemed to be unrighteous in every case. 4
 For the latter position,
this entailed active compliance with all the coercive obligations
imposed by the state, e.g., the payment of taxes which did not
directly imperil religious salvation. In Max Weber's view, the true
intent of the New Testament verse about "rendering unto Caesar the
things which are Caesar's" (Romans 13:1) is not the meaning deduced by
modern harmonising interpretations, namely, a positive recognition of
the obligation to pay taxes, but rather the reverse;
	 an absolute
indifference to all the affairs of the mundane world.
Two other viewpoints were possible: One entailed withdrawal from
concrete activities of the political community, because and insofar as
such participation necessarily led to sin, and the other position
evaluated the authority of the state, even when exercised by
unbelievers, due to our responsible sins, as an indispensable
instrument for the social control of reprehensible sins and as a
general condition for all mundane existence pleasing to God. 5
Of these four points of view, according to Weber, the first two
mentioned belong primarily to the period of eschatological
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expectation, but occasionally they came to the fore even in a later
period.
	 As far as the last of the four is concerned, ancient
Christianity did not really go beyond it in principle, even after it
had been recognised as the state religion.
In this respect, it should be pointed out that the 'general'
schema according to which Christianity customarily solves the problem
of the tension between Christian values (religious ethics) and secular
politics (the non-ethical or unethical requirements of life) is to
'relativise' and 'differentiate' ethics into an organic ethic of
vocation and a contrasting ascetic ethic. 6
	Thus, historically,
'evangelical pietism', under the influence of the last of the four
positions - here used loosely to denote an ascetic movement of inner
spiritual conviction which swept over Europe and America during the
eighteenth century7
 - attempted first of all , to change the world by
converting individuals within it, but it also maintained the world by
giving tacit or open support to legitimate politics.
	 Secondly, it
compartmentalised religion and politics, while occasionally lending
support to moral campaigns whose aim was to clean up political life. 8
Korean Methodism has shown the same features of evangelical
pietism: firstly, it is widely agreed that evangelism has been and is
notably successful in the Methodist churches. 9
	As far as we can
trace the origin of the revival, the evangelistic movement in Korean
mission history was begun in 1903 by a group of missionaries of the
Methodist Mission. 10
	
American Methodist missionaries of Puritanic
zeal and Wesleyan fervour felt keenly the estrangement between the
Japanese and Korean people, which seemed to presage a general
uprising. There was every reason for the pietistic missionaries to
avoid such an occurrence.
	 In L.G. Paik's view, "they not only
understood the hopelessness of fighting for the lost cause but foresaw
M1'
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the danger of making the younger Christian Church a political
agency 
11
In this context, it is widely admitted that missionaries were
successful in 'de-politicising' the Korean Christians through mass
revival meetings. 12 Missionaries were against the participation of
Korean Christians or churches in the political (anti-Japanese)
movement.	 In fact, they endeavoured to thwart such anti-Japan
struggles, which were mostly led by enlightened Christians by all
available means. 13	Thus the policy of non-involvement towards
Korea's internal politics initially contributed to friendly and even
cordial relations with the colonial government; 	 the missionaries
merely accepted the Japanese administration as the powers that be.
Secondly, as regards the principle of separation between religion
and politics, most leading missionaries of the Methodist Church,
supporting this principle avowedly under the tradition which usually
compartmentalises religion and politics, made every effort to support
evangelism and moral campaigns. 14
According to Bryan S. Turner and Michael Hill, in evangelical
pietism, once simple withdrawal from overt support for and interest in
secular politics becomes impracticable, then two reactions become
possible:	 support for existing governments or an attempted moral
coup.
15
	When applying this to the Korean Methodist case of the
Shinto Shrine issue, we can safely say that, among other Christian
denominations, the pietistic Methodist Church and Christians,
especially their missionary and native leaders, preponderantly
the
supported forisJapanese government, and at the same time launched the
Evangelistic Campaign in the 1930s.
	
For example, M.B. Stokes, a
leading Methodist missionary contributed an article "Personal
Evangelism and the Korean Church" in The Korean Mission Field 
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(December, 1932). Attacking the forces of materialism and atheism,
he advocated:
Efficient preaching of the Gospel to individuals
is most urgent ... How can we stir up in the
Korean Church the spirit of evangelism again?
This is our problem, the problem of the missionary
as well as of the Korean leader. I am whole-
heartedly behind the present plan for the
Evangelistic Campaign in Korea ... We need a fresh
Pentecost in Korea today.
	
Again she must go
through the purifying fire of the Holy Ghost. i6
,
In brief, the pietistic Methodist Church, with the principle of
separation between religion and politics, stressed spiritual questions
and tended to avoid conflict over temporal issues. 	 The pietists
thought that "no human action can accelerate the coming of the
kingdom, but man should prepare himself for its coming n . 17 They
placed the emphasis upon religious sentiment. In the community of the
pietists, one attitude towards the world is apparent: 	 "the
recognition of the tremendous importance of charismatic gifts of the
spirit". 18 The world will remain as it is until the Master comes
again. Thus the individual is required to abide in his position and
in his calling, subordinated to the ruling authority.
3. The Presbyterian Church
In the sphere of world view in relation to the state, the
Presbyterian Church in Korea, under the influence of strong
Calvinistic tradition, showed a somewhat 'radical' aspect. When the
contents of the confession of faith that the new church adopted at its
first session in 1907, the confession was borrowed from the
Presbyterian Church of India, with the exception of the example. 1
The new church adopted the Westminster Confession of Faith and the
Larger and Shorter Catechism as worthy exponents of the Word of God.
The new church also adopted the Westminster Shorter Catechism. The
-
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Confession itself consisted of 12 articles of strong Calvinistic
trend. It affirmed the sovereignty of God, the deity, procession of
the Holy Spirit, the predestination of men, the irresistibility of
grace, a belief in sacraments, bodily resurrection, and final
judgement.
	 By adopting this Confession, a formula of belief was
legislated for the people and given them in a finished form without
waiting for an expression of growing Christian experience. Thus, here
we can affirm that the new church was in the prevalence of a strong
Calvinistic tradition in which the Reformed faith was motivated and
informed by central attention to Scripture.
As regards political spirit, the two Confessions - Lutheranism
and Calvinism - differ fundamentally. 2
	Lutheranism, in its
conception of the Law of Nature, is thoroughly conservative; and in
its complete confidence in God's providence it regards the powers
called into being in the natural course of things as ipso facto
instituted by God and commissioned to be the protectors of the
justitia civilis. Lutheranism is thus far politically favourable to
absolutism, but, on the whole, is essentially conservative and
politically neutral.
	 Quite different was the development of the
political spirit of Calvinism. 	 Generally speaking, its state-
adaptation of the Law of Nature is at bottom also conservative; it
prefers a modified aristocracy, as is not surprising in view of its
original connection with the Genevan republic, and the prominence
which it gives to the aristocratic idea of predestination. But in its
great struggles with the Catholic governments which proscribed the
pure word of God, that is to say, the Huguenot, Netherlandish,
Scottish, and English struggles.
	 In Ernest Troeltsch's view,
"Calvinism gave a much more radical development to its Law of Nature.
It successfully established the principle of resistance, which must be
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exercised on behalf of the Word of God in the face of ungodly
authorities". 3
	The individual is required to resist the ruling
authority, "where it commands him to perpetrate a sinful deed". 4
When applying this principle of resistance to the Presbyterian
martyr's case when faced by the demand of Japanese shrine worship, the
faithful could not but resist the ungodly authority and its crude
religio-nationalism.	 In this respect, Lee Kun Sam, using the
Protocols on the martyrs, pointed out appropriately the major motives
for the Christian resistance (mostly Presbyterians) in Korea, which
have been widely accepted: a) Obedience to the Commandments of God
and Love for the Church; b) Eschatological Expectation and Personal
Commitment to Christ's Kingship; c) Uncompromising Witness to Divine
Truth and Christian Responsibility to the Church and State; d) The
High Estimate of Martyrdom and the Glory of God. 5
In order to understand the motives fully, however, we should
possess	 some *knowledge	 of	 the Korean church's	 'futuristic
dispensation alism' in connection with 'syncretism'.
	
Generally,
dispensationalists seek to understand God's dealings with man in terms
of 'them'. 6 All of them believe that we now live in a time before the
tribulation which will precede the end of this world and before the
millennium (Christ's reign of 1,000 years); and that the 'rapture' of
the church, when Christ will take all its members into heaven, will
occur without warning and without the knowledge of the world. The
viewpoint holds to the consistent use of normal, plain or literal
interpretation of Scripture.
It shOuld be pointed out in this context that historically the
Bible had a special place with the 'mass' of Korean Christians,
especially Presbyterians. 7
 We can assume that they liked the Bible
much better than the rigid doctrines developed in and for the West.
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With this J.S. Gale, a Presbyterian missionary, made an interesting
thesis:
The Oriental mind, whether possessed by literati,
or coolie, is cast in the same mind.
	
They all
think alike in figures, symbols, pictures.
	 For
this reason, I believe that allegory and
suggegtive literature have a special place with
them.
If we accept that "in mission countries the syntheses or rather
simple amalgamations between the elementary forms of paganism and a
poorly assimilated Christianity should be born so easily" , 9
 then, it
is not a surprising fact that one of the greatest stamps of any formal
dispensational theological influence came in the early Korean church's
concept of the Kingdom of God and in its adherence to the more
simplistic rules of interpretation used by the system. 10 As a result
of 'superficial Christianisation' (Mehl's terms), the dispensational
principle of exact literal interpretation and exact literal fulfilment
of all prophetic promises would fit in very well in a church just
discovering the Bible .
 for the first time, a church ill-equipped to
employ the resources of history, language and theology in the study of
Scripture. 11
In this respect, the members of the Mount Zion sect (1944), the
extremely pietistic, premillenarian (Adventist) sect drawn from the
Northern Presbyterian Church, which showed the last, strongest
resistance to the Japanese shrine demand in all Korea, seem to
represent the futuristic dispensational approach properly.
	
They,
believing the Second Advent imminent on the basis of allegorical and
dispensational interpretations especially of Daniel (0.T.) and the
Revelation (N.T.), took their sons out of schools rather than have
them receive a 'Babylonian education'.
	 And furthermore, regarding
World War II as the 'Armageddon' (Rev. 16:16), they prayed publicly for
an Allied victory. 12
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Generally, the purely religious interest is dominant in only a
small minority of persons. 13
 In this sense the resisting individual
missionaries, the SPU and the Zion Sect in the Presbyterian Church
were good examples of the influence of purely religious ideas. They
reflected to a large extent the teaching of Jesus in the New Testament
regarding the attitudes towards power.
In Weber's view, Jesus held in general that what is most decisive
for salvation is an absolute indifference to the world and its
concerns. The kingdom of heaven is at hand; let man give the Caesar
that which is Caesar's own - for what profit is there in such matters?
The individual is required to abide in his position, subordinated to
the ruling authority, save where it commands him to perpetrate a
sinful deed. 14
From the foregoing attitude, only now can we understand that all
the members of the SPU and the Zion Sect had admitted themselves to be
subjects of the Japanese Empire, • or subordinated to the ruling
authority, but after 1938, when the Japanese authority commanded the
Presbyterian Church to commit a sinful deed, i.e., shrine worship,
they rose up and began to attack the legitimacy of State Shintoism on
religious grounds rather than political grounds.
In the circles of Presbyterian missionaries, as a whole, Romans
13:1 was interpreted literally.	 This was clearly stated by the
American board of the Presbyterian mission, the largest and most
active missionary community in Korea:	 "Loyal recognition is, I
believe, the sound position. 	 It is in accord with the example of
Christ, who loyally submitted himself and advised His apostles to
submit themselves to a far worse government than the Japanese, and it
is in line with the teaching of Paul in Romans 13:1 ("Let every person
render obedience to the governing authorities;	 for there is no
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authority except for God, and those in authority are divinely
constituted-). 15 This sort of conservative Protestantism with regard
to power should be emphasised in interpretations on the major motives
for the individual missionaries, the SPU and the Zion Sect.
	 The
concern of Protestants to attack or to deny the legitimacy of absolute
power has in many circumstances encouraged them to withdraw from the
reality of power struggles. 	 Thus we would maintain that the Non-
Shrine Worship movement was a religious movement rather than a
nationalistic movement.
E. Mission Policy
1. The Catholic Church
In general terms, the weak points of the early mission activity in
the Roman Catholic Church were lack of adaptation, neglect in the
formation of a native clergy, and too close 'a bond between church and
state. With the emergence of Sacra Congregati3 de Propaganda Fide
(SCPF) in 1622, missionary control was centralised in Rome, thus
giving it a more international character. The 19th century witnessed a
gradual recovery of the missionary enterprise, now firmly supervised
by SCPF and zealously promoted by the Popes. Mission work achieved a
universal character. At the beginning of the 20th century missiology
began to receive attention in the Roman Catholic Church, thereby
accomplishing	 the acceleration of the process of adaptation.
'Accommodation' in Roman Catholic missionary societies means 'attempts
to adapt or assimilate the gospel easier for them' [the indigenous
population]. 1
 In this respect, the three decades which followed 1914
were halcyon ones for the spread and consolidation of the Roman
Catholic Church in non-Occidental lands. 2
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to a particular nation or cultural area. Compared with6
The first and most prominent aspect of mission policy we can find
•in the Catholic Church is its interest in the Church itself. A papal
policy has always had the interest of the church as its primary
objective. 3 Since the Roman Catholic bishopric of Rome traditionally
thinks that the whole of the Church's foreign missionary work is
clearly dependent upon the favour of secular Powers, the first purpose
of the diplomacy of the Holy See is 'to watch over the spiritual
Interests of the Church', and the many and varied activities involved
therein. 4 This means that the Holy See will attempt to secure as
favourable conditions as possible for the Catholic Church, as it
exists and works in different countries. Here we can comprehend its
'practical' position. This position can be very clearly illustrated
In the case of Poland:
Polish Catholics obey a Communist Government which
is unrepresentative, but always with reservations
of their own, seeking to maintain their rights as
Catholics, the right, for instance, to see that
their children inherit their religion, and are not
forcibly indoctrinated with Marxism, which is also
atheism, in the State schools. As the Church sees
It, individual Polish Catholics should follow the
leadership of the hierarchy, and the hierarchy
will act prudently, making a 'practical' judgement
about what is best in situations which are
changing all the time ... There is a willingness
on the part of the Church to tolerate acts of
economic policy which are offensive to Catholic
doctrine on property, if, in return, the Catholic
Poles are not molested in the exercise of their
religion. Provided acquiescence is never mis-
understood as approval, these are the ineNitable
compromises with anti-Catholic governments.
The Roman Catholic Church, based on a hierarchical structure, has
always been very well aware of the reality of power and in this sense
it has been far more 'realistic' in recent times than has
Protestantism, which is divided and its churches frequently confined
Protestantism, Roman Catholicism would appear to be relatively
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powerful.
The second significant characteristic of Catholic mission policy
is its worldwide policy of 	 'accommodation'. 7	The Church,
historically, has practised accommodation as a most important
missionary technique. The Church never set up a barrier against any
culture, against any legitimate custom or practice that had grown up
from the native soil. She was always at pains to adapt herself to the
particular genius of the nation she evangelised. But some Catholic
scholars proclaimed that "accommodation as sanctioned and practised by
the Church has nothing in common with syncretism", 8 or: "The Catholic
Church cannot accommodate herself in the domain of content of
doctrine". 9 In other words, they say, "Catholicism never fused with
pagan religions",	 "It never compromised with polytheism, never
surrendered any of its dogmatic and moral teachings", "The Church is
neither indulgent nor indifferent to pagan beliefs", and so on. In
spite of these complicated apologetics, it is an undeniable fact that
the Church in her endeavour to spread the kingdom of Christ has always
practised 'accommodation' as an important strategy.
In this respect it is sufficient to point out that
'accommodation' is the technical term used especially in Roman
Catholic missionary circles. 10	As a supporting example of the
Church's accommodational character, we can stress the difference in
mission policies on aboriginal customs between the Catholics and
Protestants (especially Presbyterians). According to D.E. Walker's
study on Nez Perce Acculturation (a northwestern North American
Plateau Indian culture) (1968), Catholic policy on aboriginal customs
differed markedly from that of the Presbyterians. While Presbyterians
emphasised a complete break with past customs, e•g • , aboriginal
ceremonials composed of shamanism, tutelary spirits and sorcery, and
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banned not only all that was non-Christian, but most that was
obviously non-Euro-American, Catholic missionaries, showing a much
greater tendency to retain an active approving interest in past
customs, introduced very few organisational changes that affected
everyday life, and in general emphasised a continuity with the Nez
Perce past.
11
Incidentally, the 'universal' ('Catholic') Church, considering
international politics because of the very interests of the Church,
often produces ecclesiastical accommodating policies which are carried
out on a 'worldwide' scale. 12 In this respect, by 1939, the Catholic
Church settled one of the most burning missionary problems in the Far
East:	 the permissibility of certain rites and ceremonies that are
connected with "ancestor worship", the cult of Confucius, and State
Shintoism. 13	According to the New Catholic Encyclopedia, five
discernible currents brought about a "revisionist" policy by the Holy
See: 1) the development of historical studies, through which modern
problems of ethnic adaptation were re-evaluated in the lightof
similar situations facing Christianity in the Greco-Roman world; 2) a
more ecumenical doctrine of grace and other spiritual forces latent in
non-Christian peoples, such as those of the ancient religions of the
East; 3) the rise of nationalisms in the East and their introduction
into the mainstream of international politics; 4) a secularising of
thought patterns; 	 5) formal declarations by high government
representatives that state-prescribed acts of reverence, whatever
their primitive origin and meaning, express today nothing of religious
cult but only the national virtues of good citizenship. 14
As is well known, Matteo Ricci and the Pei-ching Jesuits, by
believing that, if Christianity were to enter deeply into the life and
feeling of China, it had to find points of contact with Confucianism,
- 272 -
served as the link between Europe and China for more than 100 years.
However, the Rites Controversy ended their effectiveness. The Jesuits
had approved the Chinese veneration of ancestors as merely 'civil'
rites.	 Dominican and Franciscan friars, latecomers, accused the
Jesuits and their converts of participating in pagan rituals and
destroying essential monotheistic articles of faith. Eventually the
Pope finally rejected the Jesuits with the bull Ex illa die in 1715.
,
As a result, the Chinese emperor proscribed Christianity, and the
local Chinese churches went underground. 15 Similarly, in Korea the
Catholic position on ancestor worship resulted in the first government
persecution of Catholicism in 1791. 16
In the 20th century the challenge of the Chinese rites first
thrust itself into the open in the wake of armed conquest and the
creation in February 1932, under the tutelage of Japan's expansionist
authorities, of the short-lived state of Manchukuo. By its attempt to
promote civic unity through the Wang Tao (Royal Way), the new -
government made the cult of Confucius obligatory on the native
Catholics. On this a mission secretary writes:
The Japanese in Manchuria look upon the Confucian
shrines as the equivalent of their own Shinto ones
in Korea, Formosa and Japan. They were chosen,
first because they were actually in existence, and
second, because they involved nothing new to the
Chinese mind ... The services at the Confucian
shrines in Manchuria are iqytical with those held
at Shinto shrines in Korea.
Because of its extraordinary gravity, the [Manchurian] case was
referred to the Pope, Pius XI (14 May, 1935).
	 Rome's decision on
28 May 1935 reflected its 'revisionist' policy of the 'era of
enfranchisement' in regard to the rites the Church had outlawed for
more than 200 years under stringent sanctions. 18
In concrete historical terms, after pronouncing the programme of
toleration for Manchukuo (1935), a year later Pius XI, the Pope of the
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Missions, gave further emphasis to the movement of harmonising
Oriental traditions with Catholic culture when the far-reaching
programme of permissions was promulgated with respect to certain
ceremonial usages in imperial Shintoism as well as matrimonial,
funeral, and other social customs, all hitherto under the Christian
ban. By this time the principle of wider latitude of adaptation had
become a settled policy. 19
	It is found applied, and in the same
emphatic terms, to a particular case of funeral rites in the Belgian
Congo (1938). 20
Here, however, in the case of Manchukuo and Japan, we should not
minimise the influence of Japanese government pressure on the Roman
decisions. 21
	As a matter of fact, the Japanese government had
suggested establishing diplomatic relations with the Vatican as early
as 1922, having realised during the First World War that "the Vatican
is an excellent source of information". 22
According to Owen Chadwick, between October and the middle of
1937 the British regarded the Pope (Pius XI) as a man in Mussolini's
pocket. 23
 This was 'a Fascist Pope'. After the Lateran treaty of
1929, especially since 1933 the relationship between the Fascist
Italian government and the Church was cordial.
	 This Fascist
government saw the historic Church as a main part of the international
influence of Italy, both in the past and in the contemporary world.
Pope Pius XI's personal experiences in Poland during the Russo-
Polish war of 1920 left him with a hostility to Bolshevism and a
conviction of its danger to a Christian Empire. 24
	This fear and
enmity were reinforced by the terrible persecutions of innocent
Catholic priests or nuns in Mexico and Spain. Many Italians believed
that the only viable alternative to Mussolini's government in Italy
was a Communist regime. For Italy the choice was between Fascism and
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Communism.
On the invasion of Abyssinia by Mussolini in October 1935, the
League of Nations regarded it as blatant and immoral aggression. In
this context, E.H. Carr minuted on 27 November, 1935:
Everyone concerned in directing Vatican policy is
(so far as we can discover) 'strongly Fascist in
sympathy', so that that policy is bound to be
tinged by a strong Italian bias. The most that
can be expected, is that tItEy will maintain a
certain semblance of decency.
When the Lateran treaty was concluded, the danger was foreseen
that the predominantly Italian character of the Vatican might become
suspect in more than one quarter, once it and the Italian government
were reconciled. During the Second World War there was a feeling -
not universal, but looming out again and again in the documents - that
the Pope's organisation was but the international propaganda wing of
Mussolini's policy. 26
In 1935 Japan withdrew from the League of Nations and the next
year joined Germany in a so-called anti-Communist pact.
	 This was
extended to the Tripartite Pact in 1940. By 1942, when it established
diplomatic relations with Japan, the Vatican was now in full
diplomatic contact with all the Axis Powers - but not with any of the
Allies. 27 There is indeed a certain affinity of spirit and method
between the political totalitarianism and the authoritarian types of
Christianity, e.g., Roman Catholic. 28
Given that the Vatican finally established diplomatic relations
with Japan in 1942 on her own account, we might say that the interests
of Catholics themselves came before all others, including the
rightness or wrongness of national causes. 29 Who could believe that
the decision of the Vatican was not inspired at all by any political
considerations?
	 In general terms, Roman Catholic effort tended to
follow political interests rather than spiritual ideas except in the
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case of the Jesuits. 30
In this context, from the Manchurian Incident (1931) to the end
of the Second World War (1945), the position of the Roman Catholic
Church was, in Koreans' eyes, 'collaboration':
In a surprising and very revealing development
during the same period, the Roman Catholic Church
reversed its position and in 1931 permitted the
faithful to practice ancestor worship. The Church
also took a conciliatory position with regard to
the 1936 Japanese demand that all Koreans worship
the Japanese gods in their Shinto shrines. The
demand was stirring vehement opposition by
patriotic Koreans. The standing of the Church in
Koreans' eyes was seriously affected when
Archbishop Marella, the Papal Ambassador to Japan,
went so far as to recommend Shinto worship to the
Church's Korean members. The Church was seen to
collaborate with an unprecedented imposition by
the imperialist Japansfe government upon Korean
national institutions.
The third distinguishable feature of Catholic mission policy is
its lack of emphasis on educational institutions. 32	Unlike the
Protestants, even after the period of persecution, the Catholic Church
in Korea did not emphasise schools. 33	The reports on the Catholic
educational work for 1923 show 166 elementary schools with 8,987
pupils in all taught by 363 teachers and one secondary school with 188
students and 9 teachers. 34 These figures are contrasted with those of
the Presbyterian missions (1923): 749 elementary schools with 40,702
pupils in all taught by 1,300 teachers and 42 secondary schools with
4,733 students and 219 teachers.
35
As a result of choosing not to emphasise schools, Catholics in
Korea had fewer conflicts with the Japanese administration which had
originally wanted to control the schools completely, especially after
the Manchurian Incident. Similarly that there were not many children
to be protected and educated seemed to influence the Church to conform
to the government demand without hesitation.
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2. The Methodist Church
On its side of mission policy among the Christian churches in
Korea, the Methodist Missions emphasised philanthropic institutions,
e.g., schools and hospitals. 1
 It is important to note in this context
that in 1884 the veteran missionary to China and Japan, Robert S.
Maclay, the "foster father" of the Korea Mission of the Methodist
Episcopal Church, requested the king of Korea to permit them to open a
school and undertake medical work in Korea. 2
	The king carefully
examined the petition and in accordance with Maclay's request decided
to authorise the Methodist Mission to commence hospital and school
work in Korea. But this favourable decision contained no official
permission to purchase or to rent property. Thus, Maclay, the then
Superintendent of the Methodist Mission in Japan, asked the American
Minister, Foote, to purchase a piece of property near the Legation.
Upon his return to Japan, Maclay recommended that the Mission Board
"begin educational and medical work, using no disguise as to the
ultimate object being evangelisation", and added: "schools would be
welcome, and hospitals are a necessity" .3
	
He further assured the
Board that there was no fear of opposition from the Korean government.
Thus the pioneer missionaries of the Methodist Church to Korea,
in order to break down prejudice among the Koreans, built hospitals
and dispensaries in different sections of the city, constructed one of
the first prominent school buildings in the heart of the capital, and
inaugurated extensive school work for girls. 4
	Among seven pioneer
members, while five members devoted themselves to the institution
work, only one worked as an evangelist. 5
 The Board increased the
missionary force and budget as rapidly as resources at home would
permit. 6
	Unlike the Presbyterian Missions, the Methodists put more
money into philanthropic institutions.
	 For example, according to
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Charles D. Stokes' study (1947), the allocation of mission funds in
1927 between the Northern Methodist Missions and the Northern
Presbyterian Missions (both occupying the same territories _
northwestern areas) was as follows: 7
evangelical	 educational medical	 other
work	 work
	 work	 work
The Northern
Methodist Missions 32% 42%
e.
23% 3%
The Northern
Presbyterian Missions 54% 21% 21% 4%
The medical policy of the Methodists was extension, while the
Presbyterians adopted the programme of concentration on hospital work
and the training of Korean doctors. 8 The Methodist medical work was
started among the poorest class and carried on for the neediest.
Similarly, while most Presbyterian missionaries thought that
education was to be reserved for Christians, the aim being not
evangelisation but the production of a Christian elite, Methodist
missionaries emphasised that . education was to be supplied without
discrimination to all who were desirous of receiving it; its aim was
evangelisation. 9 Thus we can note that between the Presbyterians and
the Methodists there were 'the inner differences in the understanding
of the nature of missionary work', 10 which led to the wide variation
in practice in the course of missionary history in Korea.
Here it is important to remember that nowhere could one better
gauge the impact of 'liberalism' than in the field of religious
education. 11 In other words, we can assume that, among missionaries
generally, educationists tend to be more liberal than evangelists.
This assumption can be applied to the Presbyterian bodies: 	 the
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minority of the Missions who were strongly against the decision of
school closing were 'liberal educationists', e.g., H.H. Underwood.
Historically, as new knowledge was disseminated through education, the
fundamentalist-modernist controversy in Protestantism in the 1920s
often became one of the educated and worldly-wise versus the
uneducated and unsophisticated. 12
	Educated people were more likely
to be theologically liberal than those with little or no education. 13
In sum, the Methodist missionary's emphasis on institutions,
especially on schools, was mainly the result of their broad and
humanistic understanding of the nature of missionary work.
	 The
Methodist education missionaries and (some of the liberal missionaries
of the Canadian Presbyterian Church) thought that education was to be
applied without discrimination to all. They had originally emphasised
its aim as 'evangelisation'. But later they gradually came to regard
education as the most important work, irrespective of whether it was
religious education or not. And "conversion", they thought, "is a by-
product of education". 14
Now we can recognise the reasons why the Methodist Missions,
unlike the Presbyterians, accepted Japanese pressure quietly with the
edicts of the government regarding observances before the Shintii
shrines for the mission schools. Firstly, the educationists as the
majority group of the Missions did not see a great harm in shrine
worship, because their credo of liberalism lacked interest in the
worship. Secondly, as a more important reason, they would not, in
fact, close their schools since, unlike the Presbyterians, education
was everything to them.
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3. The Presbyterian Church
The Korean American treaty of 1882 was silent on the matter of
religious toleration. 1 In L.G. Paik's view, "one of the features of
the treaty which won the favour of the intolerant Korean officials may
have been the absence of permission for religious propaganda". 2 In
this respect the Mission Board of Presbyterians, because of the
unstable political situation and the impossibility of carrying on
extensive mission work, did not increase the staff or appropriations
until after 1890. 3
	Unlike the somewhat aggressive Roman Catholics
and Methodists, Presbyterian missionary policy was conservative and
cautious. The Presbyterians pursued the policy of maintaining the
status quo and avoiding the opposition of the Korean conservative
party. Thus they won favour with the government by acquiescing in its
policy by the year 1890. On the other hand, the Methodists gradually
gained the confidence of the populace through their philanthropic
institutions. 4
On the matter of mission policy, after 1890 the Presbyterian
Missions, first of all, emphasised 'conversion' or decision for
Christ, as the aim of all Christian preaching and personal contacts as
the most effective method of evangelisation. So Samuel A. Moffet, who
had arrived in the field in 1890, underlined in 1909 that "the Mission
and the Church have been marked pre-eminently by a fervent
evangelistic spirit, a thorough belief in the Scriptures as the Word
of God, and in the Gospel message of salvation from sin through Jesus
Christ". 5
As Korea was one of the youngest Protestant foreign mission
fields, missionaries had naturally used the methods that had been
previously evolved elsewhere. Thus, from the beginning, the
Presbyterian Mission Council in Korea adopted a written mission policy
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as early as 1893. 6	The most remarkable feature of the policy was its
"mass line": "It is better to aim at the conversion of the working
class than that of the higher class" . 7	Thus the Presbyterian
missionaries consciously made the lower-class population and women and
children their	 targets for evangelisation.	 And the
"Nevius Method", named after John Nevius of the China field, was not
popular in China but gained practically unanimous acceptance among the
Korean missionaries, especially among the Presbyterians, after Nevius
visited SOul in 1890. 8	In the principles of the "Nevius Method", it
is widely accepted that one of the most important principles is: 'the
Bible central in every part of the work 1 , 9
 that is, the central
emphasis on the Bible. In spite of the defects of the plan in terms
of theological education, there is no disputing the fact that the
Korean church grew most rapidly in precisely the 'northwestern' areas
of the peninsula - which had traditionally shown more openness to
change and new ideas than the southern areas - where the Nevius Plan
was practised most faithfully. 10
The Bible is the fundamentalist's sole basis of faith and
conduct. The Bible is believed to be the Word of God, not simply to
contain it, as liberals contend. By its very nature fundamentalism
resists changes in doctrine and contends for the truth. 	 In this
sense, essentially, "the fundamentalist mentality is that of a closed
and authoritarian mind". 11	Emphasising the letter more than the
spirit of the Word, fundamentalists do not attempt to reform society
through a social gospel as modernists did. Instead the Bible becomes
a "paper pope" to fundamentalists.
	 Appealing to the emotions and
conscience with the assurance of strong faith, fundamentalists often
make more progress in evangelism than liberals, who lack the zeal and
fervour of a dogmatic message related to a theory of history in which
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people can find comfort and security in times of anxiety and
confusion. 12
By the Nevius Plan, though the Christian message had to be over-
simplified for the mass of new Korean believers, missionaries were
able to gain many 'true believers' among the Korean masses. It is
important in this context to point out that John Ross, of the United
Presbyterian Church of Scotland, had translated the New Testament into
Han'gril (Korean script), the language of the common people i as opposed
to that of the nobility, who preferred the use of Chinese.
	
The
conservative missionaries did emphasise memorisation of biblical
passages and following the letter of the scripture;
	 thereby the
common people of Korea, who were the first to learn,Korean script and
/N
the first to be awakened by Christian literature, became dogmatic
literalists in their Christian belief. 13
	The term "fighting
fundamentalist", is a direct outgrowth of the controversial,
negativistic spirit in fundamentalism. 14
	It has been called a
"stubborn religion" which is "a twentieth-century movement of protest
and unrest; it is apocalyptic, prophetic, critical of modern life and
15
apprehensive of the future". Authoritarian dogmatism gives
evangelism a clear objective: to lead people to accept Jesus Christ
as Saviour. In short, the "mass line" and the "Nevius Plan" in Korea
contributed to the strength of the Presbyterian Church under
persecution. 16
 And during the Japanese religious persecution it was
the mass of 'true' believers, mostly dogmatic literalists in their'
Christian belief, who remained most faithful to their belief to the
end.
Incidentally, from the beginning, the Presbyterian missionaries
(except a liberal minority) in Korea understood education was to be
reserved for Christians. In other words, they thought that the aim of
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education in missionary work was not evangelisation but the production
of Christian elite .	 Therefore, for a considerable period in the
history of P u yOngyang Union Christian College, in which, though
several missions co-operated, the work was chiefly supported by the
Northern Presbyterians, no non-Christian students were admitted; the
policy was confessedly "narrow" in the sense that it sought to serve
the Christian community only and to attain a single objective rather
than offer a broader selection. 17
411e.
George S. McCune of
r
 Northern Presbyterian Mission' , president of\
Union Christian College, refused to take his pupils to the Shinn"
shrine. Consequently, he was removed as president in 1936 and the
P'yOngyang mission schools were closed in March of 1938; and in May of
that year the Board of Foreign Missions in New York directed that all
Presbyterian schools in Korea be closed. 18 But it was in 1941-1942
that the final school relationship was severed by the "Northern"
Presbyterian Mission, five to six years after the initial action
taken.	 By contrast, it is to be noted that the "Southern"
Presbyterian Mission decided in late 1935 to withdraw, and by
September 1937, the last of the ten mission schools had been closed.
Part of the reason for the delay on the part of the "Northern"
Mission seems to have been the hesitancy of the home Board, whose
liberal policy of education, unlike the conservative Korea Mission,
had been directed at non-Christians as well as Christians, in
supporting the Korea Mission policy against the Shrine. 19 According
to Lee Kun Sam, "the modernist-influenced mission board in New York
did not see great harm in shrine worship" 20 Thus Bruce F. Hunt and
some missionaries in the "Northern" Mission eventually withdrew from
the Korea Mission for this and other reasons. 21
From the foregoing discussion, we can say that the inner
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differences in the understanding of the nature of education as a
mission work was an important factor for individual missionaries and
Mission Boards in deciding whether to close mission schools or not. 22
The confessedly 'narrow' policy for education on the part of the
extremely conservative, that is, fundamentalistic missionaries of the
Presbyterian Church is contrasted with the submission of the liberal
missions such as the Methodist and the United Church of Canada
Missions to the Japanese pressure.	 Their schools, which had been
supplied without discrimination, were allowed to remain open.
F. Relationship to Nationalism
1. The Catholic Church
With regard to the relationship to nationalism, in general, Roman
Catholicism seems to be 'dubious'. The Roman Catholic Church, which
had been a loyal ally of colonialism, struggled intensely with the
Rhodesian State between 1959 and 1979 under the impact of African
nationalism. 1	Catholicism is an important ingredient in Latin
American nationalism. 2	Nevertheless, in the context of colonial
Korea, in contrast to the Protestant missions, which were the focal
points of resistance, the Catholics tried to remain 'neutral' , 3 or
took a 'conciliatory' position. 4 While half of the 33 signers of the
1919 Independence Declaration were Protestants, none
	 was
Catholic.	 According to the religious affiliation of those arrested
between March and December 1919 (total 19,525), while Presbyterians
constituted 12.7 percent (2,486) - the majority - and Methodists
gained 2.9 percent (518), Catholics were only 0.3 percent (55)• 5 In
1919, at the time of the Independence Movement, the Catholic Church
had 44 foreign missionaries, 23 Korean priests, 93 nuns, and 88,000
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persecutions, were not pro-Yi government. The Roman Catholic9
members.
6
 So the Japanese officials publicly admitted that members of
Catholic missions stood aloof from politics. 7
If we review the early history of Christian missions in Korea, we
can find a difference in the attitudes towards the Korean government
of the Yi dynasty between Catholic missions and Protestant missions. 8
It is widely accepted that, whereas the Protestants (particularly
Presbyterians) were pro-Korean government, the Catholics, remaining a
,
religion of farmers and potters in the rural areas since the
Church's emphasis upon loyalty to a foreign ecclesiastical institution
caused understandable alarm among the Korean rulers.
10
	Their
political activities were perhaps the most undesirable features of the
missionary proselytising methods of Roman Catholics. 11 Following the
advice of their teachers, the Korean converts did not hesitate to
engage in political activities. 12 They not only deceived officers of
their government, but also violated the law of the land. After the
persecution of 1801 Alexander Hwang, a convert, wrote a letter to the
bishop of Pei-ching proposing that the Roman Catholic nationals of
Europe send armed troops to conquer Korea and make it safe for
Catholicism. 13	The work of the Catholic mission progressed more
favourably after the French-Korean treaty (1886), but the Korean
government officials' antagonistic attitude towards the French
missionaries continued. 14
Similarly, it should be mentioned that from the foundation of the
Catholic Church in 1784 no attempt was made to translate a single
Gospel or any portion of the Bible into Han'gril (Korean alphabet), and
so the converts were untaught of the Scripture. 15 The Bible heti never
been translated into Korean in toto, and until the 1960s only the New
1
Testament was available in Korean.6 The renaissance of Han'ell by
-
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the Protestant missionaries (the United Presbyterian Church of
Scotland) formed the basis of a new vernacular literature closely
associated with a reformist nationalist movement. 17 The father of
this new national literature was a convert to Protestantism,
SO Chae-p'il who established the first newspaper, Tongnip sinmun, or
"Independence News", issued three times weekly in English and Korean.
In a series of discussions held at Shang University in November
1968, in which a broad spectrum of the Catholic Church was
represented, it was unanimously pointed out that Catholic life in
Korea has several distinctive features which form, as it were, the
spiritual ethos of Korean Catholicism.	 Among such features the
following are noteworthy with regard to their relationship to
nationalism:	 intellectual stagnation, indifference to social
problems, lack of moral leadership for the Korean society at large,
and the consequent general isolation of the Church from the mainstream
of life. 18
As Min KyOng-suk has stressed with great insight, for the years
since 1886 (the Korean-French treaty),
of -modern Korea
histories literally do not say a word on the presence of the CatholicA
Church in Korean Society at large; it is as though the Church had
withdrawn from the scene of Korean history altogether. 19	Church
histories do record a few incidents of persecution, especially in
Cheju Island around the turn of the century, but apart from such
incidents the history of the Korean Catholic Church since 1886, as it
is recorded in Church histories, is mainly a history of bishops,
priests, religious congregations, and convert statistics. References
to the presence of the Church in the larger society are conspicuously
absent. 20 In view of the fact that the period since 1886 has been
perhaps the most turbulent period in the history of modern Korea such
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absence is greatly significant.
It is to be noted here that in contrast to the early period, when
Koreans took the initiative in introducing Catholic doctrine, the
Korean Church leadership passed for the most part to French
missionaries after the treaty imposed by the French government upon
the Korean government in 1886, granting freedom of religion.
21
 In the
case of French missionaries, their attitudes to the political
authorities in Korea were from the French government. The French MEP
was closely allied to the development of French expansionism in
Asia. 22	Although many Christian missionaries could be accused of
confusing their religion with their nation, this confusion seems to
have been particularly acute with the French Catholics. 23 During the
19th century all communications between Rome and Pei-ching had to pass
through Paris. 24	This situation was made worse in that for a long
time (1831-1911) the French missionaries were the only representatives
of the Catholic Church, which was not the case with the Protestant
churches 25
For example, when the Russians withdrew from S O`ul on April 25,
1898, they manipulated matters in such a way that a large number of
Frenchmen were placed in government positions. 26	Dr. Arthur Judson
Brown, of the Foreign Mission Board of the Northern Presbyterian
Church, who visited Korea in 1901, reported:
	
"All these Franco-
Russian schemes are materially aided by the Roman Catholic Church in
Korea ... The relations between the French political plans and the
French Catholic mission are very close.
	
The Legation and the
missionaries work together so openly that the typical priest is
commonly believed to be a quasi-political French emissary ” . 27
Under the domination of the French missionaries, who were
incapable of distinguishing between their apostolic mission and their
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nationalism, when the Japanese annexed Korea in 1910, unlike
Protestant missions, the Catholics tried to remain neutral. During
the period of the Japanese occupation of Korea the Catholic Church
lost vigour and became dormant. 28
	Thus after the Independence
Movement of 1919 there were leaflets sent to members of the Catholic
Church, which by order of the Pope took a negative attitude towards
the Movement, saying, "Although the Pope is your leader from a
religious point of view, from a racial point of view are you not
brothers and sisters of men and women of the Korean race who were
massacred by the Japanese?" 29
 When the Japanese government insisted
that Christians perform ShintU rites, the Church naturally went to
mollify the government. 30
 During World War II the reigning French
bishop at Taegu was forced to resign in favour of the Japanese priest
Father Hayasaka. 31
 The Vatican appointed a Korean bishop in 1946,
and the Catholic churches of the Taegu region have been under Korean
control ever since. 32
2. The Methodist Church
As regards the relationship with nationalism, the missionary
attitude of the Methodist Church in Korea to the political authorities
in the mission field during the colonial period, as a whole, was from
the Japanese colonial government. With this we should note that those
who reacted most strongly against the anti-Japan movement by the
Korean Church and individual Christians were missionaries, especially
the Methodists. 1
	For example, two Methodist missionaries - G.H.
Jones and W.B. Scranton - called on the Japanese Resident-Oeneral
Hirobumi at his residence to say that the rumours that among Christian
missionaries there were some who did not like the policies of the
resident-general were simply false accusations stemming from some
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Korean's ill feelings towards missionaries. They then expressed their
sincere concurrence, on behalf of the missionaries, with the resident-
general's policies aimed at enlightening the Korean people. 	 As a
result the three leading missionaries (Jones, Scranton and Harris)
were threatened with death after the Methodist missionaries rejected
the Koreans' request for assistance in their campaign to oppose the
Japanese protectorate of Korea (1905).
The individual Christians in the Methodist Church had been
associated with a new nationalism until the March First 1919
Independence Movement, but since the 1920s they remained within the
precincts of the church, refusing to take part in the anti-Japan
national movement. 2
	Under the influence of pro-Japanese
missionaries, individual Methodist Christians were less active than
the Presbyterians in participating in the anti-Japan national
movement. In the Korean Conspiracy Case (October 1911) fabricated by
the Japanese rulers who had intended to' crack down on the Sinmin-hoe -
an anti-Japan independence organisation formed chiefly of Christian
leaders of the northwestern area, where Christian influence was
especially strong - among the 123 arrested, 86 were Presbyterians and
only eight were Methodists. 3 The most prominent of the arrested, Yun
ai-ho (T.H. Yun), a leading Methodist educator and one of the
respected Christian national leaders, gave up anti-Japanese struggles
because of the torture he suffered, and became pro-Japanese. 4	And in
the case of the March First 1919 Independence Movement, while
Presbyterians constituted 12.7 percent (2,486, the majority) of those
arrested (total 19,525) in 1919, Methodists were only 2.9 percent
(518). 5
	In fact, among 33 signers in the Korean Declaration of
Independence 15 were Christians, of whom nine were Methodists. But it
is noteworthy in this context that among the nine Methodist signers
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there were Chung Choon-Soo (Chting Ch l un-su) and Pak Hi-do, who later
became the most notorious defectors.
One thing that should not be overlooked in connection with this
sudden change of posture in some Methodist leaders is that Korean
leaders, in particular leading Christians, misunderstood the principle
of national self-determination that the then United States President
Wilson had advanced. 6 	The principle was intended chiefly to call on
European countries to maintain a power balance among themselves.
Korean Christians, however, had pinned excessive expectations on the
principle, wishfully believing that Wilson would work for the
independence of Korea. This wishful thinking, especially among the
leading Methodist Christians, was one of the stimulants of the March
First Independence Movement of Korea. Wilson, however, gave no word
of support for the Koreans' struggle for national independence,
although they struggled for nearly one year. In brief, the Koreans'
independence struggles, for which they shed so much blood, were
completely ignored in the international community, especially by the
United States of America government. We can affirm this ignorance in
the report on United States Policy Regarding Korea (declassified in
1982):
All appeals received during 1919 from Korean
nationalist leaders in the United States for
assistance and recognition of the "Republic of
Korea" were filed by the Department of State
without acknowledgement ... Korean nationalists
endeavoured to have the American Delegation to the
Washington Arms Conference (1921-1922) take up the
questions	 of	 Korean	 independence	 at	 the
Conference.	 The 7 American Delegation, however,ignored this plea.
When their struggles were ignored by the United States, which
they had expected would support their movement, the public's
departure, especially conscientious youths, from the church as a new
phenomenon
	
-began,. , 8 Furthermore, at the same time, the ignoral
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by the United States and Western Christian countries undoubtedly
contributed, in the Korean Methodist circles, to the formation of an
anti-missionary spirit in the course of various attempts to form a new
national Church.	 In this context, we can note a historical link
between newly gained national identity and anti-Westernism in younger
churches. 9
Historically, the Methodist leaders - ChOng Ch'un-su, Sin HUng-u,
cri-Lioal
Pak Hi-do - who had bsen— stronglyAWestern missionaries for their
implantation of divisions among the churches there, consequently
formed the autonomous Korean Methodist Church in 1930, led the
movement of 'Japanisation of Christianity' in 1938 on the plea of
'Orientalising of Western orthodox Christian tradition'. 10
	In Pak
v
Sun-gyong
,
 s critical view, the Methodist leaders' legitimation of the
Japanisation of Christianity reflected nothing other than the mere
a	 a
change of their 'master': from
A
 Western Power (Christianity) to
A
 non-
Western Power (Japan). 11
3. The Presbyterian Church
As regards the relationship to nationalism, it is widely
acknowledged that the Korean Christians of the Presbyterian Church
played a key role in the anti-Japan nationalist movement. 	 Most
assassinations carried out after 1906 involved Christians of the
northwestern areas. The assassins of 1t6 Hirobumi in October 1909, of
D.W. Stevens, a pro-Japanese American adviser to the Korean
government, in San Francisco in March 1908, and the would-be assassin
of Yi Wan-yong, the Korean prime minister in December 1909, were
Christian converts. 1
During the period of 1897-1906 the number of Korean Christians
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expanded greatly. 2	The rise of the Church was doubtless helped by
the political turmoil and social ctiSoYder of the time. People needed
something to ease the frustrations caused by the ineptitude of their
own government and the ascendancy of the Japanese. Christianity was
very important as an alternative to the other great force for change -
Japan.
3
	As such, Christianity gathered strength and support from
Koreans who used church institutions as havens from the Japanese. The
church was rapidly transformed into an anti-Japanese instrument. As
D.N. Clark has noted, when Japan ruled Korea, conditions combined to
neutralise the contradictions between nationalism and Christianity
that existed at the same time in China. 4
	Patriotism backed by
religion is strong indeed.	 This may be the reason why the
Presbyterians were so powerful in the whole of North Korea (more than
a quarter of all the missionaries were concentrated in North P'yOngan
Province) and had contacts with the strong independence movement in
the Chien-Tao area, in the north-east of China. 5
Two events played a crucial part in the way in which the Church
was viewed by the general populace: the Conspiracy Trial of 1911 and
the Independence Movement of 1919. 6
The Government-General of ChUsen claimed that it had uncovered a
plot to assassinate the Governor-General, Terauchi Masataka (1852 to
1919) on December 29, 1910. 7 Early in the following year,
investigations were begun which led to the arrest of 124 persons, 123
of whom were brought to trial. 105 of these men were imprisoned on
the basis of evidence of very dubious origin which was most probably
obtained under torture.
	
Ninety-seven of the original number were
Christians. The target of the "Terauchi Assassination Plot" by the
Japanese rulers in 1911 was the Sinmin-hoe, an anti-Japan independence
organisation formed chiefly of Presbyterian leaders of SOnch"On,
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Chiingju and P'yOngyang, the northwestern areas, where Christian
influence was especially strong. 8	Ninety-seven arrested Christians
comprised 86 Presbyterians, 8 Methodists, 2 Congregational, and 1
Roman Catholic.
9
	The difference in the number arrested among
different Christian denominations reflects the fact that the target
of the Trial was 'Presbyterians' of the northwestern areas.
The Independence Movement of 1919 was composed of a large number
of Protestant Christians.	 Nearly half of the signers of the
Declaration of Independence were Protestants. The suppression of the
Christians was fierce and churches suffered a severe blow (see Table
3.	 "The Religious Affiliation of Those Arrested between March and
December 1919");	 16.4 percent of the entire number arrested were
Christians (the number of Christians in the population in 1919 was
only 1.6 percent 10 ). It is to be noted that among the 16.4 percent of
Christians in those arrested, Presbyterians comprised 12.7 percent.
This also reveals that Presbyterians were the most active in the
independence movement.
One should not overlook the fact, that even if they were all
Christians, the Korean clergy and laity tad a clearly different
standpoint from that of the foreign missionaries of various
nationalities. 11 During the Independence Movement, as an organised
group, the missionaries never had anything to do with the movement. 12
Moreover, despite severe investigation by the authorities, only ten
out of about 400 missionaries were suspected of having been involved.
But on the whole there is no doubt that they were sympathetic to the
Movement.
13
	Robert E. Speer, Secretary of the Board of Foreign
Missions of the Presbyterian Church of the U.S.A. articulated the
universal feeling of the missionaries as follows:
This spirit of nationalism [in Korea] is
inevitable and it is invaluable.	 It is not in
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conflict with the idea of a unified humanity. It
is essential to its realisation. The same God who
made of one blood all nations of men, assigned
them also their racial and national character and
destinies to the end of a perfect humanity. The
development of state consciousness, state
conscience, state ambition, state dlny, is a
development in the will of God for man.
However, before the annexation of Korea in 1910, the majority of
the	 Presbyterian missionaries
	 came	 under,	 in	 J.S.	 Gale's
classification,
	
'indifference'	 and	 'recognition'.15
	
By
'indifference' Gale, a prominent Canadian Presbyterian missionary
scholar, meant to define the attitude of those who believed that it
was wrong and useless to oppose the present rule and accordingly
washed their hands of it. By 'recognition' he meant acceptance of the
new order of things and convincing others of it. The Presbyterian
missionaries, like Gale, who considered 'recognition' to be correct,
in general, accepted the new political order and did their utmost to
convince their adherents. It should be pointed out in this context
that even George McCune, a principal of Union Christian College, .
P l yZingyang, a Northern Presbyterian missionary, was not anti-
Japanese.
16 . 
Numerous insinuations of direct complicity in the
conspiracy case of 1911 were made against McCune and other
missionaries in the northern provinces, though they were not brought
to trial. 17 When Sir Claude MacDonald, the British ambassador in
TElkyd, made a journey to Korea in the autumn of 1911, McCune told Sir
Claude that he had lost no opportunity for impressing upon his pupils•
the absolute necessity of accepting the inevitable and becoming good
citizens of the Japanese Empire. 18
In this respect we can safely assume that the indifferent or
tolerant attitude of the Presbyterian missionaries in the matter of
the political authorities had neutralised the development of state
consciousness on the part of the Korean converts. 	 As Song KOn-ho
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rightly points out, the church in the 1920s, then under the control of
missionaries, not only remained aloof but also tended to disapprove of
the social movements by workers, farmers and students, which began
after the United States' repudiation of the Independence Movement. 19
These new popular movements dealt a blow to the church. 20 In its
failure or refusal to understand such a new social movement,
Christianity gradually moved away from its central role on the
historical stage of society. 21	It should be noted here that in 1929
the Japanese authorities, by the revival movements, sought to have the
conservative churches counter the anti-Japan sentiments that were
sweeping Korean society. 22
 As Korean Christianity remained within the
precincts of the church, refusing to take part in the historical
scene, mysticism, an unusual phenomenon, swept the Christian circles
during the 1920s and 1930s. 23
Against this background we can understand that Chu Ki-ch0 1 1, a
graduate of Union Christian College (P'yOngyang), a representative
figure of the Non-Shrine Worship Movement (1938-45), had admitted
himself to be a subject of the Japanese Empire in 1930. His attitude
towards the political authorities seems to have been built along the
lines of the New Testament's instructions: "Render unto Caesar the
things which are Caesar's". 	 But when the church faced a serious
problem with the demand by Japan for worship at Shinto shrines since
1932, Chu, who had submitted to the ruling authority, resisted
stubbornly against the authority because it commanded him to
perpetrate a sinful deed. In Chu's view, to worship at Shint6 shrines
definitely violated the first and the second of the Ten
Commandments. 24
	Thus it seems rather unreasonable to affirm that
resistant Presbyterians to the Shinn" Shrine Issue took part in the
historical development of society during the time from 1932 to 1945.
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Since the 1920s Korean Christianity had gradually moved away from its
earlier central role in the society. In this sense the Presbyterian
Church was no exception.
Finally, however,	 we should remember that John Ross of the
United Presbyterian Church of Scotland prepared the first translation
of the New Testament into the Korean vernacular language. 25 Before
the translation of the New Testament in 1877, he published the first
grammar of the Korean language in English, and in 1879 the first
history of Korea in English. By 1882, he and his colleague, John
MacIntyre, had completed the translation of the New Testament into
Korean and had it published with the assistance of funds from the
National Bible Society of Scotland. Ross's method of missionary work
was Pauline as he termed it. Consequently, he laid great stress on
colporteur work. 26 Before Protestant missionaries arrived in Korea,
the Ross version of the New Testament was already circulating
throughout the country. Ross's sympathetic attitude to Korean culture
reflects the Scottish missionaries' support for the nationalism of the
country in which the mission was established.
It is widely accepted that, in Korean modern history, Han'ell 
(the Korean alphabet) was the 'precursor of nationalism'. 27 In Kim
Yong-Bock's view, the fact that	 Christian literature, especially
the Bible, was translated and written in the Korean vernacular script
had a significant implication in the shaping of the language of the
lower class; and under the Japanese rule the vernacular language was
the language of the ruled, not that of the ruler. One cannot separate
the message from the medium - the language. 28	Given that the
Presbyterian Church was, according to the central emphasis of the
Bible in the Nevius system, the Bible-centred Church, we can safely
assume that there was a positive relationship between Korean
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nationalism and Presbyterians.
G. Relationship to Non-Christian Religions
1. The Catholic Church
In its attitude to
	
	 non-Christian religions, and non-Christian
,
forms of worship, the Roman Catholic Church has been more sympathetic
than the Protestant churches. 1	St. Thomas Aquinas's great works, the
Summa Theologica and the Summa Contra Gentiles, have always been
regarded as the highest authority in the tradition of Catholicism. 2
This may be partly attributed to the fact that, in spite of the
theoretical rigidity of its dogmas, Catholicism has in practice been
more sympathetic than Protestantism in its attitude to non-Christian
forms of worship. Catholic missionaries have often been pioneers in
adopting non-Christian customs. Sometimes this has gone so far that
it has been checked by higher ecclesiastical authorities. For
example, in 1715 the Pope condemned the 'adoption' of ancestor-worship
by the Catholic missionaries in China. But-it has been supported by
some Catholic theologians of high repute. Notable among these were
the Jesuit Cardinal de Lugo, Baron von Hugel, and Jacques Maritan. 3
What is more, the Reformation did not bring about any immediate
change in the predominant Christian attitude of hostility to other
religions, in other words, the combative spirit of the great
Continental Reformers did not predispose them to look for any good
features in the non-Christian religions, on the other hand, in the
Roman Catholic Church the Reformation did evoke the movement known as
the Counter-Reformation, which stimulated a fresh enthusiasm for
Missions to the heathen.
4
 St. Francis Xavier in India and Japan in
-
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the 16th century, and the Jesuit missionaries in China in the 16th and
17th centuries are the important examples of Christ-like self-
sacrifice, devotion and heroism.
But the general attitude of the Catholic missionaries towards the
non-Christian religions remained as it was before the Reformation. 5
They went out with love for non-Christians in their hearts, but not
with any thought of appreciating the non-Christian religions. Their
purpose was simply to rescue souls from the clutches of heathenism in
this world and from the fires of Hell in the next. They went to give,
and not to receive; to save, not to co-operate.
Here we should note that the first Korean contact with the Roman
Catholic Church came through Japanese Christian soldiers who invaded
Korea in 1592, 6
 It is reported that they were converted as a result
of the work of St. Francis Xavier and his successors.. The real
foundation of Roman Catholicism in Korea, however, was laid in the
18th century by native Koreans coming from China.
	 Korean visitors in
Pei-ching, where a great Jesuit pioneer Matteo Ricci had begun his
work in 1601, brought with them some books of Western knowledge
including Ricci's book on the True Doctrine- of the Lord of Heaven. 7
Matteo Ricci held that the rites of Confucianism and ancestor worship
were purely social and political in nature and could be practised by
converts, thereby in China converts were allowed to retain much from
their non-Christian inheritance. 8 It was in the year 1777 that a few
celebrated Confucian scholars became interested in the new doctrines
written by Ricci and commenced practising the precepts of the books.
In 1783, Yi Ang-hun, the first ordained priest of the Korean church
later, went to Pei-ching with the annual embassy and was converted and
baptised there.	 Thus we can assume that there was some of Matteo
Ricci's accommodating influence in the establishment of the Church in
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Korea.
But the encounter between Confucianism and Catholicism on Korean
soil was not a happy one. 9 The seed of conflict and eventual clash
was inherent in the respective character of the two world views of
that period. Ever since Confucianism became the state religion of the
Yi dynasty, it had been rigid, dogmatic, and intolerant towards
dissenters.	 Three centuries of unfortunate experiences, mostly of
internal and external threats to its integrity - such as the
Protestant Reformation, decades of religious wars, and the challenge
of the French Enlightenment - had rendered Catholicism both self-
defensive and polemical, and by the time it arrived at the Korean
scene at the end of the 18th century it was as rigid in its dogmatic
adherence and as exclusive in its attitude towards heterodoxies as was
Confucianism. 10
The Korean Church history shows that many faithful members of the
Catholic Church were to be tested and finally persecuted for the
radical difference of world views. 11
 Despite the suspicion that their
way of life drew upon them from non-Christians, the early converts
abandoned all superstitious pagan rites, And preached the Gospel
openly.
12
	During the persecutions the most heretical element of the
Christian religion was its abandonment of the established rite of
sacrifice to the deceased, the basic ethical and ritual principles of
Confucianism. 13 Bitter attacks were also directed against preaching
heaven and hell, which was deluding the people, the critics thought.
Many Confucians believed that Catholicism did not take cognizance of
the king and parents, but recognised only God. 14	Given that the
general attitude of the Catholic missionaries towards the non-
Christian religions remained as it was before the Reformation and the
missionaries went out with love for non-Christians in their hearts,
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but not with any thought of appreciating the non-Christian religions,
the fact that the faithful members of the Church in Korea rejected the
Confucian ancestor rites on account of their exclusiveness, and
thereby finally died as martyrs in the cause of their faith seems
quite natural. Furthermore, we can also note that dichotomies - this
world and the next, body and soul, time and eternity, secular and
sacred - abound in the sources regarding the persecution-records of
,
police interrogations of the martyrs, exhortations by priests to the
persecuted Christians and their survivors, letters of Church leaders,
hymns and prayers. 15
In sum, as far as the attitude to non-Christian religions is
concerned, we can safely assume that the Korean Catholic Church has
shown 'self-complacent exclusivism'. 16	The exclusivism might be
stronger during the persecution period.	 What was the Church's
attitude then to State Shintoism, a non-Christian religion in the
post-persecution period? 	 This question leads us to study the
historical legacy of persecution in the light of church struggle (see
H. "Early Historical Experience", 1. The Catholic Church).
2. The Methodist Church
In relation to non-Christian religions, like the Catholic
missionaries, the most difficult question that the Protestant
missionaries had to face was 'ancestor worship'. 1 By them ancestor
worship was declared to be contrary to the Christian religion. But
there is no record which provides a comparison between the Methodist
Church and the Presbyterian Church in terms of their attitude to
ancestor worship.
As part of their Jubilee celebration, the Korean Methodist Church
had published a translation of The One Volume Bible Commentary, known
---
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also as The Abingdon Commentary on the basis of theological
'liberalism', which received a fierce attack from the conservative
Presbyterians. 2 Pak Hyong-nyong's summary (1964) of the contents of
The Abingdon Commentary represented the Korean conservative's basic
approach to the work:
It might as well be called the compilation of all
liberal theological thought. The book interpreted
the Bible by the destructive higher critical
principles and examined the history of-'revelation
with the prejudice of religious evolution. It
therefore questioned or denied the traditional
authorship and dating of many books of the Bible
... A great many miracles recorded in the Bible
were flatly denied or explained away on a
naturalistic principle as humbugs. Besides this,
it denied the virgin birth of Christ, questioned
his deity ... It denied Jesus' physical
resurrection, and affirmed that the idea of
physical resurrection was first introduced through
the Jewish apocalyptic literature. Besides these,
one can find there many moie liberal statements
opposing orthodox doctrines.
On attitudes to non-Christians, Raymond J. Hammer classifies
three main tendencies: (1) The identification approach;	 (2) The
exclusivist approach; (3) The mediating approach. 4 In general terms,
as regards attitudes to non-Christians, the Methodist Church in Korea
has shown, in Hammer's terms, the "mediating" approach. While the
mediating approach is anxious to stress fundamental truths in
Christianity, this approach leaves the way open for a dialogue between
faiths.	 In this context the 'indigenisation theology' (Korean
theology) initiated mostly by those Methodist theologians who were
comparatively liberal in theology, e.g., Yun SOng-bOm, at the
beginning of the 1960s did nothing but reaffirm the idea of the
Methodist Rev. Ch'oe PyCing-hOn - "The Western God that is the Oriental
God" - in the 19th century. 5 The idea of Ch'oe PyOng-hOn is
ultimately identical with that of Matteo Ricci: "The Chinese God that
is the Christian God". In similar vein, Pyun Sun-Hwan, a prominent
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theologian in the Methodist Theological Seminary at Sul, In the
tradition of the mediating approach, emphasised that, in order to
overcome religious imperialism (or exclusivism), Christianity must
give up the past proselytism and should have an open attitude in order
to have dialogue with other religions, standing on an equal basis. 6
This open and mediating attitude drawn from their liberal
theology, I think, was relatively more amenable to Shrine Shint5
worship than the exclusive attitude of extremely conservative
Presbyterian groups.
3. The Presbyterian Church
As regards the attitude to non-Christian religions, the
Presbyterian Church in Korea showed the 'exclusive approach' 1 (Raymond
J. Hammer's) in the sense that it was so anxious to stress the crucial
character of Christ for man's destiny and understanding of the world.
In this approach, the other faiths are sometimes regarded as man's
search for God, whilst Christianity is regarded as the one religion
which points to God's initiative. Christ is thus considered to be the
judge of all religious faiths.
Thus, Arthur J. Brown, one of the General Secretaries of the
Board of Foreign Missions of the Presbyterian Church, U.S.A., comments
on the missionary in Korea before 1911 in these terms:
The typical missionary of the first quarter
century after the opening of the country was a man
of the Puritan type. He kept the Sabbath as our
New England forefathers did a century ago. He
looked upon dancing, smoking and card-playing as
sins in which no true follower of Christ should
indulge. In theology and Biblical criticism he
was strongly conservative, and he held as a vital
truth the premillenarian view of the second coming
of Christ. The higher criticism and liberal
theology were deemed dangerous heresies. In most
of the evangelical churches of America and Great
Britain, conservatives and liberals have learned
to live and work together in peace, but in Korea
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the few men who had 'the modern view' have a rough
road to travel, p2rticularly in the Presbyterian
group of missions.
The early missionaries in Korea came almost exclusively from the
area where the Old-School ideas were dominant. 3 It was natural that
Nevius and his Korean colleagues were extreme conservatives or
fundamentalists, since their training had been along these lines. The
Korean missionary church was radically affected for many years by
those missionaries who constituted its first trained leadership. In
other words, in the early years the extremely conservative
missionaries continued to be almost the only theological guide of the
church. In the theological division between adherents of the social
gospel and American fundamentalism, Charles Allen Clark, one of the
prominent teachers in P'yOngyang Seminary, belonged with the
fundamentalists.	 In 1937, five years after the appearance of
Rethinking Missions, Clark quotes a 1926 statement of faith drafted by
the Northern Presbyterian Mission: "We recognise that in the ethnic
faiths and other non-Christian religions, there is much to be
commended;	 nevertheless, we believe that in Christianity we have
something unique in history, a supernatural religion with power to
transform men for time and for eternity, and we believe that no
compromise can be made with other religions" .4 Thus the Presbyterian
missionaries' attitude towards non-Christian religions seems clear:
the exclusive approach.
	 We can note the same attitude in Korean
Presbyterians. As was shown before, the 24th General Assembly of the
Northern Presbyterian Church in Korea attacked the Methodists for
publishing a translation of The Abingdon Commentary on account of its
'liberal' statements opposing orthodox doctrines, and consequently
they issued a prohibition to Presbyterian believers not to buy and
read the book. 5
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Regarding the rise of liberalism in the Presbyterian Church, Kim
Yang-siin, a church historian, notes the withdrawal of the United
Church of Canada (the former Canadian Presbyterian Church) in 1925. 6
The United Church of Canada, being a union of several denominations
(Presbyterians, Baptists and Methodists), could not be held to the
1
doctrine and confession of the Presbyterian Church. After liberal
William Scott became Mission chairman in Hamhring, liberalism took its
beginning here.	 Scott interpreted Scripture critically. From this
time on, the Conservative-Liberal split could be clearly seen. 7 Quite
a number of pastors followed the United Church of Canada theological
position.	 In brief, as regards the attitude to other non-Christian
religions, the liberal missionaries and Korean pastors in the Canadian
Mission followed the 'mediating approach' like their Methodist
colleagues. Both the United Church of Canada and the Methodist Church
accepted the Shint5 shrine worship without hesitatiion, and so their
schools were not closed until the early 1940s.
	
Thus,	 in general terms,	 only the stubborn (orthodox)
Presbyterians could not compromise with other religions such as State
Shintoism because of their strict 'exclusivism' to other non-Christian
	
religions.	 But for those liberal Christians who had a more
sympathetic attitude - the 'mediating' approach - to other religions,
there was already room for compromise.
H. Early Historical Experience
1. The Catholic Church
The theological outlook of the early Church (1784-1886) as
expressed in the thoughts and sentiments of the martyrs on the eve of
their martyrdom is extremely homogeneous, consistent and clear. 1 The
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first thing which strikes the reader of early Catholic literature,
especially the martyrology,	 is the intense and persistent
preoccupation of the early Church with the thoughts of impending
divine judgement and the prospect of heaven and hell. 2 Here we can
quote what John Lee wrote in prison six days before his martyrdom in
1840 as the representative outlook of the persecuted Church as a
whole.	 Confronted with the fast-approaching end of his life, he
offered his final reflections on the basic situations of man in this
world:
This life is only an instant, and the body is indeed an
empty thing ... How can one be so senseless as not to think
of the terrible judgement to come? ... For mercy's sake, do
take every means not to fall into the deceitful snarn of
the three enemies: the world, the flesh, and the devil.
Besides Father Andre Kim, the Persecution of 1839 claimed the
lives of three of the 12 French missionaries and over 200 other
believers. The final Persecution of 1866 took a toll of over 8,000
martyrs, almost half the total believers in the country. 4 '
Historically, the world view that emerged from the persecution
period was a negative attitude towards the world and great stress on
eschatology. 5 According to Min Kyong-suk, a view of the world and the
flesh as negative, as it was, would have encouraged those virtues and
practices which were considered to be most conducive to 'withdrawing'
man from the world and 'protecting' him against ItS , dangers. 6 "And
that is in fact what happened. That the spirituality of the early
Church was essentially a spirituality of withdrawal is so clear from
the pages of existing Church histories and martyrologies n .7
The treaty with France, in 1886, gave religious freedom to Korean
Catholics, but the habits of a century of catacomb-like existence were
hard to throw off. 8 Although the process of institutionalisation
moved quickly, missionaries and Korean Catholics alike preferred to
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maintain a 'low profile'. Except for the Cheju Island riots of 1901,
in which about 700 Catholics were killed in retaliation for such
highhanded practices as the destruction of mystic shrines, the Church
disappeared from the country's history books after 1886, and even its
own internal historical records are made up of little more than the
appointments of bishops, the establishment of parishes, and other
routine details of institutional growth. 9
,
Therefore, if the Korean Church can be said to have emerged from
the 'catacombs' in 1886, it did so only to seal itself away again in a
rural "ghetto", apart from the main stream of Korean life, culture and
history. 10
	
Generally the "ghetto" Church is viewed as a beleaguered
and victimised institution, beset on every side by enemies. 11
Hierarchical authority is tightened; 	 specialisation is increased
along lines having to do with offence and defence; emphasis is placed
on training the younger generation for the faith and bringing the
laity under the direct supervision of the clergy. Direct political
involvements are eschewed, and even forbidden, for the laity who
represent the church as worldly missionaries.	 There is, then, a
withdrawal from the political arena, especially at the formal and
governmental levels. 12	In brief, the Catholic ghettos move to a
strategy of influence that combines confessionalism with the
establishment of specialised structures that are to insulate
Catholicism from secular forces.
Similarly, during Japanese colonialism the Catholic Church,
retaining the defensiveness and the reflexes of a persecuted minority,
tried to remain 'neutral'. 13	Thus the important reason why the
Catholic Church took a conciliatory position with regard to the 1936
Japanese shrine worship demand seems to be her 'defensiveness', the
historical legacy of persecution. In this respect, it was the Roman
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Catholic Clerical Association for the Promotion of Social Justice
(Ch ignjugyo chlOneli kuhy gn chgn'guk sajedan, CCKCS) that broke a
complete silence about the Shinta shrine question in the Catholic
circle. 14	With regard to the shrine question, the CCKCS frankly
admitted the Church's defensiveness and the reflexes of a persecuted
minority.
,
2. The Methodist Church
In order fully to understand the conformist position of the
Methodist Church in connection with the ShintU Shrine Issue, we should
inquire about the historical nexus between Japan and the Methodist
Church in Korea. Historically, as is well known, the Methodist Church
in Korea was introduced in 1885 through R.S. Maclay, Superintendent of
the Japan Mission. The appointment of Dr. Maclay of Japan, as the
first superintendent of the Korean Mission, led to friendly relations
with the Japanese. 1
	Methodist missionaries entered with letters of
introduction from Japanese to acquaintances in Korea and at once began
their missionary labour among the Japanese connected with the
legation.	 As a result, the first convert came in 1886 from the
Japanese legation. 2
Through invitation from Baron T.H. Yun, the Southern Methodist
Church entered Korea in 1895. 3
	A member of a political group that
wanted to Westernise, Yun had earlier been driven from his homeland,
and went to Shang-hai.
	 Later he studied at Emory and Vanderbilt
Universities, in the U.S.A.
	 With a more favourable political climate
- a pro-Japanese regime - in Korea, Yun was recalled from his teaching
position in Shang-hai's Anglo-Chinese College to become a cabinet
minister.	 While in that post, he invited the Southern Methodist
Church to enter Korea.
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Moreover, in 1904, Bishop M.C. Harris of the Methodist Church,
North, who had served the Church for many years as a missionary in
Japan, and had been decorated by the government, was elected as the
'missionary Bishop' for Japan and Korea. 4	The episcopal residence,
however, was in Japan. Bishop Harris was the most conspicuous example
of those who were charged with being partisans of Japan. 5	Thus
British Consul-General Bonar thought that he went to an undue
,-
extreme.
6
	Bishop Harris was even believed by some of their
colleagues to be a 'Japanese agent'. He knew the Japanese better than
others. It was natural, therefore, that he should be kindly disposed
towards them.	 Hence, Bishop Harris was, in Koreans' eyes, quite
generally considered an agent of the Japanese government rather than a
Bishop in the Christian church.
	
When an article criticising
missionaries appeared in the Japan Times, Harris as a Methodist bishop
wrote a rebuttal in the 7 May, 1907 issue of the Yomiuri shimbun,
which said in essence:
Our three leading missionaries (Jones, Scranton
and Harris) were threatened with death after we
rejected the Koreans' request for assistance in
their campafgn to oppose the Japanese protectorate
of Korea. Please understand that missionaries are
not the enemy of the Japanese people. Rather, we,
as the most faithful friends of Japan, work in
concert to promote well-being through Christian
reconciliation between the Japanese and Korean
peoples. In my opinion, resident-general Ito's
policies deserve the highest praise. I would like
to confess that I amthestaunchest 7 supporter of the
resident-general's rule of Korea.
It was a fact that Prince Its, the first Resident General of
ChSsen, was on specially good terms with Bishop Harris. 8 Prince It
donated 10,000 yen towards the erection fund of a Methodist Church in
P'yOngyang and also contributed 10,000 yen a year for several years to
the Korean Y.M.C.A. - a Christian organisation that accepted non-
Christians - in Sul, formally organised in 1903, which was controlled
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mainly by the powerful laymen of the Methodist Church, e.g., Yun Ch'i-
ho, Sin Hung-u. 9
Similarly, it is noteworthy that Nakarai Kiyoshi, a Japanese
officer In, Governor-General of ChUsen, attached a writing of Bishop
Northern
Herbert Welsh of the
/
,Methodist Church	 (which was published in
N
The Korean Mission Field, March 1920) to his book, Relations Between
the Government and Christianity in Chosen (1921). Under the heading
of "The Missionaries' Attitude Towards the Government in the Present
Crisis", Bishop Welsh warned against any far-reaching reforms. He was
appointed Bishop of the Northern Methodist Church for Japan and Korea
in 1916.
Given that the 'missionary bishop' elected by the Methodist
Church in America would exercise full episcopal power in his field,
and the missionary bishops were men who in every respect gave the type
of leadership and provided the episcopal supervision of a higher order
in the lands to which they were assigned, 10 it is not a surprising
fact that, after the pro-Japanese bishops (Harris, Welsh), J.S. Ryang,
the first Korean general superintendent of the national Church (1930-
38) initiated the close affiliation with the Japanese Methodist
Church.
-A	 Korean student migration (Baron T.H. Yun
included) to Japan began in 1882. 11	During the restoration of the
conservative Taewongun, many leaders of the radical party, e.g., Kim
Ok-kyun, Pak Yong-hyo and SO Kwang-bgm, went to Japan to study the
progress of the country and became profoundly impressed by it.
12
 The
Protestant missionaries in Japan, especially R.S. Maclay, became
acquainted with the liberal-minded students. 	 These missionaries
befriended the Korean political refugees, who were progressive but
inexperienced patriots. Before coming to Korea in 1884 Maclay had
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formed a friendship with Kim Ok-kyun. Kim Ok-kyun was the leader of
the "Reform Party" and also one of the high officials in the Foreign
Department of the Korean government. Maclay sent a letter written in
Japanese,	 which he had brought with him, to the king through Kim
Ok-kyun. 13	In this letter or petition Maclay requested permission to
open a school and undertake medical work in Korea.	 Thus, in earlier
times there was an affinity between progressive Korean elites and pro-
Japanese Methodist missionaries.
3. The Presbyterian Church
D.N. Clark in Christianity in Modern Korea (1986) concludes that
"much of the early growth of the church (especially the Presbyterian
Church) and the popularity of its institutions should be understood in
the light of the fact that Christianity enabled Korean believers to
feel both patriotic and modern at the same time".
1
	It was a fact
that Christianity gathered strength and support from Koreans who used
church institutions as a place of calm and safety from Japanese
oppression earlier in this century. As was shown before, the church,
particularly the Presbyterian Church, was associated with a new
nationalism. This was unlike the situation in Africa or India, where
the Christian missions were not independent of the colonising power.
During the years of the Japanese regime, thus, the pressure on the
Presbyterian Church was most extreme, more so than on the other
churches. This leads us to examine the early historical experience of
the Presbyterians in connection with missionary policies.
As is well known, among Protestant churches, the Presbyterian
church in the U.S.A. (the "Northern" Presbyterian) sent the first
resident missionary to Korea in 1884. Dr. Horace N. Allen, the first
resident missionary, was at once appointed physician to the American
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Legation and to other diplomatic establishments in SOu1. 3 Originally,
Allen, a medical missionary under the Presbyterian board, was assigned
to China in 1883, and drifted around in Shang-hai and Nan-king until
September of 1884, when he came to Korea to open missionary work.
Some of the prominent men in Shang-hai offered him letters of
recommendation to foreigners who were in governmental and diplomatic
to
service in Korea, and encouraged him to go the newly opened country by
assuring him a rather lucrative service. 4
By saving the life of a wounded prince, during the Kapsin coup of
1884, which temporarily overthrew the conservative government of the
time, Allen won the favour of the court and was made the court
physician. 5	At the request of Dr. Allen, the Korean Government
Hospital (Kwanghye-w6n) was established in 1885 and Allen was placed
in charge of it. In 1887 he resigned his connection with the Mission
Board to become a secretary of the Korean Legation at Washington. In
1889 he became the secretary of the American Legation at S'Oul. He
held the Korean post until 1905. 	 He was thrice decorated by the
Korean king.
The Presbyterians began their work under the wing of the Korean
government. Consequently, their policy was to win the favour of the
state, that obstacles might not be unnecessarily placed in their way.
Once having gained a foothold through the establishment of the
government hospital, they pursued the policy of maintaining the status
quo and of avoiding the opposition of the conservative party. 6
At least six of the members of the Mission were physicians to the
royal family. 7 Moreover, several times Dr. H.H. Underwood was asked
to accept the position of Adviser to the Educational Department, but
he declined. There were also social contacts between the royal family
and the missionary community. During times of political crises the
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counsel and help of the missionaries were often sought by the
Government.	 From the time of the murder of the Queen, in October,
1895, for seven weeks, two of the foreign community were on guard near
the King each night.	 In view of the friendly relations with high
officials, it is not surprising that the old animosity against
Christianity and the anti-foreign feeling disappeared.
The cautious mission board did not increase the staff or
appropriations until after 1890. Presbyterian policy in the earlier
years was, therefore, conservative and cautious.
8
	The Methodists,
however, were more aggressive.
9
	As we have pointed out, the
appointment of Dr. Maclay of Japan, as the first superintendent of the
Korea mission, led to friendly relations with the Japanese. In brief,
the Presbyterians won favour with the conservative Korean government
by acquiescing in its policy. In contrast, the Methodist missionaries
with Japanese connections showed affinity with many leaders of the
radical Korean party.
Also, the affiliation between the Korean court and the early
Presbyterian missionaries can be contrasted with the fact that the
Roman Catholic Church was not as tactful in its relationships with the
Korean court.
10
	The Catholic Church began to build their cathedral
on a site which overlooked one of the royal palaces and the Chong-myo,
the shrine dedicated to the royal ancestors. The refusal to change
the site when requested to do so led to a decree prohibiting
evangelism and religious propaganda in May of 1888.
11
The fact that the Presbyterian Church in Korea was associated
with a new nationalism during the years of the Japanese regime can be
partly attributed to the cordial relationship between the early
Presbyterians and the Korean court in the formative period of the
Church.
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I. Nationalities of Missionaries
1. The Catholic Church
Finally, in nationalities of mission bodies, the Catholic Church
under Japanese rule comprised four nationalities:
	 French, German,
American and Irish. 1
	Through the early 20th century, Catholic
mission work was carried on primarily under the French MEP fathers
(founded 1831), whose missioners managed the Catholic headquarters in
Sul. Their leader, Archbishop Mutel, presided over a vicariate which
covered all of Korea and part of Manchuria.
Another area of Catholic work was created in 1911 when Taegu
became the headquarters of Korea's second vicariate.
	 The Taegu
establishment supervised all Catholic work in the southern provinces
of KyOngsang and Clailla until the 1930s, when the Ch8l1as were
subdivided into separate prefectures.
	
During World War II the
reigning French bishop at Taegu was forced to resign in favour of a
Japanese priest. 2
As the years passed, the work of the MEP became bigger by the
work of an international Catholic missionary force, whose different
orders were assigned to different areas of the peninsula:
	 German
Benedictines in the northeast, American Maryknolls in the northwest
and Irish Columbans in the southwest. 3
 The Benedictines arrived in
1911 and suffered a period of suppression as enemies of the Japanese
during World War I, since they were Germans. After the War, they were
given charge of the northeast (the HamgyOng Provinces), and served
this area between 1921 and 1941.
	 As Japan expanded its Asian
conquests, Japanese authorities in Korea arrested American and Irish
missionaries and placed French missionaries under house arrest. 4
 But
in the Second World War, since Germany and Japan were allies, Father
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(by then Bishop) T. Boniface Sauer and the German Benedictines were
able to maintain their work after nearly all others were expelled. 5
Thus Bishop Sauer, in reply to the Korea Mission Field's inquiry about
'withdrawal', said that "till now we have no trouble in our mission
work" on January 22, 1941. 6
Northwestern Korea became the province for American Catholic work
7
in 1923, with the arrival of the Maryknollem 	 They were assigned to
,
work in the P'yiingan Provinces, sharing the area with the American
Northern Presbyterians.
	 It is to be noted here that, in general,
"American Catholics are Americans first and Catholics second on most
matters of politics and social action". 8
	Condemnation of the heresy
of Americanism (defined as an attitude of mind which is open to the
modification of Catholic teachings in order to win converts) by Pope
Leo XIII in 1899 may have slowed the process of internal change, but
it did not prevent it. 9
	Catholicism in the U.S.A. clearly bears the
imprint of American culture. The American Maryknolls were expelled by
the Japanese during World War II. Thus we can maintain that it was
the intention of Japan to drive out all missionaries, especially
Americans, from Korea, thereby reducing American influence in Korea to
the vanishing point during the war. 10
 The Shint5 shrine worship
controversy which was begun in 1932, we can say, involved the Japanese
Government and American missionaries. 11
The southwestern areas of Korea were assigned to a mission of
Irish Columbans, who arrived in 1933. The Columbans established a new
vicariate in Kwangju, South Ch011a Province. North Ch611a Province
became a separate church prefecture entirely under Korean leadership
in 1937. Some Irish missionaries were arrested by the authorities,
but, as a whole, the Irish Catholic Mission did not withdraw during
the Second World War.
	 In reply to the KMF's inquiry (1941) about
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'withdrawal', Owen MacPolin, Prefect Apostolic of the Irish Columbans,
answered very briefly: "There has been no withdrawal so far and no
withdrawal is imminent nor contemplated. We have no special plans for
1941; we will try to carry on as heretofore as far as circumstances
will permit •.. I anticipate that you will get similar answers from
the other Catholic Missions in Korea". 12
Similarly, in the case of French Catholic Mission (Saul, Taegu),
during World War II no withdrawal of the missionaries of the Mission
was made. 13
	According to Bishop A.J. Larribeau, the only change was
that a Korean, priest or layman, took the place of the foreign
missionary, as president of any group for patriotic activities, as was
natural. 14 The French missionaries, like the other Catholic Missions
in Korea, confirmed their work in peace, as if things were all calm
around them.
By the eve of World War II the Catholic missionary societies
operating in Korea could point to a number of successful institutions
and a substantial number of converts - 1217,643 in 1937. 15	Local
leadership, however, was still quite weak. In D.N. Clark's view, for
a combination of reasons - territorial, organisational, financial and
political - the Korean Catholic Church was heavily dependent on
foreign assistance. 16
It is widely accepted that the Catholic position during World War
II was eased somewhat by the Vatican's recognition of the puppet state
of Manchukuo and the presence of so many German and French
missionaries in Korea. 17	According to mission statistics (December
31, 1939), compiled by E.W. Koons, there were 278 foreign Catholic
•
missionaries:	 American Mission 58; 	 French Mission 132;	 German
Mission 71; and Irish Mission 17. 18
 In this respect a report on Korea
in 1946 is interesting:
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The Roman Catholic Church in southern Korea is
largely under the supervision of missionaries from
France, Ireland and Germany - countries with which
Japan was not at war. I am told that these people
were not under as much suspicion and were not
molested as much during the war as the
Protestants, who were largely the aroducts of
American and British missionary work.
Indeed, it was a fact that the Catholic missionary organisations,
except American missions, had no trouble in their work in the early
1940s, at the time of withdrawal of Protestant missionaries from
Korea.
20
The Roman Catholic missions seemed least affected. The
Department of State, U.S.A., in the autumn of 1940, announced that all
American citizens in the Far East should withdraw to the United
States 
21	
This suggestion came at an opportune time for American
missionaries in Korea, inasmuch as their work was severely hampered by
the attitude of Japanese officialdom in Korea towards continued
missionary work there. 	 When the editor of KMF in 1941 asked
representatives of all missionary organisations concerned to give
. their views of 'withdrawal', the Catholic Missions, unlike most
Protestant Missions, answered that they had no trouble in their
mission work, and no one had the intention of withdrawing. 22
The strategic intention of chauvinistic Japan in forcing
attendance of foreign missionaries who were mostly American at ShintU
shrine ceremonies from 1932 (after the Manchurian Incident) was to
drive them out of Korea before the opening of the war. Other
missionaries, particularly the German Benedictines, were allowed to
work after nearly all the others were expelled, since Japan and
Germany had been allies during World War II.
	 Thus, the nationalities
of missionaries
	 should be considered in explaining the divergent
attitudes on Shint6 shrine attendance between the various Christian
churches. In this respect the majority group of the Roman Catholic
missionaries were, unlike the Protestants (who were mostly Americans),
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from countries with which Japan was not at war - France, Germany and
Ireland. American Catholic missionaries comprised only 20 percent of
foreign Catholic missionaries in Korea at the time of the shrine
worship controversy.
2. The Methodist Church
American missionary agencies did not take positive steps to open a
mission in Korea itself until after the coming of the first Korean
Embassy to the United States (1883-1884). 1
	After 15 years of effort,
in the course of which the United States of America first sought to
achieve its goal in conjunction with France, then used the direct
approach to Korea, followed by appeal to the good offices of Japan and
of China in turn, the United States finally succeeded in establishing
commercial relations with Korea (the Shufeldt treaty, May 22, 1882). 2
Soon after the conclusion of the Shufeldt treaty, the United States
despatched L.H. Foote to represent his country in Sul. One of the
first Protestant missionary societies to begin evangelistic efforts in
Korea was the Foreign Missionary Society of the Methodist Episcopal
Church. 3
 In 1897 the Korea Mission of the Southern Methodist Church
was created.
4
	Thus Methodist missionaries in Korea were all
Americans.
Historically, with the coming of the Russo-Japanese War, the
United States inclined to favour Japanese control of Korea as against
Russian control. 5
	In the years following the annexation of Korea by
Japan the American Government was in no position to take a strong
stand on questions affecting Korea, in view of the fact that the
United States had readily agreed to a formal Japanese protectorate
over Korea in 1905 and had made no serious objections to annexation in
1910. 6
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The rise of Japanese chauvinism in the years following the
Manchurian Incident indirectly affected American interests in Korea,
because of the development of the shrine worship controversy,
beginning in 1932, which involved the Japanese Government and American
missionaries.
The U.S.A. Department of State refused to be drawn into the
controversy of the shrine worship.
	 It took the position that the
Japanese were not violating any treaty, international agreement, or
Japanese law by their requirement of compulsory attendance on the part
of American missionaries at Shint5 shrine ceremonies. 7	The Japanese
maintained that these ceremonies were in the nature of patriotic
celebrations or national rites. According to a report of the U.S.
Department of State, some of the American missionaries accepted this
contention and met the Japanese requirement: others looked upon the
shrine ceremonies as religious worship, hence a matter for their
conscience. 8	In an instruction to the American Consul General at
SOul, dated September 11, 1937, the Department stated that the
solution of the problem was one for the missionaries to work out with
the Japanese Government.
Here we can recall that the Methodist missions, unlike the
Presbyterians, from the beginning, accepted Japanese pressure quietly,
with the edicts of the Japanese government regarding observances
before the Shint6 shrines. The policy of Methodism in Korea did not
provide for separate mission opinion. 9	In general, the American
Methodist missionaries had no conscientious objections to accepting
the statements of the Japanese authorities that the ceremonies were
patriotic and had nothing to do with religion.
In this context it is to be noted that the Foreign Work Committee
of the Board of Missions of the Methodist Episcopal Church (South) on
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3 May, 1937, concluded: 	 "Christians should accept the government's
interpretation that these shrines are not religious, and help to make
that interpretation known and understood in their own circles and
among the people at large" ) 0	This statement reflects the position
of the Department of State (March 9, 1936) - "the Japanese are not
violating any treaty". Therefore, we can say that there is similarity
between the Board of Missions of the Methodist Church and the
Department of State positions in the sense that both accepted the
statement of the Japanese government at its face value.
In the same context, it seems important to examine the reasons
for withdrawal of the Methodist Mission in 1941. As tension between
the United States of America and Japan increased, the Department of
State, in the autumn of 1940, suggested that all American citizens
whose presence in the Far East was not absolutely essential withdraw
to the United States. 11
 On February 20, 1941, the Board of Missions
of the Methodist Church in New York ordered all missionaries'
'immediate withdrawal' on the ground that American citizens were
advised to withdraw from an area by the Consul. 12
	Thus, from this
action, we can infer that the decisions of the U.S. Department of
State with regard to the Far East were very influential with the Board
of Missions of the Methodist Church. The main policy of the United
States of America regarding Korea (1910-1945) was "acceptance of the
status quo".
13
 By the order of the Board of Missions, the Methodist
missionaries withdrew from Korea.	 Before the declaration of war
against America in December 1941, by April 1941, all missionaries
except the northern Presbyterians had accepted withdrawal as the only
course.
14
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3. The Presbyterian Church
At the time of Japanese colonial rule (1910-1945) there were four
separate Presbyterian missions: two from the United States of America
- Southern Presbyterian and Northern Presbyterian - and one each from
Australia and Canada. But the United Church of Canada (the former
Presbyterian Church of Canada), being a union of several denominations
- Methodists, Baptists, and some Presbyterians - since 1925, cLid not
hold to the doctrine and confession of the Presbyterian Church. 1
The majority of the Church in Korea differed greatly from Presbyterian
Church ideas. Regarding the shrine worship demand, the missionaries
of the liberal United Church of Canada were preponderantly in favour
of conformity. 2	The missionaries of Southern and Northern
Presbyterian (America) and the Presbyterian Church of Victoria
(Australia), from the outset, were generally against participation in
the shrine obeisance on religious grounds.
In this context we can note that the Board of Foreign Missions of
the Presbyterian Church, U.S.A., in December 1939, appealed to the .
Department of State, saying that the forced attendance of missionaries
at Shinto shrine ceremonies was embarrassing the mission work of the
churches.
3
	Presbyterian missionaries looked upon the shrine
ceremonies as religious worship, hence a matter for their conscience.
In reply to the appeal of the Presbyterian Church, the Department
suggested that the matter be taken up with the Japanese Ambassador in
Washington. 4
	Standing on the policy of 'acceptance of the status 
quo', the Department refused to be drawn into the shrine worship
controversy.
At the suggestion of withdrawal by A.G. Marsh, the American
Consul in Sul, by Christmas, 1940 more than 90 percent of the
Protestant missionary body had left the country. 5	Thus, American
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influence in Korea was being gradually reduced to vanishing point.
6
It was a fact that Japan intended to drive out all missionaries from
Korea.
7
	It should be noted in this context that "by April 1941, the
Northern Presbyterian Mission remained the lone Protestant Mission
which had not accepted withdrawal as mission policy". 8	The Northern
Presbyterian Mission acknowledged the precautionary cable which had
been sent from the State Department advising withdrawal of women and
children and men with no urgent business. 	 But, nevertheless, the
Mission voted to maintain the maximum continuing group.
9
	Rev. E.H.
Miller reported:
But this large number of missionaries are
remaining and are doing their Christian work.
These missionaries are committed by their own
faith and perseverance to do this. They wait in
patience, believing a better day will come ...
The Board has, by its actions, expressed its
willingnesl o to support these missionaries in such
a program.
On. , October 21, 1940, His Britannic Majesty's Consul
General, G.H. Phipps. announced that "in view of present uncertain
conditions all British subjects should now consider leaving Japanese
or Manchurian territory at an early date".
11
Thus, the Executive Committee of the Australian Presbyterian
Mission in Korea discussed the question of withdrawal in October 1940,
but they decided to take no action as a Mission, leaving it to
individuals to act as they felt the Holy Spirit was guiding them.
12
The Australian Presbyterians reaffirmed that only the personal
conviction of a call to remain in the present crisis should keep
members in the field.
In the case of the Canadian Mission in Korea, the Boards issued
orders that would take all the ladies and some of the men home in
Spring, 1941, and the missionaries decided to withdraw on account of
suggestions from Mission Boards and Consular Officials' precautionary-
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measures.
13
From the foregoing discussion, we can point out that the British
government's order to withdraw was not seriously respected on the part
of the Australian Mission. 	 Here we can recall that the Northern
Presbyterian Mission acknowledged the U.S. government's precaution,
but, nevertheless, the Mission voted to maintain the maximum
continuing group.
	 Thus, with regard to 'withdrawal', the Northern
Mission and Australian Mission reacted similarly.	 It should be
stressed in this context that most of the members of the Non-Shrine
Worship Movement - individual missionaries, Korean Presbyterians -
came from the territories of the Northern Mission and Australian
Mission - the Provinces of P l y gngan south and north, and Kygngsang
south respectively.
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SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
A. The Responses of the Three Christian Churches on the Shinta Shrine
Issue
Historically, while in Japan the introduction of Christianity
(Protestantism) coincided with the rise of aggressive nationalism, in
Korea Christianity (Protestantism) became the vehicle for the
preservation of national hopes in reaction against Japanese
domination. Much of the early growth of the Church and the popularity
Eke
of its institutions should be understood in lightof the fact that
Christianity enabled Korean believers to feel both patriotic and
modern at the same time.
But after the Independence Movement of the Koreans in 1919 had
been dismissed by Wilson and quelled by the bayonets of Japanese
troops, the public, especially conscientious youths, departed from the
church which had taken the lead in the anti-Japan struggles. The
anti-Japan movements organised by workers, farmers and students were
disdained by the missionary controlled churches. 	 In its failure or
refusal to understand such a new social movement, Christianity
gradually moved away from its central role on the historical stage of
society.
From the Manchurian Incident of 1931, when Japanese chauvinism
increased in connection with Japan's military ventures on the Asiatic
mainland, the Japanese authorities increasingly looked to State ShintU
as the main force for intensifying patriotic loyalties. 	 The
establishment of Manchukuo in 1932 after the Manchurian Incident
placed Korea in a new significant place in areas of communication,
economy, and the defence of the Japanese Empire. The loyalty and
devotion of the Korean people to the empire became, from the Japanese
viewpoint, more urgent than ever before. As a means of making Koreans
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loyal subjects, the Japanese administration, which had attempted to
bring about cultural assimilation of Koreans at any cost, urged all
Koreans to participate in Japanese State Shint5 ceremonies.
The Japanese authorities required that all school personnel -
principals, teachers, and students - attend ceremonies at Shint5
shrines. Furthermore, the government exerted pressure upon the Church
both in Japan itself and, more especially, in Korea to conform in the
matter of shrine attendance.	 The Japanese maintained that these
ceremonies were in the nature of patriotic celebrations or national
rites.	 This assimilation policy by the Japanese Empire raised
critical tensions among Koreans, especially Christian converts and
individual missionaries.
In the preceding chapter I have surveyed the attitudes of the
three Christian bodies - the Catholic, the Methodist and the
Presbyterian - towards the Shint5 Shrine Issue in their historical
evolution. The attitudes of the Christian bodies in Korea towards the
shrine problem cannot be fully understood without some knowledge of
the early history of the Japanese government's policy on religious
education and responses on the part of missions since the annexation
(1910).
The so-called 'Educational Crisis', in terms of the question of
the formal teaching of religion, came between the years 1915 and 1925.
The government was against the teaching of the Bible and holding of
' religious exercises in the schools. Therefore, mission and church
schools were offered the choice of giving up all Bible teaching,
chapel services, prayer at school ceremonies, etc., or closing their
doors altogether at the end of 1925. This presented a serious problem
and test of faith both to the missionaries and to the Korean Church.
On this policy of the government the division of opinion was not
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strictly along denominational lines, but in the main the Methodist
missions took the position that existence of the schools and their
efficiency was of greater importance than the retention in the
curriculum of formal religious instruction. Following this policy the
Pai Chai Hak Tang (Paejae haktang), the oldest of the mission schools,
early conformed to the government's policy and became a recognized
Higher Common School. A great deal of feeling was aroused by the
oldest mission school falling in line with such haste, and
denominational divisions were greatly deepened by the action and
policy.
The Presbyterians in many cases went to the other extreme. In
the Southern Presbyterian Mission many schools were closed mainly on
account of the religious exclusion policy rather than take out a
permit under the new regulations.	 In the Northern Presbyterian
Mission a number of the leading educational workers insisted that they
should comply with the new educational ordinance. 	 Eventually,
however, by a large majority the Northern Presbyterian mission decided
that they could not support schools with mission money that could not
teach the Bible.	 From the beginning Presbyterian missionaries at
P'yiingyang, where Christianity was largely concentrated, concluded
that the issue was clearly 'religious', between Christian monotheism
and ShintU polytheism.
Unlike the Protestants, the Catholic Church in Korea, even after
the period of persecution, did not emphasise schools. As a result,
the Catholics, who had not many children to be protected and educated,
had fewer conflicts with the Japanese administration that had
originally wanted to control the schools completely.
In the matter of ShintU shrine attendance, firstly, the Roman
Catholic Church, which readily accepted the Government's order after
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1936, understood the ShintE ceremonies to be 'religious' in earlier
years; Catholics in Korea before 1936 understood the participation in
Shrine ceremonies as 'idolatry'. A Korean Catholic priest declared
that the issue was so fundamental that it allowed no local solution,
but must be settled between TOky5 and the Vatican. Eventually, Rome's
instructions of 1936, which instructed the Catholics to accept the
Japanese government order, solved the 'Shrine Issue' for the Catholics
in the Japanese Empire, which included Korea at that time.
As a matter of fact, however, in most Korean Catholics' eyes, the
Church was seen to 'collaborate' with an unprecedented imposition by
the imperialist Japanese government upon Korean national institutions.
The standing of the Church in Koreans' eyes was seriously affected
when Archbishop Marella, the Papal Ambassador to Japan, went so far as
to recommend Shinn" worship to the Church's Korean members. Their
disappointment with the Church seemed to be ignited earlier by the
very fact that the Roman Catholic Church surprisingly reversed its
position and in 1931 permitted the faithful to practise ancestor
worship, whose prohibition by the Church had been a chief cause of the
bloody persecutions in Korea.
But Korean Catholics who had been indoctrinated to remain
'neutral' by the Church did not protest against Japanese oppression.
It is a fact that the Catholic Church both in Japan and Korea
maintains a perfect silence about the shrine problem.
Secondly, as regards the Shrine Issue, the Methodist Church, in
general, like the Catholic Church, acquiesced in State Shintrl
observance, and so their schools were allowed to remain open. As a
kact
rule, Methodist missionaries, who losttheir control since 1930 when
the new autonomous Korean Methodist Church was organised, kept silent
on the issue of students of Christian schools attending shrine
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ceremonies.	 In general, the missionaries had no conscientious
objections to accepting the statements of the authorities.	 The
mission agreed with the Korean Methodist Church, accepting at face
value the word of the Japanese authorities that the ceremonies were
patriotic and had nothing to do with religion.	 The policy of
Methodism in Korea did not provide for separate mission opinion.
Korean Methodist Christians as a body and, generally, as individuals,
had no objection to conformity.
Finally, as for the Shrine Issue and closing the Christian
schools, the attitude of Presbyterian missionaries, unlike that of the
Methodists, was generally against participation in the shrine
obeisance.
But here we can note that there was a 'strong' minority that
protested vigorously against the position of the majority. 	 In the
Northern Presbyterian Mission some educators were in favour of
conformity in shrine attendance on the part of schools. They accepted
the Government definition of ShintB as 'non-religious'.
In contrast, another minority in the Northern Mission including
Rev. Bruce F. Hunt, who later underwent imprisonment at the hands of
the Japanese, felt so strong a dissatisfaction with the liberal policy
of the home Board over the Shrine Issue and over the issue of
modernism in the Korea Mission that many of them resigned. About 15
resignations from the Korean Mission since 1936 were mainly due to
these reasons.	 The missionaries who resigned were a small but
vociferous faction.
The turning point for the Christian churches, especially the
Presbyterians, was the approval of Shinn shrine worship by the
Presbyterian General Assembly of 1938, P'yOngyang.	 However, the
surrender of the Presbyterians was made by unusual use of police power
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and pressure. With this approval, a serious rift opened between the
Korean Church and the missionaries. 	 The missionaries denounced the
assembly for its action and as legal owners of the mission schools
voted to close the schools rather than to allow their students to
participate in ShintU rituals.
The 'official approval' of the shrine attendance by the largest
and the most powerful Christian denomination in Korea provided an
effective tool to suppress any Christian resistance to participation
in shrine ceremonies. But Presbyterian ministers and laymen met the
issue by opposing the action of the General Assembly (Non-Shrine
Worship Movement or Sinsa pulch l ambae undong).	 The strongest
resistance was shown in the provinces of P'yOngan south and north, and
Ky8ngsang south, and also among the Korean Christians in Manchuria.
As a result, nearly 200 local churches closed their doors, about 2,000
persons were arrested, and among them more than 50 died in prison
because of the Shrine Issue in Korea.
A sect called the Mount Zion movement (Sionsan cheguk) (1944), an
extremely pietistic, Adventist sect drawn from the Presbyterian
Church, put up one of the last, strongest shows of resistance to the
Japanese shrine demand in all Korea. The sect, regarding World War II
as the 'Armageddon', prayed publicly for an Allied victory, burnt
Japanese flags and every Shinn" symbol, closed churches and ex-
communicated members and pastors who had traffic with the Japanese,
gloried in deaths as martyrs, took their sons out of schools rather
than have them receive a 'Babylonian education'.
In brief, historically, as regards the attitude of the Korean
Churches to the ShintU Shrine Issue, unlike the Presbyterians (the
largest Protestant group), the Methodists (the second largest
Protestant group) and the Roman Catholics yielded to Japanese pressure
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easily. Even though the final net result for Korean Christianity
itself was full accommodation to the ShintE political standards, some
extremely conservative Presbyterians and a few other church Christians
- most religious fundamentalists, who held the adventist's view of
Christ's return - attacked modernistic liberals in theology who did
not see great harm in the Shint5 shrine worship, and resisted Japanese
State Shintoism to the bitter end.
B. Comparison of the Catholic, the Methodist and the Presbyterian
Positions
'The dilemma of the churches', in the sense that the struggle
between a religious interest and loyalty and other powerful interests
of men which often contradict the religious teachings, is especially
sharp during war. 1 During a war it is particularly difficult to
maintain the balance between church compromise and the radical
challenge of sects. Generally, as regards the typical responses of
religious groups to this dilemma, there are two fundamental types:
the sect type and the church type. The former, preferring to maintain
its ideal in a small, intimate community, makes a radical challenge
either directly or implicitly to those aspects of society which
contradict its ideal. The latter, however, takes the steps necessary
to maintain the status quo despite its failure to come up to the
religious ideal, and thereby establishes itself alongside the ruling
powers. By this means the church maintains a good deal of influence.
Most of it, however, is not religious influence but simply secular
power clothed in religious garb.
In terms of the present study - Korean Christianity and the
Shint5 Shrine Issue - the major question which we have raised is
concerned with the reasons why some religious groups, such as the
Catholic Church and the Methodist Church, should choose the way of
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compromise and others such as the Presbyterian Church, especially the
individual missionaries, the Non-Shrine Worship Movement, and the Zion
Sect, the way of radical challenge and withdrawal. The difference
between the positions of the three churches - the Catholic, the
Methodist and the Presbyterians - can be attributed to the differences
of (1) theological emphasis; (2) church structure; (3) world view;
(4) mission policy;
	 (5) relationship to nationalism; 	 (6)
relationship to non-Christian religions; 	 (7) early historical
experience, and (8) nationalities of missionaries (Table 7: A
Comparison of the Eight Factors with Regard to the Roman Catholic,
Methodist and Presbyterian Churches).
These several factors are actually intermingled. 	 But if we
consider the sociological consequences of religious experience - the
attitude of the individual towards society in all its forms and the
influence of a religion on social relations and institutions will
depend largely on "the spirit which permeates the doctrines, cult, and
organization of a religious group' ,2
 - then we can, I think, propose
some key factors.
Here it should be emphasised that there was a prominent
denominational difference between the Presbyterian Churches and the
n
Methodist Churches on the Korean scene. So, C.A. Sau er, treasurer of
the Methodist Missions in Korea, observed in 1939:
Wittingly or unwittingly, the mission groups which
established the territorial bounds built up
psychological attitudes in their followers which
made it extremely difficult to join the church of
the other denomination. Differences in church
polity, differences in creed, differences in Bible
interpretation, differences in outlook upon life -
all these made the problem of changing one's
denomination seem lip a matter of giving up one's
religion altogether.
As a result, Christianity in Korea is controversial. Disputes
over theology have led to proliferation of denominations and sects
- 330 -
H g
g
o
4-1
4.4
0
i	 u
co 0 o H	 ›,	 0
u o co IV	 A
.1-1 .1-1	 CO	 r-1 g g	 a)
4.) 4.)	 .,1	 co 0 o	 g 4-1
co co	 .--i	 co	 co	 g 4-1 •-1	 0	 0	 0 ,--1
c0 4-)	 0 1:1	 as	 0 .1-) 4.3	 ca	 .1-4	 0	 CO
1-1 U)	 0	 0 ,0 •ri 0 0	 i-1	 0)	 4-1	 •/-1	 0
 4.3	 (1)	 1.4	 0	 4-1	 1-1
0 I-1	 4.J	 W	 0	 CV 9-1 -1-1	 CU	 a)	 o	 co	 a)
r-I 0 4-1 0	 a)	 U 4.J 4-1 A	 '0 U >
U 4-) r-I	 U	 0 0 co	 SI g	 o	 z -.-i
u 0 o u 0 ic) g 0 0 0 I-1 '0 0
a) n-I	 P.	 ca	 g	 a) 4-1 1-1	 0	 0	 P. al	 0
IC
— 331 —
1.1
0
0 4-1
0 0
0 0 0 >1
Cl)	 9-1 0 IV 4-)0 •-1
t..)
•r-1
ot$	 CD 60 0 0
U
f:/. 0 0
0 O 7:1 .0
U
	
c.)
1.4
0
CU
4.)
Pc4
Co
a)
/4
CU
0
0
Co
Co
4-1
0
tpe
0
CO
4-)
0
a)
$4
0
0
0
0
4-1
0
4-1
4.)
CU
co
a)
0
co
a)
0
CU
P.
4)
4-)
0
0
Co
0
0
Co
co
4-1
O Ca
co 0
O a)
O 0
H 0
CD S-1
4-1 CD
>
a) 0
b0
co
a)
0
14
4-3
0
0
.6)
CU
0
Co
4-)
a)
0
b0
0
4C	 41
0
0
• P
• 0	 a.) CO
-rl ij'd a)
eri 0 0
U *1-1 $4 4-1 CO
O) 4-1 0 0n-1 0
P.	 b0	 4-1 0
Co G) 04.4
• 00czt
co 0 CU CO
	
14 14	 a) 0
>I a)	 a, Co03-1	 CO
H0 1-1 W 0
C0 00 C0 0 c0
• g ca O. co
0 0 P. 0
4-) CO 1-3 0
H a, Co 1,-) 1 •t-1
n--1 1-1 CD	 0.1-)
O 0 4-I 4-1 1-1
0 P. 0
41	 41	 41
$4
Co
W
0	 0CU
	 14
P.	 414I
CU U
In	 a) 4-)(0 1-10
.0 a) -1-1 04.4 n-1 0
4-1 1.4
3 cd '0 0WO
1-10 3 1:4Ca H 0
H
• r-1 0
1-1 0 14
El 4-1 4-1
41
4..)
CO
a)	 a) 1:24
CO	 4	 14 N-I
CV	 4-)	 CL),
1-1	 4J Co
14 --,. t1-1	 0 1-4
Cd Ca 0	 -r10
g U	 0 3
O n-ICDOca 44
..-1 1.4 U 0 C.) 0 a)
co a) 0 cr H a) 0
Co ECU(0	 $4W 0 V4„I 44 4-$ CO 
O 0. 0 0 14 ,Z
0 a) .6) •:4 a) up
HOL)c0	 >
H1.1 04)0 (:)0(11 4-1 Ca Cl) 0 b0 •r-1
*	 91
co
,Co
4..) a)
H 0
14 u)
O 0
O .0 0
CO	 0 4.4H
O CD	 00 0 0
1-1	 i-1	 n-I c0 CD
O a)	 0
I:).	 1-1 1-1 0
I-I 0	 0 0 ci
4 Co	 0	 14-1 U(OH	 4-) 0	 n-1 1-1
O 1-1	 U) 0 4-) al
O (11
	
›) 4-1 4-) CO 0
9-1 0	 4-) r-I	 al 0
4.40	 n-1 ca P.., 9-1 -r-I
Ca 4-1	 r-1 0 4-) CO 4-)
,--1 4-)	 4-1 0 .--1 cl) MI
a) as	 4.) 9-1 it ,-1 g
$.4 g	 (1) 4..) p-, u
o cz 00 0
..--.	 .0 0 1-1 a) 0
in
41	 4C	 41
- 332 -
- and even a few new heterodoxies such as the Unification Church of
the Reverend Moon Sun Myung and the Olive Tree Cult of Elder Pak T'ae-
4
son. Class and regional rivalries have further fragmented the
church, as have political crises under Japanese colonial rule (1910-
1945) and the cold war era. The early missionaries may have been
somewhat responsible. 5 Although they co-operated and tried to create
a unified Korean Presbyterian Church, there are now four major
Presbyterian denominations in Korea. 6	Other Protestant denominations
suffer similar fractious tendencies, but they are not so conspicuous,
since their memberships are not so large.
In this conclusion, I propose three key factors for the
denominational division in the matter of the ShintU shrine question:
theological emphasis, mission policy and church structure.
Firstly, as regards theological emphasis, there seems to be a
positive relationship between liberal theology and conformist attitude
to the Shint5 Shrine worship. 'Theological emphasis', e.g., religious
fundamentalism and religious liberalism etc., was a key factor which
made differences in the attitude to the shrine issue, especially
between the Presbyterians and the Methodists. As regards the attitude
to non-Christian religions, while the fundamentalistic Presbyterians
showed strict exclusivism, the liberal Methodists exhibited sympathy.
It is generally accepted that liberal Protestantism is a
particularly 'precarious' belief system. 	 Unlike conservative
Protestantism which avoids relativism by sticking firmly to certain
historic statements of the faith, essential features of religious
liberalism, e.g., relativistic position, made it especially vulnerable
to assimilation by the secular world.
When applying this to the case of liberal Methodism in Korea, we
can safely say that creeds were not used to police the boundaries of
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the faith, and so the Church compromised with the Shinta Shrine Issue.
I think the open and mediating attitude of Methodists towards non-
Christian religions, which resulted from their liberal theology, was
relatively more amenable to Shrine Shint5 worship than the exclusive
attitude of extremely conservative Presbyterian groups. 	 In this
context it should be pointed out that, as a whole, the educators of
the mission, traditionally more 'liberal' than the ministers,
irrespective of their denomination, were in favour of conformity in
shrine attendance on the part of schools.
Incidentally, in its attitude to non-Christian religions, non-
Christian forms of worship, the Roman Catholic Church, in spite of the
theoretical rigidity of its dogmas, has in practice been more
sympathetic than Protestantism.
But as far as the attitude to non-Christian religions is
concerned, we can say that the early Korean Catholic Church under the
strong influence of combative missionaries still showed 'exclusivism'
during the persecution. During the Japanese colonial era, however,
the Catholic Church, retaining the defensiveness and the reflexes of a
persecuted minority, tried to remain 'neutral'. One of the important
reasons why the Church took a conciliatory position with regard to the
1936 Japanese shrine worship demand seems to be her 'defensiveness',
an historical legacy of persecution. 	 The Church, as a persecuted
minority , took the steps necessary to maintain the status quo.
Secondly, we can note the importance of 'mission policy' as the
other key factor.	 The most significant characteristic of Catholic
mission policy is its world-wide policy of 'accommodation'. 	 The
Church in her endeavour to spread the kingdom of Christ has always
practised 'accommodation' as a most important missionary strategy.
Thus, the Catholic Church, considering the international politics
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because of her very interests of the Church, often produces
ecclesiastical accommodating policies which are carried out on a
'world-wide' scale. In this sense, by 1939, the Church settled one of
the most burning missionary problems in the Far East: the permission
of certain rites and ceremonies that are connected with 'ancestor
worship', the cult of Confucius, and State Shintoism.
In concrete historical terms, in 1936 the Pope gave an emphasis
to the movement of harmonising Oriental traditions with Catholic
culture, including the permission of certain ceremonial usages in
imperial Shintoism hitherto under the Christian ban. By this time the
principle of wider latitude of adaptation had become a settled policy.
Here, however, we should not minimise the influence of Japanese
government pressure on the Roman decisions. As a matter of fact, the
government had suggested establishing diplomatic relations with the
Vatican in 1922, having realised during the First World War that "the
Vatican is an excellent source of information". 	 Given that the
Vatican finally established diplomatic relations with Japan in 1942 on
her own account, we might say that the interests of Catholicism itself
comes before all others, including the rightness or wrongness of
national causes. Who can believe that the decision of the Vatican was
not inspired at all by any political considerations?
By 1942 the Vatican was now in full diplomatic contact with all
the Axis Powers - but not with any of the Allies. There is indeed a
certain affinity of spirit and method between the political
totalitarianisms and the authoritarian types of Christianity, e.g.,
Roman Catholic. In this context, during the war period, 1931-1945,
the position of the Roman Catholic Church was, in Koreans' eyes,
'collaboration'.
The other distinguishable feature of the Catholics' mission
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policy is its lack of emphasis on educational institutions. Unlike
the Protestants, even after the period of persecution, the Catholic
Church in Korea did not emphasise schools; therefore the Catholics had
fewer conflicts with the Japanese administration on the matter of
religious education and shrine worship.
Incidentally, from the beginning, the Presbyterian missions and
the Methodist missions showed a distinguishable difference in their
theological emphasis and, in more general terms, in their ideological
elements. The missionaries of the two denominations, according to the
comity plan between them, had preached a different gospel, and it
eventually resulted in a battle on two fronts - ideological and
strategical - that is, liberals versus fundamentalists, education
versus evangelism for both Methodists and Presbyterians.	 The
strategical emphasis in mission policy has often been a variation of
theological emphasis of a religious institution. 	 More significant
than the variation of outward form of mission such as education,
evangelisation etc., have been the inner differences in the
understanding of the nature of missionary work which have led to the
wide variation in practice in the course of missionary history.
While the Presbyterians in Korea,	 apart from a minority of
liberals, thought that education was to be reserved for Christians,
the Methodists maintained that education was to be supplied without
discrimination to all who were desirous of receiving it. For the
Presbyterians, unlike the Methodists, the aim of education was not
evangelisation but the production of a Christian elite.
The Methodist missionaries' emphasis on institutions, especially
on schools, was mainly the result of their broad and humanistic
understanding of the nature of missionary work.
	
Thus they had
originally emphasised the aim of education as 'evangelisation'. But
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later they gradually came to regard education as the most important
work, irrespective of whether it was religious education or not. And
"conversion", they thought, "is a by-product of education".
The educationists as the majority group of the Methodist missions
did not see great harm in Shint3 shrine worship. They, unlike the
Presbyterians, would not close their schools because education was
everything to them.	 Eventually, the Methodist Missions accepted
quietly Japanese pressure on the matter of shrine observance.
But the mission policy of education on the part of the
Presbyterians was confessedly 'narrow' in the sense that it sought to
serve the Christian community only and to attain a single objective
rather than offer a broader selection. Therefore, they finally
decided to close mission schools rather than conform to the Japanese
government requirements.
Finally, in terms of church structure as a key factor, it should
be pointed out that the Japanese ruling clique adopted a policy to
streamline the church into one unified agency for ease and speed of
control. Christianity in the Japanese Empire was, in fact, treated in
a fairly uniform way elsewhere, from Korea to the islands of the sea.
In general terms, it is a fact that "the Methodist churches have
by
tended to work on a highly centralised system"; therefore,ieswhatever
name a Methodist superintendent be called, he has always had ,
power. Since the Methodist Church is an episcopal form of government,
the control of the Church rests in the hands of the bishop, and it is
clear that the leadership problem would be settled only by the
selection of a bishop.
In this respect we can recall that the autonomous Korean
Methodist Church was established in 1930 under the leadership of pro-
Japanese Koreans.	 Missionaries were squeezed out of positions of
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leadership and control, a movement disguised as the nationalisation of
the church. As a result, in the eyes of the Japanese police, in the
1930's church-state battle - the 'shrine question' - the Methodist
connection, with its episcopal polity, was in the most vulnerable
position. Thus we cannot underestimate the nature of the Methodists'
top-down organisational structure, which enabled the Japanese police
to seize the Methodist Church without difficulty.
All .	 democracy was set aside by the adoption of the new
constitution ("Reform Plan for the Korean Methodist Church") under the
police pressure in March, 1941. 	 The head of the church became a
dictator and the independent Korean Methodist Church went into
eclipse. Methodists were regimented under a Cong-ni-sa or director-
general, selected by the police for a term of four years.	 This
director-general selected all central committees. He could dismiss
pastors, suspend them from appointment, or cancel their ministerial
qualifications at will. The annual conferences were dissolved.
Incidentally, given that the Japanese government, expecting to
control the Catholic Church through the Vatican directly, suggested
establishing diplomatic relations with the Vatican as early as 1922,
and that the Vatican's instruction in 1936 solved the 'shrine issue'
as far as the Roman Catholics in the Japanese Empire were concerned,
we can admit the authoritarian power of the Catholic Church structure.
The Catholic Church is, in fact, one of the few world-wide
hierarchical organisations having effective power. 	 So Max Weber
loA
ranked the Church among the.:'
A
 distinctly developed and quantitatively
large bureaucracies.	 As the visible representative of Christ and
holding his power only from God, the Pope has a power of absolute
jurisdiction in questions of doctrine, of morals, and generally in
whatever touches the lives of the faithful and of the parishes.
- 338 -
Within this Roman Catholic tradition, therefore, most pronouncements
of the Pope and the hierarchy always tended to be understood by the
laity as authoritative statements of interpretations of the divine
truth.
The structure of the Catholic Church is tightly institutional-
ised and even authoritarian. In this respect the Church of Korea was
no exception.	 Within the Church marked by 'collectivism', in the
,
sense that the individual was 	 seen as being subordinate to the
authoritarian organisational structure, the social and organic
communion, and the integrating power of worship, there was a uniform
attitude.
In the Roman Instruction of 1936, attendance at shrine worship
was not an obligation but a permission. However, that the Catholics
in Korea showed a uniform willingness to conform to the instruction
reflects their collectivism. In contrast with Presbyterians, who had
the loosest organisation not so easily controked by the State,
Catholics were able to arrive at a uniform position towards the shrine
problem.
As regards church structure, the Presbyterian synodal type,
generally of Reformed tradition, is characterised by the fact that the
organisation is constituted of a hierarchy of assemblies and councils,
which rests on the base of the parish, the basic cell of the church.
Generally the Presbyterian polity has been called democratic and anti-
episcopalian: democratic in the sense that it rests on the people;
anti-episcopalian in the sense that the presidents of the various
executive councils do not have an intrinsic authority.
Hence, in the case of the Presbyterian church polity in Korea,
the decision of the General Assembly, the highest court, was not
influential as was the case of the Methodist Church. Thus, the local
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presbyteries of the Presbyterian Church, with a looser democratic
organisation, were not so easily controlled by the Japanese police.
C. Some Theoretical Considerations
The problem of 'Church-State Relations' is, no doubt, one of the
controversial themes in the religious history of every country. But
the church-state problem cannot be approached without drawing an
important distinction. There is a difference between the relationship
of religion and the state which prevails in many non-Christian
countries and the pattern which has generally obtained in the West.
In non-Christian countries which have the tradition of the relative
positions	 of	 orthodoxy and	 sectarianism,	 exclusiveness and
conversionism are less widespread than in their Christian
counterparts.
7
	In the Japanese tradition, it is probably fair to
say that apostasy never became an important problem until after the
arrival of Christianity, which rejects, on principle, the possibility
of coexistence with idolatry and superstition.
The church-state problem was particularly controversial in the
religious history of colonial Korea. 	 Her master was an anti-
Christian, non-Western power and her young church was associated with
a new nationalism. All Christian missionaries who were not citizens
of the nation in control, and Korean converts who were subjects of the
Japanese Empire, had to decide on the problem of Emperor Worship. It
is true that the idea of a divine kingship is very common throughout
the world, and the identity of state and religion is not uncommon.
The problem which arose during the war period (1931-1945) in
connection with Emperor Worship or Shrine Shinta (Jinja ShintB) as an
identity of state and religion shows the complexities which
characterise the relations between Church and State or, in a broader
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sense, between religion and government. For the ordeal of the Shinto
shrine controversy in the 1930s, missionaries who had to decide about
their attitudes on international political questions may have been
somewhat responsible.	 As Clark points out, "Some American
missionaries counselled resistance (and thereby got Korean converts
into trouble with the Japanese) and other missionaries tried to be
neutral (and later were accused of advising their Korean converts to
,
collaborate)". 8
A further problem was that the notion of 'religion' meant
different things in Eastern and Western languages.	 Moreover, some
were prepared to condone Shrine worship in terms of 'civic ritual'.
Bocock has distinguished this from religious ritual in terms of
whether or not the charismatic objects related to are connected with
the holy sphere. Such a distinction holds good even when such objects
are set apart from the profane world.
9
Complexities of this nature have made it inevitable that
different churches would respond in different ways. This was true for
the missions; and also the Korean churches were totally unprepared to
cope with the problem. On this matter we can point out two important
reasons:	 (1) the under-development of Protestant theology by Korean
theologians,	 (2) the failure of the establishment of one united
Christian Church in Korea. As far as (1) is concerned, the initial
setting of a low standard of theological education mainly resulted
from the anti-intellectual approach of the American missionaries who
in proselytising the Korean masses hindered the educational level of
Korean church leaders. As for (2), the division of Korea into mission
territories along geographic lines as a direct carry-over from
American denominationalism hampered various continued efforts on the
part of Korean Christians for church union.
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It should be emphasised in this context that in the early years
of the 1930s the conflict between the two streams of theology -
liberals versus fundamentalists - began to come to the surface in
Korea: within the conservative Presbyterian community, the largest
Christian denomination, for the first time by 1934 liberalism's
influence became a problem for the whole church. 10	As some writers
have already commented
11
, the basic conflict at the 1934-1935
Presbyterian Assemblies was 'theological'. 	 Given that after 1938 the
government pressure placed the Korean national church in the spotlight
with the ShintU shrine controversy, we might say that the Church
Struggle was not merely, as many Christian writers assumed, the
struggle between Church and State, but rather between rival
theological parties within the Church: the conservative and liberal
wings.	 Within the Presbyterian circle, which was generally more
active than others in resisting the shrine issue on religious grounds,
disputes over theology/fundamentalism have fragmented the church (See
Ch. V.B.3; Table 6: Presbyterian Denominations in South Korea, 1982).
Behind the 1951 schism, when two Presbyterian denominations of nearly
equal size emerged, lay the old struggle over Shintb" worship.
With regard to the nature and limitations of Korean Christianity
in the midst of explosive growth we can note the fractious tendencies
which were reinforced by the severe trial for the church because of
the Shintri Shrine Issue.	 Additionally, if we consider that the
history of the Church Struggle is a vehicle for proving the validity
of the theological viewpoints 12 , we could not miss the historical
discontinuity in motivation between the Non-Shrine Worship Movement
and the Mount Zion Sect by the fundamentalists and the recent
political struggle for justice by the liberals.	 This historical
disconnection and the fractious tendencies, we can conclude, have
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choked the healthy ecumenical development of Korean Protestantism.
The legacy of the ordeal of the ShintU shrine controversy in the 1930s
stands as an obstacle to the reconciliation between the ultra-
conservative theology and liberal minjung theology. 13
It is therefore demonstrated in this thesis that the particular
form of religious outlook is a relevant factor in its own right, which
is not to be reduced to other variables. 	 It is hoped that the
influence upon theology of other factors, especially historical, has
been adequately demonstrated.	 But each religious organisation in
question stands in the last analysis for a particular view of its own
relationship to the secular world, and this is reflected in the
differences in response to the Shinn' Shrine Issue.
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APPENDIX A
The Imperial Rescript on Edvation
(Kyiiiku Chokugo, 1890)
* (From Ryusaku Tsunoda, et al., editors, Sources of the Japanese 
Tradition, New York, Columbia University Press, 1958, pp. 646-7).
Know ye, Our subjects:
Our Imperial Ancestors have founded Our Empire on a basis
broad and everlasting, and have deeply and firmly implanted
virtue; Our subjects ever united in loyalty and filial
piety have from generation to generation illustrated the
beauty thereof. This is the glory of the fundamental
character of Our Empire, and herein also lies the source of
Our education. Ye, Our subject, be filial to your parents,
affectionate to your brothers and sisters; as husband and
wives be harmonious, as friends true; bear yourselves in
modesty and moderation;	 extend your benevolence to all;
pursue learning and cultivate arts, and thereby develop
intellectual faculties and perfect moral powers;
furthermore, advance public good and promote common
interests; always respect the Constitution and observe the
laws; should emergency arise, offer yourselves courageously
to the State; and thus guard and maintain the prosperity of
Our Imperial Throne coeval with heaven and earth. So shall
ye not only be Our good and faithful subjects, but render
illustrious the best traditions of your forefathers.
The Way here set forth is indeed the teaching bequeathed
by Our Imperial Ancestors, to be observed alike by Their
Descendants and the subjects, infallible for all ages and
true in all places. It is Our wish to lay it to heart in
all reverence, in common with you, Our subjects, that we may
all attain to the same virtue.
October 30, 1890
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APPENDIX B
The Nevius Method (1890)*
* (From C. A. Clark, The Korean Church and the Nevius Methods, Seoul,
1937, P. 4 ff).
1. Personal evangelism and wide itineration by the missionaries.
2. The Bible central in every part of work.
3. Self-propagation: every believer, including converts, a teacher
of someone else, and a learner from someone else better fitted;
every individual and group seeking by the "layering method" to
extend the work.
4. Self-government: every group under its chosen unpaid leaders;
circuits under their own paid helpers, who will later yield to
pastors; circuit meetings training the people for later district,
provincial and national leadership.
5. Self-support: with all chapels provided by the believers; each
group, as soon as founded, beginning to pay towards the circuit
helper's salary; even schools to receive but partial subsidy, and
that only when being founded; no pastors of single churches
provided by foreign funds.
6. Systematic Bible study for every believer under his group leader
and circuit helper; and for every leader and helper in the Bible
classes.
7. Strict discipline enforced by Bible penalties.
8. Co-operation and union with other bodies, or at least territorial
division.
9. Non-interference in lawsuits or any such matters.
10. General helpfulness where possible in the economic life problems
of the people.
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APPENDIX C
Three Negative and Four Positive Principles for the
Training of the Korean Ministry (1896)*
* (From W.D. Reynolds, "The Native Ministry", The Korean Repository 
for May, 1896, pp. 200-1, quoted in L.G. Paik, 1970, pp. 215-6).
Negative
1. Don't let him know for a long time that you have an idea of
training him for the ministry.
2. Don't employ him as a preacher or evangelist on foreign pay if you
can help it.
3. Don't send him to America to be educated, at any rate in the early
stage of mission work.
Positive
1. Seek to fit him to a high plane of spiritual experience. Let him
strive above all else to be a 'Holy Ghost Man'.
2. Ground him thoroughly in the Word and in the cardinal facts and
truths of Christianity.
3. Train the young pastor-to-be to endure hardness as a good soldier
of Jesus Christ.
4. As Korean Christians advance in culture and modern civilisation,
raise the standard of education of the native ministry. Seek to
keep his education sufficiently in advance ' of the average
education of his people to secure respect and prestige but not
enough ahead to excite envy or a feeling of separation.
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APPENDIX D
Educational Ordinance of 19L1
(Chapter 1, General Plan)
* (From H.H. Underwood, Modern Education in Korea, New York,
International Press, 1926, p. 302).
ART. I.	 Education for Koreans in Ch5sen shall be given in
accordance with this ordinance,
ART. II. The essential principle of education in Ch5sen shall
be the making of loyal and good subjects by giving
instruction on the basis of the Imperial Rescript
concerning Education.
ART. III. Education in Ch5sen shall be adapted to the need of
the times and the condition of the people.
ART. IV.	 Education in Ch5sen is roughly classified into three
kinds, i.e., common, industrial and special education.
ART. V. Common education shall aim at imparting common
knowledge and art, special attention being paid to the
engendering of national characteristics and the spread
of the national language.
ART. VI . Industrial education shall aim at imparting knowledge
and art concerning agriculture, commerce, technical
industry and so forth.
ART. VII. Special education shall aim at imparting knowledge and
art of higher branches of science and art.
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APPENDIX E
Revisions in Regulations for Private Schools
(Some Articles of Ordinance No..24 of he
Government-General of ChUsen, 1915).
* (Adapted from H.H. Underwood, Modern Education in Korea, New York,
International Press, 1926, P. 196).
ART. VI .2 The subjects of study and their standard in a
private school other than a Common School, a Higher
Common School, Girls' Higher Common School, an
Industrial School or a Special School, but giving
common, industrial or special education shall be
fixed after the model of the regulations for common
schools, higher common schools, girls' higher common
schools, industrial schools or special schools.
In the case of a school coming under the foregoing
clause it is not allowed to add any subject of study
other than those set forth in the regulations for
common schools, higher common schools, girls' higher
common schools, industrial schools or special
schools.
ART. X.2.
	
Teachers of a private school giving a common,
industrial or special education shall be those well .
versed in the national language (Japanese), and
having scholarly attainments sufficient to teach the
subjects in such a school.
The foregoing provision shall not be applied to
teachers teaching, exclusively, a foreign language,
the Korean language, Chinese literature, or to
teachers of any special art.
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APPENDIX F
Statement made by Bishop Chung Choon Soo, of the Korean
Methodist Church, Keijo, ChEsen. 2.10.40
and adopted by the
General Board of The Korean Methodist Church
It is urgent and proper that our Christians realize the true
spirit of our country and the policy of amalgamation of Japan and
Chrisen ("Naisen Ittai") as the people behind the guns; therefore we,
the General Board of the Korean Methodist Church, hereby take lead in
deciding upon and putting into effect the following:
Reform Plans for the Christian Church
I. Right Guidance of Thoughts
1. To cause to understand the principles of the New Order in East
Asia and the amalgamation of Japan and Chrisen.
2. To make (our people in the Churches) understand that the Christian
idea of brotherhood is realized in the principle of "eight pillars
... under one universe". (N.B. "Hakko Ichiu" or universal family
idea, ascribed to Jimmu Tenn, the founder of the Empire, 2,600
years ago).
3. To make (our people) understand the unity of patriotic loyalty and
the Christian ideal of sacrifice.
4. To forbid the idea of the sovereignty of the people as contrary to
the national policy of the Empire.
5. To oppose individualism that has degenerated into selfishness.
6. To oppose the idea of liberty which has degenerated into a
devouring of the weak by the strong.
7. To extirpate cruel and irreligious communism.
II. Reforming Education
1. National Polity shall be taught in
a. Theological seminary.
b. Colleges and professional schools.
c. Middle and primary schools through the ethics course.
2. Military Training 
a. Military training shall be given in the theological seminary.
b. New emphasis shall be placed upon it as already taught in
colleges and middle schools.
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3. Theological Education
The Gospel (Christ's teachings and example) shall be the
fundamental basis of theological training, separating therefrom
Jewish history and pagan thoughts and usages which have crept in
on the path of Western cultural progress, and giving a clearer
exposition of the Gospel by the traditions and philosophies of
Oriental saints.
III. Social Education
1. Disseminating and Upholding the Imperial Way. This shall be done
by:-	 ,
a. By attendance at shrines.
b. In the Church organs.
c. By printed matter.
d. By lectures.
e. By discussion group meetings.
f. In Bible study classes.
g. In special evangelistic meetings.
h. In personal preaching, etc.
2. Defence against Communism: National Defence
a. By means of the Union of National Spiritual Mobilization
Movement.
b. By patriotic societies in the Churches.
IV. Support of the Army
1. Church members should be encouraged to enlist voluntarily in large
numbers.
2. To make Church members understand the meaning of military duties.
3. Church members should do their utmost to prevent espionage.
V. Unified Control of Organisations
1. The Korean Methodist Church and the Japan Methodist Church shall
bring to reality their union. (See report, Unification Comm.).
2. The Korean Methodist Church and its organisations, men's and
women's work, receiving financial support from abroad, shall
become independent of such support.
3. Churches and institutions shall avoid placing in a position of
leadership or representation, any foreigner.
4. The Methodist Theological Seminary shall be entirely made over.
5. The Central Council which is organised with the Methodist Missions
shall be dissolved, (but a committee of five, of whom one shall be
the Bishop shall be chosen to contact the missionary group).
6. In order to put into effect the above articles an executive
secretariat of appropriate size shall be appointed by the Bishop.
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GLOSSARY OF CHINESE CHARACTER TERMS 
Amaterasu 5Mikami XligjOJO
Amatsukami
An Chung-grin YZEktik
Anesaki Masaharu kenlE700,
An I-suk gZMN
An Ushiku gZTIM
Bakufu gflq
Bushicl5 -gt±1
Chae-Pin
Ch'anessi kaemyOng ( S5shi kaimei ) fOfQ2k.g
Cheju
Cheju Province MANI
Chesa
Chien-tao Mg1
Ch'ing /W
Chinju
Chirei
Ch'oe Che-u EMAD
Ch'oe Han-ho tiNtia
Ch'oe In-gyu tgt=±
Ch'oe	 tffia
Ch011a Province g2gola
ChOndo chiingei charyo WADIN11$4
Ch'Ondogyo 3-alft
ChOng Chae-sik ( Chun g Chai Sik) mum
ChOng CRun-su ( Chun g Choon Soo) V54Ht
ChOnggam nok ON:ig
Chonggyohak yOn' gu 5-Mgan
Ch6ngjong taewang sillok1E5WEIV1
ChOngju 52)ii
Chongmyo 510.4
Ch'ongnisa ISOM
ChOngsin Girls School AtIJOW
Ch'Ongsong ma
ChOng
 Tae-wi ( David Chung , Chung Tae-wi ) f5Jk%
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t1;-
Chiing Un-hun
Ch'onju-gyo chimed kuh yOn chiSn'guk sajedan	 TVAISI
Ch6n SOn g-cliOn ( Chun Sun g Chun )
Cho PyOn g-guk MIN
Ch-cishii
ChTsen
ChUsen san4chi dokuritsu sl5R3 jiken
	
—N&R#LZ{L
Chostin elf
Chu Ki-ch'51 *Afa
Ch'ung -ch'On g Province VIVA
Ch'uw*On
Dai Ni ppon t El*
Deus
Doka HIE
DUshisha University 1.1. Zat4-4-
Edo Period
	 11-=-'11-1.-ft
Ewha omans University paztg-t--xstt
Fujita Tao
Ha Daiusu 
Hakkii ichiu
HamgiOng Province gtfiM
Hamhring gzPi.
Hananim *4\4
Han'guk ch'iinju kyohoe-sa 	 EL%4
Han'guk ch'Onju k yohoe-n wisang 	 XIntr-9-1 fAffl
Han'guk kamni k yohoe-sa V-412.Ege-*
Han'guk kat'ollik taesagn 
Han'guk kidokkyo-sa P:1-4',A7N/A
Han guk kidokk yo-sa	 ' gu	 k	 41
Han'guk kyohoe siin gjang-sa 12[241*AR.
Han'guk minjok kyohoe hyOngsOng-saron 
Han'guk pulgyo-sa yOn'gu VEVAntsJin
Han' g uk	 ch'Onju sinang	1-11AP-IxIturp
Han'guk-rli kidok kyohoe-sa 
togyo sasang •tt
Han' g 1 'F
Han Pu-siin	 &V
Han San g-don g tat,'.131/
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Han SOk-hiii Or131
Hap-Tong
HUM -5PAIII
11in-5y-dna Buddhism '.1"
Ho-Hon ag.
Honda Toshiaki
Hongi
Hong Taek-ki
Hui-yuan
Hwangguk sinmin siSsa
Hwanghae Province Nom
Hwang Sa-icing ( Alexander Hwang ) _CM*
Hwang Yu-ha
Iinuma Jir5 PS113.-EIS
Ilbon chekukchuili-rii Chosn chibae o**131Insi1211-TIE
Ilbon cheguk-si sionsan kyohoe t'ujaeng-sa El**1.;4n Ai -a- am*
Ilbon kidokkyo-sa El*Aza
Ilche-ha Han'guk kyohoe sojongp t a undong
 y'On'gu 
/..h'ggEltaM
Ilche malgi p 'asichtim-kwa Han'guk sahoe 
Inari fM.
Ise Shrine filgVilg
Itz Hirobumi
	 OtAitSC
Jimmu Tenn43 1.11FAI
JingiT 741vg
Jinja via
Jinja mondai to Kirisutok y-5	 a pug Lt-11
Jinja seido chosakai Viti$111f
Jinja Shinn- ;pawl
Kamakura Buddhism	 1-4-41
Kami	 7111
Kamidana VIVA
Kang Chae-On	 71Z
Kang Wi Jo -WIff
KangwOn Province EMI
Ka psin Coup rfrE13ZOR
Kat5 Genchi 1JUUA111
Kazoku kokka *NEM
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Kokumin seishin s5d5in remmei
Kokurei Elf
Kokutai
it a RVIVialb.R122.
Keij5
Ki •
Kidokkyo sasang 
Kidokkyo-sa iOn' gu-hoe AZIATif?itt*
Kidokkyo-wa yOksa- tisik 10.411.21-Mitla
Ki-Jang AR
Kijang-p 'a ERM
Kil S'On-ju
Kim Chae-jun ( Kim Chai Choon ) 	 t'fR
Kim Kwan-sik
	 /11Zl1fi
Kim Nam-sik
	 M#1ft
Kim SOng-gOn ( Kim Sung-Gun)	 t2
Kim Sing-tae
Kim Yang-sOn ( Kim Yang Sun )
Kim Yong-bok ( Kim Yong-Bock )
Kindai Nihon no keisei to Kirisutoky5 Wit El*ONAL U 1-1A
Kindai Nihon no shilk y-5 to seiji g f-t Ef *Ø;,i g Lam
Kirishitan
Kitabatake Chikafusa ILOIN
Kitagawa 101
Kodera
KoguriO
Kojiki t$7.2
Kokka Shint5 4.2 gVIZ
Kokka sOd5in ho cgrgeomm
Kokkateki Shinn" EVAM'1'
Kokka yukitai
Kokugaku La5
Kokutai no hongi _EL% ft: *
Konk5my6ky5	 31613.fraA
Korys6
Kory *O-p 'a AltM
Kosirt.
	 AV!
Kos5
Kowtow alin
- 418 -
Koyake
Kukhak yOn'gu-An	 WifFRIE
Kumiai Church tEtAsae
dh"
Kunitsukami
Kwanghwamun I1L11
KwanghyewOn Mt In
Kwangju 316)+1
Kwansei Gakuin University
KwOn	 417-EPr
KyUdan	 kI1
KyiTiku Chokugo awm7r-P,
KyOnggi Province P;2!il
KyOngju
KyOngsang Province CM 'I
Kyiishrl
Lee Ki-baik
Li n
Mah5yEna Buddhism	 A.13:4-e
Manchukuo
Manchurian Incident MAI* t&
Maruyama Masao Itiltirt
Matsuo
Matsuri 0
Matsuri-goto 0*
Meiji Vilil
Meiji Restoration @JIMMIE
Mikuni Movement g-A	 (	 V ,	 )
Ming
Minjok t'ong il-kwa kidokkyo .X1*--31-mva
Minjung	 (	 )
Min KyCing-bae Mrkgi
Mito School *PIN
Mori K-dichi
Motoor i Nor inaga
Muky5kai Iltka*
Mun SO'n-myOng ( Moon Sun MYung ) 3ZATISI
Murakami Shigeyoshi tt_E29.
Myting-dong PAM
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Nagasaki Alta
Nai-Sei ittai ( Naean ilch'e )
Nakamura Hajime tifITG
Namin
Namsan
Nan-king PIV;
Nanzan Shilky5 Bunko Kenkyrdo TtlIMEOZIL4ffIN
Nichiren BZ
Nihon Kirisuto ky5dan 13*- 9 .X (21E)alll
Nihon Seiknal B*2./4-ft
Nihon shoki B*VE
Nihon teikokushugi-shitano Ch5sen dendo B*VEInTOVillff42
Oda Nobunaga
Onshi
Origuchi Shinobu 4\11f OA
Origuchi Shinobu zenshii
Oyake 11/X
Oyama	 [1.1
Paejae haktang ( Pai Chai Hak Tang ) " 44-114
Paekche
Paek Nak-chun ( L. Geor ge Paik ) iti$7108
Pak Hi-do t1.142
Pak HyOng-nYong
 *FTFAI
Pak KyOng-sik *I.
Pak Sun-gY'Ong ti.ma
Pak T'ae-s/in 4:1•e%
Pak Ton g-g i *I-311E
Pak YOn g-hyo *Fa*
Pak Wing-sin fl'Afil
Pei-ching
Pobon	 *
PohtiOn Mountain itHLL
Pusan
P' yOngan Province
P'yngyang 1/4
PyOn SOn-hwan ( Pyun Sun Hwan )
Rikken Minseit'd
Rikken Sei yUkai Azocisr.
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RisshiT ankoku ron &E
Saisei-itchi oa—y*
SaitO Makoto ?fOrt
Samurai 1-1
Sasangnye 
Sawa Masahico MES
SeikOkai
SeiyUkai
Sekai -MX
Shang-hai
Shang-ti
Shan-tung
ShintO 14Z
Shinto no shukya hattasu shi-teki kenkyri
Shinn" to KirisutokyO VIZ	 -X F k
ShOgun 1111T
Shogunate See Bakufu
ShOwa 177:1f11
ShiikyO seido chosakai '7?cg$11PAZIA*-
Sich'Ongyo f4XIA
Silhak VW-
Silla
Sillok
Sim II-sOp ( Shim II-Su p )	 —V
Singminji sidae	 sahoe-wa chOhang tititattgE2iztir.2.1-11m
Sinhak chinam /111W31%
Sinhak-kwa segye nit-43}-t
Sin Hilng-u I:PPM
Sinmin-hoe 4;61*
Sinsa pulch'ambae undon g ( Jinja fusampai undo ) 7ipalfmtb
Sionsan cheguk Al
Sionsan kyohoe Al -2-.
SO Chae-p'ilSEV
SO ChOng-un ( Suh Jung Woon)	 %EZ
SZlhak
Kwang-bOm
SO Kwang-sOn ( David Kwan g-Sun Suh ) tvett
SO MyOng-wOn ( R. E. Shearer ) tV.1341
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S'Onch'Zin V./11
SOnggyo konggwa 
Sonnz
Son Yang-wOn
Sorae
	 (	 e.J11--AgVfn )
SO Sang-yun	 Iljk
Sul ( Seoul )
Sumiya Mikio .T.,"g•EiEM
Sunch''On mn
Suzuki Masahisa
	 *EX
Suzuki Norihisa At$11X
Taegu
	
z513
TaewsOn-gun t
Taiwan
Takeda Kiyoko
Tama 2
Tan'gun
Tao-an Z'3k-
TennUsei
TennUsel kokka to shilkyZi Xti$11L.7rKa
Tenniisei to ChOsenjin X2$1.1LOILIA
Tenshi
Terauchi	 153
The Chinese God that is the Christian God. ±*RIJXI
The Western God that is the Oriental God. PgM2.XN113442W
T' ien X
T'ien-chu Shih-i 
Todong Presbyterian Church ZARfAft
Tokugawa Ieyasu ItRigkt
Tokugawa Period EMUft
TUky.5 ( Tokyo )
Tomura Masahiro T=1*leff#
Tonga i lbo VMBE
Tongbang hakchi 
Tongbang yobae
Tonghak
T'ong-Hap
T'ongni MIN
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Ton gni p sinmun 035nfilIfl
T'ongnisa H31101
Tongsan Bible School.VIIIIVAM41
Tosa
Toyotomi Hideyoshi
Uchimura KanzU P104E:F.
Uchimura Kanzi3 zenshiT N41-griEF.-t
llemura Masahisa 041EX
Ugii
WOn-hyo 5-GIV8
WOnsan
Yakuin ZensU affiN5rcifti
Yamaji Aizan
Yamato
Yang Is2
Yang Chu-sant ( J. S. Ryang )
Yangban ffilff
Yasukuni Jinja ( Shrine )kill:1;41a
Yen RI
Yi Chin-gu ( Minister )
Yi Chin-gu
Yi Chong-sOng ( Rhee Jong Sun g )
Yi 1k	 .31
Yi Ki-stn	 ra,
Yi Kwang Su
Yi Man-nyOl	 XF!1
Yin M(Yarn)
Yin-Yang DM
Yi Siing-sam,
y i Su-Sing
	 itlE
Yi Sung-hun
Yi Wan-yong	 'PG Ill
Yi YOng-hOn	 Mk
Yonsei University M-EM1&
Yomiuri shimbun	 z
Yu Hong-nyt1
Yun Ch'i-ho ( T. H. Yun ) 9EFItM
Yun Stng-bOm •171riffil
Zen Buddhism	 a
Zhu Xi tE
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